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
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







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MERCHANT'S MAGAZINE

AND



COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

EDITED BY

WILLIAM B. DANA

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FROM JULY TO DECEMBER, INCLUSIVE, 1868.

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VOLUME LIX.

FROM JULY TO DECEMBER, BOTH INCLUSIVE.

EDITED BY WILLIAM B. DANA.

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ERRATA.—In the November number pages 241 to 284 should be 341, &c. In the December number from pages 484 to 448 are dated *January*, 1868, instead of *December*, 1868.

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THE

MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE

AND

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

JULY, 1868.

ON THE TRADE WITH THE COLORED BACES OF APRICA. *

I propose to take a general survey of the commerce between the colored or Ethiopic races of Africa and the civilized world; and then briefly to consider the means by which that commerce, hitherto confined to the coast, can be extended to the interior.

The Ethiopic races inhabit that vast country south of the great desert, which may with tolerable accuracy be defined by a line drawn from the River Senegal to Cape Guardafui as its northern boundary; while its southern limit is the Cape Colony. It thus comprises about forty-five degrees of latitude, and is bounded, east and west, by the Indian and Atlantic Oceans; its area being equal to one-fifth or one-sixth part of the habitable globe.

Apart from any question of inherent inferiority of race, it is obvious that the country occupied by the Ethiopians is not calculated to engender civilization. It lies in too compact a mass, unbroken by bays or inlets; nor do the rivers afford either defensive frontiers or the means of commu-

^{*} Read before the Statistical Society of London by Archibeld Hamilton, Esq.

nication and transport equal to those which divide and traverse the other divisions of the globe. The great desert cuts it of from the ancient civilization of which the Mediterranean was the centre, while the intercourse subsequently established by the Arabs, is limited and impeded by the same cause. The rivers are all subject to a dry season, which renders them during a part of the year unfit for inland navigation; and they are all more or less interrupted by rapids and cataracts; though it is true equal obstacles have not hindered the St. Lawrence from becoming the great means in the settlement of Canada.

There are two circumstances which give reason to hope, not only that our commerce with the races dwelling on the coast will be rapidly enlarged, but also be extended inwards. I mean the almost total stoppage of the Christian or transatlantic slave trade, and the rapid strides which have of late been made in the exploration of the continent.

In 1854 Livingstone penetrated from the Cape Colony to Loanda, and thence he crossed to Quillimane, tracing the course of the Zambesi on his way. Subsequently he explored Lake Nyanza, and it has recently been a public consolation to learn that he is now on his way home, most likely down the Nile, to complete our knowledge of Lake Tanganyika, first discovered by Burton. Barth has supplemented the labors of Denham and Clapperton in Central Africa, between the Niger and Lake Tchad, the most hopeful and important district of all. Speke and Grant advancing, northwards from Zanzibar, have discovered Lake Victoria Nyanza; while Baker, coming in the opposite direction from Egypt, has terminated the long mystery as to the source of the Nile, having beheld it issuing from the great lake Albert Nyanza. Brilliant as have been the results of these explorations, and others of lesser note, the field of adventure is far from exhausted; much remains for discovery before the map of Africa can be filled up, and the future highways of commerce be traced out. Happily, however, the spirit and enterprise of our countrymen are more likely to be stimulated than diminished by the exploits of the celebrated travelers to whom I have alluded.

There is one subject which occupies a large space in every book of African travel—the slave trade. I do not intend to enter into any details of the horrors attending that traffic; but as human beings have for three centuries been one of the chief exports from Africa, this subject is inseparably mixed up with that of legitimate commerce; because of the anarchy which the slave trade everywhere creates, the ceaseless kidnapping—slave hunts—and wars undertaken expressly to obtain captives, to the destruction of settled industry. It is even the principal cause of the difficulties experienced in exploring the country; and has, moreover, brutalised the natives on the coast far below the condition of the people in the interior

Within the last few years success seems at length to have crowned our efforts to suppress the transatlantic slave trade, but the Mahomedan traffic continues unchecked, or nearly so. Owing to their contraband nature, it is impossible to obtain accurate information of either at any period. The matter was carefully investigated by Sir Fowell Buxton, who estimated the number of slaves exported at 170,000 per annum so recently as 1839—40, on data which has never been impugned. To this must be added a loss of life from the slaughter in wars undertaken for the capture of slaves, and subsequent mortality, so that the figures are thus stated by Buxton:

	Delivered.	Loss of Life.	Total.
Transatlantic slave trade	120,000	280,000	400,000
Mahomedan		50.003	100,000
Total	170.000	880.000	500,000

It would appear, however, from more recent information, that the loss of life from the Mahomedan trade is considerably understated by Buxton.

Such was the most moderate estimate that could be formed of the transatlantic slave trade in 1840, and there is reason to believe it was stimulated for several years by the alteration of our sugar duties in 1846. The first effectual blow it received was in 1853 and 1854, when Brazil abolished the trade and importations ceased; so that Cuba thenceforward has continued the only importing country. Since 1864 the slave trade has almost ceased, a stray cargo now and then being all that has reached Cuba. The authorities there have of late been in earnest in preventing importations, and it is gratifying to observe that public feeling in Cuba is becoming adverse to their continuance.

I shall now briefly explain the progress which has been made in substituting legitimate commerce for the slave trade along the west coast; and may remark that this has nowhere been accomplished without compulsion of some kind in the first instance; and there is too much reason to fear that, in case of a renewed demand, the trade would once more break out were our vigilance relaxed. No export of slaves has taken place for many years from our settlements on the west coast, viz., the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Cape Coast Castle; nor from the adjacent territories under the influence of those settlements; nor from the Republic of Liberia, nor the Dutch settlements on the Gold Coast; so that if we except the River Nunez, the coast between the Gambia and Dahomey, say for 1,500 miles, has for many years been free from the slave trade. Relying on this immunity, it was resolved in February, 1864, to withdraw the squadron entirely from this part of the coast; the consequence was, that in Septem-

ber following, a cargo of slaves was shipped from Nunez (situated between the Gambia and Sierra Leone), but with which there has been but little intercourse from either settlement.

It is worthy of note that for many years great pains have been taken by the missionary societies with the education of the liberated Africans at Sierra Leone, and the children born in the colony. During six years ending 1864, between seventy and eighty schools have been maintained at a cost of £5,000 per annum, which have been attended by 57,000 scholars, or an average of 9,500 per annum. An important class of educated blacks has thus grown up, who, together with the Liberian blacks, are actively engaged in trade all down the coast; and ever since the mail steamers were established, in 1852, they have availed themselves freely of the facilities thereby offered, to trade at the various places on the coast at which the steamers call. As many as 150 per month of these native traders pass in the mail steamers between the different stations. Besides Sierra Leone, they are numerous at the Gambia, Cape Coast, Accra and Fernando Po, while they swarm at Lagos. They are everywhere useful as middlemen, and have, in fact, driven all white traders on a small scale out of the field at Sierra Leone; and the more extensive European merchants employ them as agents and clerks in their operations on the neighboring rivers. Of late it has become the ambition of these traders to order goods direct from England, paying for them in produce. I shall presently point out how the educated blacks are capable of playing a most useful part in opening trade with Central Africa.*

Whilst on this subject, I may allude to the progress made by the republic of Liberia, which occupies a coast line of about 600 miles.

The first settlement of emancipated slaves from the United States was in 1820, and in 1847 it was declared a free republic. It now contains about 30,000 civilized inhabitants, about 15,000 of whom, with their descendants, are from America. From 300,000 to 400,000 aborigines reside within the territory of Liberia, and are brought more or less directly under the influence of her institutions. There are about fifty churches in the republic, representing five different denominations. The educated blacks in Liberia and Sierra Leone, are intensely religious, and the various sects, Episcopalians, Wesleyans, Baptists, Independents, &c., are represented among them just as in England and the United States. Differing from Sierra Leone, Liberia has been governed since 1847 by blacks alone. Their constitution resembles that of the United States, and if their proceedings are at times calculated to raise a smile as a parody upon their

^{*} Already, as often as the educated native traders have had opportunities, they have shown great eagerness to carry small adventures up the Niger, and have even endeavored to form among themselves a company, with a capital of £25,000, for steam navigation in that river.

model, it is impossible to deny the good sense, frugality and success which have attended them so far. In 1861 the revenue was \$149,550, against an expenditure of \$142,831. The presidential message for 1866 alludes, with just pride, to the foundation of the Liberian college, and lays down a plan for national education. There can be no doubt that this well ordered and well governed community will play a great part in the civilization of Africa. The present state of matters in America will lead to a considerable accession of strength, 600 emigrants having been despatched in the course of 1866, and 942 in 1867. The American Colonization Society, which founded the settlement in 1820, now regularly employ a vessel in the conveyance of emigrants. The settlers have already been able to repel all attacks from the natives, and, as they gain strength, will become aggressive and extend their influence inwards.

For the year 1864 the imports amounted to \$162,930, the exports to \$172,608.

I come next to the British settlement of Lagos, which was for many years the head-quarters of the slave trade in the Bight of Benin. Situated at the entrance to an extensive lagoon, affording boat navigation eastward as far as the River Benin, and westward to the notorious kingdom of Dahomey, it possessed unequalled facilities for the slave trade, enabling the slavers to dodge our cruisers. In 1851 a treaty was forced on the chiefs and king, and a consulate was established, which continued until 1861; but those measures being inadequate, we took possession of the island of Lagos and of one or two points on the adjacent coast, which, with a couple of gunboats on the lagoons, has answered our purpose effectually.

A considerable trade in palm oil had grown up under the treaty o 1851. Since we took possession the trade has been seriously interrupted by a war between Abeokuto and Ibadan, caused by the latter desiring a direct road to the white man at Lagos, and so avoid paying toll to the Abeokutans. The ground lost will soon however be recovered, and Lagos is rapidly becoming the seat of a flourishing trade.

Stopping the slave trade at Lagos had the effect of directing the current thence to Whydah, a port in Dahomey; but of late, owing to the cessation of the traffic, the king of that country has turned his attention to legitimate commerce. Some small trade had indeed been carried on chiefly by the French, concurrently with the slave traffic; and in 1864 a Liverpool company opened trade at Whydah, the king granting them his baracoon, or slave depot, as a store for goods. Two other English houses have sent agents there, and a healthy trade is rapidly in course of development. I may mention, however, that so recently as May or June, 1867, the king tendered slaves in payment of a debt which he had con-

tracted. I am unable to give the particulars of this trade, which as yet is in its infancy.

I come next to the rivers, Benin, Brass, and Bonny (mouths of the Niger), also Old and New Calabar and Cameroons, generally classed together as "oil rivers." These were at one time the noted haunts of slavers. In the years 1838 to 1840, treaties were forced upon the native kings and chiefs, by which they engaged to discontinue the slave trade. Courts of equity were afterwards established for the regulation of legitimate commerce, consisting of the captains, supercargoes, and agents of English houses, together with the kings and chiefs of the place. They take cognizance of all disputes between the English and the natives. consul visits the river at intervals, and the system has been found to work successfully, with only an occasional resort to the squadron; in fact, the mere presence of a man-of-war has of late sufficed to restore order. I am enabled to show, from private statistics, the progress of the trade between the oil rivers and Liverpool. The average during the first fourteen years was 17,932 tons; and during the last fourteen years 24,734 tons; but during the first fourteen years the trade was chiefly with Liverpool; Bristol participated, and of late years the Clyde has also shared. It will be observed that there are great fluctations in the imports, which have been influenced by the prices at home, leading occasionally to suspension of trade when the natives were unwilling to submit to reduced prices; likewise to bad seasons.

The next point on the coast where there is a considerable trade is the Gaboon river, which is under the control of the French Government, and has hitherto been thrown open to all nations. There are five English, two or three French, one German, and two Dutch houses engaged in the trade. The police regulations are good, and traders well protected: until recently the expense was borne by the Imperial Government, but within the last twelve months they have enforced a charge for a trading licence, and it is expected will levy a duty of 4 per cent on imports and exports so as to assist in defraying the expenses of government. our colonies a revenue is collected by similar import duties. I have been unable to obtain returns of the imports and exports, but these will enter into the general tables of trade with the west coast.

Further south we come to the River Congo, notorious as the last seat Within the last five or six years, of the slave trade on the west coast. as many as twenty-three slavers have been counted at Ponta de Lena at one time. Legitimate trade made no progress, until at last an effectual check was given to the slave traffic by the adoption of a very obvious course—our Government entered into a contract to coal the preventive cruisers on the spot, instead of resorting to Fernando Po or Ascension for a supply, leaving the coast and rivers for the time unguarded.

To prove how effective has been the blockade since this arrangement was adopted, I may state that within the last twelve months 700 slaves were sent down for shipment, and two slavers appeared on the coast to embark them—one was captured and the other left the coast in despair. When my informant left the Congo, the slaves were still on hand, and have doubtless either been set free or put to some useful occupation ere this. Cut off from the slave-trade, the natives are now eagerly engaged in raising produce, while the Portuguese slave dealers are rendering good service as middlemen in the up-country trade. One Dutch, one American, three French, and three British houses have established themselves in the Congo, with branches along the neighboring coast as far as the Portuguese settlements at Angola, and an active trade is now carried on in palm oil and kernels, ivory, coffee, india rubber, copper oar, gum copal, and ground nuts. The trade has probably increased tenfold within six years, and the exports for 1867 have been estimated at 250,000%.

Besides the points on the west coast to which I have alluded, there is an active trade carried on by the French at their settlements at Senegal and Goree, as well as elsewhere; by the Dutch at their settlements on the Gold Coast; as also by the Hanse Towns and Americans at various points; while the Portuguese settlements of Angola and Benguela are little developed, though there are valuable copper mines within their ter ritory.

As regards the goods shipped to the west coast, I may state that the demand has for the last ten years or so, been constantly for an improved quality. The consumption of British manufactures seems limited only by the possibility of supplying produce or value in exchange; thus at the time when returns were unhappily obtained chiefly in slaves, the exports from the United Kingdom were in—

1805		£1,150,000
1806		1,650,000
	(slave trade abolished)	

This was the lowest point to which they dwindled. About 1830 the palm oil trade became important, so that the exports of British manufactures rose in—

18'0 to£250,000	1850 640,000
1875 800,000	1855 1,100,000
1840 4-0,000	1860
1845 580,000	1865

As it has been often stated that considerable supplies of cotton may be

derived from Central and Western Africa, I subjoin the qualities imported, viz.:—

	Cwts.	1	Owts.
1856	808	1862	8,488
1857	. 1,026	1863#	_
1858	. 2.116	1864*	_
1859	. 1.816	1865	7.126
		1866	
1861			••

It is true the cotton plant is indigenous, and the soil and climate over an enormous district are capable of supplying more than we even now consume; still the needful European superintendence for a large production cannot be supplied. The means of transport for so bulky an article do not exist; neither could the capital required for implements, gins, presses, etc., be prudently invested unless under British rule; so that many years must elapse, in my opinion, and many changes must occur, before we can look for any quantity of African cotton, such as would be sensibly felt in our markets.

As regards the trade with the natives bordering on the Cape and Natal colonies, as well as the Dutch republics beyond the frontiers, it is impossible to arrive at exact data. Speaking generally, we may assume that the greater part of the ivory and ostrich feathers from the colonies is obtained from the natives, or through their agency and assistance, as well as a quantity of hides and skins. Commerce is gradually extending northwards; for example, it is not many years since Livingstone discovered Lake Ngami, and now it is within the ordinary range of the traders in quest of ivory and ostrich feathers. The Caffres and Fingoes settled within the colony are making marked progress; they now participate in the carrying trade of the colony, conveying merchandise in well appointed wagons from the coast to the up-country, and bringing down the returns of produce. Their consumption of European goods is increasing, and they now require these to be of better quality; a remark which applies likewise to the natives beyond the limits of the colony.

As a rough guess merely, I am inclined to set down the trade between the colonists and the natives beyond the borders, as follows:

Ivory, one-half exports from Cape and Natal	£20,000
Hides	10 000 100,000
Total	177,500

The eastern coast of Africa, northward of the colony of Natal, was the

^{*} Importations ceased, owing to Absolutan war above menti.ned.

seat of a flourishing commerce of great antiquity, carried on by the Arabs, who occupied the coast nine hundred years ago, and founded numerous cities as far south as Sofala; some of which remain to this day, while the ruins of others have lately been discovered. They traded to India, Persia, Arabia and Egypt. It was at Malinda that Vasco de Gama, in the year 1498, procured a pilot to conduct him to India.

The Portuguese speedily possessed themselves of the principal positions on the coast for a range of about 2,400 mile. Their power did not, however, extend far inland, though they made efforts to advance into the country, chiefly with a view to reach the gold mines, the produce of which was brought down the Zambesi to Sofala (supposed by some to have been the Ophir of the Bible). But instead of the abundance they expected, they found the gold, as in other parts of Africa, had to be laboriously washed from the extraneous substances in which it is deposited.

As the power of the Portuguese nation declined, the Arabs re-established their independence over a portion of their former possessions, so that the coast from Delagoa Bay to Cape Delgado, 1,300 miles, is all that remains to the Portuguese, while the coast from Delgado to Magadoxo is claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, a range of 1,100 miles. Though, in fact, the sovereignity thus claimed by the Portuguese and Arabs is merely nominal, except here and there where forts are maintained. The natives beyond the range of these forts pay no taxes, and are in fact a source of terror to the Portuguese who subsidize them at times, and have difficulty in holding their ground; indeed, Mr. Young has just brought word that they have been driven out of Senna and all places south of the Zambesi by the Zulus.

The blight of slavery had fallen upon their settlements, and of the prosperity for which they were at one time famous, scarce a shadow remains. The trade consists in gold, ivory and slaves. The slave trade, though contrary to Portuguese law, has unceasingly been carried on with the knowledge and connivance of the officials; happily it has been curtailed by the stoppage of the trans-Atlantic traffic; but the Portuguese still supply the Arabs with slaves for the eastern markets. The only healthy symptom is a trade which seems likely to spring up between our colony of Natal and the Portuguese settlements at Delagoa Bay, Quilimane and Mozambique. It is to be regretted the soverignty over 1,300 miles of coast should be in the hands of a jealous and indolent people like the Portuguese, who by their commercial restrictions have, in fact, left their own subjects and the native chiefs little else to engage in but the slave trade, while they play this dog-in-the manger policy on the coast of a fertile country, possessed of fine harbors and rivers more or less navigable. Zambesi, the chief river of all, Livingstone has proved to be navigable for

700 or 800 miles inland, interrupted, it is true, by cataracts, but still offering facilities for commerce; while its tributary, the Shire, gives access from the sea to the great lake Nyassa, with the exception of about 35 miles of rapids not navigable, as has been recently proved by Mr. Young of the Livingstone search expedition.

In the returns of trade between Portugal and her African settlements, no distinction is made between those on the west and east coasts; indeed they are kept so imperfectly that I am compelled to estimate them as follows, viz.:

Imports to Africa	£300,000
Exports from Africa	409,000

In marked contrast with the Portuguese, the Sultan of Zanzibar encourages European commerce, both on the island so named and on the coast over which he claims sovereignity, though his influence does not extend over the heathen tribes beyond the range of his forts. The rapid development of the Zanzibar trade is a striking proof of the resources of Eastern Africa, and confirms the accounts which have reached us of its ancient prosperity. The island is 48 miles long by 15 to 30 broad. In 1861 it contained about 250,000 inhabitants, and is supposed in the three following years, to have increased to 300,000, consisting of Arabs, half castes, and settlers from India, together with negro slaves from the mainland; the latter carry on the cultivation, while all trade is in the hands of the Hindoos. In 1834 the trade of Zanzibar was reported to consist of a few imports from Arabia, and exports of gum and ivory to Bombay. In the year ending April, 1866, it was visited by sixty-six square rigged vessels of all flags, amounting to 21,000 tons, besides of Indian, Persian, and Arab craft 8,000 tons; and, taking an average of five years ending 1865 the

Imports were	£349,562
Exports were	

Of these the largest proportion is with British India; the Germans and Americans comes next; the British trade is, however, on the increase.

These results will show what might be done on the coast with settled government; but the Island of Zanzibar is an Arab settlement, and I have to do only with that portion of the trade which is derived from the Ethiopic races on the mainland. It is the chief mart for ivory, and Baker mentions that when he reached the neighborhood of the Nyanza Lakes, he found the natives wearing cloth, and possessed of other goods which had been passed along from Zanzibar. From the last consular report, I find the imports from the mainland to have been, on an average of five years, equal to £225,000, exclusive of slaves.

A considerable trade has been carried on between Zanzibar and Lagos in cowries, of which there is here a fishery.

The Zanzibar dominions are the only part of Africa where the slave trade is legal. There are recognised importations into the Island during a certain portion of the year, under a system of passes; during the last five years the average number entered at the customs has been 14,000 per annum, on which a duty of \$2 per head is levied. Adults are worth £2 to £7, boys and girls 25s. to 50s. The slaves in Zanzibar are well treated, but, contrary to experience in America, they do not increase. Rigby states that only 5 out of every 100 female slaves bear children; this he ascribes not to disparity of the sexes, but to their unwillingness to rear children, which will be sold as soon as they grow into sufficient value. It is uncertain how many of the slaves annually imported are exported from the island to the eastern markets, but it is thought not less than 6,000. The regulations alluded to are indeed but a mere cloak for a traffic carried on by the Arabs from places on the coast as far south as Mozambique, to ports in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. These, jointly with what are brought from the White Nile country and across the Great Desert from Central Africa, furnish slaves for Arabia, Syria, and Asia Minor, as far as Constantinople; while those carried to the Persian Gulf supply Mesopotamia, Persia, and the countries eastward as far as the Indus. The unhappy negroes are to be found sprinkled over the country, from the confines of Russia to Cashmere, and from the Indus to the Mediterranean.

The great difficulty we have experienced in our efforts to put down the Mahomedan slave trade is due to its sanction by their religion. has existed among eastern races from the remotest ages, and is in some respects necessary to their society as constituted. They do not, therefore understand our views; hence the chiefs and rulers, even though willing, might be unable to suppress it; but in fact they not unfrequently derive much profit from the traffic. We have hitherto been restrained from putting it down with a high hand, because our policy in the East is considered involved, lest we should excite the hostility of the countries concerned. But our proceedings on the east coast, as yet, are calculated to irritate, rather than seriously interrupt the traffic. It has been suggested that the coast should be scoured by steam gunboats, capable of following the dhows into shoal water, which would be less expensive than the cruisers at present on the station; while some of these latter could be employed with advantage on the Red Sea, so as to intercept the traffic brought from the White Nile as it crosses to Arabia. The Egyptian Government has been induced to place a steamer on the White Nile to check the evil; and I trust before we have done with Abysinia that something may be arranged to hinder the transit through that country.

I come now to the caravan trade by camels from Morocco and Tripoli, across the desert, which the Arabs and Moors carry on with Central Africa, We know but little of that between Morocco and Timbuctoo, except that the returns are chiefly in slaves. From Tripoli the caravans pass by way of Mourzuk to Bornou and Soudan-Kuka and Kano being the chief centres from whence branch caravans pass to other places. indebted to Denham and Clapperton, Richardson and Barth, for our knowledge of this commerce; and fuller details are expected in a work by Dr. Rohlf, now in the press in Germany. The cost of transport is about £30 per ton, independently of duties and exactions on every pretext, except where the caravan is strong enough to bear down opposition; it takes four months to cross the desert, so that the cost of goods at Tripoli is quadrupled by the time they reach Kuka and Kano. The returns are therefore chiefly in slaves, with the addition of a small amount in valuables, such as gold, ivory, ostrich skins, and a little antimony. Ordinary articles of produce would not bear the cost of transport.

The return caravans frequently include over 5,000 slaves; large numbers of whom die of hunger, thirst and fever on the way—the route being actually marked by the whitening bones of the wretched beings who have sunk under the fatigues of the journey. A whole caravan has been known to perish for want of water.

At Mourzuk the slaves are sold, at from £20 to £25 per head, and from thence smuggled into Tripoli, Egypt and the East. It is in vain that we have treaties with the Turkish and Egyptian Governments—the officials connive at the traffic; we have no means of enforcing the treaties in the case of this inland slave trade, such as we have at sea; but it happens we have a more effectual means of extinguishing it by the readier access to Central Africa afforded by the River Niger, so that we can undersell by that channel those engaged in the caravan trade, and bring down returns in produce such as can be raised in abundance. As an example of how this will work, I may mention that a gentleman having ascended the Niger in a steamer direct from England, to a point within a few days journey of Bedá, saw a caravan arrive there with European goods from Tripoli, part of the goods being loaf sugar made at Whitechapel! There can, in fact, be no doubt that so soon as the Niger trade has been developed, the caravan trade from Tripoli and Morocco will be extinguished, and with it will end the necessity of carrying back returns in the shape of human beings.

Having thus made the circuit of Ethiopis, I summarise its commerce with the civilized world in a table which will be found on the following page.

Summary of the Trade with the Colored Races of Africa, including Bullion and Specie,

(Sums	in	this	table	given	in	round	numbers.)
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	Imports into Africa. fr	Memoranda					
United Kingdom	£1,878,000	£1,957,000	Average o	of 8 year	rs ende	d 1866	
France	767,000	1,063,000	٠	4	"	184	
Belgium	8,000	25,000	"	8	64	'68	
Spain	4,000	2,000	"	4	**	'68	
Portugal	\$00,000	409,000	**	2	**	'61	•
Holland		98,(00	44	8	44	168	
Germany		79,000	44	8	44	'64	
Uni ed States	879.000	486,000	Year 1961	•		V.	
Brazil.	56 0(4)	80,000	Average		re ende	1984	
East Indies	156,000	237,000			-,,	'65	
Cape of Good Hope and Natal.	180,000°	180,000*	Estimate	•			
Egypt.	50,000*	75,000	Ivory to	United	King	dom and	Ĺ
Barbary States	150,000*	71,000	Average	of 2 yes	irs end	ed 1864	
Miscellaneous (say)	8,580,000 100,000*	4,687,000 100,000*					
	8,680,000	4,787,000					

It is to be observed, that with the exception of ivory and gold, no legitimate commerce has yet been established with Central Africa. Europeans have in fact as yet traded with the natives dwelling on the mere outskirts of this vast territory, and though the trade on the west coast has reached respectable dimensions, it is still capable of being largely increased; and, as I have shown, is rapidly increasing. That of the east coast is well night neglected.

The Arabs are the only people who have established a regular communication with Central Africa; by introducing the camel from Arabia, they were enabled to open paths through the desert, which had previously By successive migrations they became in time the defied all efforts. ruling power, introducing the Mahomedan religion and Arab civilization, the traces of which latter can be discovered to this day. They founded kingdoms, ample accounts of which have been transmitted to us by the Arab writers of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries; while modern travellers have ascertained that these countries in Central Africa are now inhabited by a variety of races, some of them red or chocolate color, and differing in shades of black. The black tribes again range from those with high features, approaching the Caucasian, to the common negro. Of all these races the Felatahs are the most warlike, and they are supposed to have emerged from the condition of a mere pastoral tribe, and to have founded their powerful empire of Sokatu, within a century from this time. They are still encroaching on their neighbors.

With the exception of some few nomadic tribes, the people for security live chiefly in large towns fortified by mud walls, sufficiently strong to

^{*} Items which have been estimated.

resist ordinary attacks, and round these towns cluster agricultural villages. The space within the walls is usually extensive, the houses are interspersed with cultivated fields, and this renders it difficult to estimate the population with accuracy; but it is certain that many of the towns contain as many as 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants, though some travelers rate them as high as 100,000.

In all the towns, markets are held every two or three days; large numbers from the neighbouring villages attend them; and although their dealings would appear to us trifling, still there is everywhere shown a strong love of trade.

Cotton and indigo are cultivated, and in many towns there is a considerable manufacture of cotton cloth, noted for its excellent quality and the durability of its dye, which latter equals, if it does not excel, in quality anything done in Manchester. Besides cloth, there are manufactures of leather, as saddlery, bags cushions, &c. The art of smelting is understood, and in some places gold chains and ornaments are manufactured with creditable taste and skill. The trade of the blacksmith is everywhere plied. At the Exhibition of 1851, the late Mr. Robert Jamieson exhibited some specimens of native copper ware, tinned inside, rudely done no doubt, but proving they possess that as well as several other useful arts.

Salt is a prime article of commerce; it is brought by caravan from certain points in the great desert, and likewise from the coast.

Some of the canoes on the Niger, approaching the sea, are large enough to convey upwards of one hundred people; and Park saw one as high up the river as Sego, carry four horses and six or eight men.

The medium of exchange differs in various places. In Kano it is cowries; in Bornou, cloth; in Loggun iron, where indeed, in Denham's time, a kind of iron coinage was in use, and Baikie saw the same thing in 1854, when he ascended the Tchadda. In general, in all important transactions, the value is expressed in the price of a slave.

The religion of the dominant races is Mahomedan. The only written character is the Arabic, and the Koran is, of course, read in all mosques—though sometimes the reader does not understand a word, and the hearers very seldom, if ever.

Disputes are adjusted by palaver, when professed advocates, who can expound the Koran, conduct the cause of the litigants, often with much ingenuity. These palavers are, indeed, everywhere a marked feature of the native races, as they are, one and all, noted for loquacity.

The proportion of slaves to free population differs in various countries. At Kano, Clapperton says the free population was in the proportion of one to thirty slaves; other travelers estimate in other places the proportion of

slaves to vary from two-thirds to four-fifths. There is, however, a wide difference between the domestic, or born slaves, who form the buik, and slaves who have been purchased or captured. The domestic slaves have certain well established rights, only give up a portion of their time to their masters, and cannot be sold out of their districts except for crime, adjudged in due form by palaver. In short, it is rather a mild form of serfdom than slavery.

All these facts bespeak a certain security of property and industry protected, as well as the elements of civilization. There are, however, no traces of antiquity—no works of art—and it is wonderful that so much of the Arab civilization should have survived, amid the constant slave hunts and wars which for three centuries have prevailed to supply the demand for slaves for America. That demand has only now ceased, so that slaves are no longer sent down from these countries to the coast, and they are, therefore, ripe for legitimate commerce. To this rich and populous region there is ready access by the River Niger, next in size to the Nile, but destined to play a still more important part in the civilization of Africa, affording as it does, together with its equally important branch, the Tchadda, a noble highway to the very heart of the continent.

The history, too, of the Niger is not a little strange. The sources of other great rivers have frequently been the object of curiosity, but the Niger alone has been distinguished by the interest attaching to its junction with the sea. Its existence was successfully known to the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans and Arabs, the latter, indeed, having settled on its banks at Timbuctoo. An enormous body of water was known to flow eastward towards the great desert; it was supposed to be lost in the sands of Sahara, or to be a branch of the Nile; and other theories innumerable were from time to time put forth, until 1830, when the problem was solved by Richard Lander, who, extending the previous achievements of Park, followed its lower course to the sea, and laid open the long-coveted channel for commerce with Central Africa.

The first attempt to render Lander's discovery available, was by a company formed in Liverpool, which sent out an expedition consisting of two steamers, accompanied by the late Mr. Macgregor Laird, who published an interesting account of its proceedings and misfortunes. Having entered the river too late in the season, the steamers grounded at the confluence of the River Tchadda. Out of 48 men 9 only survived, and the capital of the company was lost.

Mr. Robert Jamieson, a merchant of Glasgow, next fitted out a steamer in 1839. His operations were commercially unfavorable; but they added greatly to our knowledge of the Niger and its delta, besides exploring the Rivers Benin and Old Calabar. The loss of life, though great, was not so deplorable as on the previous attempt.

In 1841 followed the well known Government expedition, which cost the country upwards of £200,000, and accomplished absolutely nothing. The failure of the expedition was foreseen by Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Laird, while the late Mr. Thomas Stirling wrote to Lord John Russell predicting, with marvelous accuracy, the misfortunes which ensued. Though the sickness was general, the loss of life did not exceed 53 out of a complement of 303.

In marked contrast with this deplorable failure was the expedition fitted out by Macgreggor Laird in 1854, at his own risk, but partly assisted by Government. Under charge of Dr. Baikie, the steamer ascended the Tchadda 300 miles beyond the point previously reached, and returned to Fernando Po after having been in the river 118 days, without the loss of a man. This gratifying fact, so different from all previous experience, was due to better sanitary arrangements, and the use of quinine as a preventive; also to the plan of manning the ship with blacks, and sending the smallest possible complement of Europeans to officer the ship and work the engines. By the observance of these rules, the frightful mortality has been obviated, which previously was the sure attendant of a river expedition.

Notwithstanding that this expedition was merely one of exploration, the produce picked up in exchange for outward cargo realized £2,000.

Encouraged by these results, Mr. Laird entered into a contract with Her Majesty's Government, binding himself for a small subsidy to maintain steam communication on the river and its tributaries, and to carry goods and passengers for all who might offer. He further embarked a considerable capital in trading stations at various points on the river.

Ιn	1857,	the returns realized about	£4,000
14	1858,	owing to various drawbacks, they were	2,500
66	1859.	they realized about	8.000

In 1860, there was no ascent, owing to the hostility of the natives in the delta and the absence of a promised convoy. This, however, led to the conclusion that the best way to remove the hostility of the people in the river and delta is to trade with them at proper intervals, since it was proved on this occasion that their hostility arose, not from the presence of white men in the river, but because the steamers gave them the go-bye, whereas they have been in the habit of levying dues on all canoes passing up and down.

Unhappily, while maturing these plans, Mr. Laird died in 1861, and it became my duty as his executor to close up these most interesting operations. Accordingly the steamer made its final ascent in 1861, and the year's trading in the delta and river realized 10,000l.

During the next four years a gunboat was sent up annually with sup-

plies for Dr. Baikie at the confluence, where he held the post of agent for Her Majesty's Government, a post which has since been raised into a consulate, and is now held by Mr. Lyons McLeod.

The Niger enterprise has since been taken up by a Manchester company, unsupported by a subsidy. In 1865 they sent a steamer up to the confluence with a well-assorted cargo and an experienced agent, which resulted, I understand, in the most successful year's trading yet attained. The operations of 1866 and 1867 have not transpired, but if not equally successful it has not been due to any inherent obstacles, but rather to the limited scale on which they have been conducted. Whatever may be the result of the spirited operations of this company, they have certainly made valuable additions to our stock of experience.

The truth is, that at present no steamer will pay her expenses on the river. The caravan trade has to be diverted gradually from the desert routes to Tripoli and Morocco towards points on the rivers Niger and Tchadda. New markets have to be established, and new industries have to be created, to supply returns in produce, before the traffic will suffice to cover the heavy expense of steam navigation. Returns will be obtained in ivory, shea butter, indigo, and other articles of produce, and already the native traders, availing themselves of the steamers, have brought down native cloths made in the interior, tobes, fine mats, and other goods which sell well on the coast. But to effect any good in the Niger steam navigation is indispensable; and to maintain this, a subsidy for five years I consider would suffice, as by that time it would become self-supporting. Whoever embarks in this enterprise without a subsidy, must be prepared to incur heavy loss for several years, merely, if successful, to open the way to others who would be eager to reap the fruits of his outlay.

Impressed with these views, I urged on the Government the advantage of continuing the subsidy granted to the late Macgregor Laird, to whoever would carry out his plans, with such amendments as experience has since suggested. These were to place suitable steamers on the river for a monthly service to the confluence during eight months of the year, while it is navigable for cargo vessels; to offer every inducement to the native traders (educated blacks from Sierra Leone and Liberia) to enter into the trade and become a useful class of middlemen; to employ them freely as clerks and agents under European superintendence; to form trading sections at proper intervals, and keep the same stocked with goods, so as to obviate the hostility of the natives, and thus make sure of the ground as far as the confluence; operations could subsequently have been pushed up the Tchadda in sea-going steamers 300 miles above the confluence, or 570 from the sea, and up the Niger 470 miles from the sea to the rapids of Boussa, beyond which the Niger is again available

for transport through a fertile country es far as Bammakoo, a distance of nearly 1,000 miles.

An influential company offered to embark 80,000l. in steamers and trading stations to carry out these operations, stipulating for a subsidy of 6,000l. per annum for five years, which they considered would be equivalent to sharing the loss on the first two or three years equally between the Government and the company. I regret to say, that although this offer was approved by Lord Palmerston, and recommended for adoption by Lord Russell at the Foreign Office, in which department the matter originated—the scheme was vetoed at the Treasury.

I trust I may be excused for dwelling so long on the Niger enterprises, because it is impossible to over-estimate the importance of that majestic river, as the only available highway to the Mahomedan countries of the Soudan—populous, productive, and semi-civilized—the key to the regeneration of Africa.

In conclusion, I may be allowed to express a hope that the success which has at length crowned our efforts for the suppression of the slave trade on the west coast, may not lead to a premature withdrawal of the squadron and the relaxation of our vigilance—but rather that the same system may be extended to the east coast, so that a flourishing trade may be established there as it has been on the west—that we may press for more stringent treaties with Persia and Turkey, Egypt and Muscat, so that the sea-borne slave trade may be stamped out wheresoever it may be found—and that although we cannot directly reach the inland slave trade it may be as effectually extinguished by the encouragement of steam navigation on the Niger. By these means it may be that the gloom which has for long ages settled upon this continent, will, in our time, be lifted up, and the dawn of commerce, civilization, and Christianity be hailed throughout the length and breadth of Africa.

THE EASTERN QUESTION IN EUROPE.

The Summer has at last come: and in the Old World the press and public men are putting to this "late guest" the question which the father of the bride in Sir Walter Scott's ballad addresses to the young Lochinvar, "O come ye in peace, or come ye in war?" A practical question it is in this case, of the gravest importance, not to the press and to public men in Europe alone, but to all men everywhere; to the farmers of Illinois and to the merchants of New York as well as to the bankers of Paris and to the politicians of Berlin. The French War

Minister is making formidable reports upon the efficiency of the new Chassepot rifle, which did such cruel service at Mentana upon the young Italian volunteers of Garibaldi's luckless expedition, and which has now been put into the hands of every soldier in the tremendous army of France. The French Minister of Marine announces that the French fleet is now ready for extensive operations, and that its reorganization as an iron clad navy is fast approaching completion. The questions whether it is not necessary for France to fight some one, and whom it is best for France to fight, are daily discussed in the French journals. just as they were two years ago after the Prussian victory of Sadowajust as they were a year ago after the close of the great Paris Expo-The reserves of the Bank of France continue to be increased. The distress in the manufacturing districts in France is so great as to furnish the advocates of protection with an opportunity upon which they have eagerly seized, of denouncing the commercial treaty of 1860 with England as the source of woes unnumbered. In the French capital the laws against gatherings in the streets are enforced with a severity unknown for ten years past; and the restrictions imposed by Power upon the Press are sharper, more vexatious and more irritating than. ever. All this, it must be confessed, has an aspect of coming conflicts. and goes far to justify the apprehensions of a general European war. which, the cable reports to us, are loudly expressed throughout France. and the Continent.

Furthermore, it is obviously impossible that Europe can for any great length of time go on in her present state of "armed peace" without a serious explosion. The burden imposed upon the wealth and industry of the Continent by the existing armaments of all the powers, is not only utterly without precedent; it is wholly incompatible with the spirit of the age and the tendencies of public opinion even in the least enlightened of European countries. If the greater powers of Europe were now ruled as they were, for example, in the time of Frederick the Great, or of the first Napoleon, by autocratic sovereigns substantially independent of the popular will and the popular intelligence. it might be possible to protract indefinitely a state of things which in all the European monarchies compels a sort of financial congestion, and which in some of them, as for example in Austria and in Italy, amounts to a deliberate organization of public insolvency. But there is no one European country to day, unless we are to except Spain, in which the government is exempt from the necessity of cajoling if it does not consult the opinion of the public, and there is no one country of Europe in which the public has not already begun to give signs that it will not much longer acquiesce in the actual status of things. If France

and Germany, for example, are to keep on foot between them nearly a million and a half of armed men, and to expend upon their military establishments sums amounting in the aggregate to more than one-fourth of the whole public revenues of both nations, it is but natural and reasonable that Frenchmen and Germans should sooner or later demand that the necessity for these enormous efforts be clearly demonstrated. That necessity can only be demonstrated by the dread reality of war; the sole alternative of which is a general disarmament. Of the latter we see no symptoms; every suggestion looking to such a result which has been put forth by various governments during the last twelve month having been received with indifference. If Europe then be steadily drifting towards a general war, in what quarter is its outbreak to be expected?

The conflict between France and Prussia, which was last year regarded as imminent, has been growing more and more improbable with every month which has followed the conferences held by Napoleon III. with the Emperor of Austria and his premier, the Baron Von Beust, at Salzburg in September, 1867. Such a conflict, had it broken out in July or August, 1866, while South Germany was still smarting under the shame and surprise of its overwhelming defeat by the Prussian arms, might perhaps have resulted in breaking up the Prussian schemes for a reorganization of Germany around the Prussian throne. Austria, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Baden and the Hesses were then really in arms against Prussia: Saxony had not then lost her position irretrievably, and Hanover was in a ferment of hostility to its Prussian conquerors. Had the French then crossed the Rhine as the allies of South German independencies they might possibly have been welcomed, and their work achieved. But when Napoleon III visited Austria in September, 1867, he had abundant occasion to satisfy himself that the French opportunity of 1866 had gone by never to return; that the expulsion of Austria from Germany had been accepted by Austria herself as an irretrievable fact; and that the hope of a real German unity had pretty thoroughly mastered, even in Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the traditional dislike of the Catholic South Germans for their stiffnecked, arrogant and Protestant brothren of the North. Napoleon III came back to Paris from Austria, there is reason to believe, profoundly satisfied that any French interference in German affairs would only precipitate the whole German people into the arms of Prussia. He brought back with him also a new programme of European politics for the new future, a programme concected by him in many conversations with the able and far seeing statesman Von Beust, who, escaping from the ruins of the Saxon monarchy, has contrived to find a refuge in the highest post of the Austrian Empire. To this

new programme it was necessary not only that France should make herself at once more formidable in the field than she had ever before been; but also that Austria and Prussia should put themselves in the highest condition of military efficiency; and that all the efforts of the leaders of opinion in the three countries should be directed toward appearing the resentments, distrusts and jealousies by which the masses in each are animated towards the others. For this new programme of European policy, it is asserted on the highest authority, tends to no less a result than the substantial expulsion of Russia from Europe; to the reconstruction of the Polish nationality and of the Scandinavian power, and to the greatest extension of Austria eastward to the Euxine.

Many signs have recently concurred to show not only that such a programme as this has been conceived, but that it has been advancing towards its fulfillment. The extraordinary efforts which the Russian government has been making during the last three or four months to "crush out" utterly the "poison of Polish nationality" from the provinces which were known down to last year as the "Kingdom of Poland; the sudden reappearance of the "Polish Societies" in Paris and in Switzerland; the repeated declarations of Count Bismarck that peace is not and will not be in peril between Paris and Berlin; and the mysterious visit which Prince Napoleon, a well known partisan of the extreme anti-Russian movement in Europe, is now making to the Emperor of Austria at Vienna, may be enumerated as among the most striking of these signs.

Simultaneously with these indications we have the Turkish Government suddenly taking the initiative in propositions of reform more liberal than any which have ever been proposed to it by its European allies—propositions which proceed directly from the Sultan, and which certainly tend to put the Moslem authorities in a very favorable light of contrast with the Russian policy towards Poland. This liberal demonstration on the part of the Sublime Porte has been, responded to in Servia by the murder of the reigning Prince of that country, which has long been a great focus of Russian intrigues for the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; and by a vivacious renewal of the Greek clamor for an extension of the Hellenic monarchy.

We cannot therefore but regard it as eminently probable that the "Eastern Question" is on the eve of assuming pracatical and perilous shape; and that Russia may be about to take upon herself the dread responsibility of provoking such an explosion of that question as must almost certainly lead to an armed interference of Austria and France in defence of the Turkish authority. The extreme and restless "Muscovite Party" appears to have got so completely into possession of

the Imperial machinery at St. Petersburgh, and to be so resolutely bent on an effort to arrest the progress of Austria towards the consolidation of her power on the new basis made for it by the results of Sadowa. that such an outbreak in the East must almost inevitably lead to a new war between Russia and the allies of Turkey. In this war, should it come. Prussia would occupy at first a position curiously analogous with that held by Austria in the Russian war of 1854; but if the speculations in which we have indulged as to the ultimate designs of Napoleon and of Von Beust be, as we believe them to be, well founded, and if the arrangements which have so long, as we believe, been maturing to bring Count Bismarck into harmony with those designs have borne their fruit, we may expect to see Prussia also wheel into line with the Western allies against the Empire of the Czar. In that event there can be little doubt that the conflict would result in effecting a complete and most important change in the map of Europe. We should then look to see the policy of Peter the Great and Catherine utterly foiled; Germany constituted, with the consent of France and of Austria; Poland and Scandinavia erected into a powerful outwork of the West against Russia, and Austria become in fact, as she is in name, the Ester Reich or Empire of the East.

The possibility of changes such as these is beyond a doubt, and, considered merely as a possibility, they are of such a nature, and so important, as to make it worth while for us to watch with enlightened attention every move in a great political game, which may have so profound a bearing upon the future of Europe and of the world. If events like these, or events of equal importance, be not indeed on the point of coming to pass, as the upshot and excuse of the tremendous military reorganization of Europe during the last two years, the burden of that reorganization will assuredly bring it to the earth ere long with a crash not less startling, perhaps, but far less compatible with the welfare of mankind.

PROSPECTS OF THE COTTON TRADE.

It would be premature, as yet, to attempt any definite estimate of the growing cotton crop. There are, however, some generally recognized facts which foreshadow what may be expected under certain conditions; and to specify these is all we now propose to contribute toward the elucidation of this much canvassed question. The unsatisfactory results to the planters of the last crop induced a general limitation of the area planted this year. The factors, as well as the planters, had been impoverished,

and were neither able nor willing to make liberal advances to the growers. They took the view that the true course, pending the high prices of food products, was to turn more attention to the growth of cereals, and by curtailing the production of cotton help to enhance its price. To such an extent was this policy acted upon, that the original planting afforded the prospect of a crop below that of 1867. The natural effect of this tendency was to cause an advance in the price of cotton at Liverpool from 7d. to 13d. during the period of planting; and this advance, again reacting upon the planters, induced them to place more land under cotton. Ordinarily, March planting is deemed unpropitious; in this instance, however, the season has favored the crop, and the March cotton appears to be unusually promising. A comparison of reports from all sections of the cotton region would give the following result as to the area of land planted compared with last year: North Carolina, 10 per cent less; South Carolina, 20@25 per cent less; Georgia, 25 per cent less; Florida, about the same as in 1867; Alabama, 15 per cent less; Louisiana, 20 per cent more; Mississippi, fully equal to last year; Tennessee, more; Arkansas, more; Texas, fully up to 1867. Setting off these accounts one against another, we have, as an average result, an area under cotton about equal to that of last year. In most of the States, the crop is reported rather backward, the principal exceptions being in Tennessee and Arkansas. Without exception, however, the stands are represented as unusually good, the plant healthy, and the condition of the land favorable. There has been no appearance of the army worm, except in some parts of Texas, at which no concern is now felt in the vicinity affected. The weather has hitherto been unexceptionally favorable. The heavy fall of rain at the North appears to have been accompanied with an unusually moist condition of the atmosphere South; which has been conducive to a vigorous and healthy vegetation. Nor does there appear to have been any neglect of the culture owing to the idleness of negroes. All accounts represent that the late severe experience of the colored population, bordering in some districts upon famine, have produced among them a greater willingness to work, and for reasonable wages; the result having been that the planters have found it practicable to keep the crop clean and in good condition. To sum up, then, we have about the same acreage under cotton as last year, with a much better condition of the plant. It appears, therefore, that as the crop now stands there is a reasonable prospect of a better yield than last year. There are yet the contingencies of weather and worm to encounter, of which the event only can be the exponent; but, providing that no unusual misfortune should arise from these sources, we may hope for a fair increase on the yield of 1867.

An accurate knowledge of the prospects of consumption is also necessary to an estimate of the probable future value of cotton, a question at present of more than usual interest, yet also one of unusual doubt. The rapid advance in the staple at Liverpool early in the year has somewhat unbalanced the judgment of the trade, and produced considerable irregularity of movement. The decline to 7d. per lb. induced a sudden revival of the demand for goods; and spinners and manufacturers, long stagnant, accepted immense orders. To fill these engagements, a consumption averaging 66,000 bales per week was required for the first 15 weeks of the year, and the consequent demand produced an advance of 54d per pound within four months. It soon became apparent, however that this immense production of goods so far exceeded the wants of the trade that the price of goods ceased to follow the advance in raw material, the greatest rise in cotton being 5%d. per lb., and in cloth only 4%d. per lb. Mesers. Ellison & Haywood's Liverpool Circular of June 1, has the following noteworthy remarks upon this feature of the trade;

At the opening of the year the price of Middling Uplands was 7½1, per lb.; 4½lb. Printers 4s. 9d. per piece, and 5½lb. Printers 6s per piece averaging together 13½d. per lb.; 7lb. Shirtings 7s. 9d. per piece, and 8½lb. Shirtings 8s. 9d. per piece, averaging together 13d. per lb. The average price of these four descriptions of goods was, therefore, 12d per lb., and the margin in favor of manufacturers 6½d. per lb. Working out the quotations at the close of each of the past six months we have the following result:

		Mid. Up-	to 514 lb.	8 lb Shirt-	Margin
		per lb.	Printers, per lb.	ings per nound.	per
Dec.	80	7×d.	18×d.	18d.	6¥d.
	81	734	14%	14%	6 X
	29	932	15%	15)	6 5-16
Mar.	81	1136	16%	16%	5%
April	80	12%	17%	17%	4 11-16
May	80	1132	1536	16	436

Here it will be seen that piece goods followed the rise in cotton until the latter reached 9d, to 10d, per lb.; but after that the raw material shot far ahead of manufactures, so that from the close of March to the present time the margin of prices, as compared with the average of the previous three months, has shown a difference of from 1d.@1\frac{1}{2}d. against producers. But the most important fact exhibited by the table is that at the highest point cloth did not exhibit an advance of more than about 4\frac{1}{2}d. per lb., while cotton showed a rise of 5\frac{1}{2}d., or, in other words, piece goods ceased to follow cotton beyond 11\frac{1}{2}d. per lb., and even then the response came some time after the latter price had been obtained in Liverpool.

A similar discrepancy between the advance on cotton and on goods obtained in our own markets; for the illustration of which we present the following comparison of prices of cotton and of sheetings at New York:

	Middling	Sheetings,
_	Uplands.	Atlantic H.
December 27	15½ ce ts.	15 cen's.
January 81	193/00193/	1516 "
Feb uary 28	22 cents.	19
March 27	26 "	1634 **
April 80	8214 "	1836 "
k ay 80		17 "

These comparisons show that there is a point in the value of goods at which consumption begins to contract, and they also indicate with more or less clearness where that point lies. The advance at Liverpool in the price of shirtings of 41d. per lb., produced such a check on the demand that sales to spinners, from being 66,000 bales per week in January, February, March and most of April, fell in May to 33,000 bales per week. This reduction of one-half in the consumption, however, is not for obvious reasons to be considered as the measure of what consumers would take at the then current prices of goods; but rather as meaning that the markets were so over stocked that, with the supply of raw material in the hands of spinners, only that small amount was required to meet the wants of the trade. How far the present large stocks of goods may continue to keep down the spinning demand is a question of much practical importance, yet one not easily determined. The cotton goods trade is not especially active in any part of the world, and is not likely immediately to become so. The exports of cotton goods from Great Britain to 16 principal countries for the first three months of the year were 583,000,000 yards against 478,000,000 for the same period of last year. The increase occurred chiefly in the shipments to India, China, Turkey and Australia, and has been followed by a sharp reaction in those markets; and as these countries have been taking nearly two-thirds of the exports, it is evident that a consequent reduction in the shipments in that direction must tell materially upon the cotton trade. This conclusion coincides with the general adoption of short time by the Lancashire mills, and warrants the expectation of a continued limitation of the consumption of cotton.

A glance at the probabilities of the immediate supply will further indicate the probabilities as to the value of the staple. The exports of cotton from the United States may be considered as almost at an end until the new crop comes to market. Our total stock is now reduced to about 115,000 bales, or about 130,000 bales less than at the same period of last year; so that our own spinners will require about all our supply. The supply of Great Britain for the three months, June, July and August, may be thus stated as compared with 1867:

Stock at Liverpool May 30th. bales. Stock at London June 1	86,720	1867. 867,529 56,910
At sea for Liverpool May 80. "Loudon "Imports from other sources (estimated). "	482,548 60,809 60,000	559,845 88, 558 60,000
Total supply for three months bales.		1.682.857

The supply for the next three months may thus be taken, in round numbers, at 1,300,000 bales, against 1,632,000 bales for the same period of last year. The exports for this period, taking the average of 1867 as the basis, may be estimated at 190,000 bales; which leaves 1,110,000

bales for consumption and for stock at the close of the three months. Now a consumption at the average rate of the year 1867, viz., of 42,245 bales per week, would require 549.185 bales for three months, leaving for stock at the ports on September 1st. 560,815 bales, against 890,000 bales at the same date of last year, and 555,000 bales on January 1st, 1868. Beyond this period it would seem that the trade, if all things continue favorable for the growth of the plant, may count upon a somewhat increased supply from the United States, and probably fully average receipts from India; but upon the course of the trade for 1868-9 we decline at present to speculate; since with even an increased supply (which is as yet uncertain) so much depends upon consumption, and the consumption may be largely influenced by an abundant wheat harvest and consequent cheap food. So far as respects the three months ending September 1st, there appears to be nothing except unfavorable future reports as to the growing crops to justify higher prices than were current at the same period of last year, when the Liverpool quotations ranged at 101d.@111d.

MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL AND MILWAUKEE AND PRAIRIE DU CHIEN BAILWAYS.

These railroads are now virtually consolidated, having been operated together through the year 1867, and agreements made for their final union. The report now before us is the fourth of the Milwaukee and St. Paul, and the seventh of the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Company. During the year the litigation which the St. Paul Company had been compelled to carry on with parties claiming to own the Eastern Division of the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad, and a portion of the rolling stock, has terminated in favor of the former, and secured to it the 95 miles of road involved in the dispute The year also closes with the completion of the Iowa and Minnesota Division extending from McGregor, Io., to St. Paul Minn., 215 miles, the section between Cresco and Owatonna, 85 miles, having been opened about November 1, 1867. The Iowa and Minnesota Division is owned by the St. Paul Company, and was built at a cost of \$9,015,000, being about \$41,930 per mile. The company are not engaged on any additional lines, except in extending the existing line in Wisconsin from Omro to Winneconne, a distance of five miles, the cost of which will not exceed \$70,000, valuable donations in land, &c., from those towns having been made. Winneconne is on the Wolf River, which is navigable for steamboats 150 miles into the heart of a vast and valuable lumber region. The lines of railroad owned by the two companies

are reported at an aggregate length of 820 miles, and are described as follows:

1st. Milwaukee and St. Poul Railway. Milwaukee, via W-tertown, to La Crosse Milwaukee, via Hor con, to Portage Watertown to Sun Prai le Horicon to B-rlin and Omro	196 95 26 58 870 miles.
2d. Miwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway. Milwaukee to Prairie du Chien. Milton to Monroe	198 } 235 miles.
3d. Iowa and Minne ola Division (formerly known as the McGregor Western and the Minne ota Central Rai ways.) McGregor (opp. 1 r. du Chien) to St. Paul, Minn	
Aggrega e length of all lines owned by companies	820 miles

The rolling stock in use on these several lines is enumerated in the fellowing table:

	M. & St.	Io. & Minn.	M. & P.	Total of
	Paul Rail'y	Division.	du C. R.	all lines.
Locomotives	64	14	47	125
Passenger cars—1st class	25	8	27	60
2d cl ss	. 4	1	8	2
" Slerping	8	·ō	8	8
Baggage, mail and express	. 28	8	17	46
Box and f eight cars	. 1.079	215	558	1.858
Platform cars		84	152	898

The following is a summary of the operations on the several lines for the year ending December 31, 1867:

	M & St. P.	I. & M. Div.	. M. & P. du	C. Total.
	(870 m.)	(215 m.)	(\$25 m.)	(820 m.)
Miles run by trains—		4	, ,	
Jassenger trains	869,081	75,029	296,724	740,834
Freight tal s	692,523	154,149	483,180	1,829,844
Wood and gravel trains	112,846	89.587	78,085	225,468
Total m les run		268,708	852,969	2,296,146
Tons of r ight carried-		•		• •
Tops eartwar	297,344	90.248	280,609	618,201
Tous west arg		59,648	128,206	829 888
To a both ways		148,891	858,815	948,034
Tons carried one mile-	•		•	· ·
	81,518,328	4,626,276	81,467,606	67,637,205
Tons · es ward		2,911,745	11,673,482	28,540,814
Tons both ways		7,588,021	48,1,1,088	96,178,049
Tounege revenue—				
Revenue eastward	R1.100.861 01	\$249,202 49	\$1,055,294 03	882,404,787 58
Revenue westward	h94 1+8 08	188,377 56	4 9,847 16	1,831,893 80
Revenue both ways	1,794,529 09	487,530 05	1,504,571 10	8,786,680 83
Tonnage revenue per mile-				
Per mile eart ard	8 49 c.	5.88c.	8.85c	4,07c.
Per mile westw rd'	4.97c.	6 46c.	8.85c.	5.09c.
Per mile bo h ways	8.94c.	5.90c.	8.49c.	4.41c.
Passenge s carried-				
Passengers eastward	159,493	46,548	190,873	896,414
Passengers westwird	187,909	60,889	180,545	868,8 6
Passengers both ways	847,895	96,987	250,918	695,250
Passengers carried one mile-	•	-		-
Passengers castward	8,952,406	1,816,280	4.989,891	15,788,077
	12,221,946	1,939,981	5,832,217	19,494,144
Passengers both ways	21,204,852	8,756,261	10,821,608	85,282,221
Passenger r venue-	•	•		
Revenue eastward &	871.646 04	290.514 08	\$177,818 08	\$639,478 10
	476, 190 14	95,988 48	197.015 40	709,194 (2
Revenue both ways	847,886 18	166,503 51	874,848 48	1,408,667 12
Passenger revenue per mile-	•	-	•	•
Per wile evetward	4 14c.	4.98c.	8.55c.	4.99c.
Per mi e westwa d	8 90c.	4 950.	8.69c.	4.18c.
Per mile both ways	4.00c.	4.97c.	8.63c.	4.90c.

The gross earnings of the several lines, including mails rents, express, &c., were as shown in the following account:

	M. & St. Paul (870 miles)	. I & M. Div. (215 miles)	M. & P. du C. (235 mil s.)	Total. (830 miles.)
Passengers	\$847,83 6 19	\$193,727 48	\$877,005 25	\$1,418,569 86
Freight	1,794,529 09	491,990 87	1,501,591 35	8,791,114 31
Military	9 704 88	******	44 48	2,841, 86
Mails and rents	41,117 11		27.847 51)	
Miscellaneons	6.866.94	ľ	1 200 80	
Express service	158,344 09	59,658 79	74,786 55	374,984 57
Telegraph	2,417 07	}	2.026 55	
Sleoping cars	18,701 85	•	4.838 20	19 0KG KK
Elevators	78,799 94	•••••		18,059 55 78,799 94
MOTRO10	10,188 33	•••••	•••••	10,100 01
Total Operating expenses, including taxes	\$2,946,906 95	\$745,879 09	\$1,991,829 55	\$5,658,638 59
and all other charges	1,722,217 21	59 2, 486 98	1,881,081 68	8,665,685 83
Net earnings applicable to bond interest and dividends	\$1,224,189 74	\$182,985 11	\$610,747 93	\$2,017,922 77

These figures for 1867 compare with those of 1866 as shown in the following statement:

Gross earnings incressed	\$407,606 99	\$202,651 25	8	\$588,889 67
Gross carnings d creased	290,086 27	85,703 09	21,919 57 289,570 50	565,859 86

The following compares the gross earnings of the several lines for the last four years:

	M. & St. P.	I & M. Div.	M. & PduC.	Total.
1884	\$1,402,105 86	8	\$1,711,290 88	88,118,386 74
1.00	3.585.001 48		1.985.511 71	4,520,518 14
1000	21 0335.799 96	542,721 80	2,018,749 12	5,095,270 92
1867	2,946,406 95	743,872 09	1,991,8.9 55	5,688,608 59

From the above tables we make the following summary o comparative results for 1867, reducing the primary figures to relative proportions:

		M. & St. P.		Total of
	(old lines.)	(I. & M. Div.)	P. du Ch.	ali liues.
Miles of road operated	` 87Ú	215	285	820
Train miles to mile of road	8,160	1,230	8,629	2,849
Tons of freight per mile	122,970	85,061	183,579	117,510
Passengers per mile	57,809	17.638	48,918	44,246
Gross earnings per mile	27,963 26	\$3,4 66 85	\$ 3,443 18	\$6,931 28
Expenses per mile	4,654 64	2,605 76	5,854 28	4,470 85
Net earnings per mile	8,309,62	851 09	2,588 90	2,460 88
Expenses, incl. taxes, &c.,p. c	57	75	69	6436
Receipts per ton per mile	3.76 c.	Б.80 с.	8.49 c.	4.85 c.
Receipts per pars, per mile	4.00 c.	4.97 c.	8.68 c.	4.20 c.

The gross earnings	ОD	all	these	lines	for	the	year	ending	December
81, 1867, amounted to And the operating expenses	to	• • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •				• • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	\$5,683.608 59 3,665,655 82
Leaving the net earnings at.			•••••						\$2,017,922 77

This residue is charged with interest on the mortgage indebtedness and the Prairie du Chien preferred stock \$1,144,932,00, and hence the balance applicable to the St. Paul stocks is \$872,990 77. No dividends, however, were paid on either the preferred or common stock of the latter during the year, all the net earnings having been required to pay for new buildings and additional equipment for the roads. The directors announce that hereafter they will be able to pay a cash dividend, commencing the current year on the preferred stock The floating debt is of such limited dimensions as to be manageable without fear of embarrassment. The general accounts of the companies are given seperately and are as follows:

MILWAUKER AND ST. PAUL COMPANY.

(Including the Iowa and Minnesota Division.)

Purchase of road	\$19,501,038 8,990,145	41 2 8	Stock—preferred	\$8,050,892 5,406,888	
Materials on hand	\$28,421,168 831,434 4,014,281 19,286 155,885 14,802	28 44 27 68	Bonds—1st mortage	148 500 2,000,000	00
Sinking fund, 2d mortgage bonds	94,000	00	Pay rolls and bills	\$12,501,542 179,390	
Interest paid on bonds since Jan. 1, 1868	\$4,559,589 155 544 170,898	50	Bills payable State Treasurer, Wis Due other roads	259,646 86,267 81,986 88,617	52 21 33 64
Total	\$28,807,171	86	Income account		
			Total	\$28,807,171	86

MILWAUERE AND PRAIRIE DU CHIEN COMPANY.

General property	\$7,698,981 00	F rst mortg. bonds	\$890,500 00
Materials and fuel	168,861 51	Stock—1st preferred	8, 14,250 00
Advances to I. & M. Div	782,940 08	" 2d "	1,014,000 00
Post office dep't	10,851 07	" common	2,986,081 00
Money lent in New York	295,072 92	PODICE OF STICKS CARCOLLED DA	-,,
McGregor Western RR. bonds		Sinking Fund	514,200 00
_ \$17,000	15,788 88	Reserved and unpaid Sinking	
Due from agents & other compa-		Funds	178,580 00
nies	95,874 54	Other accounts & balances	218,051 75
Survey of Monroe & Dubuque		Convertible property and old	,
Extension	4,89 78	debts	141,266 59
Cash on hand	198,871 85	Income account	498,689 22
Total	\$9,150,568 56	Total	29,150,568 56

THE CHINA TRADE.

NUMBER II.

In considering the probable influence of the completion of communication by one or more lines of railway across the continent, especially upon the future of the Pacific States, it is necessary first to examine the existing routes.

The great bulk of the trade between Europe and America on the one hand, and all India and Asia on the other, is now, as it has been since the fifteenth century, carried on by sailing ships around the Cape of Good Hope. Its value is hardly to be measured by any figures of which the mind can take definite impress; nor would it be easy to collect the statistics of its many parts into an exhaustive and accurate view. In the year 1861, which we take for illustration, as showing the highest development

of the American trade before the depression caused by the war, and of that of Great Britain before it took on the rank growth consequent upon the same event—the tonnage of vessels departing for all China, and arriving thence from and at ports of the United States, Great Britain and France, and the declared values of goods carried by such vessels were as follows:

Great Britain	124,075	Values of im- ports & exp's. \$65,000,000 18 249,146 5, 00,000
Total	841,592	\$88,269,146

These figures, of course, include the values of treasure and merchandise carried during the same year by steamers via the Isthmus of Suez.

Taking New York as a central point, the distances by the usual sailing routes round the Cape are: to Calcutta 9,350 miles, to Hong Kong 14,000 miles, to Shanghae 14,500 miles. The ships engaged in the trade are for the most part of the best class fully fitted out, well manned and ably commanded. Their valuable cargoes and extra prizes for best passages, as with the first teas of the new crop, have led to the construction, here and in Great Britain, of the famous "tea clippers," unequalled for their performances. In 1866 eleven of these ships sailed from Foochow between the 29th of May and the 7th of June, and arrived in London or Liverpool between the 6th of September and 5th of October. Wonderful to think of, three of these, the "Taeping," "Ariel" and "Serica" sailed together on the 30th of May, and all arrived within a few hours of each other, on the 6th of September, the "Taeping" having won the "heat" of 14,000 miles in ninety-nine days, five hours, simply by being towed into dock before her competitors! Last year the race was won by the "Ariel," arriving on the 23d of September in 101 days, 22 hours, 30 minutes, and beating her successful rival of the previous year by four and a half hours! the ordinary voyages, however, range between four and five months.

The immense importance of the Eastern trade in past centuries, at once the coveted prize and gage of battle of all the great nations that have in turn claimed and exercised the maritime supremacy of the world, and have drawn from the profits of this commerce the sources of their ma erial power, has in the present age turned the attention of many thinkers among the statesmen and merchants of Europe and America to number-less projects for diminishing the length of the voyages and the time consumed in them. Prominent among these have been the schemes for inter-oceanic ship canals across the Isthmus of Suez, uniting the waters of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and across the Isthmus of Darien or Panama, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The one pro-

mises for the Eastern Hemisphere the same relative benefits that the other extends to the Western. The former, under the powerful stimulus of the Napoleonic policy and the French treasury, has gradually grown from the germ of an abstract idea into the fruit, now approaching ripeness. of accomplishment. M. Lesseps, the engineer of the work, promises that it shall be finally completed in October next. Already the canal is used for the transportation of cargoes by small vessels or lighters of inconsiderable draft; a considerable quantity of coal for the Abyssinian expedition having crossed the Isthmus in this way. Mr. Kelley estimated the value of the tonnage and trade of Great Britain, the United States and France that would to-day pass through a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama at \$450,000,000 per annum, and the yearly saving in freight. insurance and the like at no less than about \$50,000,000; but the canal has not been built, nor, in spite of an occasional spasmodic agitation of the question, even begun. The Isthmus of Suez is now spanned by a railway, 252 miles long, constructed under the patronage of the Viceroy of Egypt; the Isthmus of Panama by the line, 47 miles in length, of the Panama Railway Company. These railroads and their maritime connections give us three great steam lines between Europe and America on the one hand and China and Japan on the other.

The first is that of the "Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company," of London, incorporated in 1840, which now performs a fort nightly service between Southampton and Marseilles and Yokohama, via Malta, Alexandria, Suez, Aden, Galle, Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghae, with a weekly line to Bombay and Calcutta, and a monthly connection at Galle with Australia. The distance between Southampton and Yokohama, 11,586 miles, is performed in five connecting steamers, the time occupied in the transit of mails and passengers between London and Hong Kong being about forty three days, and the entire service is characterized by great regularity. This company, under a recent contract, is to receive from the British Government a subsidy of from £400,000 to £500,000 a year for twelve years.

Next comes the China lines of the "Compagnie des Messagiers Imperiales," at present monthly, but promising soon to be semi-monthly. This company receives an enormous subvention from its Government, rather difficult to calculate with accuracy, inasmuch as its ships were built by loans from the imperial treasury and it has absorbed the entire steam marine of France, except the General Transatlantic Company's lines to New York, Panama and Mexico. Its service is parallel with that of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and its steamers, having been more recently constructed and from ampler means, are larger and more powerful, and consequently perform the service with somewhat greater speed.

The third line is that of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company between New York and Hong Kong, via Panama and San Francisco, making four trips a month between this port and California, and one a month thence to China, by way of Japan, with a branch to Shanghae. The extreme length of its route is 11,900 miles, the distance to Yokohama being 10,300, and the time occupied in the voyage is at present about 54 days to Hong Kong, 50 to Shanghae and 44 to Yokohama. The missing link between this port and Europe is filled by an endless chain of steamers owned by European companies. The Pacific Company receives \$500,000 a year from the Government in the form of a postal subsidy for the China mail service, which is proportionately less than that enjoyed by the British and French lines.

Thus it will be seen that the distance and time by existing routes to China is about as follows:

	FROM	NEW YORK.				
	-Sail, v	ia Cape of Hope.—	—Stean Suez		—Steam Pans	ı, via
		Days. 129-180 110-150 100-140	Miles. 14,840 13,800 18,000	Days. 65 60 55	Miles. 10,800 11,400 11,900	Days 44 50 54
•	FROM I	INGLAND.			Via Nev	
To Hong KongShanghaeYokohama		100-140 110-150 120-180	9,800 10,600 11,600	48 48 53	14,900 14,400 18,800	66 63 54

By the overland mail the time is already six days less than by steamer via Panama, so that even now the Japan mails are delivered most speedily to Great Britain by the American route.

To compare these distances, which are given in nautical miles, to those of the land route stated in statute miles, we add one sixth to the former. Thus the distance between New York and Hong Kong via the Cape of Good Hope, 14,000 nautical miles, is equal to about 16,300 statute miles. The distance by railway from New York via Chicago to San Francisco, is 3,250 statute miles, thence to Hong Kong by steamer. 6.700 nautical, or 7,800 statute miles, making the entire distance between New York and Hong Kong via the Pacific Railroad and China Mail Steamship route, 11,050 statute miles, as against 16,800 by sail. Again. the distance from London to Hong Kong, 13,300 nautical, is equal to 15,600 statute miles, while the entire distance between the same points by the American route is 14,000 statute miles. But in reaching these great distances the world has again almost unconsciously returned to the primitive ways of measuring them by time instead of length, by days instead of miles. This is the ultimate test to which all commercial routes must be subjected. The duration of the voyage by the existing routes has just

been given. In company with it, the time that will probably be occupied in the voyage by the Pacific Railway route, we take the present average performance of the mail and commercial steamship lines across the Atlantic as a standard for the entire sea route, and extend to the Pacific terminus the the present rate of speed by railway hence to Chicago, which is about twenty-five miles an hour on the express passenger trains. This would give 130 hours for the entire journey overland, although it is little likely that for some years after the first completion of the road, in about 1870, the trip will be made in less time than 150 hours, or six days and a quarter. Allowing ten days for the trans-Atlantic, and seventeen for the trans-Pacific voyage, with one day each for the connection at San Francisco and New York, and the entire journey would be made in the following time:

New	York to	Yokohama	24 days	Lond	on to	Yokohama	83	davs
44	••	Shanghae	29 ''	,	"	hanghae	40	
66	44	Hong Kong	8) "	۳ .	••	Hong Kong	41	66

This is no fancy, but a practical reality, the proof of which only avaits the development a few years hence of the favorable commercial conditions. Those who lament over the present "slow time" made by the China Mail steamers of the American line need not be discouraged, for their so-called "slowness" is the salvation of the enterprise. They make all the speed that their trade now requires or justifies, all that was made under like circumstances on the Atlantic, and whenever a trade springs up which demands on the Pacific the same speed now made on the Atlantic it is demonstrable that the demand will be met.

There can be no question then, that the bulk of all the mails, passen. gers and valuable merchandise passing between New York and Europe and Japan and China will cross the Pacific Railway. The course of exchange must inevitably follow the mails. But all except the more valuable cargoes must long continue to take the ocean routes, whether by sail or steam, for two reasons: 1st. They cannot pay any rate of freight at which the Pacific Railroad can take them, in view of the increased cost of transportation by railway as compared with that by steamship or sail, and especially of the heavy cost of the former west of the Mississippi; the probable railroad charge for a ton of ordinary merchandise between this port and San Francisco has been estimated at \$117, gold, while the entire charge for a ton of tea by steam from Shanghae to New York is only \$35, and by sailing ship \$15 to \$20. 2d. The Pacific Railway cannot for some years be expected to furnish the facilities required for the movement of large bodies of freight, as will be seen by a simple calculation. Supposing the road to attempt to transport the 230,000 tons now carried between New York and San Francisco. at an average speed of 15 miles an hour; this would be about 700 tons a day, or 100 car loads, each train would reach its destination in 13 days, and, with only 2 days given for unloading and reloading at either terminus, would be at the starting point ready for a second trip in thirty days; thus not less than 3,000 cars would be needed for this trade alone, in addition to the vast number required for other through and local express, passenger and freight traffic.

From the foregoing statement it will be seen that the time occupied by mails, passengers and express freight in the journey between London or New York and Japan or China by way of San Francisco will compare with the existing routes, after the completion of the Pacific railway, and as soon as its full efficiency is reached, as follows:

		ie, at present,	оу
	Pacific	Steamers	
From New York to-	Railwey.	via Papama.	VIA SUEZ.
	days.	CATS.	davs.
Yokohama	24	44	65
Shanghai		50	60
Heng Kong		54	55
From London to-			•••
Yokohama	85	68	58
Shanghai	40	62	48
Hong Kong		ŠŠ	48

This difference in time will inevitably turn the current of travel, trade and exchange into the American channel. At the same time—and especially if, as seems likely, the constitutional vices of the Chinese Custom House, on which Hong Kong flourishes, be removed—the British colony at that point will probably lose its rank as the chief port of the Far East, and transfer the commercial crown to one or other of the northern ports of China or Japan; this change, however, will be but relative, if it occur at all, for the new communications can hardly do otherwise than largely increase the traffic of which Hong Kong is now the centre.

Those who have watched the development of trade and travel consequent upon the opening of regular railway communication, even under circumstances apparently the most adverse, will hardly be surprised at any increase in volume or change in character which the Eastern trade may take on, as a consequence of the opening of the new highway across this continent. That articles will be interchanged heretofore unknown to this commerce, and by persons previously unfamiliar with its operations, is but the simplest form of the new growth. Things now regarded as curiosities or rare luxuries, much as sugar or tobacco in the times of Drake or Raleigh, will come to be staples common as those articles to-day. This is the history of all commerce.

Again, New York will soon cease to pass through her Custom-House the teas and spices consumed west of the Alleghanies. These must naturally come by rail from San Francisco, and with them products now unknown beyond the smell of salt water, or known only to be stared at.

West of the Rocky Mountains an immense area, quite uncultivated. but of fertility so fabulous that the mere statement of it excites a smile, certainly of surprise, perhaps of incredulity, and mines of precious metals. and all useful minerals, whose mere surfaces have as yet been but irritated, invite all the starving population of the world to come and there find labor and its rewards. To China, with her dense population, estimated at four hundred million souls, and an inability to feed these numbers, so evident that, in spite of all the industry and frugality of her people, rebellions which are in fact only gigantic bread riots are chronic, and infanticide is common;—to China we naturally turn for the source whence this population is hereafter to be supplied. The demand and supply are separated only by the Pacific Ocean. This movement of population has already begun. The Chinese Government, which, in its care of its subjects, is notably the most paternal in the world, now recognises its interest in promoting the general welfare by encouraging and facilitating the emigration of its surplus numbers. In our own country, ignorance, always the most expensive of luxuries whether for individuals or nations, still opposes, with a bitterness which can only come from prejudice so born. the immigration of the Chinese on several pratexts, alleging that they are immoral people, an idle race, irreligious, and the like: all of which they are not. Noted for the practical morality which governs their lives, for their steady industry, for their rare frugality, these Chinese immigrants form the best laboring class that has come to the shores of America during this century. Their influence upon us, and ours upon them, for good or evil, must largely depend upon the spirit in which they are received; but however that may be, their coming, and in millions, is foredoomed by the unalterable conditions of the case, and can only be turned aside by staying the march of our material prosperity.

Thus a mighty empire bids fair to arise on the Pacific slope peopled by a new race or a new admixture of races. The commercial results must be obvious.

San Francisco will naturally become the great entrepot and depot for the greater and more valuable trade between the United States and China and Japan, which we have assumed will be carried on by steamers across the Pacific, and by rail or steamer between the Atlantic and Pacific States. Valuable goods of all kinds and all small shipments, such as are sent by express in this country, passing between Europe and the Far East, will be gradually diverted to this route as its advantages become known.

The exchange of precious metals, which now flow from their sources to London, as into a great reservoir, and thence to the various points of distribution in India, Egypt, China and elsewhere—will this be changed? When?

There is no natural reason why silver should be taken from the mines of Mexico or Peru by way of Panama to England for the purpose of being exported to China or India, now that a bridge has been thrown across the short gap that formarly seperated producer from consumer. Shipped to San Francisco, it is in a few days within the control, by telegraph, of its actual or ultimate owner, the London banker. exchange is finally a question of cost of transportation. Why should he pay a high freight to get it to a cheap market, when for a low freight he can in less time place it in a dear market! The conclusion is irresistible that all exchanges of the precious metals between Europe and America and China, Japan and India will converge at San Francisco, which will thus become the "centre" of these exchanges at least, if not indeed of those "of the world," as her more ardent citizens are wont to predict. "The centre of exchange of the world" is and must ever be where the commerce of the world settles its balances; in other words, where those balances can most conveniently be settled. Other elements than the most important one of facilities for frequent, rapid and reliable communication enter into this problem; chief of these is the possession of the accumulated capital by which that commerce is carried on. To-day London holds this golden master key, as Byzantium, Carthage, Venice, Lisbon once held it. Exchanges are settled in London for the same reason that a merchant does business in his own counting house. Whether this condition will be changed by the bodily transfer of the capital itself, or by the drying up of the sources of its growth in one place and their breaking forth afresh in another, it would be useless now to speculate. That the trade of America with the Far East vili grow vastly in value and importance; that it will be mainly controlled at New York; that the race between New York and London for the first place will be hotly contested: so much seems clear.

THE BREADSTUFFS TRADE.

The recent general decline in the price of flour and grain is the result of considerations relating to the prospective harvest. There appears to be no dissent in any quarter to the conclusion that present prospects warrant lower prices for breadstuffs; there is, however, some difference of opinion as to what extent of decline may be reasonably expected. Present prices range 10@15 per cent lower on flour than at the beginning of the year, and on wheat $7\frac{1}{2}@12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, while corn is about 25 per cent lower. For the purpose of illustrating the course of prices, from Jan. 1st

to the present time, we present the following comparative quotations of breadstuffs at New York at stated periods:

PRICES OF BREADSTUFFS AT NEW YORK.

	Jan. 1. 1868.	April 94, 1868.	June 19, 1868.
Flour, Superfineper bbl	88 600 9 40	\$9 40@10 00	\$7 95@ 8 \$5
Extra State	10 10/010 85	10 852210 85	8 26 6 9 75
Shipping R. hoop Ohio	10 25/011 00	10 502510 90	9 00@ 9 85
Double Ex. West & St. Louis	19 50/216 00	11 752516 00	9 75@14 50
Southern supers	10 75@11 60	10 40@11 15	9 85@11 10
California	12 50@18 75	12 75@14 50	10 50@18 (0
Wheat, Springper bush	2 300 2 50	2 450 2 68	2 126 2 28
Red Winter	2 65@ 2 75	<u> </u>	2 50@ 2 55
Amber Winter	2 800 2 85	2 97 <u>6</u> 2 8 00	2 6000 2 70
White	2 800 8 25	8 00@ 8 40	2 55@ 2 80
Corn, Western mixed	1 38@ 1 44	1 16@ 1 19	10620.108
Southern white	1 35@ 1 45	1 1400 1 16	1 14@ 1 16
Rye	1 7000 1 80	2 05 6 2 85	1 96@ 2 05
Oate, Western cargoes	843660 87	8500 87	82× Ø 88×
Barley	1 80@ 2 10	2 10 2 2 85	3 20@ 2 40

Considering that, at the beginning of the year, stocks at New York were unusually light, owing to the premature closing of the canals, and also the consequent locking up of a large quantity of grain, which at that time gave a factitious firmness to the market, the decline can hardly be considered an unwarranted one. The receipts at this port since January 1st have been unusually large. How they compare with these for the same period of last year appears from the following statement:

RECRIPTS OF BREADSTUFFS AT NEW YORK FROM JAN. 1 TO JUNE 19.

	1867.	1868.	Increase*
Flour	644,185	966,970	812,885
Corn meal "	186,720	178,255	41.585
Wheatbush.	698,145	8,719,005	8,085,860
Corn "	2,803,115	7,425,885	4.629.770
Rye "	36,220	908,450	172,280
Barley, &c	278,960	698,650	419,690
Oats 4	780,850	2,107,195	1.826.845

The export movement has of course taken off a large amount of this liberal supply. The shipments from this port from Jan. 1 to June 19, compare as follows with those of the same period of 1867:

EXPORTS OF BREADSTUFFS FROM NEW YORK, FROM JAN. 1 TO JUNE 19TH.

Flour, bbls Corn meal, bbls Wh:at, bush	78,274 87,549	1968. 881,918 94,747 2,694,524	Inc 179,049 Inc 6,478 Inc 2,586,975
Rye, bush	136.837	151,998	Inc. 16,106
Oats, bush	124,759	28.948 8.647.866	Dec. 95,815 Dec. 486 678

It will be seen from a comparison of the two tables, that the increase in the exports is not at all equal to the gain in the receipts. We have received of flour 312,835 bbls. more than in 1867, and have shipped only 179,049 more than then; of wheat our receipts are 3,035,860 bushels more, and our exports 2,586,975 more; of corn we have received

4,622,770 bushels more, and have shipped 436,678 less; while our receipts of oats are 1,326,845 bushels more, and our exports 85,815 less. It is true that at the beginning of the year stocks were unusually low, and that a large amount of this supply has been required for making up that deficiency; but the fact nevertheless remains that, so far as respects the movement at the principal grain port of the country, the supply available for home consumption shows a very large gain upon last year. A similar increase of receipts is apparent at the lake ports, as will appear from the following comparison:

RECEIPTS OF FLOUR AND GRAIN AT THE LAKE PORTS, FROM JAN. 1ST TO JUNE 13, FOR FOUR YEARS.

Flour, bbls	1868. 1,517,497	1867. 1,227,030	1866. 1,488,568	1863. 961,80 3
Wheat, bush Corn, bush Oats, bush Barley, bush Rye, bush	18,112,489 4,109,364 891,986	4,104,548 10,986,011 2,792,985 592,883 458,249	8,065,200 13,824,061 5,514,941 824,055 658,283	7,244 604 6,286,360 4,549,297 440,993 246,764
Total grain, bush	24,698,095	18,965,175	27,910,509	18,717,978

It is thus seen that the arrivals at the interior grain ports are about 6,000,000 bushels in excess of those of either 1867 or 1865, and a little over 3,000,000 bushels below those of 1866. The stocks at Chicago has been reduced to a comparatively low point, especially those of corn and oats; and the arrivals at the lake ports now show a material falling off, but, considering that we are close upon harvest, and that the stocks on the seaboard are comparatively ample, this consideration can hardly be allowed much weight as an argument in favor of a firm market. Taking into view all the circumstances relating to the home visible supply and to export, the late decline in prices can hardly be regarded as precipitate or unfounded.

The prospect of the supply from the approaching harvest is unusually flattering. In all parts of the United States the weather has been highly favorable to the growing crops. In some sections there has been too much rain for the corn, and farmers have had to resort to a second planting; but, even as respects this crop, there is no apparent reason for doubting that the yield will be fully up to the average. The Western States have doubtless planted fully up to their capacity; and nature has seconded their efforts with more than ordinary beneficence. The Southern States, discouraged by the poor results of the last cotton crop, have somewhat increased their production of cereals, to the growth of which an unusually moist condition of the atmosphere has been peculiarly favorable, so that there will probably be a moderate surplus in that section available for export or for consumption in other districts. The reports

from California are equally encouraging. The late high prices realized on grain, and the favor with which California wheat is received in the Liverpool market, have encouraged a large extension of wheat growing in that State. The weather also, as elsewhere, has proved propitious, and, according to the latest reports, the crop is likely to exceed that of last year by one third. In connection with the home supply of breadstuffs however, it is important to keep in mind that there is considerable danger, that the potato crop will prove a failure on the Eastern seaboard, a fact which must be allowed due weight in estimating the future value of grain.

The crop accounts from Europe also encourage the expectation of an unusually abundant wheat crop. With no one exception of moment the weather has been highly favorable to the growth and healthy condition of the crops. In England, the period for ploughing and sowing, both in the Fall and the Spring, is admitted to have been unprecedented, while the mild Winter was favorable to a healthy and vigorous growth of the plant, so that it would require unusually bad weather to spoil the present prospects of an abundant yield. The "blooming" season comes in at about this time, and much must depend on the character of the weather at that period, which, at the latest advices, was very favorable. In France, the harvest is already in progress in the Southern districts, with every prospect of at least an average yield. In Algeria, the crop has been already harvested and proves remarkably good, so that, instead of importing, as last year, that country will probably have a surplus to send to the French market. In Egypt, the grain crops no longer suffer from the diversion of agriculture to cotton growing, and this year's wheat crop is unusually abundant. The reports from the Danube districts are as yet somewhat meagre, and the same may be said of Prussia; but, so far as they go, they are entirely satisfactory, and indicate the probability of a yield fully equal to, if not in excess of that of last year.

As a general result, then, it may be said that the world's crops, in their growing condition, promise a larger yield than last year. There yet remains the harvest, however, with all its contingencies and adverse possibilities. The dangers of blight and excessive rains have yet to be encountered, and, until these liabilities have been passed, no safe calculations can be made as to the result. Even assuming, however, that the harvest should prove as favorable as the growing season, it would be rash to jump to the conclusion that we must therefore return to old prices for breadstuffs. Stocks have been depleted by three years of deficient crops, and it may be safely assumed that stocks are now everywhere below the old average. There are indications that in this respect there has been considerable recovery effected within the past few months so far as the receiving ports are concerned. At the leading Western

cities, stocks are generally larger than at the same period of last year. and in the New York ware houses we hold about one million bushels more than a year ago. The imports of wheat into the United Kingdom. from January 1st to May 30th, are 8,000,000 cwts, more than for the same months of 1867; the arrivals at Belgium are 25 per cent. larger, and at the ports of Western Europe generally the receipts are much above those of last year. These facts would indicate that some gain has been made in stocks at the receiving ports from the generally abundant harvest of last year; but the amount in farmers' hands the world over was never lower, with the one exception of last year, so that it will require an ample surplus from the harvest of 1868 to bring up the world's stocks to near their former condition. This being the case, it would seem probable that the trade will wait to ascertain, first the effect of this years crop upon stocks, and next as to whether the crops of 1869 are likely to sustain the recovered position, before assenting to the return of old prices for breadstuffs.

THE NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE.

One of the marked characteristics of the present day is the recognition and employment as never before of the uses of organization and association in efforts for the advancement of morals, of the sciences, and of commerce.

Under various conditions, merchants have long been accustomed to maintain more or less closely defined personal relations with each other. Very early in the history of commerce they saw the advantage, if not the necessity, of meeting together at stated times for the interchange of intelligence, for the consummation of bargains, and for the regulation of matters in which they had a common concern. Five hundred years before the Christian era Rome had its Collegium Mercatorum, or Exchange; and in every emporium of trade from that day to the present there has been some central place in which merchants have been wont to congregate. During the middle ages companies were formed for carrying on foreign traffic, and for the promotion of particular branches of industry at home. members were united by identity of interest, but they were few in number, and circumscribed in purpose. Both the exchange and the trading company still exist, although under somewhat modified forms. Comparing the two, we might say that the one shows us an aggregation of units, the other a compacted society; in the one, each man is left free to pursue his own plans in his own way, in the other a selected few are united in joint efforts in behalf of a special object; in the one, no attempt is made to limit

or check the intensity of individual action, in the other, the energies and the resources of individuals are concentrated, and thus rendered the more effective in competition with those not embraced in the membership. Between them is the Chamber of Commerce, or popular Board of Trade, an institution which, while it discourages isolation and exclusiveness. makes no interference with personality; while it brings individuals together, associates them for the general benefit; while it fosters enterprise, presents no restrictions as to either its method or its scope. The value of the Exchange cannot be called in question; and trading corporations were especially useful, when capital was scarce, and the broad field of commercial endeavor lay almost entirely uncultivated and untried; but it must be admitted that a local organization seeking to develop the social principle, comprising the representatives of varied branches of industry, furnishing opportunity for those engaged in one pursuit, to become acquainted with the facts relating to every other, and inspiring all its members with the impulses of a common purpose for the attainment of a common good, possesses advantages and gives promise of an influence, such as are not to be found in the others, which, for the sake of illustration, we have placed in juxtaposition with it.

Chambers of Commerce were first established early in the eighteenth century in some of the leading cities of France, and soon appeared in other European countries. The New York Chamber is the oldest in the United States, having been organized in 1768. Its objects and advantages are well stated in the preamble to its register of proceedings: "Whereas, mercantile societies have been found very useful in trading cities for promoting and encouraging commerce, supporting industry, adjusting disputes relative to trade and navigation, and procuring such laws and regulations as may be found necessary for the benefit of trade in general, &c." With the growth of the country it has been seen to be desirable to establish many similar institutions; and, under the various names of Board of Trade, Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Association, or Produce Exchange, they have a recognized position in all the chief centres of trade. Differing from each other in particulars of administration, as well as in name, they are substantially alike in their purposes and aims, and they could all adopt the language of the merchants of New York of a century ago, in defining what these are intended to be.

But commerce is not local, either in its activities or in its relations; and these organizations, designed to promote the advantage of the different communities in which they exist, have come to understand that they can render essential service to each other both by word and by act, and that, especially in reference to questions of national importance, they can cooperate together, with promise of immense benefit to all concerned. These

boards and chambers began their intercourse by correspondence, and by the interchange of resolutions and recommendations. It was then proposed to bring them together in convention, and in 1865 a meeting was held at Detroit, attended by delegates from twenty-eight mercantile associations of the United States, and fifteen of British North America. was the first occasion when these bodies, in their distinctive capacity, were represented in convention, and the experiment was quite successful. February of the present year a second general meeting, limited to the boards of trade in the United States, was held in Boston, and it was then determined to bring these commercial organizationins to a permanent connection with each other, by means of a board in which they should be the constituent members, which should hold regular meetings, and which, through its executive officers, should give constant and careful attention to the general industrial interests of the country. This, in brief, will explain the origin of the National Board of Trade, which was formed by delegates duly appointed for the purpose (representing thirty-two commercial bodies, and twenty States of the Union), on the 5th of June, 1868, in the City of Philadelphia.

We propose to explain the objects, the organization, and the plans of this National Board.

I. The declaration, which precedes the constitution of the board, makes its objects to be three-fold; to promote the efficiency and extend the usefulness of the local boards of trade and chambers of commerce; to secure harmony and unity of action in reference to commercial usages, customs, and laws, and to secure the proper consideration of questions pertaining to the financial, commercial, and industrial interests of the country. It is not intended that the National Board shall undertake to perform any of the functions properly pertaining to the local boards, or that it shall in any degree obviate the necessity for their existence or efficiency; on the contrary, it is designed to quicken the activity of each of these, by furnishing a broad channel through which its energy and influence can be directed, and by seconding and sustaining whatever efforts it may be making for the public good. It will give assurance to each that, however remote it may be from the older and more densely settled portions of the country, and however limited in its local influence, it does not stand alone, and it is not working by itself. It will place the various boards in intimate and fraternal relations with each other, and will be a medium of communication between them. With whatever is strictly local, or sectional, or special, it will have nothing whatever to do. All that the boards can or should themselves undertake it will not interfere with, but all such matters as do not exclusively pertain to any one of them, and such as require the assistance of more than one in their adjustment, will legitimately fall within its

sphere. It will not only enable the boards to compare views, but it will promote accordance in these views, and will give emphasis to their expression. Hence the facility with which it may be expected to secure unity in commercial customs and laws throughout the country. Its membership will embrace every section, and its discussions will take every peculiarity of usage or statute into the account; its deliberate recommendations, therefore, will carry a quasi authority with them to a very considererable and influential number of our business men, and a weight such as sound judgment and ripe experience always command to all. So also, in reference to the financial, commercial and industrial interests of the United States, in their broadest relations; its plan of organization will qualify it to indicate some of the methods by which these interests may be developed in harmony with each other, and consistently with the rights and the necessities of every State and of every community.

II. This leads us to notice one or two of the more important features in the constitution of the National Board of Trade. And, first, its members are not individuals, but associations; and its proceedings, therefore, will be carried on by delegates, who will act not on their own responsibility simply, but with accountability to those by whom they are appointed. Each association having fifty voting members, will be entitled to one delegate; having one hundred members, two delegates; having three hundred members, three delegates; having four hundred members, four delegates; and for each additional five hundred members one additional delegate. These delegates will not be justified in seeking to enforce their own opinions, excepting as these shall have been approved by the bodies to which they belong; and they will be precluded from advocating measures in which they may have a personal interest, excepting as these shall have received a similar sanction. In this way the National Board is to be protected against abuse from those who would employ it to subserve private ends. Then, secondly, pains have been taken to guard against efforts to make it the agent for advancing special interests. Such bodies only are eligible to membership in it, as are duly chartered under State or national laws, and are organized for "general commercial, and not for special or private purposes." Associations have recently been formed in the interest of the shipbuilders, the shipowners the cotton manufacturers, the wool growers, the wool manufacturers, and' other classes of business men, and there is a work for each of these to perform, valuable to the class which it represents and useful to the country. But to give these special interests representation in a board formed to consider and advance the industry of the nation in its completeness and totality, would not only introduce discord and confusion, but would defeat the purposes for which the board was organized. The delegate, for

example, from the shipbuilders, would consider every question in its bearings upon shipbuilding; the delegate from the woolen manufacturers would weigh every consideration against the supposed requirements of fabrics in wool, and so on; each would be expected to do this; it would be made his duty to do this. But these interests, with others, are already strongly represented in the various local boards; the shipbuilders, at Portland; the manufacturers of cotton and woolen goods, at Boston and Providence; the shipowners and importers, at New York; the iron and coal masters, at Philadelphia; and the produce trade, in all its branches, at each of the large cities west and east. These interests are fully and adequately represented therefore in the National Board; but they are represented in their relations to the whole country, and to every branch of industry in it, and not in their more restricted and special aspects. Even in the local boards, the individual members are called upon, if not to forget their particular avocations, at least to remember those of their associates, and to subordinate private and personal considerations to the harmoniously adjusted claims of the whole community. more absolutely indispensable is it, that such a spirit should prevail in a national board; and that it will do so, there is substantial ground for hope, because the business men of the country have become in some degree prepared for its exercise, by the training they have received in the local organizations. In these they have learned to look beyond their own circle; they have been taught conciliation and concession; they have been liberalized; and they are beginning to understand both the strength and the value of the inter dependence which subsists between all the various branches of human industry. They will now be obliged to take one step further; they must be ready to subordinate not only self, but class and locality and section to the general good. The scope of the new board, as its name indicates, is national; if it is not this, it is nothing. As already intimated, it cannot undertake to concern itself with purely local matters, or to promote the advancement of any particular craft or calling; all these it must regard as "parts of one stupendous whole," and must deal with them in their complex yet balanced relations.

The meetings of the National Board of Trade are to be held annually, on the first Wednesday in December, and at other times as may be necessary. They are not to be confined to any one city. It is not intended to originate business at these meetings. Except by a two-thirds vote of the delegates in attendance, no subject can be considered which has not been submitted by one or more of the constituent bodies, and notified to all, through the Secretary, at least thirty days beforehand. This provision will save much time, and will tend to prevent crude and partial action. There need be no apprehension that the National Board

will not have business enough before it; the danger is much more imminent that the calls upon its attention will be too numerous, and, in consequence, that its influence will be scattered and weakened. Nor need it be feared that too long an interval will be likely to elapse before final action can be reached by it. If its judgments are to be sustained by the concurrent convictions of the merchants of the country, and especially if they are to have any effect upon our national legislation, they must be carefully formed and deliberately taken.

The officers of the Board are a President (Mr. Frederick Fraley, of Philadelphia), a Secretary and Treasurer (Mr. Hamilton A. Hill, of Boston), and an executive council of fourteen, the members of which are Vice-Presidents of the Board. This council will probably meet three or four times during the year, and is required to submit a report of its official acts, and to make suggestions and recommendations to the Board at its annual meetings.

III. The plans by which the National Board of Trade proposes to secure the objects for which it has been organised, have not as yet been fully matured. These objects themselves, are quite general, and the purpose has been to make the method of operation simple, to have as little machinery in the constitution as possible, and to allow the institution to take its precise shape according to the development of circumstances. For the present it will not adopt a local habitation or open central offices. It may be desirable, however, before very long, to collect a library, and to accumulate commercial information in the shape of maps. charts, reports and pamphlets; and then a permanent abode will be necessary. Whether it will attempt the collection of statistics, will depend upon the degree of improvement which the Federal Government shall make, in this department of the Treasury service. Hitherto, governmental statistics in the United States have been unworthy of absolute reliance, and therefore, have been altogether unsatisfactory to business men. It remains to be seen whether changes recently made at Washington, will lead to a more favorable result; if not, it will be the duty of this National Board to undertake what the Government ought to do, and ought to do well, and what with proper care, it can do in a manner better than could be expected from any private association. In Great Britain the system pursued by the government for the compilation of statistical information, is most thorough and complete; and, consequently, the Association of Chambers of Commerce there, does not find itself called upon to assume any part of that important duty.

The executive officers of the Board will prepare business for the annual meetings; and they will carry into effect whatever decisions may have been reached at these meetings, which, for the present, will be the most

important feature in the operations of the Board. Everything, however, will depend upon the care and discretion with which the constituent bodies shall select their delegates. They should send only men of approved ability and integrity, men of large views, of patriotic impulses and of liberal tendencies, men who will have no political or otherwise personal aspirations to gratify, and who will thus be qualified to deal with national interests in a broad, national spirit. The nation in this crisis, needs the counsel and the cooperation of just such men as these, true representatives of the commercial class, who are eminently fitted by their training, by their experience and by their position, to grapple with the economical and the financial problems which are now pressing upon us for a satisfactory solution. Certainly, the formation of the National Board of Trade could not have been more appropriately and fortunately timed; and we sincerely hope that its usefulness will prove to be as far reaching and as permanent, as the auspicious circumstances amid which it has, entered upon its work, vould seem beforehand to promise.

INTERNATIONAL COINAGE.*

In June last, while the Universal Exposition was in progress, an international monetary conference was held in Paris, under the presidency of the French minister for foreign affairs. Delegates from the several European nations were present. Mr. Samuel B. Ruggles represented the United States, and his report on the subject has been communicated to Congress, through the Department of State. From this it appears that a plan of monetary unification was there agreed upon, the general features of which are:

- 1. A single standard, exclusively of gold.
- 2. Coins of equal weight and diameter.
- 3. Of equal quality, nine-tenths fine.
- 4. The weight of the present five-franc gold piece to be the unit, with its multiples. The issue by France of a new coin of the value and weight of 25 francs was recommended.
- 5. The coins of each nation to continue to bear the names and emblems preferred by each, but to be legal tenders, public and private, in all.

Senate bill 217 is designed to carry into effect this plan. Its passage would reduce the weight of our gold coin of \$5 so as to agree with a French coin of 25 francs. It determines that other sizes and denomina-

^{*} Report of Mr. Morgan, from the Senate Committee on Finance.

tions shall be in due proportion of weight and fineness; and that foreign gold coin, conformed to this basis, shall be a legal tender, so long as the standard of weight and fineness are maintained. It requires that the value of gold coins shall be stated both in dollars and francs, and also in British terms, whenever Great Britain shall conform the pound sterling to the piece of \$5.

It conforms our silver coinage to the French valuation, and discontinues the silver pieces of one dollar, and five and three cents, and limits silver as a legal tender to payments of \$10. The first of January, 1869, is fixed as the period for the act to take effect.

The reduction which this measure would effect in the present legal standard value of the gold coin of the United States would be at the rate of three and a-half dollars in the hundred, and the reduction in the legal value of our silver coinage would be still more considerable.

A change in our national coinage so grave as that proposed by the bill should be made only after the most mature deliberation. The circulating medium is a matter that directly concerns the affairs of every-day life, affecting not only the varied, intricate and multiform interests of the people at home, to the minutest detail, but the relations of the nation with all other countries as well. The United States has a peculiar interest in such a question. It is a principal producer of the precious metals, and its geographical position, most favorable in view of impending commercial changes, renders it wise that we should be in no haste to fetter ourselves by any new international regulation based on an order of things belonging essentially to the past.

Antecedent to any action by Congress on this subject we should carefully consider:

I. The effect which the present abundant production of the precious metals, especially of gold, and the probable great increase in the supply, as mining facilities are improved and more generally applied, will have upon the purchasing power of these metals.

II. The question of preserving such a relation between gold and silver as will retain the latter metal in free circulation, and continuance of the coinage of such denominations of silver as will serve to encourage American commerce with Mexico and with South American and Asiatic nations.

III. The choice of a standard of unification which, all things considered, shall be least objectionable on account of fractional weights and intricacy of calculations.

1V. Of delaying action until the Paris plan has been adopted by the commercial powers of Europe, and accepted by those nations on the western continent with whom we have commercial relations; or at least until their intentions in this regard are more fully known.

V. Should not a period when the public mind is calm, more so than now, on the subject of monetary affairs, and when the national debt has become less formidable, be chosen for initiating a change?

VI. The advisibility of further popular discussion of the subject, to the end that the business as well as general public shall fully understand on what grounds so important a reduction in the value of our monetary unit, the dollar, is based, and the further advocacy of the merits of our own, so that, should any existing system be accepted, ours shall be more fully considered in that connection.

Uniformity in coinage and also in weights and measures has been the pursuit of ages. Speculative systems have been advanced, only to be given up when subjected to practical tests, but the idea has never been abandoned. Nor was the recent occasion the first in which our government has been recommended, and that, too, with some urgency, threequarters of a century ago, by the minister of that country, to adopt the French system of weights, measures, and coinage. But Congress, both then and since, has properly exercised great caution on a subject so full of complications. And the question of international unification yet remains an open one, balanced between the facilities it would afford to foreign commerce and the evils it would introduce into our domestic affair. The adoption of some satisfactory and comprehensive plan, one to be adopted because it shall best subserve the interests of all, and not because it is or is not an existing one, may become desirable. If so, Congress will then be ready to take part in effecting such a measure. At present, however, there are questions of a very practical nature relative to the precious metals, that begin to reveal themselves, and will soon press home upon us, which largely outweigh in importance the more theoretical one of assimilating all metallic circulations. Our situation as a commercial nation makes it prudent that on this, as on every question affecting home interests, we shall remain free to mould our policy to meet occasions as they arise, following such course as shall appear best suited to develop our great, almost limitless, natural resources, increasing by "gentle means the stream of commerce, but forcing nothing, rather than to hamper ourselves by international engagements or arbitrary regulations. An error now in fixing the values of gold and silver would injure this nation far more than any other. We may safely trust to the natural laws of commerce for the correction of any evils from which we have suffered. We have paid our seigniorage, we have met the demand for foreign exchange, but who shall say that the course of trade in the next ten years may not make an American city, New York or San Francisco, the centre of exchange, and confer upon us the advantages so long enjoyed by European capital? Certainly no other nation can so well afford to wait.

The movement proposed in the bill appears to be in the wrong direction. The standard value of gold coin should be increased—brought up to our own, rather than lowered. The reason must be obvious. Authorities unite in the conclusion that a fall in the value of precious metals, in consequence of their rapidly increasing quantity, is inevitable. M. Chevalier recently estimated that the present yield of gold amounts, in ten years, to about as much as the entire production during the 356 years which intervened between the date of the discovery of America and the year 1846, when the mines of California were found; and Mr. Cobden concluded that unless the cardinal rule of commerce, that quantity governs price, which applies infallibly to all other commodities, loses its force when gold is concerned, this continued and great increase must be followed by a reduction in its value.

Ross Browne, in his recent report, says that the time is not far distant when the price of the precious metals, as compared with other proceeds of human labor, must fall. "They are now increasing more rapidly than is the demand for them, and at the present rate of increase they would soon have to fall perceptibly; but the production will become much greater than it is. The vast improvements that have been made both in gold and silver mining, within the last twenty years, are applied only to a few mines. * * If all the argentiferous lodes of Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia, known to be rich, were worked with the machinery used at Washoe, their yield would really flood the world. * * New deposits of silver will be found, and innumerable rich lodes on the Pacific slope of the United States, not yet opened, will be worked with profit."

The present enhanced prices of commodities and labor, the world over, measures, to some extent, the increasing quantity and consequent depreciation in the value of precious metals, and clearly indicates the direction the change is taking.

The creditor, public and private, will be affected by this tendency, and while he must abide a depreciation which proceeds from natural causes, he may properly insist that artificial evils shall not be superadded.

Of the increased production of gold the United States supplies more than half, and when the lines of railway now pushing across the continent shall penetrate the gold bearing mountains and valleys of California and Oregon, and the western territories, mining improvements will be powerfully supplemented.

The American continent, too, produces four-fifths of the silver of commerce. The mines of Nevada have already taken high rank, and Mexico alone supplies more than half the world's grand total. Our relations with the silver-producing people, geographically most favorable, are otherwise intimate. Manifestly our business intercourse with them can be

largely increased, a fact especially true of Mexico, which, for well-known political reasons, seeks the friendliest understanding. This must not be overlooked.

These two streams of the precious metals, poured into the current of commerce in full volume, will produce perturbations marked and important. Other countries will be affected, but the United States will feel the effect first and more directly than any other.

The Pacific railway will open to us the trade of China, Japan, India, and other Oriental countries, of whose prepossessions we must not lose sight. For years, silver, for reasons not fully understood, has been the object of unusual demand among these Asiatic nations, and now forms the almost universal medium of circulation, absorbing rapidly the silver of coinage. The erroneous proportion fixed between silver and gold by France, and which we are asked to copy, is denuding that country of the former metal. Our own monetary system, though less faulty, is not suitably adjusted in this respect. The silver dollar, for instance, a favorite coin of the native Indian and distant Asiatic, has well-nigh disappeared from domestic circulation, to reappear among the eastern peoples, with whom we more than ever seek close intimacy. As they prefer this piece we would do well to increase rather than discontinue its coinage, for we must not deprive ourselves of the advantages which its agency will afford, and "it would be useless to send dollars to Asia inferior in weight and value to its well-known Spanish and Mexican prototype."

Mr. Ruggles says that nearly all the silver coined in the United States prior to 1858 has disappeared. A remedy is not to be found in the adoption of a system that undervalues this metal, for that commodity like any other, shuns the market where not taken at its full value to find the more favorable one. It is a favorite metal, entering into all transactions of daily life, and deserves proper recognition in any monetary system.

It is said that "to promote the intercourse of nations with each other, uniformity of weights, coins, and measures of capacity is among the most efficacious agencies." Our weights, coins, and measures now correspond much more nearly to the English than to the French standard. Our commerce with Great Britain is nine times greater than with France, and if the former does not adopt the Paris system of coinage—and we have no assurance that she will—the United States would certainly commit a serious error in passing this bill. No argument is needed to enforce this. And what of the rising communities? A properly adjusted coinage would stimulate commerce with those great parts of the continent lying south and southwest of us, with the West Indies, and the countless millions of trans-Pacific countries. We stand midway on the thoroughfare of traffic between these two widely-separated races. Our railways, canals,

our natural highways, and merchant marine may be made to control their carrying trade. But here, as everywhere else, a well-adjusted coinage becomes a wand of power in the hand of enterprise. Tokens are not wanting to mark the favor in which the United States are now held by China The unusual honor recently conferred by that government upon a citizen of this country was not alone because of his fitness as an ambassador at large, but was a mark as well of a friendly disposition towards this country. Future harmony of intercourse is assured, too, by their adoption as a text-book in diplomatic correspondence of a leading American authority on international law. Much might also be said about the growing partiality of Japan towards this country; but it is enough that the recent opening of certain ports indicates an enlightened change in the policies of these two old empires, of which commerce, especially our own is availing itself. There is nothing, indeed, in our foreign policy to create suspicion in the minds of the cautious statesmen of Asia. We are nonaggressive; our vast domain leaves no motive for conquest; but, on the other hand, our fertile, unpeopled territory invites settlers, and our mines and the demand for labor on the Pacific slope are rapidly drawing thitherward from Asia an increasing tide of emigration, siding not only in peopling that region, but in establishing closer relations as well between individuals as a more liberal commerce between the nations.

Referring to the third inquiry, it may be asked, should a new standard be adopted, is the French system more suitable for us than our own?

Doubtless the French system "embraces all the great and important principles of uniformity which can be applied to weights and measures, (and coins as well,) but it is not yet complete. It is susceptible of many modifications and improvements." And it is not inconsistent with the respect held toward so exalted a power as France, briefly for us to examine somewhat more closely certain features of this question. We are producers; France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy, (who have adopted the system,) are non-producers, of the precious metals, and, therefore, while adding little to the common stock of material for metallic currency, are not affected like us by an increase in gold and silver. Nor are they likely to be influenced as we are to be, by other coming changes. there anything in the financial or commercial status of France which entitles her monetary scheme to a preference over all others in fixing a common coinage, unless, in itself, it is superior to all others. This, in a practical sense, is not the fact. Writers represent it as surrounded with difficulties, and an eminent French author calls it "the worst of all systems." Its basis is arbitrary, and the ratio it observes between gold and silver—one of gold for 151 of silver by weight, but one to 14 38-100 in value—is a confession of the erroneousness of the plan. In theory, her coinage is metrical, and yet it is said that France has not, nor never has had, a gold coin containing an even number of grams; or, practically, it is unmetrical.

The bill proposes 1,612.9 milligrams, or $24_{100}^{+9.0}$ grains, for the gold dollar. If adopted, and we should still give to our silver dollar a weight and value equal to the Mexican dollar, 416 grains, we should establish a ratio of value of gold to silver of 16_{100}^{-10} to one, while 15 to one is as high as it would be safe to go, and where, indeed, our own standard places it. "If we consent to reduce our gold dollar as proposed by the Paris conference to 24.89 grains, we could not possibly coin a silver dollar that would be of any use to us in commerce," for we should increase rather than diminish the weight of the gold dollar.

On the subject of the French monetary unit Mr. Dunning, Superintendent of the United States Assay Office, in New York, a competent authority, says:

The present weight of the gold five-franc piece is not justified by any scientific reasons better than the mathematical accident that 620 of them weigh exactly a kilogram, a circumstance which has not the slightest practical importance. The fact is, this fractional and inconvenient weight, which the world is invited to adopt, was not fixed upon by the F. ench themselves by design, but as the unavoidable result of a false theory.

Further, that after having fixed the ratio of gold as one to $15\frac{1}{2}$, and having adjusted the weight of their silver coins in integral numbers—

"They were compelled to accept for the five-franc gold piece the interminable decimal resulting from the division of 25 grams by 15.5, viz.: 1.61290822580645. The awkwardness and inconvenience of this weight," he adds, "can be best shown by giving the weight of a few of the gold coins of France, Great Br tsin, and the Uniten States, as they will be if the proposed unit is adopted." (See accompanying tables.)

Mr. Dunning recommended for consideration a monetary unit of 1620 millegrams, for which he claims greater facility of making calculation than that proposed by the conference, and that it is also a compromise between the French and English coin weights, and would require a reduction on our own dollar of half a cent less than by the plan proposed in the bill. Mr. Dubois, assistant assayer of the Philadelphia mint, concurs in the views of Mr. Dunning.

Other considerations aside, it may be said that until the leading nations represented at the Paris conference shall adopt a plan of unification, Congress may very properly decline to act; for anticipatory legislation, while disturbing relations existing between debtor and creditor, would accomplish no practical end. Mexico would not be partial to the French system and Canada cannot be expected to accept it until its adoption by England'. Unification, to be desirable, must be universal. Unless its advantages are

palpable to commercial people of Europe, occupying contiguous territories, and whose intercommunication is constant, it cannot be of serious moment to us, to whom the change would be of but comparitive usefulness.

It has been urged as a reason for the early passage of a law to unify coinages, that commercial transactions with Europe would be focilitated thereby; and also that citizens of our country, in visiting Great Britain and the continent, would be spared losses and annoyances if we possessed uniformity. But it should be recollected that, in all large commercial transactions, gold coin is accounted by weight and not by tale-a proceeding more speedy and equally just; and of the moneys used abroad by travellers from this country, probably more than 90 per cent is carried in bills of exchange, a mode much safer and more convenient to the traveller, and which would be continued even if the bill became a law. The British delegates at the Paris meeting stated that, "until it should be incontestably demonstrated that the adoption of a new system offered superior advantages, justifying the abandonment of that which was approved by experience and rooted in the habits of the people, the British government could not take the initiative in assimilating its money with that of the nations of the continent."

A period of suspension of specie payment like the present, it has been stated, is a favorable one for inaugurating the change proposed by the bill. But the juncture is one marked by great differences of opinion in respect to the question of circulation, return to specie payments, and the public finances as a whole. A change in the value of coinage would but add to the embarrassments of the situation, and it may be remarked incidentally that the reduction of the legal value of the dollar would inure largely to the benefit of speculators in gold and hoarders of the precious metals, a fact that might seriously prejudice the measure in public estimation.

If the nation were comparatively free from debt, Congress might with more propriety consider the question of changing the legal standard of coin; but one effect of reducing it as now proposed would be to deprive the public creditor of nearly a hundred million dollars of his rightful due. In the estimation of the committee such a proposition ought not to be entertained by Congress. It is proper here to say that the delegate, Mr. Ruggles, who favors unification, has at no time thought it just to lower the value of our coin without making proper allowance to the holder of the several forms of national obligations.

To be acceptable a change in our coinage must be a thing of clearly obvious advantage and proceed from the people. There has, however, been no popular expression in favor of the proposed plan, nor, indeed, any voluntary action in that direction whatever on the part of financial men,

either in this country or elsewhere. If there has been any complaint in regard to our monetary system, the fact has not come to the knowledge of your committee. On the other hand, certain scientific bodies in our country have already protested against any ill-considered change in the present American dollar. Our coinage is believed to be the simplest of any in circulation, and every way satisfactory for purposes of domestic commerce: it possesses special merits of every-day value, and should not, for light reasons, be exchanged where the advantages sought to be gained are mainly theoretical, engaging more properly the attention of the philosopher than the practical man. The instincts of our people lead them to believe that we are on the eve of important business changes, and we may therefore safely hold fast for the present to what experience has proven to be good, following only where clear indications may lead, and a future of great prosperity opens to our country. The war gave us selfassertion of character, and removed many impediments to progress; it also proved our ability to originate means to ends. Its expensive lesson will be measurably lost if it fails to impress upon us the fact that we have a distinctive American policy to work out, one sufficiently free from the traditions of Europe to be suited to our peculiar situation and the genius of our enterprising countrymen. The people of the United States have been quick to avail themselves of their natural advantages. The public lands, not only, and the mines of precious metals, but our political institutions, have likewise powerfully operated in our favor, and will continue to do so with increasing force.

Unification of the coinage, like all similar questions, should be taken up without bias and considered on the broad ground of national interest. At the proper time, when the country is restored to a normal financial condition, and the public ask a change in this regard, it may be well to appoint a commission of experts, carefully to consider the question in its various bearings. Reflection and further observation here and elsewhere may suggest the foundations for a better and more enduring system than the one now proposed, which in the nature of things is but a provisional one. Permanency is equally important with uniformity in our coinage.

John Quincy Adams, who spent several years in studying the question of uniformity in weights and measures, and incidentally in that of coinage—indeed, the latter cannot be separated from the other two—says:

If there be one conclusion more clear than another, deducible from all the history of mankind, it is the danger of hasty and inconsiderate legislation upon weights and measures. From this conviction the result of all inquiry is, that, while all the existing systems of metrol gy very imperfect and susceptible of improvements, involving in no small degree the virtue and happiness of future ages; while the impression of this truth is profounly and alm at universally felt by the wise and powerful of the most enlightened nations of the globe; while the spirit of improvement is operating with an ardor, perseverance and zeal, honorable to the human character, it is yet

certain that, for the successful termination of all these labors, and the final accomplishment of the glorious object, permanent and universal uniformity, legislation is not alone competent. All trifling and partial attempts at change in our existing system, it is hope, will be ateadily discountenanced by Congress.

In this conclusion, which applies with even greater force to coinages, a fact fully recognized by Mr. Adams himself, the committee may safely now unite.

For the reasons herein set forth it is respectfully recommended that the bill be not now passed into a law.

APPENDIX TO MR. MORGAN'S REPORT.

MR. DUNNING'S SUGGESTONS.

United States Assay Office, & New York, Feb. 8, 1868.

- 1. The present weight of the gold 5 franc piece is not justified by any scientific reasons better than the mathematical accident than 620 weigh exactly a kilogram, a circumstance which has not the slightest importance. The fact is, this fractional and inconvenient weight, which the world is now invited to adopt, was not fixed upon by the French themselves by design, but as the unavoidable result of a felse theory. The famous coinage law of the 7th Germinal An. XI attempted to make a double standard, and to fix the ratio of gold to silver as 1 to 15½. Then having very sensibly adjusted the weights of their silver coins in integral numbers, 5 grains for the franc, and 25 grains for the 5 franc piece they were compelled to accept for the 5 franc gold piece the interminable decimal resulting from the division of 25 grains by 15.5, viz.: 1.61290322580645.
- 2. The awkwardness and inconvenience of this weight can best be shown by giving the weight of a few of the gold coins of France, Great Britain, and the United States, as they will be if the proposed unit is adopted:

		Proposed weights,	
	Existing	adopting 1612.9	Equivalents
	weight of	kilograms for mon-	in troy
	gold, 900 fine.	etary unit.	weights.
French Coins.	Milligrams.	Mi ligrams.	Grains.
Five francs	1,612.908	* 1,612.903	24.5908
Twenty-five francs	8,064.51	# \$,064.516	124.4544
One hundred francs	82 258.064	*32,258.064	497.8177
BRIT: SH COINS.	•		
Four shilling piece	1,627.196	†1,612.903	24.8908
Sovereign	8,185.488	\$8,084.516	124.454 4
Five sovereigns	40,679,915	†40,322.580	622.2721
UNITED STATES COINS.	• •	• •	
Dollar	1,671.818	1 1,612.908	24.890 8
Half eagles	8,350.064	18,064.516	124.4544
Eagle	16,718.129	116,129.032	248.9088
Double eagle	83,486.258	132,258.065	497.8177
•	Grame.	Grams.	Graine.
One thousand france—French	822,5803	822.5806	4,978.1769
One thousand dollars-United States.	1,671.8129	1,612.9032	24,890.884
One thousand pounds sterling	8,185.9840	8,064.5161	124,454.422

^{*} No change.

[†] Reduction 0.88 per cent.

[‡] Reduction 3.52 per cent.

3. The following table shows the weight of the same denominations of coin, &c., by adopting 1,620 milligrams instead of 1,612.9 for the monetary unit:

July units		Proposed weight	
	Existing	adopting 1620	
	weights of	milligrams for	Equivalent
	gold, 900	the mone-	in troy
FRENCH COINS.	fine. Milligrams.	tary unit. Milligrams.	weight. Grains.
Five france	1,612.908	#1.620	25
Tive trades	1,012.908		
Twenty-five francs	8,064.516	#8,100	125
One hundred francs	82,258.064	#3 2,400	500
BRITISH COINS.			
Four shilling piece	1.627.196	† 1,620	25
Sovereign	8,135.938	† 3,100	125
Five sovereigns		+40,500	625
UNITED STATES COINS.	20,0101010	120,000	•••
Dollar	1,671.813	11,62 0	25
			125
Half eagle		‡8,100	
Eagle		‡16.200	250
Double eagles	\$8,436.259	‡ 32,400	500
•	Grams.	Grams.	
One thousand francs	822,580	824	5,000
One theusand dollars	1,671,813	1.620	25,000
One thousand pounds sterling	8,135,984	8,100	125,000

Norz.—The exact equivalent of 1,620 milligrams is in troy grains 25.0004; discarding this fraction of 4-10000 involves a discrepancy in calculations of on'y one cent in \$600, or 1-600 of one per cent.

- 4. It will be noticed that the proposed unit of 1,620 milligrams has the merit of offering to Great Britain an even compromise of the difference between her present coinage and that of France, instead of a reduction of the British gold coins of 88-100 per centum to make them equal to the French coins. The unit of 1,620 milligrams exactly splits the difference, requiring an increase of the French coins of 44-100 per centum, and a diminution of 44 100 per centum in the British coins. This difference is so slight as hardly to call for any legal adjustments of existing contracs in either country; and while in the United States such an adjustment will doubtless be required, the proposed unit of 1,620 makes the reduction of our coins almost one-half per centum less than would be effected by the unit of 1612.9. The exact difference as shown by the above tables is 42 100 of one per centum.
- 5. There is another very important advantage offered by the unit of 1620 milligrams, which you and all who have to do with mint calculations will appreciate. I allude to the facility of making calculations. I will not attempt to exhibit the difficulties in calculating value from the standard weight when the relation is expressed in such interminable decimals as must result from the adoption of the unit 1612.9. But you will see at a glance the facility of dealing with the unit of 1620.

^{*} Increase 0.44 per cent.

The weight of 1,000 francs, or \$200, or £40, at 1620 milligrams to the dollar, would be 324,000 milligrams. These values are readily deduced from the weight, as will be seen by the following examples:

France. Milligrams 824,000	United States. Milligrams 324,000	Great Britain. Milligrams 324,000
9 — 86,000 - 9 — 4,000	9 — 86,000 - 9 — 4,000	÷ 90 — 8,600 ÷ 90 — £40
- 4 - 1.000 france.	- 20 \$ 200	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The above divisions are performed mentally without difficulty, and the rule of calculation is exceedingly simple. It is not at the mint alone, nor chiefly, that this facility of calculation will be appreciated. The transactions in coin and bullion the world over will be simplified by it. The experts at the mint can soon adapt themselves to any system however complicated; but for the convenience of commerce the relation of weight to value in the coins of the world ought to be simple.

- 6. If the troy system of weights is to be continued in this country and Great Britain, it will be immensely important that the monetary unit expressed in milligrams should be easily convertible into troy weight. A glance at the tables given above will show the discrepancy between the unit of 1612.9 and the troy system, and also the beautiful and almost marvellous harmony effected by the unit of 1620 milligrams.
- 7. I trust, however, that Mr. Sherman's bill will contain a section making the use of the French system of weights obligatory in all the mints of the United States. This change would seem to be almost a necessary part of the plan of monetary unification of the world's coinage; and it would certainly be a judicious method of partially familarizing the country with the metrical system, the universal adoption of which, even if not perfect, is so devoutly to be wished.

If you deem these remarks of sufficient importance, I should be glad if you would send them, with your comments, to Governor Morgan of the Senate.

Very respectfully and truly yours,

Mr. Dubois.

GEORGE F. DUNNING.

In forwarding this copy, I have only to add my hearty concurrence in the views taken by Mr. Dunning. Whether they would arrest or embarrass the plan of complete and prompt unification, is a point which I must leave to wiser counsels.

With respects of,

WM. E. Dubois,

February 12, 1868.

United States Mint, Philadelphia.

THE ALASKA APPROPRIATION.

The opposition developed in the House of Representatives to the appropriation of \$7,200,000 for the purchase of Russian America suggests considerable doubt whether the Alaska treaty may not after all be defeated. It would be unfair to regard the House as altogether captious in its opposition; and yet there is a degree of rashness in its discussion of this question which does not altogether bear examination. It must be allowed that there is some ground for the House feeling jealous at an apparent slight in the negotiation of the treaty. While it is to be conceded as beyond all question that the Constitution invests the treatymaking power in the Executive and the Senate conjointly, yet it is quite conceivable that, in a matter of so much consequence and involving, according to Mr. Sumner and Mr. Banks, a great national policy in the future, the House should feel affronted at the negotiation having been carried to the extent of taking possession of the territory without consulting the representatives of the people who are expected to vote the money for the purchase. The House, naturally enough under such circumstances, feels that there has been a stretch of prerogative, in the case, and is disposed to make the President and the Senate feel that in all treaties involving the payment of money the House has practically a very important control, which in future cases it may be convenient to recognise.

It was doubtless imprudent to occupy Alaska before the purchase money was actually appropriated. The act could hardly fail to offend the respect of the House for its prerogatives; inasmuch as it seemed to imply that the House was absolutely bound by the action of the treatymaking power, and had no option but to vote the public money, no matter what their views as to the expediency of the appropriation. Such an assumption the House could only be expected to resent. The premature occupation of the territory indeed is the principal cause of the opposition. Occupation before appropriation is wholly inconsistent with our Constitutional provisions. It assumes what should on no account be taken for granted, that the House will certainly vote the requisite appropriation. The action of the House is discretionary in these matters; and, in all treaties involving the payment of money, a proviso should be introduced making the engagement binding only in the event of the House of Representatives voting the required funds. It is unfair toward the foreign power in treaty to make conclusive engagements with it, so long as it is unascertained whether those holding the purse strings will advance the purchase money. If the House intends to teach our officials a lesson for their undue haste in this matter, and to establish a warning precedent for their successors, it is impossible not to respect the motive.

Not a few representatives, however, appear to oppose the appropriation purely upon the merits of the acquisition, as a matter of public policy. They regard Alaska as unneeded for strategic purposes; and its value for fishing, mining and lumber they consider as having been extravagantly over-estimated by the promoters of the annexation. For ourselves we are ready to concede all this, and regard the treaty as a very costly mistake. We do not regret that the measure has been very sharply criticised in the House, nor yet that a course has been taken calculated to warn all the departments of the Government against future hasty treaties; and yet we should deem it a great misfortune were the opposition to be carried to the extent of defeating the treaty. As a choice between the evils of appropriating seven millions for the conclusion of a foolish treaty, and the dishonor of repudiating a contract to which the Government has fairly committed itself, we consider the former decidedly the more preferable. The agents duly authorized for the contracting of treaties have made the engagement with Russia. The ceding power was so generous as to allow us to take possession before any part of the purchase money was paid, and without exacting any sort of security for its payment; Russia has removed her officers from Alaska, and many of her subjects have returned home at considerable expense; and we have held possession for several months, introducing important changes in the affairs of the country. Is it to be supposed that we are at liberty to do all this and then vacate, assigning no other reason than that we have decided not to part with our money? Would this be just? Would it be generous treatment of a power which, above all others, has shown itself friendly to us in times of peril? The least that could be expected from Russia in such a case would be a demand for compensation; and are we prepared to submit to the humiliation of rendering such reparation? Or, if we should refuse to grant any compensation, the subsequent disposition of Russia toward the United States can hardly be a matter of question. Moreover, after such an act, having ratified the treaty and taken possession of the country ceded, what would be the standing of our honor with all foreign governments? If our treaties thus deliberately made and executed, are to be violated upon any frivolous pretext, or upon mere quarrels between the co-ordinate branches of the government, we must be content to be treated as a power whose compacts are unworthy of reliance.

In view, then, of the grave international consequences which must follow the failure of this treaty, we can see no course but for the House to make the requisite appropriation; no matter how inconvenient to the Treasury, how burthensome the acquisition. If a mistake has been made, we have gone too far to turn back now. If the Executive and the Senate have made a bad bargain; if they have improperly committed the country to it by needless precipitation; if they have slighted the House in their inconsiderate haste; if it be necessary to teach them a lesson which will prevent a recurrence of the error in other acquisitions now sought; these are matters for adjustment between the House and those invested with the power of treaty; not for settlement between the United States and Russia. There are other ways by which the House can express its disapproval of this annexation policy than by defeating compliance with the terms of the treaty; and we cannot but believe that ultimately the representatives will conclude to first honor the treaty and then take proper steps for preventing the recurrence of similar errors.

THE PROPOSED PAYMENT OF FIVE-TWENTIES IN GREENBACKS.

Politicians appear to think they have at length succeeded in making popular the idea of paying the Five-Twenty bonds in greenbacks. With the people at large the belief doubtless has heretofore been, that the principal no less than the interest of all the bonds is payable in gold. The suspension of specie payments, they viewed as merely a temporary incident of war finance, and never dreamt that the twenty years obligations of the Government would be regarded in any other light than as engagements to pay so much in coin. Besides, the agents of the Government in issuing the loans announced, while the Secretary of the Treasury confirmed the announcement, that the principal as well as the interest was to be paid in gold; and, although viewed in this light. the engagements of the Government thus assumed a very weighty and serious aspect, yet there was no disposition on the part of the people to evade any part of their engagements as thus understood, but rather to establish an unparallelled precedent of national honor, and to put on record the fact that republics are mindful of the rights of their creditors. So the matter stood until quite recently; no other idea being entertained, except by foreign censors, whose doubts were generally regarded at home as but an expression of the untriendly desire of Europeans to depreciate our character and institutions. A few politicians, however, in search of a popular issue for the presidential election, pretend to have discovered what they sought in the domain of finance. The idea was put out, at first cautiously, and then boldly, that the Five-Twenty bonds were issued intentionally without any provision in the acts requiring payment in gold, except as to the interest, and with a reserved purpose that the Government should be free to avail itself of the privilege of redeeming them pending the suspension of specie payments; and that with this view, the bonds were made payable, at the option of the Government, on the expiration of five years from date of issue, in whatever might then be the legal tender money of the country. This option, it is argued, was provided against the probable contingency that, after the conclusion of peace, the Government might have an opportunity of taking up its obligations in the same depreciated paper for which it issued them, and of re-negotiating its loans under the circumstances of the improved credit resulting from the restoration of the national authority. The advocates of the policy maintain that this opportunity has now come, and urge that the Five-Twenty bonds shall be retired in currency at the expiration of the five years option, and new bonds issued bearing 4 or 5 per cent interest, and principal and interest made payable in coin. This idea is now gaining ground rapidly as a political issue. The New York convention has unequivocally committed itself in favor of the payment of the Five-Twenties in greenbacks. On the other hand, the Chicago platform, although it insists very emphatically upon the observance of good faith in respect to the public obligations, yet contains nothing to preclude the supposition that this very course may not be construed in that sense by the leaders of the party. And hence we have a prominent Congressman from Massachusetts claiming, in the House, such to be the true interpretation of the platform, and the sentiment of the House drifting in the same direction; while Mr. Sherman's funding bill, now before the Senate, is based upon a similar view of the law. These circumstances at least indicate that politicians believe the idea a popular one. That it will be the settled policy of the successful party after election we cannot believe. The money was borrowed on the representations that the bonds were to be paid in gold, and to insist now that the agents of the Government had no authority to make such representations appears to us too closely allied to repudiation for the American people to adopt it. Besides the Senate is conservative and likely to remain so; and while it does, such a scheme would find little favor there. As this issue, however, has been so prominently raised, it is not untimely to enquire what would be the prospect of success were it attempted.

The first necessity would be to obtain the required currency, and as no considerable party seeks the issue of more greenbacks, or would for a moment tolerate the idea of additional taxation to raise them, the payment must be made through an exchange of bonds. This exchange must be accomplished either voluntarily on the part of the bondholders, or by compulsion. Let it be supposed that, to avoid the odium of a compulsory method, the bondholders be offered a four or five per cent bond, principal and interest made specifically payable in gold, in

exchange for their Five-Twenties; what inducement is there to make the exchange? Investors prefer to pay four to five per cent more for Five-Twenties than for Ten-Fortles, a five per cent bond expressly payable in gold, even although there is now considerable reason for expecting that the Government will treat the former as payable in currency; and it certainly is not very apparent how our political financiers are going to persuade bondholders that it is to their interest to surrender a 6 per cent obligation for one paying only 5 per cent. If it be said that Congress will declare itself not bound to redeem the Five-Twenties in coin, then bondholders will reply that for the sake of securing 1 per cent more interest for fifteen years they are quite willing to take the risks as to what may be the legal money of the United States at the period of the maturity of the bonds, and especially as there is a strong show of probability in favor of the supposition that the Treasury would, at that period, have resumed specie payments. These considerations would manifestly induce the public creditors to decline any voluntary offer to substitute their Six Per Cents by a bond bearing a lower rate of interest.

Let it be supposed, however, that the Treasury call in the Five-Twenties at five years from date, offering the holders either to pay them in . greenbacks or to exchange them for a new bond bearing 4 or 5 per cent interest, and made payable in coin; how would the case stand in that event? A large majority of the present holders of Five-Twenties have bought their bonds at 5 to 10 per cent premium, and in the event of accepting currency in their redemption would lose that amount of principal; a loss to which they would not consent except under compulsion. Would the bondholders then prefer the alternative of exchanging their bonds for one bearing a lower rate of interest, say 5 per cent? That must depend very much upon their views as to the value of such a security. In ordinary times the five per cent bonds of the United States sold upon the market for more than their present price reduced to gold. In 1860 the Fives of 1874 sold at 100@1021, which is equal to 141@143½ with gold at its present premium. It must be remembered, however, that then the public debt was only \$65,000,000, and the total national expenditure only \$77,500,000, which placed the Government credit in a very different position from that which it now occupies. that time no question was entertained as to our ability and willingness to meet all our obligations in gold; now it is otherwise. It may also be urged that Ten Forties are now selling at a good premium, and consequently a bond more or less of that character ought to prove exchangeable at par for the Five Twenties if called in. The fact of Ten-Forties having recently advanced to over par is due to exceptional causes.

recent agitation of the question of paying Five-Twenties in greenbacks has caused foreign investors to give the Ten Forties a marked preference, owing to the stipulation for the payment of principal in coin; while the banks have, to a large extent, bought them for use as a deposit against their issues of currency in consequence of their costing less, and yet sustaining an equal amount of circulation. The fact of Ten-Forties ranging above par is therefore, under these exceptional circumstances favoring their value, no evidence whatever that an issue of \$1,600,000,000 of similar bonds could be put out at par. Due weight must be attached to the effect upon the feeling of the bondholders that would attend this compulsory method of dealing with the debt. Beyond question, the mass of the holders of Five-Twenties consider that the bonds are rightfully payable in coin; and they would consequently feel themselves wronged in being compelled to receive anything short of gold. They would regard the action of the Government as simply a dishonest pandering to the desire of the masses to get rid of the burthens of taxation; and would argue that this was but the first step in bad faith, which from like motives might lead to further measures of repudiation. They have already witnessed a loud clamor against the bondholders, and in the event of Congress practically recognizing this hostility, they would be apt to conclude that the public creditors have no security in the good will of political leaders and the people. It would seem then to be a probability amounting almost to certainty that the holders of Five-Twenties would, under the circumstances supposed, almost universally accept currency in preference to the new bonds, and eschew all further connection with Government securities. What could the Treasury do in the event of matters taking that course? With an average of about \$30,000,000 of currency in its vaults, its means for retiring the bonds would be exhausted in two or three days, and it would be compelled to abandon the scheme and allow the bonds to run on to maturity.

We think that the above considerations, carefully weighed would lead to the conclusion that any effort to retire the Five-Twenty bonds in the way now agitated by politicians must prove an utter failure, and a gratuitous injury to the national credit. The clamor respecting the payment of the bonds in greenbacks may answer well enough for electioneering effect; but any party undertaking to put such a policy into operation must shoulder the responsibility of a disgraceful financial failure.

BRAZILIAN FINANCES.

We have received from the Brazilian Consul General the financial report of the department of Finance of Brazil, showing the debt, revenue, and expenditures for several years past, and the estimates for the coming year of that government. The increasing interest felt in this South-American State has induced us to make a full analysis of this report which we give below.

ESTIMATES FOR THE COMING YEAR.

In estimating the receipts the Finance Minister says that he follows a process which has been justified by facts, unless when extraordinary circumstances disturb the ordinary course of the public revenue. This process consists in ascertaining, as far as possible, what has been the product collected of the current year, up to the date on which the estimates are organised, and in basing the calculation of receipts upon the figures thus obtained. The elements for this work are the returns of the various collecting stations in the municipality of the court and of the treasuries of fazenda in the provinces. The treasury possesses returns of the year 1867-8 up to February of this year, from some treasuries, from others up to December last, and from the rest up to September, 1867. If we unite the data furnished by those documents and with them make the proportional calculation, the sum of 64,435:682\$447 is obtained for the presumable revenue of the said fiscal year.

In order to ascertain how far this result approximates to the truth, it is necessary to recur to another process of valuation, recommended by the law namely: to taking the average of the revenue in the three years preceding that of the estimates. The revenue having been 56,995:928\$ 628, in 1864-65, 57,815:567\$483, in 1865-66, and 61,152:478\$387, in 1866-7, the average is 58,654:658\$163. As, however, for greater exactness, the revenue of the years 1865-66 and 1866 67 do not include the yield of the D. Pedro II. railway, which did not belong to the State in 1864 65, it is proper to add the amount of this yield, now valued at 1,500,000\$, to the average given above; doing which will raise the sum of the average to 61,154:658\$166. In the sum of 64,435:682\$447, obtained by the calculation in table I, is included that of 2,900:000\$ which represents approximately the product of the taxes levied or created by the law of September last, whose collection has already commenced. Deducting this amount, the remainder, reis 61,535:682\$447 shows how exact is the calculation based on the product collected of the current year, inasmuch as the difference observed between the latter result and that of the calculation by average, is only the effect of the constant progression of the public income.

Thus, therefore, we would have the sum of 61,500:000\$, for base to the estimate if we had not to look to that increase of the ordinary resources of the treasury which will result from the dispositions of the aforesaid law of September 26, last. The increase which the new taxation will give to the public income cannot yet be estimated with exactness; some imposts commenced collection only in October last, that is, in the fourth month of the current fiscal year; others affecting foreign commerce required a certain delay; and the rest still depend upon difficult and therefore dilatory assessments, and upon the completion of the new tariff. Meanwhile, by the collections made up to the present time, we have no reason for believing that the reality will differ much from the calculations made when the legislature discussed the ruling law of the estimate, when the product of the new taxation was valued at 12,250:000\$000.

Supposing that the legislature, appreciating the exigencies of our financial system, will continue to authorize the collection of those imposts, the finance minister says he has added the above sum to what was ascertained as base for the valuation of the receipts, and I have estimated those of the fiscal years 1869-70, in the terms of the bill, at 73,000:000\$, a margin thus remaining for any eventuality.

The annual progression of the revenue may be deduced from the above figures. The receipts were:

In 1864-65					• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	56,995:029\$628
In 1865-66,	including	yield of	D. Pedro II.	railw	ау	58,146:843\$998
In 1866-67	"	**	4	4	·	61,469:4378500
In 1867-68	"	46	u	u	not less than	61.535:0008000

—without the product of the new taxes. So that, at the height of the struggle with Paraguay, the report says, the powers of the country have not failed, nor should we fear that they may fail.

One of the most important branches of agriculture—coffee—promises in this year a harvest exceeding that of last year (which itself was large) to judge by the following figures, relating to the mart of Rio de Janeiro, which is that of greatest movement and that of which we can obtain the latest and completest notices, when comparing the first quarters of the last and current years:

			dray set or
		1867.	1868.
Entered	sacks.	395 586	422,922
Exported	"	508,907	528,615
Stock, March 81	"	57,000	160,000

As to cotton, the chief centres of production being the provinces of Pernambuco, Maranhao, Bahia, Alagoas, Ceara, Parahyba and S. Paulo, the information held by the treasury is not of so recent date, nor so complete, wherefore it cannot be judged whether this branch of production tends

with certainty towards progression, although it is incontestable that it has augmented in some provinces.

After furnishing the estimate of income, the report passes on to the expenditure. The expenditure for the fiscal year of 1869-70 is calculated at 70 798:932\$333, thus distributed among the various ministries:

28.431:7428 2 11,819:6998

Comparing the sum of these amounts with what was voted for the fiscal year of 1868-69 some excess is noted, which arises from the indispensable development of some branches of public service. The excess arises from a larger amount being needed for payment—of the interest of the internal debt, which has increased with the issue of bonds; of pensions, whose number has augmented in consequence of the prolongation of the war; of differences in exchange; and, finally, of the service increased by the payment of the guarvntee of interest on the Sao Paulo railway.

A summary of the foregoing as follows:

Estimated "	receiptsexpenditure	73,000:000\$000 70,786:932\$333
The f	ional ware of 1880-70 will show a surplus of	0 019.0479647

PRESENT STATE OF THE TREASURY.

In the current fiscal year is continued the high expenditure exacted by the war against the government of Paraguay. And, although the treasury has made use of part of the authorizations conceded, still it struggles with some difficulties.

The receipts of the present fiscal year, with resources from loans,	
etc, will not be less than	109,047:739\$085
The total expenditures will be	183,896,554\$985

Comparing the receipts with the expenditures there is a deficit of . 24,848:815\$900

which the government was authorized to provide for by the issue of paper money and did in part.

EXTERNAL DEBT.

The debt of Brazil due abroad has been reduced by £349,900, the amount paid off in the course of the last year, and it shows at present the sum of £14,068,600, inclusive of £376,314 yet owing by the Pernambuco Railway Company.

The bonds redeemed belong:

To the	loan of	f 1889	£10,000	To the loan of 1863£116,400
64	46	1852	28,900	" " 1865 70,400
. "	"	1858	64,800	
"	**	1859	11,600	Total £348,900
"	ш	1860	46.800	•

The outlay for interest, commission and brokerage on the foreign debt, during the fiscal year of 1869-70 is estimated at £931,163, namely: £657,358 for interest and commission, and £237,805 of amortization and respective commissions and brokerage. As, however, the loan of 1839 matures in January, 1869, the outlay for the debt spoken of will exceed in 1869 the £931,163 estimated above by £277,800, to which the above debt will be reduced at its maturity, if it be redeemed in the manner authorized in Art. 36, No. 2 of the ruling law of the estimates. To meet the outlay made in Europe, both for this and other ministries, remittances of £2,025,000 were made from April 22, 1867, to April 30, 1868, costing at various rates 25,049:229\$281.

INTERNAL FUNDED DEBT.

On the 31st of March last 125,206:700\$ in bonds of the public debt existed in circulation, which gives a result of an increase of 18,856:100\$ over that of last year in April, when 106,350:000\$ was circulating. This increase arises from bonds for 46:600\$ given in exchange for Don Pedro II. railway shares; 16,896\$800 issued by virtue of the acts of June 28, 1865, and September 19, 1866; 1,912:300\$ sold in the provinces; and of 400\$ in a bond at 5 per cent interest interest given in the province of Pernambuco in payment of a debt inscribed in the auxiliary of the Grande Livro. In the above sum of 16,896:800\$ is included that of 1,620:000\$ issued as premium for the liberation of slaves for service in the war, and that of 117:400\$ in payment to Dr. Thomas Cochrane, arising from a debt of a previous year, ordered to be paid in bonds by an order dated October 24, 1867. The bonds existing in circulation are owned as follows:

By nationals	5.032:500\$
" public establishments" various in the provinces	23.585:1003
Total	. 122.206:70U\$

For the payment of whose interest the Caixa de Amortizacao received 6,537:457\$558. In the account of remnants of unclaimed interest, which is converted into bonds by virtue of Art. 48 of law of October 28, 1848, there is a profit of 394:743\$669.

TREASURY BILLS.

The total of the treasury bills in circulation upon April 30 last was 69,985:400\$, which, compared with 45,369:600\$, to which it amounted at the same date last year, shows an increase of 24,615:800\$.

PAPER MONEY.

The paper money in circulation upon March 31 last amounted to At present it is raised to	42,560:044\$ \$1,749:274\$
Showing an excess of	39,189:230\$
—which arises from:	
1st. The i-sue corresponding to the notes of Bank of Brazil called in with the product of the sale of its bullion, effected since last years report 2d. That made on account of the credit of 50,000:000\$, granted by the law of September 28, 1867	20,647:880\$
Less the discounts on various substituted notes	89,216:43:\$ 27:200\$
Total	89,189:280\$

The report states that the government was obliged to recur to the credit of the act of September 28, last. When I solicited this credit says the Finance Minister, I promised to use it in extreme cases only, and, in fact, it was only after trying other means recommended by experience, but fruitless as to enabling the treasury to regularly and promptly support its heavy burdens, aggravated by the crisis, that I decided on employing it. When the metallic reserve bought from the Bank of Brazil by the government was expended it became indispensable to undertake the acquisition of gold, so as not to interrupt paying the officers and men of the army and navy operating in Paraguay. The ordinary resources of the treasury were insufficient for this and it became necessary, therefore, to recur to operations of credit in order to obtain means. I have already shown you that the impropriety of attempting a loan in Europe will subsist as long as the war lasts; I sustained this idea in the debate on the law No. 1,508; and, although our financial state should improve through the ruling law of estimates having created taxes, no circumstance indicates an opportunity for making that attempt. The government having to rely upon our own resources, it reduced the price of bonds to obtain a greater issue of them, and it tried to attract more floating capital to the treasury by raising the rate of interest.

Meanwhile the urgency of the heavy monthly expenditures did uot permit waiting for the slow effect of these measures, which, indeed, from the extension given to the issues, must little by little go on producing slenderer results, and thus only the employment of both of them combined with that of paper money could be efficacious, as in fact was the case. Since October the government has issued paper money for account of the credit referred to; but at first issue had in view to aid in the

operation of paying for the gold bought from the Bank of Brazil, and it would be completely annulled on abandoning the issue for account of the credit of the law of September 12, 1866, corresponding to that payment, because it is a matter of indifference whether the issue be for account of one or other law, so long as it be not in duplicate. In December, however, the necessities of the treasury forced the government to effectively issue paper money, notwithstanding the considerable sale of bonds then being made and the great revenue of the custom house, produced by the anticipation of the clearances.

The act of the government, therefore, appears to me to be justified, and meanwhile, it has not, as I have already observed, produced the evils so much feared from it.

CIRCULATING MEDIUM.

The paper in circulation at the dates of the last returns received at	
the treasury amounted to namely	124,686:209\$
Paper money issued to March 31 last	81,749:2748
Bank paper issued to February 21 last	42,936:935
The effective issue of the banks was-	
Bank of Brazil	
Bank of Bahia	2,007:000
Bank of Pernambuco	15:100\$

Having nearly concluded the calling in of notes of the Bank of Brazil with the product of the sale of its bullion, and having commenced that of 11,000:000\$ corresponding to the debt due by the treasury to the bank for redemption of paper money, the respective issue is now almost in the state prescribed by the act of September 12, 1866.

PUBLIC REVENUE.

The revenue collected during the fiscal year of 1866-67 amounted, including the deposits, to: 66,756:431\$145.

Being from:

Importation	87,897:058\$576
Maritime dispatch	296:1428687
Exportation	10,674:640\$896
Interior	9,941:4408011
Municipality taxes	2,077:908\$930
Extraordinary	1,457:289\$835
Deposits	4,911:005\$210

Without the deposits it exceeds the estimate of 55,000:000\$ by 6,845:425\$935.

That of 1865-66 amounting with the deposits to 63,271:871\$336, an increase of 3,484:559\$808 took place in 1866-67.

Excluding the deposits of both years the revenue of 1866-67 was greater than that of 1865-66 by 3,602:823\$023.

Comparing the different items of revenue in both it may be seen that the collection of 1866-67 rose above that of 1865-66 in the following:

Importation	3,955:658\$822 or 11.82
Maritime dispatch	5:909\$512 or 2.03
Interior	
Municipality	21:079\$400 or 1.02
And diminished in:	
Exportation	
Extraordinary	278:821\$233 or 16.06

And there was a diminution of 118:273\$215 in deposits.

COTTON.

According to return 97 the export of cotton was in:

1866-67	1,816,387	arrobas	value	28,741:598\$
1865-66	2,899,004	4	44	46,917:409\$
1864-65	1,126,015	"	44	31,558:635

However as the export from Ceara in 1866-67 is altogether wanting together with that of the last half year from Pernambuco, the export of 1866-67 will not have the relation with the other years which would appear from the return.

COMMERCE OF IMPORTATION, EXPORTATION AND NAVIGATION.

The value of the import trade in 1866-67, according to the official data in the treasury, was 43,483:745\$; 22,503:313\$, or 18.6 per cent more than the average of the five years 1861-2 to 1865-6, and 5,716:903\$, or 4.1 per cent, more than 1865-6.

This importation took place in the various provinces in the following proportion, which is compared with 1865-6:

	1865-66.	1866-67.	over in '65-66.
Rio de Janeiro	80.709:0678	20.458:0648	
Bahia	i7.598:941 8	17.878:203	279:2625
Pernambuco	21.088:655	22.211:290\$	1.127:645
Maranhao	2.946:760\$	4.028:383	1.08 :62.8
Para	4.613:218	5.396:704	788:488\$
S. Pedro	6.514:92-8	7.746:076\$	1.281: 448
. Paulo	1.295:948	1.546:755	250:8078
Parana	154:08°\$	287;278	8 :195
Parahyba	26:0678	99:446\$	78: 879 8
Ccara	1.924:546	2.586:978	662:484
Santa Catharina	449:246\$	630:9128	181:666\$
Alagoas	62:250\$	219:5378	157:287\$
Sergipe	6 : 778	17:3908	
Espirito Santo	1:209\$	2:1168	9078
Rio Grande do Norte	80:853\$	171:6548	140:801
Piauoy	298:157	252:957\$	
	136.766:5428	148,488:745\$	6.058:8988

Diminutions occurred: in Rio Janeiro, 251:003\$; Sergipe, 45,787\$, and Piauby, 40,209\$; total, 336,990\$.

The countries whence the importation came in 1866-67 were the following:

Great Britain and possessions. United States France and possessions. La Plata. Portugal and possessions. Hanceatic Cities. Spain and possesaions. Sweden.	58,276:905\$788 4,800:628\$878 23,023:196\$953 12,325:712\$734 5,580:451\$780 4,340:509\$47y 805:419\$990 222:494\$1688
Denmark Russia Coast of Africa Lialy Chile	84:1848495 12:2778800 151:7788425 468:7898695 587:0288100
Belgium	1,888:8558778 910:2688440 8:0178860 28:4008000 6808000
Ports of the Mediterranean. Ports of the Empire. F1 heries. Ports not mentioned.	29:744\$000 1,854:784\$001 1:881\$200 80,747:145\$382
Total	148,488:745\$296

The value of the exports of native production and manufacture to foreign countries was in 1866-67 156,030:906\$, 21,516:502, or 15.9 per cent more than the average of the five years 1861-2 to 1865-66, and less by 1,066:652\$, or 0.67 per cent than in 1865-66.

Each of the provinces of the Empire contributed as follows, compared also with 1865-66:

				e in 1866-67
	1866-67.	1865-66.	More.	Less.
Rio de Janeiro	78,844:227\$	69,628:962	18,215:275	
Babia		19.247:941\$		8,045:6188
Pernambuco	21,436:1418	26,084:468\$		8,648:827\$
Maranbao		6, 188:4198		1,673:5128
Para	8,619:228	6,952:7458	1,666:478\$	
S. Pedro	7,388:977	7,564:9728		175:996
S Paulo	6,718:897	7,870:766		1,157:369\$
Parana	2,099:434	1,569:286	5:0:148\$	
Parahyba	4,204:062\$	6,695:290\$		2,49.:328\$
Ceara	3,253:468	8,180:558\$	72:910	
Santa Catharina	490:830	518:862\$	• • • • • • •	2,7582
Alagoas	4,106:557\$	7,582:212		3,475:654\$
Sergipe	1,233:157	1,391:310\$	• • • • • • • •	158:4738
Espirito Santo		14:555		14:555\$
Rio Grande do Norte	630:1468	1,348:8118		728:665
Pianhy	288:4528	248:892	89:260\$	•••••
Total	1 × 0 000 000 000	157.087:568\$	15.524:0718	16 5 90 728

The countries whither the exports of 1866-67 went were the following:

Ruseis	46 :669\$717	United States	31,188:0668047
Sweden	778:1118068		7,014:2078881
Holland	80 :856\$944	Turkey	149:8478716
Hanseatic cities	4,816:242\$458	Denmark	918,680#980
Great Britain and pos-		Coast of Africa	448,869\$272
sessions	87,288:9741040	Channel	16,511:891\$087
France & possessions.	18,582:278#631	Ports of the Baltic an t	•
Spain & possessions	165:887\$149	Mediterranean	1,863:562\$864
Portugal & possessions	4,847:275\$259	Ports not known	80,885:6598000
Belgium	828:048\$841	Consumption	42:642\$178
Austria	61:3818600	· -	
Italy	784:4008624	Total	156,020:906\$766
Chile	414:9088411		•

The total of the direct importation and the national exportation abroad was in—

1867-67 Compared with 1866-66, namely	299,504:551 \$ 294,854:400 \$
There was an augment of	4,650:251\$
1865-6, namely	255,484:836\$

-these was an increase of 44,020:815, or 17.2 per cent.

The value of the importation with certificate (carta de guia) was in 1865-67 24,902:670\$, 823:969\$, or 3.4 per cent more than in 1865-6, 2,448:821\$, or 12.6 per cent more than the average of the five years 1861-2 to 1865-6.

The re-exportation in 1866-67 arose to 1,786,052\$, 447,993\$, or 33.4 per cent more than in 1865-6, and 377,686\$, or 26.8 more than the average of 1861-2 to 1865-6.

The number of national and foreign vessels cleared in the foreign trade of 1866-67 was—

Entered 3,489 vessels	1,245,214 tons	51,450 men. 49,655 "
-including nationals-		
Entered 255 vessels	43,579 tons	

MICHIGAN CENTRAL BAILROAD.

This important road extends from Detroit to Chicago, 284.8 miles, and forms one link in the great chain of roads between New York and the latter city, on the most corthern route. The company also leases the Joliet and Indiana Railroad, extending from Lake Station to Joliet a distance of 44.5 miles, making the total length operated by the company 329.3 miles. The annual report of operations for the year ending May 31, 1868, has just been issued, from

which it appears that there has been a falling off of \$102,718 in the receipts from passenger traffic, and an increase of \$195,452 on the earnings from freight; the expenses of the year have also been less by \$112,231, which makes the net earnings \$257,620 larger than in the previous fiscal year.

The decrease in receipts from passenger traffic is attributed to a reduction in rates of fare, and also to the diversion of passengers by competing lines, chi fly through the system of allowing commissions on the sale of tickets, which the Michigan Central Company refuses to do. The increase from freights is principally due to the completion of the third rail on the Great Western Railroad of Canada, and the Iron Ferry train steamer at Detroit, thus allowing freight cars to go through by that route without breaking bulk.

The results of operations for the past five years have been as follows:

EARNINGS.

Passengers	1863-64.	1864-65.	1865-66.	1866-67.	1967-68.
	\$1,969,415	81,771,814	\$2,061,835	\$1,824,926	\$1,721,506
(Av. p. pass. p. m.) cents	. 2.073.274	2,233,529			2,480,974
(Av. p. ton p. m.) cents	98,8 59	8·06 140 076	2 60 176,568	2 49 215,748	2·45 298,402
Total gross carnings	\$8,484,548	\$4,145,419	\$4,446,490	\$4,825,491	\$4,476,879
	1,720,125	2,406,149	2,808,876	2,826,777	2,714,545
Net earnings per cent	\$1,714,493	\$1,789,270	\$1,638,114	\$1,498,714	\$1,756,334
	49·92	41.96	86.94	84·65	89·28

The general income account, varying somewhat from the above figures, exhibits the total revenue and disbursements as in the following statement:

	1863 4.	1884-5.		1866-67.	
Balance from prev. years	£172.636	\$1.002.894	270:4883	\$460,803	2448,450
Receipts from earnings	,417,186	4,121,218	4,415,279	4,888,705	4,480,250
Total revenue	4.189.822	25,124,107	25,159,664	24,794,507	\$4,928,68

EXPENSES.

From which amounts were disbursed as follows:

	1863-64	1864-65.	1965-66.	1856-67.	1867-68.
Expenses	\$1,720,125	\$2,406,149	\$2,808,876	\$3,826,777	22,714,545
Binking fund		84,500	84,500	84,500	84,500
Interest and exchange	600,217	621,691	648,726	628,081	646,170
Cash dividends—July	(6) 863,489	(12) 757,889	(4) 259,648	(5) 849, 185	(5) 406,023
" —Jan	(6) 368,483	(6) 878,941		(0) 875,185	(5) 408,860
Stock dividend, July, 165	••	••••	(6) 389,472		••••
U.S. tax on dividends	21,758		55,798	96,926	57,817
" on receipts	8 1,469	95,260	118,881	60,503	48,518
Total disbursements	\$8,186,928	84,415,722	\$4,698,861	\$4,751,057	\$4,441,487
Balance to next year	\$1,002,894	\$701,885	\$460,808	\$443,450	\$582,218

GENERAL BALANCES.

The general balances are shown in the following accounts, as of May 31, yearly:

	1864.	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
Capital stock	\$6,815,906	\$6,491,836	86,982,866	\$8,070,068	88,477,866
Bonds			7,463,489	7,268,989	
U. S. tax on coupons		158		4	83
Unpaid dividends	1,598	660	1.039	965	914
Jack-on, Lansing and					
Saginaw RR. Co				233,469	
Bills and sundries		15 499	279.915		
Balance of income		708, 85	460,803	418,450	532,943

Total	\$15.088.899	S14 .781.570	£15.188.190	\$16.017 K43	@18 09) 518

Per contra the following are shown:

Construction, &c	807,841 168,225	\$18,805,576 174,0:6 224,606 168,225	\$14,816,423 288,065 75,750 169,225	\$14,980,814 : 209,887 833,660 168,225	\$14,914,167 158,739 854,878 168, 225
acct. Land accounts Arects in officers h'ds	75,736		145,787	8,055 122,036 152,110 92,758	105,000 122,008 144,551 67,457

Total......\$15,066,822 \$14,781,570 \$15,188,190 \$16,017,548 \$16,029,546

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

The Luan Market-Rates of Loans and Discounts—The Ease in Money—Bonds sold at New York Stock Exchange Board—Prices of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at London—Closing Quotations at Regular Board—Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Foreign Exchange.

The chief characteristic of June has been an unusual inactivity of trade. This condition of things is partially due to the unusual lateness of the summer season, besides being in the nature of a reaction from the extraordinary stringency of money during March and April. The position of the banks necessitated at that period the withdrawal of mercantile and industrial advances, which naturally, for a period, produced a curtailment of operations and a depression of confidence, the effects of which we are now experiencing. At the same time, business is perhaps more than at any former time feeling the results of taxation in a general economizing of expenditures.

As usual at periods of commercial stagnation, there has been an extraordinary case in the loan market. Although, at the commencement of the month, there was an increase of several millions of currency in the Treasury, yet there has been a steady flow of the legal tender circulation into the banks, while the accreantile deposits have very materially increased. Although the rate of interest on demand loans has ranged at 3@4 per cent, and was for a day or two even 1 per cent below that rate, yet the banks have found it necessary, for the employment of their large balances, to buy, to an unusual extent, government securities. The following statement will show the present condition of the banks compared with their position at the beginning of June and at the current date in 1867:

	June 27, 1863.	May 30, 1868.	June 29, '67.
Loans and discounts	\$276,504,0.0	\$268,117,u00	\$242,5:7,000
Specie	7,753,000	17,861,006	7,769,000
Circulation	. 84,048,000	84,145,000	83,542,000
Depos ts	. 214,302,0 0	204,746,000	186,218,000
Legal Tenders	. 78.858.000	65,638, 00	70,174,000

T e fo lowing are the rates of Loans and Discounts for the month of May:

RATES OF LOANS AND DISCOUNTS.

	June 5.	June 12.	June 19.	June 26.
Call loans	8 @ 5	8 @ 4	8 @ 4	8 @ 4
Loans on Bonds and Mortgage	-@ 7	-@ 7	-@ 7	-@ 7
A 1, endorsed bills, 2 mos	5 @ 6	5 @ 6	410 5	5 @ 6
Good endorsed bills, 8 & 4 mos	5100 7	51@7	5 @ 7	6@7
" single names	6 @ 8	6 @ 8	6 @ 8	6 @ 8
Lower grades	— <u>@</u> —	— @—	- @-	- @-

This extraordinary ease in money, though favorable to special activity in stock speculation, has not been productive of that result. On the contrary, there has been an unusual duliness in stock operations. This fact is the more remarkable, considering that the earnings of the railroads have exhibited a large increase. and that wealthy cliques have for some time been carrying very heavy amounts of stocks in anticipation of an active "campaign" during the Summer ease in money As will be seen from a subjoined statement, the total sales of railroad stocks at both stock boards in June were only 973,(00 shares, against 1 554,000 shares during the same month of last year. Strong efforts have been made by the combinations to encourage speculative transactions, and special inducements have been offered in the way of liberal stock dividends; but the speculative habitues of Wall street have refused to respond, while the class of merchants who are apt at this season to employ idle balances in a "turn" at stocks, have scarcely been s en in the street. This singular avoidance of speculation is, to some extent, due to its being understood that stocks were generally in the hands of cliques, desirous of unloading upon the "street;" but a more influential cause appears to have been a feeling of distrust of railroad stocks, engendered by the recent exposures in the courts of corrupt management, and by the daily accumulating evidence that the roads are managed, to a large extent, with a view to the speculative convenience of directors. Moreover, the conviction appears to be gaining ground, that the intrinsic value of railroad stocks has not improved, during late years, at all in proportion to the advance in their market price. The following statement shows the sales of the several classes of stocks at the open board, and the New York Stock Exchange in June, 1868 and 1867.

Classes.		1867.	1868.	Increase.	'Dec.
Bank shares	** ***********************************	8.584	1,659	••••	1,925
Kailroad "	******* *******************************	1,554,112	973,064		581,049
Coal "	***************************************	9,522	2,242		7,280
Mining "	*******************************	86,208	80,554		5,654
Improv'nt "	***************************************	81,533	16,775		14,760
Telegraph "	*******	53,173	24,778	••••	28,399
Steamship"	**** **********************************	76,656	82,726	6.070	
Expr'ss&c"	***************************************	57,941	51,821	••••	6,620
Motol T		4 030 000	1 100 114		040 040
	DDe		1,183,114		639,640
·· —81	nce January 1	11.889.869	10.317.619		1.022.216

But while speculation has avoided railroad shares, it has been more active than at any previous period in Government securities. The near prospect of the completion of the funding process and of the consolidation of the debt into a permanent form, have produced a favorable effect upon the Government credit; while the maturing of unusually heavy interest disbursements at the Trensury in July, and the falling due of the loan of 1848 on J by 1, have induced the expectation of a large demand for bonds in July. The consequence has been a very active speculation by both dealers and outside operators, advancing prices to unprecedented figures. While, therefore, there has been a decrease upon June, 1867, cf 35 per cent on the board sales of railroad stocks, the transactions in Governments have amounted to \$32,457,000 against \$15,137,000 in 1867, an increase of 115 per cent, as shown in the following statement.

BONDS SOLD AT TH	E N. Y. STOCK	EXCHANGE	BOARD.	
Classes.	1867.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
L. S. bonds	\$14,042,750	\$31,231,870	\$17,192,190	8
U. S. notes	1,095,850	1,226,000	180,650	
St'e & city b'ds	2,625,950	9,610,500		
Company b'ds	757,000	1,050,100	293,200	
Total—June	\$18,521,050	\$43,121,570	\$24,600,520	
" -since Jan. 1	88,800,780	165,045,120	76,744,890	

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of June, as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of	~6's, 1	L881.~		-6's, (l	5- 3 0 yr	.) Cou	ron	6	's.10-40	7-80.
month.	Coup.	Reg.	1862.	1864.	1865.	new.	1867.	1868. v	rs.O'pn	.2d sr.
1		111%	119%	110%	110%	118	118%	****	106%	109%
2	116%		1131	110%	110%	1181	118%		105%	109%
8	116K	111%	112%	110%	110%	1183	118%		106	1097
4	1163	,	1131	110%	110%	1131	1181		106	109%
5	116%	1127	112%	1101	1102	118	1187		106	109%
6		/6	1:2%	1102	1103		118%		106%	109%
8	116%	111%	112%	110%	110	118	1183		106	109%
9	116%	iiix	113%		110%	j18	118	••••	106	109%
10.	116%	iii%	1122	110%	110%	1133	112%	••••	106	109%
11	116%		1127	110	110%	112%	112%	••••	105%	109%
	116	iii×	1111	109%	110		1123	••••	105%	109
12	116%	iii	112%	1101	110%	1127	113%	*****	106	
13	117		1:2%	110%		1183	114	•• •		109%
15		• • • • •		1107	110% 111		114	••••	106%	110
16	1171	41017	113%	110%		118%		1000	106%	110
17	44411	112%	113	111	111	118%	114	109%	106%	
18	117%	••••	118	110%	110%	118%	118%	109X	1061	109%
19	1173	• • • • •	1181	110%	2222.	113%	114	109%	106%	109%
20	117%	••••	113%	110%	1111	114	114%	••••	::::.	110
22	117%	22222	113%	111%	111%	114%	114%	11111	106%	110
23	117%	119%	113%	1111	1111	114%	11434	110%	107%	1101
24	113	118%	113%	111%	1117	114	114%	110	1073	110
25	117%	118%	1131	110%	111%	118%	114		107%	110
26	117%	118%	118%	111	111%	118%	114	110	107%	
27	••••		1181		11136	118%	113%		107	• • • • •
29	117%		118%	111	11116	114%	114%	110	107%	
80		1181	113%	110%	1111%	113%	114		1071	
First	116%	111%	112%	110%	110%	118	1181/4	109%	106⅓	109%
Lowest	116%	111%	111%	109 %	110	1123	112%		105 K	109%
Highest	118	118%	118%	1111	111%	114%	1141		107%	110%
Range	11/	21/	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	*	1%	1%
Last	117%	118	118%	110%	1113	113%	114	110	107%	110

The closing prices of Five-Twenties at Frankfort in each week ending with Thursday, were as follows:

June 4.	June 11.	June 18.	June 25.	Month.
771	77%	77%	77%	71X@71X

The closing prices of Consols for money and certain American securities (viz. U. S. 6's 5-20's 1862, Illinois Central and Erie shares) at London, on each day of the month of June are shown in the following statement:

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

	Cons	Am.	securi	ties.				secur	
Date.			Ill.C.		Date.			Ill.C.	
	mon.	0-206	8n B.	808.		mon.	3-2008	BH 8.	IRTI.B.
Monday 1		(Holi	day.)	(Monday22	95	78%		45%
Tues 2	9634	72%		46%	Tuesday28	94%		1011	45%
Wedne 8		72%		45%	Wednerday24	91%		1011	45%
Thurs 4		721	97%	45%	Thu sday25	94%		101%	
Friday 5	95	72%	97X		Friday26			101%	45%
Sat'day	95 ⅓			45%	aturday	94X		101	46×
Monday 8	96%		100%	40%	Monday29	94%		101%	46 ×
Tuesdy 9			100% 101%		Tuesday80	94%	1078	101%	45%
Wedn'y10 Thursday11			100%	46×	Lowest	94%	72%	9734	4516
Friday12			100%	46	Highest			101%	
Sat'day18			100%	46	Range			41	
Monday 15			1001	46					
Tus'day16		73.7		46	Low) go	91%	70%	84%	4136
Wednesday17		73	99%	45%	Hig Sa	96%		101%	
Thursday 19	95	781	99%	45%	Rig di	4%	82	16%	6%
Friday	95		100%		Last	94%	73%	1013	45%
Saturday)	(Holi	day.)	1			1		

The following are the closing quotations at the regular board June 5, compared with those of the five preceding weeks:

	May 22.	May29.	June 5.J	nne 12.	June19. J	une 26
Cumberland Coal	86		8414	84	••••	
Quicksilver	8034	24 %	261	26%	25%	2436
Canton Co	60	5132	51	50		493
Mariposa pref	ğ		•••	714	936	- ₹¥
New York Central	129	188%	132 4	1843	18374	184€
Erle	68 %	72%	69%	707	693	694
Trainer Diese						
Hudson River	188	148%	1411	14134	140	140
Reading	98	9434	94	961	100 🖌	10434
Michigan Southern	8734	88	89 3 4	8934	9032	92%
Michigan Central	••••	11934	11934	120		• • • •
Cleveland and Pittsburg	81 36	8814	86%	87%	8034	9036
Cleveland and Toledo	1673	10936	105%	107%	1073	10334
Northwestern		60%	6834	69 %	xd65	6934
" preferred		79%	81 34	8134	xd77¥	7937
Rock Island	9534	97.36	109	108%	105%	105 ¥
Fort Wayne	1091	110%	111	1111	111%	11936
Illinois Central		148)	150	15436		156
Ohio and Missiesippi	80%	81 🔏	••••	29%	29%	80%

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of May and June, 1868:

		X	y			Jur	e.——	
Railroad Stocks—	Open.	High.	Low.	Clos'g	Open.	High. I	Low.	Clos.
Alton & Terre Haut	45	4934	43	48	48	48	48	48
do do pref	78	78%	66	7034	68%	68%	67	6736
Boston, Hartford & Brie		15%	15	15	15%	151	151	151
Baffalo N. Y. & Erie		-		10	85	85	83	85
Chicago & Alton		128	127%	127 %	129	123	129	188
do do pref	. 199	126%	128	1283	130	136	130	186
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy		150	149	150%	151	154	151	154
do & Gt. Eastern	• • • • • •	•:::	•::	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	85	8736	35	8734
do & Northwest'n		70	63	69	68%		651	71.3
do do pref		80%	75	79 %	80	8436	7734	77.36
do & Rock Island		98%	931	9736	97	105%	96%	103⅓
Cleve., Col., Cin. & Ind		• • • •			91%	94	9036	1038
do Painesv. & Ashta	. 102%	1081	102	198	100	107	1003	1003
do & Pittsburg		89	8836	٤8	88%	91 1/4	8n 💥	89
do & Toledo		110%	1051	109	109%	1103	103	1033
Del., Lack & Western		125	118)	1251	124%	12474	123	198
do do scrip		117	117	117	••••			
Dabuque & Sioux city					78	78	78	78
Erie		7234	683		68%		68	68%
do pref		77	74	76	75%		75	
Harlem		• • •	17		197	127		75
Mariem		88	***				122	122
Hannibal & St. Joseph			78	80	80%		8034	1534
_ do _ do pref		87	. 88 3 K	87%	. 86	91	86	87
Hudson River		144	186	142	1413/		138	1401
Illinois Central	. 146%	148%	145%	148	149	158	149	157
Ind. & Cincinnati					58	53	50	50
Mar. & Cincin., 1st pref		293≰	27	2834	2∾1∢	29	283≰	2836
do 2d pref	. 10	10	10	10	1036	10%	10	10
Michigan Central	. 116	121	118	120	120	12131	117%	118
دُن S. & N. Ind	. 90%	9134	8214	88 %	89	93 🖟	8934	92
Mil. & P. du Ch'n, 1st pr		104	100	104	103	105	103	105
de do 2d pr		97	9136	97	98	98	98	98
Kilwankee & St. Paul	. 6436	6734	62	67	66%	67	F236	6514
do do pref		79%	7434			791	7634	78
Morris & Essex	. 65	65	65	65	63	65	65	65
New Jersey	. 183	188	138	188	•	•	•	00
do Central		120	116	119%	119%	126	11976	12436
New York Central	1001	184	1371			136%	1321	
					151			184
	. 130	159	150	151	100	151	145	145
Norwich & Worcester		****		. "		95	90	93
Ohio & Mississippl	. 813	8:36	2934		8034	81 1	29	29%
_do do pref		80	78	80	793		79	79
Panama	. 815	8301		8301			320%	
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica		116	104	116	116	116%	1091	109
Reading	. 90	96%		95	953		93%	101
Reneselaer & Saratoga	. 86%	8934	86%	893		95%	90	953≰
Rome & Watertown		• • • •			118	118	118	118
Toledo, Wab. & Western		52	49	51%	51 %	51%	46	481
do do do pret		69	69	69	69	69	69	69

Miscellaneous-								
American Coal	48	48	48	48				
Ashburton do	8	816	2	8				
Central do					50	50	50	50
Cumberland Coal	83	8516	83	8534	3534	85%	83 🖌	18
Del. & Hud. Canal Coal	1*8	165	156%	164	1683	163 😿	138	18434
Pacific Mail	91%	97	9034	95	95	103%	95	991
Atlantic do	85	85	31%	84	80	30	30	80
Union Navigation	20	26	20	2436	2634	2636	28%	261
Boston Water : ower		211	201	201	2036	28	17%	19
Canton		52	49	5134	5134	51%	49	50
Cary Improvement	816	834	836	8)4		•••		
Brunswick City	-/-	-/3		-/-	4	9	4	834
Mariposa		6	5	5	5	5	8	4
do pref		111	934	934	836	934	634	8%
Quickeilver.	2736	32 ×	273	29	29%	293	22%	22
Citizen's Gas		144	144	144				
West. Union Telegraph	37%	88%	36%	381	8814	3834	33%	311/
Bankers & Brokers Ass	113	118	1093	1123	ĭĭî	11436	106	106
Union Trust		120	120	120		****	200	
				2-0	••••	••••	••••	••••
Express-	-	64		~~	~~		4017	400.
American		61	58	58	58	5436	42%	4634
Adams		63	563	56 / €	56%	58	51%	52%
United States	601	6134	55%	56	56	56	45	48
Merchant's Union		81%	28	28%	28	29	24	2514
Wells, Fargo & Co	261	27	22	25%	251/4	28	23%	263

In most respects the specie movement has run closely parallel with that of June, 1867. The month opened with \$3,244,000 more gold in the banks than list year, and the receipts from Cal fornia were \$1,364,511 larger than then, while the imports of specie and the coin interest payments of the month were together \$686,000 higher, making a total increase in supply of \$5,294,000; but as the exports of specie show an increase of \$4,615,000, and the customs payments a gain of \$166,000, it results that the specie in the banks at the close of the month is about the same as a year ago.

The following formula furnishes the details of the general movement of coin and bullion at this port for the month of June, 1867 and 1868, comparatively:

GENERAL MOVEMENT OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK.

In banks, near first Receipts from California. Imports of coin and bullion. Coin interest paid.	2,568,773 497,477	1868. \$17,861,068 8,983,294 640,923 1,779,749	#3,244,023 1,364,511 143,446 542,667	Decrease \$
Total reported supply Exports of coin and bullion Customs duties	\$6,348,529	\$24,215,044 \$10,968,582 8,206,096	\$5,294,652 \$4,615,051 165,932	\$
Total withdrawn	\$14,868,643	\$19,169,678	24 ,781,085	\$
Excess of reported supply	\$4,531,749 7,768,996	\$5,045,366 7,753,800	8	\$293,454 15,696
Derived from unreported sources	\$3,237,247	\$2,707,984	\$	\$529,813

It is not easy to find any special reason for the fact that while the result of the movement so closely resembles that of last year, yet the price has ranged about 3 points higher. It is generally conceded that the Government credit stands higher now than a year ago, of which the advance in bonds is an evidence; yet the gold premium in no sense reflects this improvement. The largeness of the exports of gold may have had some influence in causing this variation from the premium of a year ago; but from the above statement it will be noticed that this enlarged export movement is set off by about an equal gain in supply. The following exhibits the fluctuations of the New York gold market in the month of June, 1868.

		COU	Man C	ann	D AT NEW YORK.				
Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st.	Closing.	Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st.	Closing.
Monday 1 Tassday 2 Wednesday 3 Thursday 4 Yriday 5 Saturday 6 Monday 8 Tuesday 9 Wednesday 9	139% 140 140 140 139% 139% 139%	139% 139% 140 139% 139% 139%	140% 140% 140% 140 139% 139%	140% 140% 140 189% 139% 139% 139%	Monday 29 Tuesday 23 Wednesday 24 Thursday 25 Friday 26 Saturday 27 Moodey 29 Tuesday 30	14036 14036 14036 14036 14036 14036	140 14 150 14036 140 140 140	140% 140% 140% 140% 140% 140%	140% 140% 140% 140% 140%
Thursday 11 Friday 12 Saturday 13 Monday 15 Tuesday 16 Wednesday 17	139% 140 140 140% 140%	139% 139% 139% 140 140% 140%	140 140 140 140 140 140 141 141	140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140	June 1868	136% 140% 138 194 146%	136% 187% 135% 193 140%	188% 167% 147% 250	1583 1583 141 1473 1473

the remittances of importers.

The following exhibits the quotations at New York for bankers' 60 days bills on the principal European markets daily in the month of June, 1858:

CO	URSE OF FORE	IGN EXCHANG	EE (60 DAYS)	AT NEW 1	ORK.	
	London.	Paris. centimes	Amsterdam.	Bremen. cents for	Hamburg. cents for	Berlin. cents for
Days.	54 pence,	for dollar.	tlorin.	rix dader.	M. banco.	thaler.
1	110%@110%	513%@512%		79%@80	2636663636	71360072
2	110米@110星	513%@512%	41年回41元	79%@80	361, 60361	7134@72
8	110%@110%	518%@512%	411/041%	79% @80	26% 面36%	713,0072
4	110%@110%	518 631236	41%@41%	79% @80	86 % @ 36 %	713,0072
5	110%@110%	5131/2 @5121/2	41 4 (0) 41 34	793(@80	86 4 @ 364	713,0072
6	110%@110%	5185 @51256	414/041%	79%@80	8614663614	71% @72
8	110%@110%	518 4 @ 512 16	415(@415)	79%@80	3 34 60 36 34	7136@72
9	110% @110%	5183/@51236	41 4 (0)41 %	79% @80	36% @36%	713,072
10	110%@110%	5131, @51214	411/041%	793 680	36%@38%	71% @72
11	110%@110%	513%@512%	413(@41%	79% @80	36%@36%	7136@72
19	110 @110%	518% @512%	415(@41%	79% @ 79%	36% @36%	711,0073
18	110 @110%	513% @512%	415604136	79%@79%	861/0861/	71% @72
15	110 @110%	513% @512%	415 (0415)	79%@79%	36%@36%	713/0072
16	110 @110%	513%@512%	41 4 @ 4136	79% @79%	86%@36%	711072
17	210 @110%	518% @512%	4116/04136	79%@79%	36%@36%	711/072
18	110 @110%	51836/051236	415(@41%	79%@79%	86 6 6 36 5	
19	110 @110%	513%@512%	411/0/41%	79%@79%	3614@3614	71% @ 72
20	110 @110%	5131/051216	415/0415/	79%@79%	3614 @ 3614	715 @ 72
	110 @110%	5131/051216	41%@41%	79% @ 79%		71%@79
23	110 @1103		411/0/41%	79% @79%	86%@36%	71%@72
23	110 @110%	51314@51214			36% @36%	7134@72
24		513%@512%	411/041%	79% @ 79%	36米@36基	71%@72
25	110 (0.110)/	513%@512%	414@41%	79% @79%	36563656	7154@72
<u>26</u>	110 @110%	513%@612%	411/0411/	79%@79%	36%@36%	715 @ 72
27	110 @110%	513% @512%	411/041%	79% @79%	8614 @ 3614	71% 6072
29	110 @110%	5131 @5125	411/041%	79%@79%	36 %@36 %	711, 0,72
30	110%@110%	513美@512美	411/0411/	79×@79¥	36 km36 km	7114@72
June, 1868]	110 @110% 109%@110%	513%@512% 518%@511%	41¼@41½ 40%@41½	79%@80 78%@73%	86 % @ 36 % 86 @ 86 %	71 % @ 72 72 @ 72 %

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1:

	_		CILL DAME.			
Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
			\$84,134,391	\$187,070,786	\$62,111,201	
January 4	\$249,711,297	\$ 12,724,614				\$ 483,266,304
January 11.	253,170,723	19,422,856	84.094.187	194,835,525	64,753,116	553,884,525
			84,071,006	205,883 143	66,155,241	
January 18	256,083,938	23,191.867			00,100,241	6 19,797,369
January 25	258,892,101	25,106,800	84.0-2.762	210,093,084	67.154.161	528.503.223
February 1	266,415,618	23,955,320	44,062,521	218,880,524	65,197,153	637,449,928

Date. Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Legal Tend's.	Ag.clear'gs.
February 8 270,555,35	6 22,823,879	81,096,834	217,844,518	55,846,959	597,942,595
February 15 271,015,97	0 24,192,955	84,048,296	216,759,828	68,471,769	550,521,185
February 21 267,768,64	8 22,518,987	84,100,028	209,095,851	60,868,980	452,421,592
February 29 267,240,67	8 22,091,442	84,0 6,228	208,651,578	58,553,607	705,100 784
March 7 269,156,68	6 20,714,248	34,158 957	207,787,080	57,017,044	619,219,598
March 14 266,816,03		84,218,881	201,188,470	54,738,866	691,277,641
March 21 261,476,90	0 17,944,308	84,212,571	191,191,526	52,261,086	649,482,341
March 28 257,878,24		84,190,808	186,525,128	52,128,178	557,848,908
April 4 254,287,89	1 17,077,299	84,227,108	280,956,846	51,709,706	567,788,188
April 11 252,936,72	5 16,848,150	84,194,272	179,851,880	51,982,609	493,871,451
April 18 254,817,93	6 16,776,54%	84,218,581	181,882,523	50,538,660	628,713,923
April 25 252,314,61	7 14,948,547	84,227,624	180,807,489	58,866,757	502,734,154
May 2 257,623,67	2 16,166,878	84,114,848	191,206,185	57,863,599	588,717,902
May 9 265,755,88	8 21 286,910	84,205,409	199,276,568	57,541,527	507,028,567
May 16 267,724,78	8 20,939,142	84,193,249	201,813,305	57,613,095	480,186,908
May 23 267,881,27	9 20,479,947	84, 183 (3 8	202,507.550	62,233,003	488,785,142
May 80 268,117,49	0 17,861,088	84,145,606	204,746,964	65,633,964	602,118,248
June 6 273,792,76	7 14,828,581	84,188,159	209,089,655	68,822,028	640,663,329
≠nne 13 275,142,02	4 11,193,631	74,166,84 6	210,670,765	69,202,840	580,828,197
June 10 274,117,60	8 9,124,830	84,119,120	211,484,887	72,567,582	553,988,817
June 27 276,504, 3	5 7, 758, 8 00	84,048,791	214,302,207	78,858,303	516,726,075
	PRILADE	LPHIA BANK I	RETURNS.		
Date. Le	egal Tenders.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.
January 4	£16.782.482	\$52,007,804	\$285,912	\$10,689,000	\$86,621,274
January 11	16,037,995	52,593,107	400,615	10,689,096	87,181,830
January 18	16,827,428	53,018,196	820,978	10,641,752	37,457,089
January 25	16,836,937	52,825,599	279,393	10,645,226	87,812,540
February 1	17,064,18	52,604,916	248,678	10,688,927	57,922,257
February 8	17,063,716	52,672,448	287.878	10,685 926	37 396,658
February 15	16,949,944	52,532,946	268,157	10,662,328	87.010,520
February 22	17,573,149	52,428,166	204,929	10,632,495	36,453,464
February 29	17,877,877	52,459,757	211,365	10.634.484	85,798,314
March	17,157,954	53,081,665	232,180	10,633,713	34,826,861
March 14	16,662,299	53,367,611	251,051	10,631,399	94,523,550
March 21	15,664,946	53,677,837	229,518	10,643,613	8 3,8 3 6,99 6
March 28	14,848,891	63,450,878	192 858	10,643,606	32,428,390
April 4	13, 3 8,625	52,209,234	215,835	10,642,670	31,278,119
April 11	14,194,385	52,256,949	250,240	10,640,932	32,255,671
April 20	14,493,287	52, 989,780	222,729	10,640,479	83,950,952
April 27	14,951.106	52,812 6 a 3	204,699	10,640,312	81,767,290
May 4	14,990,833	53,333,740	814,866	10,631,041	85,109,987
May 11	15,166,017	58,771,794	897,778	10,629,0 5	84,017,596
May 18	15,881,5+5	53,491,588	8 8,525	10,682,665	86,030,063
May 25	15,823,099	58, 68,225	290,802	10,661,276	36,000,297
June 1	16,184,863	53,562,449	239,871	10,626,937	36,574.457
June 8	16,074,308	53,491 364	226,581	10,630 945	42,910,499
June 15	15,837,117	53,122,521	175,803	10,680,979	48,016,968
June 22	15,993,145	53,381,820	182.711	10,631,920	43,243,562
June 29	16,414,877	53,072,878	198,56 8	10,630,307	43,936,629

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Ca	ipital Jan. 1	, 1866, \$41,90	00,000.)		
•	-	Legal		Circula	ttion
Date. Loans.	Specie.	Tenders.	Deposits.	National.	State.
January 8 \$31.960,249	\$1,466,946	\$15,548,169	\$40,856,022	\$24,636,559	\$228,730
January 13 97,800,239	1,276,987	15,560,965	41,496,320	24,757,965	227,953
January 20 97,438,463	926,942	15,832,769	41,904,161	24,700,001	217,372
Japuary 27 97,438,435	841,196	16,849,687	43,991,170	14.564.106	226,218
February 3 96,895,260	777,627	16,738,229	42,891,128	24,628,103	221,660
February 10 97,978,916	652,939	16,497,643	42,752,0n7	24,850,926	221,700
February 17 98,218,828	605,740	16.561 4-1	41 502,550	24,850,055	220,452
February 24 97,469,436	616,953	16,309,501	40,887,614	24,686,212	216,490
March 2 100,243,692	683,S:2	16,304,846	40,954,936	21,876,089	2 5,214
March 9 101,559,861	807,174	15,550,696	89,770,418	24,987,700	210,162
March 16	918,485	14,5,2,342	89,276,514	25,062,415	197,720
March 23 100,109,595	798,606	13,712,560	37,022,546	25,094,253	197.259
March 80	685,034	18,736,033	86,184,640	24,983,417	197,079
April 6 97,020,925	731,540	13,001,924	36,008,157	25,175,194	168,023
April 13 97,850,230	873,487	12,522,033	86,422,929	24,213,014	167,018
April 20	805,486	11,905,603	86,417,890	24,231,053	166,962
April 27 98,302,343	577, 63	12,2:8.543	86,259,946	25,231,978	164,331
May 4 97,624,197	815,469	12,656,190	37,635,406	25, 203, 234	160.385
May 11 107,889,283	1,183,668	11,962,368	87,358,776	25,225,178	145,248
May 18 96,038,594	1,186,881	12,199,422	37,844,743_	25,234 465	160,241
May 25 97,041,720	1,018,809	12,848,141	88,398,141	25,210,660	160,151
June 1 97,458,997	766,553	14,188,806	40,811,569	25,204,939	159,560
June 8 98 116,632	681,149	14,368,900	41,470,876	25,194,114	159,813
June 15 99,518,988	561,990	14,373,575	41,738,706	25,190,565	159,150
June 22 99,389,634	476,438	14,564,614	42,593,871	25,197,817	158,908
June 29 99,477,074	486,699	15,195,550	42,506,816	25,182,920	158,812

THE

MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE

AND'

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

AUGUST, 1868.

THE IRON AND STEEL PRODUCED IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE—INTEREST-ING STATISTICS.

In connection with a recent discussion upon the iron trade of the Continent, as compared with that of Great Britain, some important statistics were made public in accordance with a motion made in Parliament by Mr. Laird, the member for Birkenhead, the well known iron shipbuilder of that place. The statistics furnish us with information relative to the quantity and value of iron and steel, manufactured and unmanufactured, imported into Great Britain from Belgium and France, and also similar information relative to the whole export trade in these goods by those two countries respectively in each year, from 1862 to 1866. The importations to Great Britain of iron and steel, neither wrought nor unmanufactured, are returned as follows:

	1862. Tons.	18 68. Tons.	1664. Tons.	1865. Tons.	1866. Tona.
Pig iron	0	1	5,148	59	87
Bars, unwrought	10	80	2,615	1,590	1.721
Sheet	1	0	1,664	102	54
Wire	16	123	488	282	258
Rough castings	0	0	19	108	19
Cast	24	41	188	57	67
Hoops	0	0	7	0	8
Old broken and cast iron	85	184	1,469	1,018	861
Steel, unwrought	141	102	122	89	186
Old broken steel	0	0	0	84	40

1

The total declared or computed value of the iron, not wrought or fully. manufactured, imported from Belgium, was: in 1862, £3,219; 1863, £6,433; 1864, £100,809; 1865, £33,549; 1866, £40,630. The iron and steel wrought or manufactured, also imported into Great Britain from Belgium in the respective periods indicated, are returned in cwts., and they are as follows: swords, cutlasses, matchlets, bayonets, gun-barrels gun locks, cannon and mortars of iron, not mounted, nor accompanied with carriages, 1,897 cwts. in 1862; 170 in 1863; 853 in 1864; 514 in 1865, and 280 in 1866. Ornamented articles of iron and steel, 14 cwts. in 1862; 1 cwt. in 1863; 3 in 1864; 20 in 1865; and 1 in 1866. Machinery, wrought castings, tools, cutlery, and other manufactures of iron and steel unenumerated was 15,517 in 1862; 31,268 in 1863; 84,413 in 1864; 214,248 in 1865; and 81,881 in 1866. The money worth of the property of this class sent to Great Britain from Belgium was, in 1862, £41,782; 1863, £41,172; 1864, £79,862; 1865, £132,739, and 1866, £89,224. The unwrought iron and steel received by Great Britain from France are set down as follows:

	1862. Tons.	1863. Tons.	1864. Tons.	1865. Tons.	1866. Tons.
Pig iron	. 28	818	97	41	U
Bars, unwrought	. 60	12	62	81	12
Sheet	. 0	10	260	100	10
Wire	. 8	11	45	369	887
Rough Castings	. 0	2	1	22	2
Slit, or hammered into' rods	. "	0	0	0	20
Cast	. 18	23	74	785	190
Ноорв	. 0	0	8	4	0
Old broken and old cast iron	. 19	80	548	2,016	1,004
Steel, unwrought	61	149	41	54	104
Old broken steel	. 0	0	0	8	8

The total value of the above described products received in Great Britain from France was—in 1862, £1,901; 1863, £5,155; 1864, £8,616; 1865, £26,867, and 1866, £27,753. The iron and steel, wrought or manufactured, also sent to Great Britain from France, are for swords, cutlasses, &c., as enumerated in the Belgian return, 81 cwts. for 1862, 9 for 1863, 380 for 1864, 2 for 1865, and 101 for 1866. Ornamental articles of iron and steel received in 1862 were 55 cwt.; in 1863, 40; in 1864, 97; in 1865, 86; and in 1866, 11. The machinery, wrought castings, tools, &c., as in the Belgian return, are in 1862, 20,008 tons; in 1863, 28,563; in 1864, 15,022; in 1865, 19,544, and in 1866, 46,438 tons. The total value of the iron and steel, wrought or manufactured, imported from France, was—in 1862, £56,118; in 1863, £66,112; in 1864, £48,202; in 1865, £57,176, and in 1866, £92,143. These returns have been obtained from the office of the Inspector General of imports and exports at the London Custom House. Mr. A. W. Fonblanque, of

the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade, supplies that portion of the return which shows the quantities of the several descriptions of iron of Belgian manufacture sent out from that country, not only to the United Kingdom, but also to all other places, during the five years over which the returns extend. The quantities are given in tons of 1,000 kilogrammes each, and the returns are as under:

	1863.	1868.	1864.	1863.	1866.
Ore—				2000.	1000.
To the United Kingdom	9,881	10,788	6,135		1,768
To other Countries	191,078	192,106	189,501	•••••	155,979
Pig and Old—		•	•	•••••	200,010
To the United Kingdom	0	0	5,920	88	299
To other Countries	84,002	22,918	20,087	10,628	15,089
Wrongnt-iron Wire-	-	•	•	,	10,000
To the United Kingdom	22	85	419	•••••	201
To other Countries	1,322	687	1,210	******	740
Wrought-iron Rails-	•		-,	******	140
To the United Kingdom	0	0	3,292	14,110	1,726
To other Countries	46,895	47,824	81,149	108,779	68,902
Wrought-iron (sheet)-	•		,	,,,,,	00,902
To the United Kingdom	0	0	2,776	0	4.0
To other Countries	8,212	10,961	15,861	ŏ	46
Wrought iron of other sorts-	-,-	,	10,002	U	16,849
To the United Kingdom	110	184	8,068	0	400
To other Countries	28,182	88,668	42,878	ŏ	4,9.0
Manufactures of Cast-iron-	,	,	,	v	51,8.5
To the United Kingdom	0	287	7	7	•
To other Countries	8,184	1,414	2,782	5,018	8 7 x o s
Wrought-iron Nails-	-,	-,	0,100	0,010	7,582
To the United Kingdom	905	984	1,186	1,047	3 004
To other Countries	10,975	11,619	11,876	15,112	1,204
Manufactures of Wrought-iron-	,	,	,010	10,112	9,129
To the United Kingdom	29	81	48	0	00
To other Countries	2,511	1,548	2,550	4	28
Machinery of cast-iron-	_,	-,	_,000	*	8,277
To the United Kingdom	118	64	150		_
To other Countries.	5,674	5,792	7,824	0	0
Machinery of Wrought iron and S	teel—	-,	1,044	0	0
To the United Kingdom	80	54	51	^	_
To other Countries	8,824	10,5 18	9,492	0	0
	-,554	20,010	0,202	0	O

A similar return relative to the trade of France in the same class of products, as are enumerated with regard to Belgium, shows that France sent away in

Cre	18 92.	1868.	1884.	1863.	1866.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
To the United Kingdom	1,94 4	20 ,8 08	20,966	15,116	12,095
	62,55 6	45,427	70,081	181,151	125,266
Pig— To the United Kingdom To other countries Wrought Bars—	51 299	381	0 525	0 4 81	0
To the United Kingdom To other countries Wrought Nails—	40 2,405	0 442	22 504	0 755	0
To the United Kingdom To other countries	0	0	0	2,100	0
	1,244	848	11,657	821	822

	1969. Tons.	1868. Tons.	1864. Tons.	1865. Tons.	1866. Tons.
Wrought Sheet (plain and tinned)-		1008.	I Ou s.	14 пв.	TODS.
To the United Kingdom	0	15	61	0	0
To other countries	629	179	238	290	Ŏ
Steel in bars-					•
To the United Kingdom	14	7	20	24	0
To other countries	236	211	198	162	Ŏ
Wrought Wire-					•
To the United Kingdom	0	0	0	8	0
To other countries	171	71	127	148	Ö
Manufactures of cast-iron-		•			
To the United Kingdom	70	80	81	90	66
To other countries	2,517	1,810	2,245	1.916	1,628
Manufacturers of wrought iron-	•				
To the United Kingdom	147	285	275	492	603
To other countries	5 746	4,785	5,922	5,895	5,185
Manufactures of sheet iron and tine	ned plates-		•	•	•
To the United Kingdom	26	28	38	88	88
To other countries	257	227	274	212	276
Machinery (steam)-					
To the United Kingdom	••••		• • • •	• • • •	
To other countries	487	171	1,004	772	••••
Machinery other than steam-			•		
To the United Kingdom	169	146	798	177	• • • •
To other countries	8,91 4	8,182	8,555	8,245	
Machinery (detached pieces)-	•	•	•	•	
To the United Kingdom	23	24	71	76	••••
To other countries	2,480	1,791	1,812	1,855	• • • •
Manufactures of steel—	•	•	•	· ·	
To the United Kingdom	65	82	82	28	20
To other countries	257	227	274	212	276

In remarking upon these statisticts, Mr. Septimus Ledward says:-With reference to Belgium, these returns prove that though we have actually been supplying that country with the raw material in the form of English pig iron, she has been enabled to send the manufactured article largely into our home markets, and, as a matter of course, has competed successfully with us in many of the foreign markets. With our extraordinary mineral resources it is obvious that this state of things results from one of two causes, or perhaps a combination of both; either the British workman has, until lately, been requiring a very extravagant rate of wages for converting pig into manufactured iron, or our British rolling mills are more inferior in construction and our iron masters deficient in skill (as compared with their Belgian and French competitors) in the manipulation and production of the forms and sizes of rolled iron required in the present day. The table at foot shows that during the year 1864 (about the period of the great strikes) an export trade from Belgium to Great Britain, that had not previously existed. sprang up, while their trade with other foreign countries was greatly stimulated by the state of things then existing in our iron trade at home. It will seem strange to many who know something of the ron trade that in the article of rails alone the Belgians actually sent to

England in 1864 and 1865 some thousands of tons. Some writers in the public papers make light of the idea of serious competition from any part of the world in this great and important branch of our national industry; but others who, like myself, have had practical experience of the extent to which, in the production of many descriptions of manufactured iron, our British ironmasters are distanced by their continental competitors are of opinion that this question cannot be too much ventilated or too seriously considered by the puddlers and rollers on the one hand as to wages, and by the proprietors of mills and forges on the other in desirability of increased mechanical skill to enable them to keep pace with their foreign rivals. It is a pity to see British capital driven abroad to be expended among foreign workmen, while many of our rolling mills are closed and the workmen starving; especially is this to be lamented when our very great superior mineral advantages, both as respects coal and iron, are admitted on all hands.

EXPORT OF WROUGHT IRON AND WIRE PROM BELGIUM.

	1862. Tons.	1963. Tons.	1864. Tons.	1865. Tons.	18%. Tons.
Iron wire—					
To the United Kingdom	22	35	419	(*14,110)	201
To other countries	1,822	687	419 1,210	{ *14,110 } { 108,779 }	740
Rails —	•		•		
To the United Kingdom		• • • • •	8,292		1,726
To other countries		47,824	81,159	• • • • • •	68,992
Sheet or plate iron-	•	•	•		•
To the United Kingdom	••••		2,776		46
To other countries	8.212	10.961	15,361		16,848
Wrought iron, other sorts-	,				•
To the United Kingdom.	110	184	8,068		4,069
To other countries	28,132	88,561	42,878	•••••	51,325

In value the progress will be seen by the following figures: Exported of the four descriptions above enumerated—

To Great	Britain in	1862	 £1,177	To other	countries in	1862	£548,918
u	4	1868	 1,946	44	61	1868	664,848
66	44	1864	 75,648	4	u	1864	950,168
44	44	1865	 95,950	66	61	1865	705,697

In addition to the foreign descriptions, Belgium exports annually wrought iron nails to the value of £250,000, of which £20,000 worth come to England yearly.

^{*} In the Parliamentary return for 1865 these four descriptions are not classified.

INFLATED CORRENCY-PARMERS THE GREATEST LOSERS BY IT.

BY R. G. HAZZARD.

An able writer estimates that producers and dealers make an addition of at least one per cent to their prices as compensation for the additional risks of our currency, which will amount to a premium of \$130,000,000 per annum, to be paid by the consumers. This, on his own data, appears to be an under-estimate, and a premium of two per cent for this risk, making an aggregate of \$260,000,000, is probably not too high. The amount is startling, and if this were actually lost to the nation, would be appalling. But fortunately this is not the case, for the excess paid by the consumers is made by the sellers, and the aggregate property in the country is not thereby diminished. So far as the accumulations of the premiums thus paid shall be needed to reimburse the producers and dealers for the actual decline of stocks on hand at the period of resumption, it might be supposed they would be repaid to the consumer, who will then be buying at a less price in consequence of the change in currency: but the aggregate rises and falls from the commencement to the end of inflation must be equal. Hence no portion of this premium charged for its extra risks will really be thus returned, and it amounts to a bonus paid to induce people to take chances which, though in the aggregate just equal, may turn against those who take the risks, and which, by the extent of the fluctuations, may involve them in ruin. A faro bank does not engage in the business of gambling without charging a premium for taking the equal chances of loss or gain. This bonus is not all paid by those who are only consumers. Each producer or dealer charges the premium, and each pays on what he consumes. A charges B two per cent extra for bread, and B charges A two per cent extra for beef, and a portion of the premium is thus neutralized. Those who live on fixed salaries or the income of accumulated property, pay their full quota in proportion to what they consume and get no return. If the farmer gets the two per cent premium on the sale of his product, he is still comparatively a loser. If he has an investment of \$10,000 in his farm and appurtenances, he will not be able to sell over \$2,000 worth of products from it per annum; and of this, as matters now are, he will have no surplus profit over the expenses of producing it, and the cost of living. He gets his premium on this amount but once a year, and buys about as much as he sells; but the articles he buys have, on an average, passed through the hands of four dealers, adding eight per cent to the price.

A dealer who has \$10,000 capital in his business, can turn it at least four times a year; and as he will furnish nothing of his own production, and, with the advantages he derives from the fluctuating currency, can

afford to spend liberally, we will suppose him to expend \$3,000 per annum. The account will then stand thus:

The farmer receives premium on sales of \$2,000 at two per cent	\$40 160
Loss to the farmer per annum	\$120 800 240
Gain to the dealer	8560

This excess of bonus received by dealers, absorbs that paid by those living on salaries or interest, and by farmers and others whose sale of products is small in proportion to the capital and labor employed. If the farmer sold his whole farm and appurtenances four times every year, and got the bonus of two per cent on each sale, he would be on an equality with the dealer. As things are, it is very doubtful whether he gets the two per cent on his sales of \$2,000 per annum. We have a surplus of agricultural products to export, and the price of the whole crop of any kind is measured by what the surplus portion of it is worth to export and sell in competition with foreign producers, who, having a sound currency, do not add any bonus for the risks of dealing in it. In such a competition no such bonus can be added to the price of our products. But the products of the farmers have to pass through the hands of the dealers to the consumers, and here again two per cent bonus is charged by each one, and this cannot be got back from the consumer abroad, for he can buy products not subject to such charge, so that the price which the farmer's products are worth at his door, is again lessened by these premiums paid in its transit to the ship, and the price of this surplus exported thus diminished, as before stated, fixes this price of the whole. If there is more than can be sold at home, the general market price must come to what the surplus will net, after deducting all expenses and charges incident to shipping it, or no one would ship the surplus. The farmer thus loses at both ends; what he sells is diminished, and what he buys is enhanced by the premiums charged for the risks of the currency.

I have before, on some occasion, adverted to an absolute loss which a fluctuating currency entails upon us, in preventing economy in transportation. This applies with peculiar force to our Western farmers. Those who buy their heavy products cannot take the risks of the currency for the long time required to transport them, by the circuitous lake routes, in the slow but cheap and appropriate means of sailing vessels. This risk is deemed at least equal to the increased cost of the more speedy modes, and of course the risk in the one case or the increased cost of transportation in the other must be deducted from the price paid the farmers at the place

of production. In the article of Nov. 26, I also mentioned the loss which arises from the unwillingness of capitalists to invest in the machinery of distribution, such as railroads, rolling stock, steam and sailing vessels, at inflated prices, unless they can, by charging high prices for their use, speedily get back the extra coat.

This is severely felt by the farmers of the far West in the increased cost of transportation both ways. An element which caused the rents of stores in New York to advance fourfold in one year is not to be overlooked.

I have, in articles heretofore published, alluded to all these blighting influences of a surplus of paper currency, though not in this same connection. I would now suggest another item of loss from the same cause, which falls almost exclusively upon the agricultural industry.

In the natural course of trade, gold and exchange will rise when we have little products to export, and will fall when the amount of our shipments become large.

In our national affairs, since we have had an excessive paper currencys the disturbing influences have been so great that it would be difficult to test this proposition by reference to actual experience. I will, therefore, in the way of illustration, refer to a case on a smaller scale which was free from the disturbing elements of war, and also from the, financially, hardly less baleful influence of political action. Perhaps private speculation was also to a great extent excluded:

After the severe revulsion of 1837, there was a time when all the States except Alabama had resumed specie payments. I then observed and pointed out to the planters of that State that, during the portion of the year in which they were making their crops, and there was nothing to export, they paid for their supplies at prices based on gold or Northern exchange at about 120 to 130; and that when their crops came into market to be shipped and drawn against, exchange payable in gold fell to about 108 to 110 per cent, making a loss to them of about one eighth of the cost of production.

The same principle must now apply to the nation. Our surplus grain, provisions, cotton, and tobacco are all ready for shipment at nearly the same time, and the tendency of this is to give the producers a price for them based on gold at the lower rate, after having bought their supplies, through a great portion of the year, at prices based on the higher. Other causes may temporarily interfere, but as these, in the long run, will neutralize themselves, the chances are still against the farmers, who, on the average, must suffer in the fluctuations by just the amount which the circumstances of their crops coming into market lessens the currency price of gold and foreign exchange.

This does not apply to petroleum and other products, the supply of which may be regular throughout the year.

If the currency were only depreciated, and remained steadily at any given value, these losses would not occur. If, for instance, all the gold and silver dollars were cut in two, and each half still called a dollar; or if two paper dollars were always out for every one required for business at gold prices, making them worth just fifty per cent, it would make no material difference, after we had once accommodated ourselves to the change, and all prior contracts had expired. The price of things would be nominally just double; that is, would sell for just as many whole dollars, or as much weight of gold as before. Those who paid new currency for notes, mortgages, &c., contracted under the old, would, of course, gain half the amount. In the early period of expansion the West was a debtor section, and profited by the inflation; but they are no longer benefitted in this way. The losses to which I have alluded. though they increase with the expansion of the currency, are entirely distinct from this nominal change in prices, and grow, not out of the depreciation, but of the fluctuations, or apprehended fluctuations, in the value of the currency. If the salaries, fixed incomes, and price of farmers' products all increase as fast as the currency depreciates, there is no direct loss to those who live from these sources by the depreciation, but they still lose by the incidents of fluctuation as above stated.

All regular industry suffers much and in various ways, by the use of excessive irredeemable currency, and especially in having to support an army of speculators who live on its fluctuations, costing, probably, no less than our army in the field during the war; but the foregoing positions go to show that the farmers, and especially those far from market, suffer more from it than any other class of producers.

Our Western farmers may have been influenced by this consideration: in selling their crops for depreciated paper, they get higher prices, and the Government will still take the paper at par in payment for land at former gold rates. But if the foregoing views are correct, it is not the farmer who will have a surplus thus to invest, but the traders on whose capital he pays two per cent four times a year, and who sell him gold at an average of 75 and buy it back from him at an average of 68, who will have the means and will get the land at the reduced price. The farmer who, under existing conditions, has as many paper dollars spare income as, with a sound currency, he would have in gold, is fortunate, and in this case he can buy no more land, though its price is thus reduced.

It must be borne in mind, too, that this price for Government land keeps the farmer's land also at the same price in paper that it was before in gold, and they have further to help make up in taxes what the Government loses by selling its land for paper; for nearly all our interest, all the salaries of foreign ministers, and other foreign services and expendi-

tures must be paid in gold, and the compensation to members of Congress and most other officials at home, with the cost of supplies for the army, &c., has kept pace with the price of gold, and the really less value which the Government realizes for its land must be made up by increased taxes.

I will add one other item of national loss, showing how the bane of inflation reaches where we would least expect to find it.

Gold is now an important item of our exportable products, and by the change in our currency the exchangeable value, or purchasing power, even of this has been reduced in the markets to which we send it. We have dispensed with its use as a common currency, and, as a consequence, the quantity of it in other countries has increased, and its purchasing power proportionally diminished. If in this country we should all substitute potatoes for bread, our wheat would all be crowded into foreign markets, and a fall in price would there be the consequence. This same effect must result from substituting paper for home use in place of gold. The difference between the invigorating influence of a sound currency and such as we are using upon the business vitality of a country, is greater than between potatoes and wheat upon muscular and mental energy. We have voluntarily adopted the potato currency, and, by its persistent use, are in a fair way to be driven to the potato diet also.

Fluctuations in the measure of value are obviously just as inconvenient and injurious as variableness in the measures of bulk or length would be. If a man contracts to sell his wheat at one dollar per bushel, the result to him is precisely the same whether the bushel is doubled in size, or the dollar is reduced one half in value. Suppose a maker should furnish measures which would swell and shrink with changes in the weather, sometimes holding three or four quarts more, at others three or four less than half a bushel. Without having learned to calculate those changes, those who love the excitement of gambling, and those who seek gain from the mere mutations of trade, would favor those variable measures. But there would soon be a class who, having made it their business to investigate, would prefer them, as gamblers in the secret prefer certain makes of cards, for the reason that they know them by ingenious devices on the back as readily as by the spots on the face. The case of the farmers in relation to the currency is even worse than this. For reasons before stated, it is as though they were using measures which, of themselves, would swell whenever they were selling, and shrink when they were buying.

It is not to be wondered at, that under these peculiar hardships the Western farmers should be restive and even clamorous for change; but at first glance it seems incredible that, as asserted in Washington, the

pressure for further expansion is mainly from them. Is it not from some other portion of the Western population! from demagogues vilely seeking, for party purposes, to make things as bad as possible? or from interested speculators? always an active, energetic, vigilant, and pushing, not to say impudent class. The farmers complain that their just earnings slip away from them in some unaccountable way, so that at the year's end there is nothing left in the "stocking." The speculator suggests that this is because their measures do not yet vary enough; that they must get them so made that they will swell and shrink still more than they now do; and Congress is beset to do this. The interest of the farmers especially demands that we should get back to a sound currency as soon as due regard to other important interests will permit. But Congress has already suspended the slow movement which it had before permitted in that direction. If we cannot contract when regular business is already so prostrated and curtailed that little money is needed for it, and interest is at four per cent per annum to stock speculators, when can we expect to do it? Must we wait for the entire annihilation of our industries before it will be deemed prudent to take this essential, and the only essential and effective step toward a specie basis?

In view of the mistakes and blunders of men who, with the stimulus of interest, make finance their study in Wall street, and of those who under the circumstances ought to have made it their study at Washington, it should not perhaps surprise us if the farmers have made the mistake of demanding measures the very reverse of what the general interest of the country, and more particularly their own really require.

Our debt is nearly \$1,000,000,000 more than, with a proper regard to the most obvious principles of finance, it would have been; and unwise legislation now threatens to lessen our ability to pay as much as it has already increased the burden.

THE RIGHT HOUR STRIKES.

The agitation in the labor market, and the increasing difficulties between employers and workmen constitute one of the gravest features of the times. It would seem, too, that the disagreement instead of becoming less marked is growing wider, a war of classes having been inaugurated, under circumstances calculated to exercise a decisive influence upon the future of our State. It is a serious misfortune in this country that these difficulties are frequently fostered and stimulated by political parties with a view to partisan aggrandizement. It was this political influence that led Congress deliberately to sanction the eight hour system by reducing the hours of labor for all persons in the government employ-

ment twenty per cent. Under the same influence, one of the two great parties which divide the nation has lately adopted as its own, the platform of the Workingmen's National Convention—a platform the enforcement of which would sunder all the existing relations between capital and labor, and shut out American industry from all competition with foreign nations.

It is fortunate for the country, however, that there is a law higher and more immutable than the parchment edicts of human government, and that this law will eventually work a cure, since by its terms it is ordained that the only means for increasing the wealth of individuals and nations is by increased production and economy of savings. State and Federal Governments may legislate to reduce the hours of labor, yet they cannot but for a limited time give the workmen ten hours pay for eight hours work—a man cannot long receive more than he earns. The only effect this edict of Congress can have is to temporarily benefit the workmen at the expense of the tax payers, and to set a bad example, which is eagerly quoted by ignorant persons as an endorsement of a vicious principle. The final result, however, will be disastrous to the laborer when necessity brings about the adjustment between the employer and the employed.

The strike in the building trade in this city illustrates the whole subject. The journeymen bricklayers who have heretofore been receiving \$5 00 a day for ten hours work, now demand that they shall receive \$4 50 a day for only eight hours work; in other words, they demand a reduction of 20 per cent in the hours of labor, and only consent to a reduction of 10 per cent in wages. The employers profess that they are unable to agree to this demand. They state that they entered into contracts for the work which were calculated at the existing scale of prices; that while the rate of wages is constantly rising, the amount of work is diminished. Formerly, 2,000 bricks a day were the standard for a day's work. Now a "trade rule" prevents the workmen from "setting" more than 1,000 bricks a day. The employers also complain that they are forced to pay the same wages to good and bad workmen, and that the trades society also attempts to prevent them from taking apprentices, and even goes so far as to prevent boss masons from working on their own buildings unless they are members of the Bricklayers Union.

As the employers were unable to accede to the demands of the workmen, a "strike" was the result. The building trade in this city is therefore at a stand still at the most favorable season. The employers in self-defence formed a "Master Builders' Association," and are making every exertion to obtain men from other cities to work for them. The Bricklayers Unions, on the other hand, are not idle. They watch the steamboat landings and railroad depots to induce the workmen from the interior to turn aside, and are sustained in funds by the other trades. The plasterers society, for instance, on Wednesday last, gave the brick-layers \$3,000 to support them while idle. The fact that a single society could afford to give away so large a sum, proves that the trades in this city do not suffer severely from the hard times. The plasterers, it will be remembered, already work on the eight hours system, and receive \$5 a day—good, bad and indifferent alike. Trades societies in other towns are also forwarding money to the New York bricklayers.

In this struggle the interests of the community are all on the side of the employers. This is true even of the workingmen who sustain the "strike." The high rents had tempted a large amount of capital into the building trade, and within the last year so many new houses were built in New York and Brooklyn that there was an important reduction of rents. There were more houses than tenants, and rents had to come down. There was a prospect that this reduction would continue, and that in another year or two rents would be still lower. But the brick layers strike stops all this. If their demands are acceded to, there must be a large addition to the cost of house-building, and a further advance of rents in place of a decline. It would not be difficult to show that the industrial classes must suffer more from high ren's than any other; yet we find them sustaining a movement that is calculated to place them at the mercy of landlords. Their interests are really identical with those of the master builders, who are fighting for cheaper rents.

Other disturbing elements are at work. Last week a plasterer's national convention at Chicago took measures to organize a movement for next year, placing all the plasterers of the United States on the "New York standard"—that is \$5 a day for eight hours work. Curiously enough this movement is undertaken at the instigation of the trade in New York. The plasterers in the interior work more hours and for less pay than their New York brethern, and, as a consequence, they crowd to this city to enjoy the superior advantages offered. This overstocks the market for this kind of labor, and the plasterers of this city, to prevent competition, tax themselves to support country workmen, and to pay their expenses back to their homes. Thus the present high wages and short hours are of no essential benefit. The means contemplated to remedy this tendency of the natural laws of supply and demand to overthrow the plasterers eight hour system, embody a blunder of the worst kind. It will be impossible to establish the New York rates of wages as a standard for the entire country, because the expenses of living, which always rule the rates of wages, are less in the country than the city. The Amalgamated Engineers, the most perfectly organized trade in the world, attempted to establish a uniform standard of wages, but failed. The matter is now left to the local societies. We may confidently anticipate that the plasterers will meet with no better success.

The strike in the mining regions in Pennsylvania is for eight hours a day and an increase of wages. A compliance with this demand is out of the question, and there is a suspension of work. Thus, the only positive result of the effort will be to increase the price of coal to the consumer. Coal must advance while production is at a stand still, and if the men receive more pay for less time, prices must go still higher. Thus we see that rents and coal, the most important items of household expenditure, are advanced by the direct agency of the very classes who have the greatest interest in reducing them.

The instances might easily be multiplied of the mischievous tendencies of the present labor agitation. That the eight hour movement is factitious, and not demanded by any real necessity, is proved by its effects upon the plasterers societies; and, also, by a demand made a few days ago by the workmen in the government dockyard at Bangor, Maine, to be allowed to work ten hours for a proportionate increase of wages.

But it is only when we consider the condition of the country at large that the fallacy of the eight hour movement is fully apparent. At a time when the whole American people are required by an inexorable necessity to produce more and economise more than ever before, as the only means of recovering the enormous losses of the civil war, there is sprung upon them a movement which, by checking industry and offering a premium to idleness, must arrest progress and postpone the era of returning prosperity.

It is, therefore, of the highest interest to all that the employer should persist in refusing to comply with this demand, and we trust he will be enabled to do it successfully.

MOBILE AND OHIO RAILBOAD.

Our last notice of this road will be found in the Chronicle of January 26, 1867. The information contained in that article was based chiefly on the annual report of the company for the year 1865. We now propose to illustrate the progress of affairs for the two years, 1866 and 1867, and thus bring down the financial condition of this company to the latest date accessible to us. These are the two first complete years of operations since the close of the war and the restoration of the railroad to its owners.

The gross earnings of the road for the years ending December 31, 1866 and 1867 are shown in the following statement:

Passenger Freight Express Mail		15 90	1867. \$742,580 1,400,815 109,050 49,900	97 90	Increase. \$8,768 10 7,106 00	Decrease \$160,188 55 82,675 18
Gross earnings	\$2,449,256	09	\$2,802,296	46	\$	\$146,989 63
The expenses far the same yea	rs were:					
Roadway	804,207 9	98	\$371,904 885,427 766,568	81	\$97,771 86 81,219 88 24,400 68	8
Total expenses	\$1,390,898	46	\$1,528,790	83	\$183,899 37	8
Net revenue	\$1,058,897	63	\$778,505	68	\$	\$280,382 00

-showing a decrease of about 261 per cent in 1867 as compared with the net earnings of the next previous year. Both years were signalized by short crops and unremunerative prices. To these misfortunes the year 1867 added extensive inundations of the Mississippi Valley at the north end of the road and a deadly epidemic at the southern end, all operating adversely on earnings by interrupting traffic, and on expenses by increasing the cost of repairs and transportation. The net difference in the receipts for the two years, however, is probably more apparent than real, the operating expenditures in 1867 having been largely burdened by costs which properly belonged to reconstruction and the restoration of engines from the deterioration of former years This policy of charging one year with the cost of others no doubt keeps down the reconstruction account to the lowest limit; but on the other hand it so falsifies the general results as to make comparison impossible. Had the usual course of charging the year with its own proper expenditures been adopted, the net income would have been \$885,497 37. and the dimunition from the preceding year been \$173,389 26, instead of \$280,382 00 as shown in the account given by the company in the above exhibit. A better balance, however, is shown for the first three months of the current year, the receipts having been for that period \$580,551 30, and the expenses \$323,974 61, leaving a net revenue of \$256,576 69, or proportionately, 17.7 per cent greater than in the whole of the preceding year.

The following is the condition of the rolling stock on the 1st May, 1865, (the date of the restoration of the property to the company,) and at the close of the years 1866 and 1867:

	∠ M	ay 15,	1865.—		Dec. 31, 1866.—				—Dec. 81, 1867,—			
	a	ъ	C	ď	Œ	ъ	C	ď	a	ò	·c	d
Locomotives	15	4	88	8	50	13	24	6	69	10	15	8
Passenger c's	11	7	••		84	••	•		82		••	
Baggage cars	8	9			4	••		••	4	••	••	
Freight cars	231	88	••	•	653	••	•	••	799	••		

The letters a b c and d refer to the condition of the rolling stock at date; a indicates "in running order"; b, "under repairs"; c, "out of order," but repairable, and d, "exploded and condemned.

This table exhibits an immense improvement from date to date, and evidences the ability and determination of the company to give efficiency to their operating power. In the following exhibit we cluster together a few of the more important results of the operations for the years 1866 and 1867:

	—Miles	run by	Earnings per mile run.		—Rarnings per mile of road. —	
Passenger	1866. 455,997 585,870	1867. 867,165 618,097	1806. \$1 97 2 45	1867. \$3 45 9 29	1866. 61,857 2,949	1867. \$1,588 2,682
Freight	198,039	186,944 1.167,204	2.86	2 24	981 5.087	828 4,738

The cost of motive power per mile run in the same years was as follows:

Repairs, Fact. Wages, Oils, waste, &c. Total

| Repairs | Fact | Wages Offs | Waste out | Offs | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 | 1050 |

The amount of cotton transported over the road of this company is rapidly increasing, the quantity in 1866 having been 97,581, and in 1867 141,666 bales, of which in 1866 84,313 bales, and in 1867 120,804 bales reached market at Mobile. Recent arrangements with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company are materially changing the course of this staple, and directing the largest part of that grown north of Corinth to Louisville. The amount to Louisville in 1866 was only 931, while in 1867 it increased to 15,117 bales. In the meanwhile the amounts formerly sent to Memphis and Columbus on the Mississippi have been proportionately decreased. This northward route, however, can only be used largely when low rates of freight prevail, the Southern route being generally cheaper to the Atlantic markets. The great increase in the total quantity moved was not alone due to an enlarged crop, but also to the close and satisfactory working arrangements with the Selma and Meredian Railroad, nearly 25,000 bales having been received over that road from Alabama, which formerly reached Mobile through other channels.

The financial status of the company is improving. The floating debt is somewhat lessened, and the progress of funding has been moderately successful; while the road has developed a satisfactory earning power. With regard to the past, the report for 1867 says: "The loss of earnings by Confederate and State securities as per report of 1866 was \$5,228,562 23, and the expenses of reconstruction have been \$3,872,843 78, making a total loss by the war \$9,101,506 01, thus showing a loss of about 65 per cent of our entire capital; and yet to-day our road, with its equipment and property could not be replaced with gold for the amount of our indebtedness and par for stock." The assets as appears from the balance

ment, valued in gold \$15,552,000 00; 1,100,000 acres of land, valued at 10s. sterling per acre £550,000 or \$2,684,888 50, and station and town lots valued in gold \$75,000—total \$18,311,888 50. At the same time the liabilities were: funded debt \$7,904,021 06, and arrearages of interest \$1,372,900 00; capital stock, consolidated, \$2,532,600 00, and unconsolidated \$737,220 70; and floating debt (currency) \$1,223,632 28—total \$14,770,374 04, leaving an excess of assets amounting to \$3,541,514 46. "It may well be asked, whether any other enterprise in the country can make a stronger showing."

The floating debt, January 1, 1867, was \$1,756,441 74. Of this sum \$468,691 56 was due to parties at the East for rolling stock purchased previous to the war. A part (10\frac{3}{4} per cent) of this last sum was paid from the proceeds of cotton sold, and the remainder was to be paid in equal instalments in one, two and three years. This the company failed to do, and ultimately these creditors agreed to take for the balance of the debt second mortgage bonds, which reduced the floating debt as it stood Jan. 1, 1867 to \$1,287,750 24. The floating debt of Jan. 1, 1868, was, however, \$1,433,081 85, including the cost of machinery purchased in 1867, \$369,417 90, and some other items. Of the amount, \$1.131,654 18, spent in reconstruction in 1867, \$762,236 19 has been paid; the interest due the State of Tennessee has also been regularly met. In the first quarter of 1868 the floating debt was further reduced by \$209,449 57, leaving the total on April 1, 1868, at \$1,223,632 28.

The promise to resume interest payments on May 1, 1868, failed of realization. All the moneys earned or that could be obtained on credit were required for reconstruction and equipment. This failure led to further negotiations with bondholders both in New York and London, resulting satisfactorily to all parties. English creditors agreed to fund, under contract dated Feb. 4, 1867, all coupons up to and including those of N.v. 1867 in interest bonds, and all coupons on interest and sterling bonds due in 1868 and 1869 in sterling bonds. The same contract is to be signed by the New York creditors, and this the large holders are said to have done already. "By this plan," says the report of 1867, "we are to resume interest payments on the 1st of May, 1870, leaving the company its earnings for two years with which to discharge the floating debt nearly all of which has been contracted for account of reconstruction; and thereafter be fully able to meet not only its interest, but provide a sinking-fund for the ultimate payment of the bonds," &c.

In the following statement we condense the old and new balance sheets of the company, the 15th May, 1865, being the date of separation. The sheet of April 1, 1868, were as follows: 486 miles of road and its equip-

last column shows the whole amount of liabilities and assets as they existed at the close of the year 1867:

Capital stock	6,640,805 01 275,862 88 15,860,896 88 68,419 48 642,656 89 87,900 79 286,617 08	Total May 15, '65, to Dec. 81, 1867.	Aggregate, Dec. 31, 1897. \$3.702, 399 85 8,856,926 07 295,697 67 21,968,211 60 66,419 42 412,282 86,11 60 1,201,694 47 173,668 77 87,900 734,056 63 74,539 39
Total liabilities	\$27,889,548 25	\$10,281,848 62	\$87,671,896 87
Charged with the following dis Construction	\$11,947,568 88	- \$96,479 54 4,070,44 2 78	\$11,844,048 87 4,070,449 78
Donated land surveys	\$7,427 50	••••	97,497 50
Bonds and State loans paid Interest	1,808,119 00 9,488,974 54	895,000 00 1,816,690 78	1,688,119 00 8,750,695 27
Paducah Branch	114,894 08	1410,000 10	114,894 08
Transportation	11,786,988 90	8,510,759 19	15,997,U49 09
Other property and assets	874,757 48	907,856 19	1,232,118 69
Cash	100,956 97	5,190 19	105,149 16
Total assets	\$37,889,54 8 25	\$10,281,848 62	\$87,671,896 87

The following table describes the funded debt of the company as it stood on December 31, 1867, and the interest arrears to be funded:

Bonds, Income of 1861 " 1863 " 1865 " 1865 Income (10 y'rs), 3d m rt Ist mortgage, sterling Ist " Tennessee State loan Interest bonds.	42,000 49,000 226,900 556,431 4.598,000 { 1,951,000 888,800	Rate. 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 6	Payable. N. Y. & Mobile. Mob le. Mobile. Mobile. Mobile. Mobile. Mobile. London New York. New York. Mobile.	Arrearages. \$28,000 16,800 15,400 81,000 7,600 1,380,000
Total	87,904,091			\$1,872,90C

The Mobile and Ohio Railroad extends in almost a direct line from Mobile, Alabama, noth the through Southwestern Alabama, Eastern Mississippi, West Tennessee, and West Kentucky to Columbus, Ky., a distance of 472 miles, with a branch to Columbus, Miss., distant from the main line 14 miles—the total length of the road being 486 miles, or, including sidings 509.6 miles. The last rail of the line was laid down April 1, 1861, the same day that saw the national forces enter and occupy Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio. Between Columbus and Cairo, regular steam packets were established after the completion of the road, forming a water connection between the Mobile and Ohio, and the Illinois Central Railroad and a great line of travel and transportation between the lakes at Chicago and the Gulf of Mexico at Mobile. The endowment of this line by Congress was the first, and as yet, in results, the most successful example of the land-grant [policy, which has since become a recognized precedent in

all the States and Territories, the lands of which are at the disposar of the national legislature. From Chicago to Mobile the total distance is about 860 miles—extending from the great grain fields ot the interior to the cotton and sugar regions of the South-from the climate that fosters the staples of food and agriculture to that in which tropical vegetation is most luxuriantly developed; and hence the interchange of the widely differing commodities of each by this line cannot fail to become extensive and mutually profitable. It must also become a great avenue for the distribution of foreign importations landed at the gulf ports. The national significance of this road is not therefore to be estimated from the existing volume of its business, though already large and valuable. It traverses a country recently desolated by contending armies, and which vet requires a season of rest for recuperation. This season need not be protracted, for it possesses all the natural and many of the acquired means for rapid development. It is a region that was flourishing before the era of railroads, and when the only avenues for its commerce were the rivers. and the imperfect appliances by which they were navigated—the ark, the flatboat, and in more recent times the steamboat.

THE PROSPECTIVE PREMIUM IN GOLD.

At this season, the probabilities as to the gold premium are usually canvassed with more than ordinary interest. The importer is concerned in ascertaining what price he may have to pay for the gold with which he buys his exchange for remittance, and what premium he ought to charge upon the gold cost of his goods. The cotton merchant and the manufacturer are anxious to ascertain how far the price of the new crop is likely to be affected by the gold market. Both exporters and domestic traders are interested in knowing to what extent the whole range of our exportable products may be influenced by fluctuations in gold. The question, therefore, as to the probabilities of the premium for the next three or four months has a very intimate bearing upon the value of the entire aggregate of products destined to change hands during the fall trade.

It must be allowed that, at present, there are influences at work throwing more than usual doubt upon the question as to the course of the premium. We are on the eve of a presidential election of unusually exciting interest. The issues to be discussed during the preparatory canvass are of a fundamental character; and the party acerbity with which the agitation will be conducted must naturally give rise to extreme sentiments, calculated to alarm the timid and to produce, for the

time being, a generally unsettled feeling. The politics of the country are, in some respects, undergoing an important transition, and as the changes are made conspicuously apparent by the heated discussion of opposite policies, there will naturally be more or less uneasy forecasting of the influence of the contest upon the future of the nation. The bearing of the election upon the gold premium is the more important from the fact that the adjustment of the finances is a prominent issue. Leading members of both parties have shown an inclination to impose a tax upon the bonds of the government, and to declare the Five Twenties payable in greenbacks, in opposition to what the bondholders generally conceive to be their rights.

Among those who understand our heated election discus sions these controversies will have little influence. But it remains to be seen how far this prospective agitation may affect the confidence of foreign holders of United States bonds. The financial resolutions of the Democratic Convention have produced little effect as yet upon the foreign bondholders. The London press takes the ground that they have already heard much of this kind of talk from politicians, and that the financial resolutions are a mere echo of that sentiment, designed for election effect, but not to be regarded as certainly reflecting the ultimate policy of the party. Should the recent discussions in Congress and the agitation of the question during the presidential canvass modify this impression, a lower price for bonds in Europe might be expected, requiring a corresponding rise in the gold premium unless followed by a fall in the price for bonds on this side.

The more important considerations, however, affecting the premium are those connected with our foreign commerce. We have repeatedly called attention to the fact that, for the last five years, we have been paying for our imports to a material extent by the remittance of bonds to Europe. It is now very generally estimated that nearly one-third of our gold-bearing bonds are held by foreign investors. These securities may be estimated as having realised about \$425,000,000 in gold, so that they may be viewed as having compensated for a deficiency in our ordinary exports averaging about \$70,000,000 per annum. The interruption or suspension of this form of remittance must clearly be productive of a very important crisis in the import trade of the country. It would hardly seem probable that Europe, under the present circumstances, would be willing to take more than \$700,000,000 of our bonds, the amount estimated to be now held there; and the experience of foreign bankers for the last few months proves that the demand is now confined almost entirely to the re-investment of a portion of the interest. It is true that trade in Europe still continues inactive, and that the large



accumulations of money in the banks induces an active demand for securities; but it is also to be kept in mind that European governments are at present large borrowers at liberal rates of interest. Without, however, assuming that the foreign demand for our bonds will now cease, it may be quite safely concluded that we have at least reached a point at which there must be a material contraction in that demand. In no other way can we account for the unusually heavy shipments of specie from this port during the current year than from the curtailment of our shipments of securities. From the opening of the year to July 18, we have exported from New York \$57,400,000 of specie; which is \$7,500,000 above the highest former shipments for that period, and \$33,500,000 beyond the average for the last 16 years, as will appear from the following comparison:

EXPORTS OF SPECIE FROM NEW YOR FROM JAM. 1 TO JULY 18.

1968	\$57,892,854	1859	\$40,888,057
1867	89,774,091	1858	14,786,660
1866	49,779,151	1857	25,677,779
		1856	
1864	80,612,898	1855	18,868,561
1863	28,687,328	1854	18,122,568
1862	84,891,850	1858	10,997,818
1861		1852	
1860	21,106,797		

This immense increase in the specie exports is partially due to a further unfavorable balance existing this year between the imports and exports. That is to say, with the same amount of bonds exported as last year, we should still require some increase in the shipments of gold to adjust our foreign trade balance. From the subjoined statement it will be seen that, for the first four months of the year, there was a decrease of \$24,000,000 in the value of United States exports of produce and merchandise, while the falling off in the imports was only \$11,400,000.

Foreign trade of the united states for first your morths of the trae. Imports (gold value).

First four months, 1867		•••••••	\$135,964,417 194,589,524
Decrease		······································	\$11,484,898
exports (gold value).		
First four months, 1867	Prod. & Mds. \$187,939,896 119,897,488	Specie. \$14,741,897 \$4,060,065	Total. \$151,980,713 136,887,498
Increase	24.411.898	9,818,678	15,098,215

For the months of May and June the imports at New York are \$198,021 less than for the same period of last year, while the exports

are \$1,764,207 less than then. So that, for the whole expired portion of the year, the exports of produce have been less, in proportion to the imports, than in 1867; but the increase in the exports of specie over last year is immensely in excess of this disparity; the inference being plain that the specie drain is largely due to a decrease in our exports of bonds. Now, if we have reached the point at which our shipments of securities are being materially curtailed, it is evident that to adjust affairs to the loss of this medium of settlement our produce exports must bear a larger ratio to our imports than during late years; a change to be effected either by the diminution of our imports or the increase of our exports. Without such an adjustment, the drain of specie must be continued. It is the fact that no such adjustment is at present in process that constitutes the serious feature of the probabilities as to the future of the gold premium. The foregoing statistics show that while the general trade movement for the first half of the year is somewhat below that of 1867, yet the contraction is much larger on the exports of produce than on the imports; so that up to this point, affairs have been taking a direction opposite to that we have shown to be required by the changed situation. The indications are, both from foreign advices and the current arrivals of goods, that the importations for the fall season will be well up to those of last year. From now up to the close of September, we shall have little produce for shipment; apparently less than at the same period of last year. After that date we shall have a fair cotton crop, which is likely to realise good prices, and probably also a larger surplus of breadstuffs than last year; so that it is reasonable to expect that our exports of these important products will realise a considerably greater value than in 1867. The question to be settled, however is, will this gain be adequate to set off any deficiency of exports between now and October, and any possible increase of imports that may be induced by the promising crop prospects? An answer to this question would go far towards determining the probabilities as to the future gold premium.

THE NORTHAMPTON FORGERIES.

In any country where paper money has ever been issued the resulting speculative excitement has been the hot-bed of prodigality and breach of trust. One of the most surprising features of our inflation era of the past six years is the small number of forgeries, swindles and defalcations which have come to light. During the earlier part of the era scarcely any such cases were discovered, and since they have increased the aggre-

gate has been so few as to inspire us with a high and grateful sense that the moral character of our people will compare favorably with that of any other commercial nation in the world. If resistance under temptation is the touchstone of moral strength and the only proof of loyalty to principle, we might well congratulate ourselves on the result, did not the tone of public feeling seem to be undergoing a change for the worse.

The Springfield Republican of the 22d inst. contains the details of one of the very sad events which offer of late but too frequent evidence of this moral deterioration. Captain Sylvester Wright, an enterprising respectable merchant of Northampton, in Massachusetts, is alleged to have been forging his neighbors' signatures to a considerable amount. He was greatly esteemed, and had held several municipal offices of trust. We regret to add that he was a member of one of the leading churches of Northampton, and that this circumstance, together with his blameless moral character, gave him a credit and a standing which he has so outrageously abused. The subjoined details show how the infamous affair was first discovered, and how it finally terminated:

The forgeries extend over a period of three or four years. The first that was suspected was about two months ago, when James Ellsworth, of Northampton, accidentally heard, one of the persons whose name Capt. Wright had forged, state that he had not signed a note for two years, to which Mr. Ellsworth said he thought he was mistaken, as he had a note of \$1,500 at home with his name on it. The person addressed at once pronounced sey such note a forgery. Mr. Ellsworth, who had \$2,200 of Capt. Wright's paper, then made him take it up, and thus escaped a loss. Other parties afterward found out that they held forged paper, when Capt. Wright scknowledged it and appealed to J. P. Williston for assistance, who loaned him \$7,000, and was about to loan him \$6,000 more, when the whole matter came out. To his few confidential friends Capt. Wright scknowledged he had committed a great crime, and should not shrink from the punishment that he considered his just deserts, if the community chose to proceed against him. He appointed Josephus Crafts, of Northampton, Trustee of his property, and made it all over to him, not even reserving his homestead exemption. Saturday fight he came home, ready to take the consequences, but some of his friends advised him to take a different course, furnished him with money and a horse and buggy, and he left for parts unknown that night. His creditors held a meeting last night, and have decided to let Mr. Crafts proceed and settle the estate rather than have it go through the Court of Bankruptoy. Capt. Wright lost nearly his whole property by fire some years ago, his mill at Northampton being entirely destroyed. This greatly crippled his business operations, and hindered him from making much headway for some time, but it was generally supposed that he was now in a more prosperous condition than he had been in for a long time. But the entire confidence bestowed upon him was dangerous.

The liabilities are estimated at about \$50,000 and the torged paper at \$30,000, the largest amount to any one individual being under \$7,000.

This sad case brings to light an amiable but ill timed and very mischievous laxity which prevails whenever a felony is committed by some person well known in society. His friends and associates are all

anxious to escape the public odium of seeing their old friend arraigned as a felon and with one consent they conspire to defeat the ends of justice, and to let the "poor unfortunate" criminal go. Now it is clear that if such amiable reasons are sufficient for releasing one criminal, they are equally valid for another. The majesty of law, the sacredness of property, and the paramount claims of public justice over private favor might thus be outraged to the dissolution and disentegration of the body politic.

Another result of this affair should be to inspire us with caution. It has been supposed that our merchants, especially our merchants of the interior, and above all our merchants of New England, were free from certain obliquity of moral sentiment which circumstances had begun to develop in other orders of the community, and especially among the sorely tempted financial classes of our great cities. Brokers and bank officers at Washington, Baltimore, Boston, and New York have fallen victims to the temptation. But other members of the monetary republic are now contributing to swell the sad catalogue of defaulters. What can be done must be done to arrest the rising tide of peculation. Let all men holding in our banks, brokers' firms, and other moneyed institutions, in our merchants, manufacturers, and shipping firms, a position of commanding influence and trust, look carefully into the private expenditures of his juniors. Nine-tenths of the peculation that occurs is begotten by extravagance.

THE GRAIN MARKET AND THE CURRENCY.

Information received from all parts of the United States, as well as Europe, seems to render it certain that the crop of cereals for the current year will be uncommonly large, and breadstuffs and provisions of all kinds will be abundant. Should this be realized, what is to be the price of our great staples when the crops are well secured and ready for market? Should the surplus in this country, over all needed for home consumption be, as is probable, at least equal to 75 million bushels of wheat and 150 million bushels of corn, that quantity of course must find a market abroad. It cannot be held here. It must be exported, and for that purpose it can be worth only the current price in Liverpool, plus expenses of shipment, &c., and that price will govern the value of the entire crop. Should the supply abroad be large, as appears now quite certain, so that the wheat of this country is brought into sharp competition in the markets of Europe with the wheat of Egypt, Poland, and other wheat growing districts, we shall certainly be obliged to sell at much lower prices than have

been obtained for several years past, especially for the last year, and our agricultural interest will begin for the first time to feel the full effects of a depreciated currency. Up to this time, owing to the great demand occasioned by the war, and the subsequent short crops abroad, breadstuffs have brought excessive prices, and the West has not only been quite well satisfied with a largely expanded currency, but desirous even of a still greater extension of it. But the tables will be turned when their products are sold at the usual gold prices in Europe, while all the articles they purchase for consumption and use will be held at currency prices. They must lose the difference, and a large difference it will be. So it would be with the cotton growers, if the crop of 1868 were equal to that of 1860.

The experience of the past shows that while the currency of the country does govern the price of all articles made and sold exclusively within the country, it has no effect in determining the value of those products, a surplus of which must be sent abroad.

From tables that have been prepared with great case for a long series of years, it is shown beyond dispute that flour and cotton have not risen and fallen with the expansion and contraction of the currency, as all other articles produced in the country have done.

Flour, for example, in 1846, with a currency of \$9 94 per capita, was at \$5 06; while in 1851, though the currency had risen to \$11 86, an increase of 20 per cent, flour was sold at \$4 50, a decline of 10 per cent. Cotton was at 12 cents in 1850, under a currency of \$10 39, and at 9 cents in 1854, with a currency of \$14 95—a fall of 25 per cent in the price of cotton under an increase of nearly 50 per cent in the quantity of the currency! Nothing seems better established than the fact that our expanded currency has no influence on the price of any commodity a large part of which must find a foreign market, for the obvious reason that in the commerce of the world all values are measured in gold, while all non-exportable articles are governed by the quantity of local currency in use.

Should it turn out, then, that there is throughout the world a large crop of cereals, and that the people of the United States produce some 75 or 100 million bushels of wheat and 100 to 150 million bushels of corn more than required for home consumption, we may predict with great assurance, unless some unlooked for event occurs to interrupt the operation of the natural laws of trade, that breadstuffs must experience a serious decline, and that those engaged in producing them will be convinced that it is not for their advantage to have a currency expanded beyond the natural wants of the country, and will become as clamorous for contraction as they have hitherto been for expansion.

It may be thought by some that the immense volume of currency now

in use, some 1,200 millions, will enable speculative operators to hold the crops to such an extent as to control prices if they choose to do so; but if there be the large surplus now expected, it would be quite impossible for them to accomplish the undertaking, since the market must in the end certainly break down, and the actual gold value for export be the established price. But whatever the result may be, those persons who take an interest in the question of the relation of currency to prices (and the number of such is not small at the present day), will regard with deep solicitude the developments of the grain markets for the next twelve months; for it is nearly certain that they will be such as to exhibit in a striking manner the disadvantage those must suffer who produce articles for export under a currency less valuable than that generally used in the commerce of the world.

INFLUENCE OF THE TELEGRAPH ON COMMERCE.

By no class in the community will the reduction of cable charges. which is to take place on and after the 1st of September next, be more highly appreciated than by merchants, while indirectly it is a benefit to every one. After that date a message of ten words, exclusive of the address, date and signature, which are free, will cost only fifteen dollars. This reduces the expense of ocean telegrams to somewhere near the rates of overland dispatches for equal distances; and though a lower tariff may at some future period be adopted, it is nevertheless sufficiently reasonable to bring the privileges of the cable within easy reach of the public. That it will be attended by a largely increased and more profitable business can scarcely be doubted. The cable is not worked at present to more than a third of its capacity, and as it is claimed that use improves in place of injures it, there is no reason why the business should not be greatly enlarged; and this may be effected by reducing the rates charged until they are within the means and the wants of the public.

The influence of this cable upon the world is, we think, scarcely appreciated. Speculators are not benefitted by it, and especially is this true as the rates for telegrams gradually come within the control of all. It has, however, diminished the risks of business, equalized prices, regulated the production of commodities and promoted their distribution. As a mercantile agent, therefore, the telegraph system is invaluable, and when the missing links shall have been completed of the great chain that will bring all civilized nations into instantaneous communication with each other, it will also be found to be the most potent of all the means of

civilization, and the most effective in breaking down the barriers of evil prejudice and custom that interfere with the universal exchange of commodities.

But as we have already intimated, the most important effect of the telegraphic system is the saving that results to each individual. Through its agency a larger business may be conducted upon a smaller capital than in the old times. A merchant, through its use, may quickly learn of the scarcity of any article in any port of the world, and also the prices of the same goods in the leading markets, and decide on the expediency of engaging in the trade. In the same way, one holding a heavy stock of goods can ascertain at a small cost the condition of the various markets in reference to it, and thus obtain the data for determining the proper course of action to be adopted for bringing his goods to the market. Consequently it is no longer necessary to keep immense supplies of goods on hand in anticipation of the wants of consumers. Through the agency of the telegraph and steam he may obtain in a few weeks the supplies that are needed. Examples of this kind are within the experience of every business man. In case of a sudden turn in the American market for any particular line of French or English goods, orders can be sent by telegraph and a supply obtained by steam within as many days as it formerly required weeks or months to obtain them.

Last fall there were short crops of breadstuffs in Europe under circumstances that would have produced a bread panic in the olden time. But this was obviated in the most natural manner possible. The telegraph was set to work in every direction, and the remotest quarters of the globe reached. To the Baltic, New York, San Francisco, South America, Australia, Egypt, the word flew that the necessities of England and Southern Europe were very great, and orders for the shipment of breadstuffs were sent forward, so that in a very short time two million bushels of wheat were afloat for England. The scarcity, in place of a panic, only produced a proper adjustment in prices, without any of the excitement which in former times would have carried the cost of living to a very high figure, and be attended with immense suffering to the masses. Nearer home, in the winter of 1866-67, a heavy increase in the price of breadstuffs in New York was only prevented by the prompt arrival of supplies from California via the Isthmus. It was the first time that flour had ever been shipped by that expensive route; but the telegraphic information warranted the risk, and the result more than justified the venture.

In the same way the cotton trade was last year saved from some disastrous vicisitudes. English spinners and dealers were impressed with the idea that the supply of cotton would be largely in excess of con-

sumption. As a consequence, prices went down to a figure that rendered its production no longer profitable in the United States, and, on the eve of the planting season, Southern planters prepared to abandon its cultivation. This fact becoming known, and the consumption at the same time increasing, a little panic in the cotton trade set in, prices went up rapidly, so that planters were induced again to raise cotton. Had we been without the cable, the information as to the rise in prices at Liverpool would have reached us too late to have had the same influence on cultivation, and hence we should have raised very little cotton. Other countries, too, within telegraphic communication of Liverpool, were led by the same facts to increase the cultivation of this staple. The benefit thus accruing to each consumer of cotton goods will be felt through the present year.

The influence of the telegraph in equalizing prices is also very marked. There can be scarcely any such thing as wide fluctuations under a condition of affairs that places the markets of the world in momentary communication with each other. A failure of the sugar crop in the South and in Cuba, even with a short supply in this city, would not necessarily cause a very large advance of prices in New York if it could be known by telegraph that supplies could be obtained from India and Europe. To the legitimate trader the facilities of the telegraph reduce risks to a minimum; secures greater certainty of returns on outlay; effects a considerable saving of time, and therefore of money, and renders it possible to transact a larger amount of business with the same capital. All these results are highly advantageous to the masses of consumers and producers everywhere; and hence a reduction in the rates by the Atlantic cable is a good subject for general rejoicing.

A CENTRAL LINE OF NAVIGATION PROM THE ONIO TO THE CHERAPBAKE BAY.

BY R. W. HUGHES, VA.

Cheap transportation is the great necessity of the West. Its products exceed in amount the means at command of cheap outlet to the seaboard. They press constantly upon the avenues of transportation, and millions of Western producers are thus placed under the power of carriers. A system of transportation is needed which shall be free from interruption, and sufficient to carry all the freights promptly and at low charges. The railroads do not furnish this means. Their charges are high, and are put up when the business is most pressing. They are not common highways, but close corporations. Though their rates may be borne for short distances, yet but few of the agricultural and mineral products of the West can bear

even their minimum charges over the long distances which intervene between very extensive portions of the far interior and the seaborrd. Between certain distances from the Eastern markets, the great bulk of agricultural and mineral products must rely exclusively upon water transportation.

There are now but two routes of continuous navigation by which they can obtain outlet—that by the Northern lakes and that by the Mexican gulf. But these, besides being liable to the casualties of climate (one of them to five months of interruption by ice), are so circuitous, that they require the products of our very extended country to pass beyond its boundaries in seeking their way to its own markets. This tedious circuit, while it is at all times objectionable on the score of time and cost, is most especially so whenever the nation becomes, or is in danger of becoming, involved in hostilities with a maritime power. During the recent war with a domestic power, whose ports were rigidly blockaded, this evil was most sensibly felt, even with reference to the route by the lakes. What might not the evil be in the event of a war with Great Britain?

The great length of these two circuitous lines of water transit, and the non-existence, up to the present time, of any continuous line of navigation directly across the country from the centres of the interior to the centre of the seaboard, have compelled a resort to the policy of substituting rail-road transportation over the direct routes. But although the cost of carriage has been much cheapened on these works, they cannot be thrown open to general use and free competition. Meantime water transportation has itself undergone very great improvements, which have had the effect of reducing freights far below any possible minimum at which railroads can afford them. It is now practicable, on lines of unbroken navigation, for the heaviest classes of agricultural and mineral products to be borne, from distances exceeding five thousand miles in the interior, to the seaboard, at charges by no means prohibitory.

Even at present the great bulk of western trade avoids the direct transit across the country afforded by the railroads, and seeks the circuitous and more or less hazardous routes of the lakes and of the gulf on account of cheapness; thus proving, that as water will seek its lowest outlet, however great the circuit it may have to pursue, so trade will seek its cheapest outlet, however long may be the passage. It is true, that during the recent war, vast quantities of produce went to market over the railroads; but then, the gulf route was closed and the lake route much obstructed. There was also a stronger reason even than this, which found its cause in the high prices resulting from the condition of the currency and the existence of war. The direction which these phenomena gave to the movement of products is thus accounted for by the superintendent of the census in his report under the department of agriculture:

Had it not been for the high premium on gold, the price of wheat in this country, and especially at the West, would have been less than the cost of production; as it is, the advance in gold has served to increase prices in the West much more in proportion than in the Eastern and Middle States. For instance, if a bushel of American wheat sells at \$1 25 in London, and the cost of sending it from Iowa is \$1, the Iowa farmer, with gold 'at par, receives only twenty-five cents a bushel for the wheat. Shoul gold continue at \$2 50 (the price at the present writing, 1864), though the wheat still brings only \$1 25 per bushel in 'ondon, and the cost of sending it there should be \$1 par bushel, as before, the Iowa farmer would receive \$2 13 per bushel for his wheat instead of twenty-five cents, as would be the case if gold was at par. The wheat is sold for gold, and \$1 25 in gold sells for \$3 12 in legal money. Deduct \$1 as the expense of sending it to London, and we have \$3 12 as the price which wheat should bring in Iows. In other words, the premium on gold increases the price of wheat in Iowa eight-fold.

This statement of the superintendent of the census, though not accurate in its details, even as of the date when it was written, yet serves to suggest the manner in which war prices, in conjunction with a depreciated currency, may operate temporarily to enable the owners of western produce to pay the high expenses of railroad transportation. With the fall of prices to normal rates, and with the gradual decline of the premium on gold, western producers find themselves obliged to desist from the use of railroads for heavy products for long distances, and again to recur to the circuitous navigation of the lakes and of the gulf. No interior water-line of continuous East and West navigation yet exists within the United States.

But if a line of cheap transportation were opened directly eastward from the centres of western production to the centre of the Atlantic seaboard line, it would offer all the advantages of directness, shortness, expedition, and freedom from interruption, which are presented by the central lines of railroad; combined with the indispensable desideratum of cheapness, now only presented by the circuitous routes of gulf and lake navigation. Such a line would be afforded by completing the unfinished portion of the Virginia canal, over the 80 miles of distance between the present terminus at Buchanan, Botetourt Co., Virginia, and the Greenbrier River, in Greenbrier Co., West Virginia. This work would connect steamboat navigation at Richmond with steamboat navigation on the Kanawha, by a canal 277 miles long; whereas the Eric Canal in New York connects steamboat navigation at either end of it by a canal navigation of 363 miles in length.

American genius and enterprise have accomplished many grand achievements for the West; first, the application of steamboat navigation to the Mississippi River and its great tributaries, then the opening of the Eric Canal; then the construction of great lines of railroad over the most difficult passes of the Alleghanies at immense cost. One great achievement remains to be performed. It is the opening of a line of water transportation directly eastward across the shortest passage of the Alleghanies,

from the Ohio to the base of the Chesapeake. Railroad transportation is for manufacturers, merchants, speculators and capitalists; water transportation is for the people. A line of navigation, open to general use, accessible to all classes, is needed on the shortest route from the interior to the seaboard. That route is presented by the interlapping valleys of the Kanawha and James Rivers in Virginia, connecting the channel of the Ohio and the channel of the James.

Impressed with the great superiority in cheapness, general utility, and popular convenience, of water navigation over railroad transportation, for their increasing products; and naturally desiring a shorter, more central, and more expeditious line of water transit than the present circuitous and extraneous ones by way of the northern lakes and southern gulf, the people of the West are beginning to look to Congress for the provision of such a route. With this object in view, the General Assembly of Iowa, at its last session, unanimously voted an able and earnest memorial on the subject to the national legislature, following it by a resolution "instructing their senators and requiring their representatives in Congress to use their best efforts to obtain such aid from the general government as will secure the early completion" of the Virginia water line.

The memorial concludes as follows:

This is a work of great national importance. Its benefits will be shared directly by more than half the people of this country; and indirectly by all. It is a necessary addition to the improvement of the navigation of the western rivers, without which the benefit of that measure will be but half realized. It is a work to be done by the whole country for the benefit of the whole country. It belongs to the government of the United States.

Nothing need to be given. An advance upon good security, for the return of principal and interest, is all that will be necessary. Not only will this advance be returned in kind with the interest, but the benefits of each year will return the outlay more than five-fold. Instead of increasing our national burthen of taxation it will so increase the means of payment as to greatly lessen is.

To the end, then, of obtaining government aid, there should be a co-operative movement of cities, towns and States. It should be connected with the western river improvements as a part of the same enterprise, and the influence of the great interest to be promoted by it should be concentrated through a convention, and brought to Lear upon Congress, to ensure a speedy completion. Keeping it always in mind that every year's delay is a loss of more than five times the amount required for that object.

Resolved, By the General Assembly of the State of Iowa, That the great rivers on our Eastern and Western borders are the natural highways for the trade and commerce of our State, and any measures that will add to their efficiency and importance, as channels of communication will increase the value of all our productions; add to the price of all real property, and contribute to the prosperity of all our people.

- 2. That the line of water communication between the Valley of the Mississippi and the Atlantic ocean, by way of the Kanawha and James Rivers, through the States of Virginia and West Virginia, is a work of national importance, and one deeply affecting the interest of the grain producing States of the Forthwest.
- 8. That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested to use their best efforts to obtain such aid from the General Government, as will secure the early completion of said line of water communication.

4. That a copy of these joint resolutions and the accompanying memorial, be forwarded by the Secretary of the State to the President of the United States, the President of the Senate, and to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress.

RESULTS EFFECTED BY THE ERIE CANAL. OTHERS EQUALLY GREAT WOULD ATTEND THE OPENING OF THE VIRGINIA CANAL.

Although steamboat navigation on the western waters dates from 1817, the development of the West did not fairly begin until 1825. In October of that year the great Erie Canal was completed. The effect was virtually to give another mouth to the Mississippi River. It opened to market a vast region which otherwise could have presented but limited attractions to emigration. The fact that the lake country, where the rigors of winter are more severe, and the climatic disadvantages imposed upon agriculture greater, than in any part of the Union, has undergone a more rapid development than any other, is due in chief part to the Erie canal. This work brought that great region within readier and cheaper reach of market than any other portion of the West. The long and tortuous channel of the Mississippi, the circuitous navigation of the gulf, and the heating, sweating and moulding effect of the semi-tropical and moist southern climate upon many products of agriculture, presented objections to the gulf transit, which rendered the lake route preferable to it, even for the trade of localities where the advantage of distance was less considerable. The falls of the Niagara, and rapids of the St. Lawrence River were turned by the canal, which completed a line of unbroken navigation from the farthest of the great lakes to tide-water at Albany. On the completion of the Erie several canals in the North-West were immediately projected and were soon completed, connecting the lakes with the Ohio River on the south and the Mississippi River on the west. These, in later years, were followed by railroads laid down in the same directions, forming portages between the navigation of the great rivers and that of the lakes. But all these canals and railroads pointed to the Erie canal as the common debouche. These works were all in the first instance constructed as feeders to the Erie canal, which was the parent work and grand trunk line of the whole system. After the system of works, of which the Erie canal was the base, had stimulated an unprecedented development of populatian and production in the West, it was found incapable of discharging the vast trade which it had created; and then it became necessary to enlarge its capacity, and to construct as many auxiliary works as possible, parallel with it. Hence the Welland and St. Lawrence canals, and hence the Grand Trunk Railroad in Canada, and the New York Erie, the Pennsylvania Central, and the Baltimore and Ohio railroads, within the United States. But it may be said with perfect truth, that if there had been no Erie canal, the stupendous agricultural development which has been witnessed in the west would not have taken place, and that these great auxiliary works would not have become necessary until after a much greater lapse of time.

The following table shows the effect of the canal upon the growth of imports, exports and population in the city of New York, in contrast with the same growth in Philadelphia where the influence of the trade of the canal was only partial and indirect:

			of imports	~Value of	exports	
	Tolls Tot		the ports of -	from the	ports of-	-Pop'lat'n of-
	Amount me		Phila-	New	Phila-	New Phila
Year.	collected. &	t West. York.	delphia.	York.	delphia.	York, delphia-
1890		8		\$11,769,511	\$5,748,549	123,706 137,097
1850		38,556,064		17,666,694	4,291,798	208,007 188,961
1840		117,046 60,064,949		32,408,689	6,820,145	819,719 258,889
1850	8,278,899 8,0	076,617 116,667,55	9 12,065,834	47,580,857	4,501,606	515,894 409,858

The power of a direct canal running west and east to attract trade to itself is exhibited in the operations of the Erie canal. "There are now seven great railway lines competing with this work, besides the canals of the St. Lawrence. They are the Baltimore and Ohio, the Pennsylvania Central, the Atlantic and Great Western, the Philadelphia and Erie, the Erie, and the New York Central railroads, in the United States, and the Grand Trunk railroad in Canada. Yet these great railways do not (computing with theirs all the trade which goes to Montreal, Ogdensburg and Cape Vincent by lake), secure more than fifty per cent of the total eastward movement of all classes of freight from the west to the seaboard markets." [Annual Statement of Trade and Commerce of Buffalo for 1865.7]

It is a peculiarity of railroads that they stimulate a greater production in the country within their reach than they can transport. Their capacity for transportation falls behind the demands upon it, resulting from the stimulus which they impart to production. This is particularly the case where the roads are of great length, and penetrate into fertile regions of country. The construction of railroads does not relieve the pressure of produce upon the means of transit, but on the contrary, aggravates the pressure.

The opening of another and shorter canal eastward to the seaboard, over a line exempt from the long suspensions enforced further north by winter ice, would produce a similar development of trade on the more southern line; and some future statistician will be able to write of the Virginia canal, as the superintendent of the census has written of the Erie:

[&]quot;The opening of this work was the announcement of a new era in the internal grain trade of the Uni ed States. To the pioneer, the agriculturist, and the merchast, the grand avenue developed a new world. From that period do we date the rise and progress of the northwest, as well as the development of the internal grain trade."

INADEQUACY OF ALL EXISTING OUTLETS FOR TRANSPORTING THE INCREASING TRADE OF THE WEST.

Remarking upon the subject of transportation for Western trade, the Superintendent of the Census says:

"It is feared by many in New York that the construction of a ship canal to the St. Lawrence River would damage the canal interests of the State by diverting a large portion of the grain trade of the lakes from the Eric Canal; but when it is considered that the production of grain in the northwestern States increased from 218,463,583 bushels in 1840 to 642,120,366 bushels in 1860, and that of the eight food-producing States west of the lakes, embracing an area of 262,549,000 acres, only about 52,000,000 acres were under cultivation in 1860, and that 26,000,000 acres of that have been broken since 1850, no fears need be entertained that any of the outlets to the ocean will be unoccupied to the extent of their capacity. The only fear is, that we will not keep pace with the increased production by the provision of increased facilities of transportation."

Sir Morton Peto, in his interesting and very clever work on the "Resources and Prospects of America," makes the following truthful observations:

"How far is the amount of tonnage employed in inland intercourse in America adequate to the wants of the country! In considering this point we have to regard the very great lengths over which traffic has to be carried; and looking at those distances, no reasonable doubt can be entertained that the inland navigation of America is very inadequate to the wants of the people. It has not, in fact, kept pace with the population and progress of the country; and, if it were not for the rillroads, the great producing districts of the United States would be at a stand still for want of means of transport for their produce. There is a period of the year when the canals are frozen up. The whole task of conveyance then falls upon the railways, and the consequence is, not only an immediate rise in their rates, but absolute inability to conduct the traffic. The results are often most disastrous. In one case 40,000 barrels of flour were detained at Toledo (nearly half way between Chicago and New York) for several months, in consequence of want of carriage. A vast mass of produce is yearly destroyed from the inability of the carriers to forward it. The owners are ruined, and parties in the Eastern Stat s who advance money on this produce charge excessive rates to cover the risks of delay. The grain producers of the Western States are quite unable to find sufficient means of conveyance for their products, because the railroads from west to east are choked with traffic. The existing railroad requirements of the West are, in fact, insufficient. At present, because they cannot carry the produce, the whole traffic of the country is subject to two gigantic evils, arising, first, from uncertainty of conveyance; and second, from uncertainty of charge. The present railways are quite insufficient for the growing traffic. The lines of communication from the West by canal, &c., which existed previously to railways, have not been affected by their construction. The produce of the Western States has, in fact, increased faster than the means of transport, and additional facilities for the conveyance of goods are urgently required. It is of the utmost importance to the development of the West that no time should be lost in making this additional provision. An inadequate railroad provision, and a corresponding uncertainty as to conveyance and delivery of freights, must have the effect of checking production in the West, and consequently of checking capital of the East from seeking employment in the West. Railway fac lities are now the measure of the prosperity of the country.

Now what is the effect of this inadequacy of transportation?

Now what is the effect of this inadequacy of transportation? The producer, the merchant, the railway comp: ny and the consumer, are all directly injured; but the indirect injury extends far beyond those interests. The whole produce of the West, and, consequently, the entire cultivation of America, is affected. If the produce cannet be carried, it can only find local markets. If it on y finds local markets, prices must abate. If prices abate, the stimulus to the cultivation of land is lost. If the

land is not required for cultivation, in the same proportion it necessarily diminishes in value. The prosperity of the West, the value of its produce, the value of its land, and the extent of land cultivated—all depend, therefore, upon increased facilities for the conveyance of produce, and those facilities, canals and railroads, must afford. The American public ought never to be satisfied until they are able to calculate on fixed moderate prices for freight, and fixed periods for its delivery. The future of the West depends upon ample means of communication with the East; and the success of its means of communication with the East; and the success of its means of communication with the East is expressed in a few words: "Prompt and economical delivery—in a fixed time and at a fixed price."

Nothing could be more true than these remarks. The talk of competition between railroads and canais, between one water line and another, or one railroad line and another, is wholly out of place. When there is more than enough trade for all, it is useless to consider the subject of competing interests.

A direct unbroken line of water transportation is urgently needed for the teeming products of the West. The necessity for it is becoming more and more imperious every year. How vast is the country producing tonnage, how wonderfully prolific is its production, how marvelously rapid its increase!

VAST EXTENT OF COUNTRY TO BE DRAINED.

The portion of the Mississippi valley and lake country interested in the opening of a direct line of transportation extending the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi to the base of Chesapeake Bay, is composed of the following States and Territories, whose area and population, taken chiefly from the census of 1860, are attached:

West Virginia. Kentucky Tennesse Arkansas Obio Indiana Illinois Muchican	Sq. miles. 24,(100 87,680 45,000 52,198 89,964 83,809 55,409 55,248	Population. \$76,688 1,'55,688 826,782 435,450 2,839,511 1,350,428 1,711,951 769 118	Minnesota Iowa Missouri Kansas Nebraska		Popu'ation. 172,028 674,913 1,182,012 107,206 28 841 865) 4,837 865) 20,000 84,277
Michigan	54,248		Colorado	104,00)	84,277
Wisconsin	58,924	775,881	 	1,228,795	11,945,597

In the same geographical relations to trade and its markets, though not belonging to the same political jurisdiction, is another extensive region lying above our natural boundary line. The Red River of the North, and the Sascatchawan, in Northwest British America, traverse a territory in the heart of the continent, five hundred thousand square miles in extent, and capable of sustaining a population of thirty millions. "In the valleys of the Sascatchawan and Assiniboin," Professor Hand estimates that "there are eleven millions of acres of arable land of the first quality." Of this region about one-half is prairie and one-half is wood land; it is the only

extensive prairie country open to the Canadas east of the Rocky Mountains; it is destined to be the Illinois or Iowa of British America. This is no inhospitable desert repugnant to the increase of the human race. Here is "a vast wedge-shaped tract of country, extending from 47 degrees to 60 degrees of northern latitude, 10 degrees of longitude, deep at the base, containing 500,000 square miles of habitable land subject to few and inconsiderable variations in climate. The summer at Buffalo is about ninety-five days, and it is ninety days at Cumberland House on the Sascatchawan, on 54 degrees north. The annual mean temperature is only 8 degrees lower than Toronto, with 17 inches more of rain and 33 inches less of snow than Toronto. Herds of buffalo winter on the wood land as far north as 60 degrees parallel. Corn grows on both sides of the Sascatchawan; wheat sown in the Red River valley in May is gathered in by the end of August.

The lake and river system of this region are almost as wonderful as our own: Lake Winnepeg having an area equal to that of Lake Ontario, and Lake Manitohah nearly half that of Winnepeg. The distance from a given point on the westerly end of Lake Superior to the navigable waters of Frazier's River in British Columbia, will not exceed 2,000 miles, about twice the distance between Boston and Chicago. The westerly end of Lake Superior is on the parallel of about 46 degrees, which passes from the heart of Germany through the British channel, across the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Lake Superior, Vancouver's Island and the rich and populous Archipelago of Japan.

The climate of Edmonton is milder in winter than at St. Paul. The Sascatckawan is clear of ice in the spring as soon as the Mississippi is between St. Anthony and Galena. Steamboat navigation, now established on the Red River of the North to Fort Gerry, by Americans, can readily be extended through Lake Winnepeg and up the Sascatchawan, to Fort Edmonton, the supposed eastern limit to the new gold district. This territory has now a population of about ten thousand. The valley of the Red River of the North will make one of the finest of wheat-growing countries, the yield being forty to sixty bushels to the acre. One hundred miles east of the Rocky Mountains, on the Sascatchawan, is an immense coal field, atretching away towards the Arctic Ocean.

The trade of all this region, equal in area to ten States of the size of New York, will, from necessity, seek an outlet by the Mississippi, or Lake Superior, or the Virginia water-line. The discovery of gold will ensure its early settlement.

ITS PROBABLE POPULATION.

Here is a great region within and bordering upon the United States, embracing 1,750,000 squares miles of territory, becoming rapidly popu-

lated, whose trade is to be brought to the seaboard. The population of the portion of it which lies within the United States has greatly increased since the census of 1860, and will continue to increase until this expanded region, one of the most fertile in the world, shall contain inhabitants approximating in numbers, per square mile, the populations of other districts of the earth no more fertile. As indicating the actual density of population in other quarters of the globe, the following table is given:

NUMBER OF INHABITANTS TO THE SQUARE MILE.

Belgium	897 Prussia	159
Saxony	858 Bavaria	156
England and Wales	807 Austria	142
Netherlands	250 Hanover	123
Sardinja	225 Denmark	114
Wurtemburg	910 Scotland	92
Ireland	205 Sweden	21
German States	199 Norway	18
France	176	

Few, if any, of these European States are more fertile than the valleys of the Mississippi and the lakes; many of them are far less fertile. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to assume that within another century the population of this region will average one hundred persons to the square mile, and will reach the imposing aggregate of one hundred and seventy-five millions of inhabitants.

The State of Illinois gained, between 1850 and 1860, one hundred per cent of population. To show how much room is open for an increase of population, one of the densest portions of the population of the west, that embracing the States of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota numbered, in 1860, only sixteen persons to the square mile. The increase of population in the entire Union during each of the last decades was 35½ per cent. At a rate of increase for the west, equal to only 33 per cent (it will be more than 50), the population of the seventeen States and Territories of the west that have been named, will be one hundred and twenty millions by 1940. But the increase will be much more rapid. There are persons now born who will live to see it reach more than that number.

But confining our attention to the affairs of the present time, it is important to know what amount of tornage is now produced in the States and Territories under consideration; what portion of this production is necessary for consumption, and what part might be spared for market; whether all that might be spared does or does not actually go to market, and if it does not go, whether the failure is due or not to inadequate facilities of transport, and too great a cost of carriage.

ITS PRODUCTION IN TORS.

In 1860, the production of that portion of the West embraced in the seventeen States and Territories entering into the questions under discussion, was as follows:

Wheatbush.	111 110 274	eanal to	8,867,700 tons.
Corn	527,898,527		15,996,775 "
Rye "	5,568,461		167.529 "
Oats	71,962,829		1,151,897 "
Barley "	5,210,770	. 1	
Buckwheat	4,286,566		22 6,127 "
Feans and peas	1,648,558		
Irish potatoes	89,016,910		1,285,810 "
Sweet polatoes	4,981,759		2,000,020
Clover seed	408,428	,	
Grass seed	546,170		
Flax seed	887,818		
Butterlbe.	188,624,188		91.817 =
Cheese	28,575,218	•	14,267 ~
Wool	28,267,128	4	14,188 "
Flax	2,180,828	44	1,056 "
Tobacco	222,829,886	"	111,165 *
Hope	272,892	u	186 "
Maple augar	12,164,546	66	6,082 "
Honey	10.857,944	•	5,428 "
Beeswax	476,989	66	286 4
Hay tons.	210,000		7,405,876
Hemp			68,902
Coal			1,928,466
Pig iron			168,266
Copper			7,422
Orchard producevalue.	87.481.517		•,
Market garden produce	8,695,696		
Home manufactures "	9,774,577		
Slaughtered animals	99,887,988	equal to	718,128 tons.
Lead	915,481	"	4,577 "
Salt "	8,620,418	4	250,000 "
Pi-heries	851.479	44	5,859 "
Lumber "	85,429,729	66	5,250 "
Winegalls.	975,254		-,
Maple molasses	1.108,772		
Sorghum molasses	5,620,675		
	2,020,010	_	

Here is a grand aggregate of thirty-three millions of tonnage. It is difficult to determine what amount of this total could be spared from consumption and sent to market. Some statisticians contend that a community occupying so fertile a country, and so situated as that of the Great West, can easily spare for market an amount of tonnage equal to three-fifths of the total production, which, in the case of the West and its production in 1860, would be twenty millions of tons. This estimate does not seem excessive when we find from the foregoing statement that if we deduce for home consumption a tonnage equivalent to that of all the oats all the hay (besides every other sort of fodder), all the butter and cheese

and orchard and garden produce, all home manufactures, all the wine, molasses, fish, clover and grass seeds, hops, maple sugar, honey and beeswax, all the wool, flax and hemp, all the coal and pig iron, three-fourths of all slaughtered animals, and of the Irish and sweet potatoes, peas and beans, five pounds of tobacco for each inhabitant, and six bushels of wheat to every man, woman and child of the population, there would still be eighteen millions of tons left to be sent to market, besides what live stock might go off on the hoof, by rail, or by boat. Such was the amount of tonnage which the West would seem to have been competent to send to the seaboard in 1860, if the facilities at hand for carrying it to market had been adequate in capacity to the herculean task, and if the rates of charge had been low enough to leave a profit to the producer.

WHY DID NOT THIS TONNAGE COME TO MARKET!

But these facilities were not adequate in capacity, nor were the charges of transit sufficiently low to permit so vast an eastward movement of tonnage. In a comparative sense, the actual movement of tonnage as late as 1862, while the stimulus of war prices was active in bringing it forward, was very meagre.

"In 1862," says the report of the Board of Trade and Commerce of Buffalo, 1865, "the surplus products of the West sent eastward (through trade) to the tide water markets, including products of wood, agriculture, animals, manufactures, and miscellaneous commodities, was 5,176,499 tons. This includes the eastward movement of through freight over the four great roads of the United States, and the Grand Trunk and Northern railways, and the total exports from Buffalo and Oswego by canal. If the way freights received at the western terminal points of all these railways, and delivered in the interior, be added to the through freight, it is estimated that the total number of tons moved out of the West during that year exceeded 5,500,000. Of the eastward movement in 1862, 2,080,656 were sent from Buffalo, and 638,419 tons from Oswego, making nearly 50 per cent of the total movement by the New York canals, and the remaining portion by the five through lines of railroad."

Thus it seems that the great public works of the country already in operation did not attract from their places of production nor transport one-third of the products which the West could actually have spared. If the whole exportable production had offered itself for transit, it could not have been carried; and it did not offer itself, because the cost of carriage on a vast proportion of the exportable products was not low enough to tempt them forward.

PROBABLE INCREASE OF THIS TONNAGE.

Now, while the number and capacity of these works have been very slightly augmented, production in the West has grown apace. That this production grows at about an equal rate with the population, is shown by the following table for the country embracing Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan.

	Population,	Cereal Product	4
1840	8,840,542	165,698,882 bu	shels.
1850	5,408,595	810 050 295	4 .
1860	8,855,982	556,801,897	æ

The decennial increase in the States, both of population and cereal production, exceeded 65 per cent. The actual exportation of the West in 1862 slightly exceeded five millions of tons. Distinguishing actual from possible exportation, the actual movement from the West, if it shall increase at equal pace with the population, will by 1880 become fifteen millions. How will this certain amount of exportable tonnage find exit? Unless the bulk of it go down the Mississippi, it will be unable to reach the seaboard without a great increase in the number and capacity of our public works. Even on the basis of actual exportations, a direct canal across the shortest passage of the Alleghanies to the seaboard is evidently necessary.

But, by 1880, the exportation will be far more than fifteen millions of tons, provided means are provided for carrying away the produce. In 1860, when the population was twelve millions, the West could have exported eighteen millions of tons. In the absence of facilities of cheap transportation, it actually did export less than five millions of tons. There was a difference of 250 per cent between the actual and possible exportation. At present the western population has reached eighteen millions, and it is capable of exporting fully twenty five millions of tons of produce, if avenues of transportation were accessible, and if freights were cheap. To bring out this trade a short line of cheap navigation is necessary. Another canal on the most direct central route, with the attendant railroads that would spring up near its margin, is indispensable to the accommodation and development of Western trade.

COMPARATIVE VALUE AND CAPACITY OF CANALS AND RAILROADS.

Much has been said of the comparative merits of canals and railroads. When the discussion loses sight of distance and circumstances, it leads to no sound conclusion. The chief exports of the West are the bulky products of the farm, forest, and mine, and it is generally true that beyond certain distances, these commodities cannot afford the cost of rail

road transportation. For instance, if a cent and a half a ton per mile (which is much below the average charge) be assumed as the lowest price at which railroads can profitably transport tonnage, and if the specie price of wheat in the market be \$1 50 per bushel, or \$49 50 per ton of 33 bushels, and if the cost of growing wheat be 60 cents per bushel, or \$19 80 per ton, so that the margin between cost and market value is 90 cents per bushel, or \$29 70 per ton, then, making no allowance for expenses of handling, storage, commissions and the like, it is clear that wheat cannot go farther than 1,980 miles by railway without the cost of carriage trenching upon cost of producing.

Price per ton in market	\$19 19	80 80
Margin for expenses of carriage	\$29	70
Equal, at 14 cents per top per mile, to 1.980 miles.		

But, as the cost of production varies in different localities, and even on different farms, and as the price in market varies almost weekly, it would not be proper to conclude either that railroads can invariably carry wheat as far as 1,980 miles, or that this is the distance beyond which wheat can never be transported in any season, under any state of the markets, between any points. It is generally true that in a region so remote from the seaboard as vast portions of the West, water transportation is essential to the purposes of farmers, lumbermen, and miners of bulky minerals, while railroads suit best the uses of manufacturers, merchants, and speculators. Both methods of transportation are necessary, each for its appropriate sort of trade, and, so far from their being antagonistic, they are mutually assistant and beneficial. Cheap navigation developes production in the first instance, and then commerce and art demand the assistance of railroads for their more rapid operations.

The respective distances for which canals, railroads, and ordinary highways command trade is approximately exhibited by the following table. It takes no account of charges other than for freight, and is made out for wheat at \$1 50 per bushel, or \$49 50 per ton, and corn 75 cents per bushel, or \$24 75 per ton of 33 bushels. It assumes the cost of carriage at five mills per ton per mile on canals, fifteen mills on railroads, and fifteen cents on ordinary highways.

STATEMENT showing the value of a ton of wheat and one of corn at given distances from market, as affected by cost of transportation respectively by canal, by rail-read, and over the ordinary highway.

				-Canal Ca	arriage-	-Railway	Carriage-	Com. R'	d Car.~
77-1-		arket		Wheat. 49.50	Curn. 24.76	Wheat,	Corn. 24.75	Wheat. 49.50	24.75
do				49.45		49.85	24.60	48.00	28.25
			n market		24.70				
ďο	20	φo	φο	49.40	24.65	49 20	24.45	46.50	21.75
φo	80	do	φο	49.85	24.60	49.05	24.80	45.00	20 25
do	40	ďο	φο	49.80	24.55	48.90	24.15	48.50	18.75
qo	50	ďο	do	49.25	24.50	48.75	24.00	42.00	17.25
do	60	do	do	49.20	24.45	48.60	28.85	40.50	15.75
ďo	70	do	do	49.15	24 . 40	48.45	28.70	89.00	14.25
go	80	do	do	49 10	24.85	48 80	28.55	87.50	14.75
do	90	do	do	48.05	24 80	48.15	28.40	86.00	11.25
do	100	do	do	48.00	24.25	48 00	23.25	84.50	9.75
do	110	do	do	47.95	24.20	47.85	28.10	88.00	8.25
do	120	do	do	47 90	24 15	47.70	22.95	81.50	6.75
do	180	do	do	47 85	24 10	47.55	22.80	80.00	5.25
, qo	140	do	do	47.80	24.05	47.40	22.65	28.50	8.75
do	150	do	do	47.75	94.CO	47.25	22.50	27.00	2.25
do	160	do	do	47.70	28.95	47.10	22.35	25.50	.75
do	170	do	do	47.65	28.90	46.95	22.20	24 00	
do	820	do	do	46 90	28 20	44,70	19.95	1.50	
do	830	do	do	46 85	28.15	44.55	19.80		
do	840	do	do	46.80	28.10	44.40	19.65		
do	850	do	do	46.75	28.05	44.25	19.50		
	1000	do	do	41.50	19.75	84.50	9.75		
	1650	go	do	41.25	16.50	24.75			
	1980	do	do	29 60	14.85	19.80			
	8300	do		88.00	8.25	19.00			
	4950		do		0,20				
		do	do	24.75					
	5940	do	do	19.80					
ao	8800	do	do						

The table is merely theoretical. Of course the charges on produce, other than for carriage proper, would materially curtail the distances indicated by it. The exhibit is valuable, however, as showing by contrast for how much greater distances navigation commands trade than overland methods of transit. At 330 miles the cost of carriage on common roads consumes the whole value of wheat, leaving nothing at all for the farmer. At 1,980 miles the freight on railroads leaves but 60 cents per bushel (\$19 80 per ton) for the grower; and at 3,300 miles sweeps off the total value. But on canals the cost of carriage does not trench upon the cost for production (of 60 cents per bushel) until the wheat has been carried 5,940 miles; nor is the value wholly exhausted within a distance of 9,900 miles.

Thus the question involved in this comparison is very far from being one of mere percentage. The railroad charges become prohibitory within actual practical distances from the seaboard, and it then becomes a question with the interior producer between water transportation and no transportation at all. If no cheap navigation is available, the crops of the far interior must rot in the fields, and the minerals must remain indefinitely emboweled in the earth.

It is very far from being the fact, therefore, that, in a country of such vast extent as ours, railroads have superseded, or can supersede, canals. In a small island like Great Britain they may do so, but not on this spacious continent. Here canals have not ceased, and they cannot cease, to be of essential importance to the great producing classes of the far interior.

GROWTH OF THE WESTERN GRAIN TRADE—ITS EFFECT UPON OUR FOREIGN EXPORTS OF BREADSTUFFS—NATURAL PREFERENCE OF THIS TRADE AMONG LINES OF OUTLET TO THE BEABOARD.

Forty years ago the surplus products of Ohio had accumulated beyond the means of transport, and wheat sold in the interior at 37 cents per bushel, and Indian corn at 10 cents. Then the Eric Canal was opened, and soon after the Ohio canals, and prices were raised more than 50 per cent. Now that the means of transport have been increased, the price of flour at Cincinnati is nearly double the price in 1826, the price of Indian corn is four times, and the price of pork three times as great. On the other hand, the prices of grain and meat on the seaboard have not been reduced in the least. It is therefore evident that the bulk of the grain obtained by the increased facility of transport has gone to the producer.

Not only has the transport of produce been cheapened, but also the cost of the transport of every article of manufacture required by the producer. Machinery and articles of foreign growth have been supplied him at almost seaboard prices. Sugar and coffee were no dearer at Cincinnati in 1860 than in 1835, although the population of the Western States in that interval had increased in enormous proportions.

Prior to the opening of the Eric Canal the only outlet to the ocean from the northwestern territory was by the river Mississippi. During the progress of the Erie Canal it was predicted that "it would never pay," for that the trade would follow the rivers, and was not likely to be diverted across the continent. It has turned out, however, that the artificial channels of trade, the canals and railroads, have completely diverted the course of the traffic as to a very large section of the West. There are various causes for this. The principal, no doubt, is the increase of the grainconsuming population in the States of the Atlantic. Other causes are to be found in the uncertainty of river navigation during the summer months. the greater speed and security of transport by railway, the superior advantages of New York to New Orleans as a place of trade; and the greater risk of damage to grain and flour by "heating" in the southern latitudes of the gulf of Mexico. Thus it results that New Orleans has not become a leading shipping port for grain, although her trade in cotton, sugar and tobacco has largely increased.

Much has also been due to the energy of the north; and the graphically expressed complaint of Prof. De Bow was well grounded when he declared, thas "the bold, vigorous and sustained effort of the north has succeeded in reversing the very law of nature's God, rolled back the tide of the Mississippi and its ten thousand tributary streams, until their mouths, practically and commercially, are more at New York than New Orleans."

The first shipments of grain on the lakes, of which there is any record, was made in the year 1836, when the brig John H. McKenzie shipped at Grand Haven, Michigan, 3,000 bushels of wheat for the port of Buffalo.

The first shipment of grain from Chicago, consisting of 78 bushels of wheat in 39 sacks, was made in 1838. The first shipments from the State of Wisconsin were made three years later, in 1841. These shipments consisted of about 4,000 bushels of wheat purchased at Milwaukee on Canadian account.

In 1848 the Illinois and Michigan Canal was completed, opening up another great field of cultivation in the State of Illinois. In 1849 the era of railroad communication was inaugurated by the opening of the Chicago and Galena Union Railroad, traversing a widely cultivated district. This line of railroad led to a great and rapid development of the country which it traversed. In 1863 nearly eleven and a half million bushels of grain were carried over this line. These large shipments of grain to the seaboard soon began to excite an export movement.

. The growth of the grain trade of the lakes is illustrated by the following table of

BHIPMENTS EASTWARD FROM MICHIGAN PORTS.

Year.	Bushels.	Year.	Bushels.
Year. 1858	27,879,298	1861	69,4 9,113
1859	25,829,758	1862	78,214,675
1860	48,2:1,448	1808 ,	74,719,664

Such a record of progress is probably unparalleled. The production of grain in the Northwestern States is estimated to have increased from 218,463,583 bushels in 1840 to 642,120,366 in bushels 1860.

Thus the opening of the Eric Caual in 1825, which placed the Hudson River in communication with Lake Eric, inaugurated a new era in the trade of the United States. The shores of the great lakes were brought by this line of communication into connection with the Atlantic by a navigable water-course through the entire State of New York. This grand avenue did, indeed, "develop a new world to the pioneer, the agriculturist and the merchant,"

The following official table shows the ratio of increase in the value of the grain exported from the United States, for a period of 40 years:

Years.	Aggregate value of exports of grain.	Per centage of increase.
	mat 040 11 1	8.0
	198,594,871	170.9
1853 to 18 8	512,380,514	158.0

EUROPE BEGINS TO RELY CHIEFLY ON AMERICA FOR GRAIN.

The repeal of the corn laws of Great Britain in 1846 gave the greatest encouragement to the exportation of American grain. During the years 1862 and 1863 the total exports of grain, flour, and meal from the United States were of greater value, in either year, than the aggregate value of the whole grain trade of the Union for the ten years from 1833 to 1843.

Year.	Bushels.	Value.
1862	76,809,425	883,692,812
1868	77,896,082	88,597,064

The years during which this very great supply of food was exported were, it should be remembered, years of civil war. Of the total amount of the exports, nearly two-thirds were shipped to Great Britain and Ireland. The proportion sent there is represented as follows:

Year.	Bushels.	Value.
1862	84,102,785	\$17,916,266
1868	47.082.026	56,959,860

The supply of wheat from the United States to England and Ireland during the years 1861, '62 and '63, was estimated to amount to 37½ per cent of their whole import. Of the imports of flour into Great Britain, 58.3 per cent were from the United States.

It has been estimated by the Mark Lane Express, a paper of authority on agricultural matters, that the average consumption of wheat in Great Britain is six bushels per head per annum; and as the population amounts in round numbers to thirty millions, this gives a total annual consumption of 180,000,000 bushels, and indicates the importance of Great Britain as a customer of our Western States. The exportations of wheat from eastern Europe to its western populations having reached their maximum magnitude, and being henceforth destined to decline, while the western European populations are steadily increasing; the dependence of the latter upon American grain is becoming more and more absolute, and the Mississippi valley is becoming more and more emphatically "the granary of Europe." The rapid growth of our foreign exportations of grain will require, more and more imperatively, the opening of a direct water-line of navigation from the central West to the seaboard over the shortest possible line.

Western exportations are even at present much restricted on account of insufficient facilities of cheap transportation; and this restriction directly affects the foreign produce exportations of the Union. Since the great loss which the export trade of the United States has sustained from the decline of Southern production, it has become doubly important to the national prosperity that its exports of Western produce should be increased by every possible means. The nation must look chiefly to the free labor of the West for compensation for the sacrifices it has incurred by emancition. That is the only source from which compensation can come in the form of exportations. These can be indefinitely enhanced by multiplying the channels of cheap transportation from the interior to the seaboard; and, of all such channels which can be possibly devised, none offers so many advantages as the Virginia water-line.

CHEAP TRANSPORTATION MAKES WESTERN TRADE PREFER THE WATER OUTLETS.

Notwithstanding the strong tendency of Western produce to seek markets by direct eastward routes, it is still diverted to the circuitous northern or southern water lines by the cheapness of water transportation, and dearness of railroad carriage. This strong tendency of trade to pursue the shortest route eastward to market, has for forty years given the lake and Erie route a great advantage over that by way of New Orleans. These two routes are subject to equivalent disadvantages; that by way of New Orleans to the damaging effect of excessive heat during the summer months upon produce; and that by way of the lakes to obstruction by ice in the winter. These disadvantages being nearly equivalent, the northern route secures more trade by reason of its being much shorter. If the direct railroads were liable to five months of obstruction in their operations, they would fail to secure any considerable proportion of through trade, and would be unable to carry through produce at prices which it could afford to pay.

WESTERN TRADE PREFERS THE SHORTER NORTHERN WATER OUTLET TO THE LONGER SOUTHERN ONE.

The advantage which its comparative shortness gives to the lake route, over that of the gulf, is exhibited by the statistics of the eastward movement of produce from the West; some of which are now given.

Andrews report on "Colonial and Lake Trade," gives the eastward movement of tonnage in 1851 as follows:

By New York canals	1 ons. 1 977 161	Value. \$58.727.508
By New York railroads	228,107	11,405,850
Ly St. Lawrence River	829,681	9,158,589
By Mississippi River	1,292,670	108,051,708

It seems that more tons went by the canals; but more value by the Mississippi; owing to the difference in price between farm produce and cotton.

The same authority gives a table of the value of property received at the seaboard by way of the Hudson and by way of the Mississippi, for the ten years ending with 1851. The totals for the ten years were as follows:

By way of the Hudson	•••••	8484,924,474
By way of the Mississippi		857,658,164

Here, too, although the value of the movement by the Mississippi was 85 per cent greater, the avoirdupois tonnage was but half that which went out by the canals.

The following were the shipments (not receipts) of flour, wheat and corn from Chicago eastward in the years designated:

SHIPMENTS FROM CHICAGO.

	Wheat & flour, bush.	Corn, bush.	l	Wheat & flour, bush	. Corn. bus.
1856	9,419,865	11,129,668	1859	10,759,859	4,217 654
1857	10,788,292	6,814,615	1860	15,892,857	18,700,118
1858	10.909.248	7.498.212			

The shipments from Milwaukie and other lake ports, eastward, were proportionally large. Contrast with the shipments from Chicago alone, as above stated, the following table of shipments from New Orleans during the same period:

SHIPMENTS FROM NIW ORLEANS.

	Flour, bbls.	Wheat, bush.	Corn, bush,
1862	251,501	1,096,788	2,941,711
1867	428,486	1,858,480	1,084,402
1858	474,906	596,442	1,184,147
1859	188,198	107,031	111,522
1860	80,541	2,189	224,882

The foregoing tables show not only how small a proportion of Western grain and flour sought a market by way of the channel of the lower Mississippi and New Orleans, but that this proportion was yearly and rapidly diminishing before the war. The natural tendency of these products is eastward, across the continent, on routes as near as possible to the same parallels of latitude as those on which they are grown. This tendency of trade is pointedly shown by the following tables, for four years, of—

SHIPMENTS FROM CINCINNATI.

	1857	-'58	1858-'59	
	Shipped north.	Ship, ed south.	Shipped n'th, S	hipp'd s'th
Flour, bbls	445,650	162,565	544,570	17,569
Wheat, bush		80,446	270,581	1,182
Corn, sacks		1,927	24,796	8,707
•		-160	1860-	-'61. ———
Flour, bbls	885,389	92,919	268,038	158.592
Wheat bush	810.154	11,841	477,264	47.801

The bulk of this trade took the line of the lakes. Thus strongly does the trade of the West itself appeal for a direct water-line along the shortest route to the seaboard.

(To be continued in next number.)

THE GENERAL DEPRESSION OF TRADE.

The inactivity of trade experienced throughout the United States is but a counterpart of what exists in nearly every commercial country. A deep rooted depression has set in everywhere, enterprise being held in check, and prosperity a rare exception. There is no real distress, labor being, as a rule fairly employed; yet industry nowhere exhibits energy or offers inducements to an expansion of operations. An universal dearness renders commodities and manufactures costly of production, and makes it impossible to market them at an average profit. Wealth, therefore, accumulates slowly and is not readily drawn into productive enterprises. As a natural consequence of these discouragements, money is returning from active circulation into the banking reservoirs and seeking temporary employment at unusually low rates of interest. On the continent of Europe, and especially in Germany, the plethora of idle funds has induced an active demand for securities; which again has produced a more or less extravagant speculation. It is the protracted prevalence of this commercial depression that has opened a market in Germany for fully \$500,000,-000 of our bonds, and which is now inciting railroad and other enterprises of a speculative character. The Governments of Europe, weakened by late wars, find the occasion favorable to the negotiation of loans, and are recruiting their finances upon easy terms. England has advanced a large amount of its idle capital for the development of India; and yet there are now proposals on the market for foreign and colonial loans amounting to £20,000,000 sterling. In our own market money is lending at unprecedentedly low rates and the special facility of borrowing has induced large speculative operations by capitalists, resulting in unnaturally high prices for stocks and bonds.

This industrial and commercial depression and its reflex results upon financial operations are the product of very obvious causes, the proper understanding of which will contribute materially to the remedy. In truth, we are in the midst of a reaction from a widespread series of wars, the effects of which are felt by all countries having commercial relations with each other. Scarcely had Europe recovered from the injury of the Crimean war, when a struggle broke out in Italy, resulting in a large loss of life. Then came a civil war in the United States, which has retired permanently from the ranks of labor fully one million of our ablest producers—an enormous per centage of our productive population. Contemporaneously, a bloody struggle occurred in Mexico, which has cost France heavily, and rendered Mexico a nullity in the commerce of the world for years to come. Next, came a brief but terribly severe struggle between Austria and Prussia, in which the needle-gun made sweeping havoc of human life, the loss to the belligerents being far greater in men than the material of war or the

destruction of property; nor are we to overlook the injury to Holland from the Schleswig struggle, which was the first step toward the German contest. More recently, we have had the Quixotic Abyssinian expedition, costing England £10,000,000; and finally the South American war, which has caused much loss of life, and may entail the most serious injury upon the trade of the Argentine Republic and Brazil.

The injury to commerce growing out of this seven years of ceaseless hostilities is incalculable. An immense proportion of the population of the civilized world has been kept under arms, and literally millions have been slaughtered or so disabled as to become a burthen to the community. While production has been curtailed to a very material extent through this severe thinning of the ranks of producers, and industry has been diverted to the construction of stupendous navies and the production of a thousand new appliances of warfare, national debts have been augmented and the burthens of taxation made more oppressive. The fact to be most prominently noted, in connection with these causes, is that they have very largely reduced the proportion of producers to consumers in both the Old World and the New. The natural result of this condition of things would be to exact an increased amount of labor from those laborers who remain, and to compel some to become producers who had been non-producers. Most unfortunately, however, the former of these results has not been realised. By one of those perverse freaks which often deprive society of a much needed relief, the working classes have organized influential combinations for exacting unnaturally high wages, and, still worse, for curtailing the hours of labor; so that factitious restrictions have been imposed upon production, and the cost of products has been unnecessarily increased.

Under such a condition of things is it a matter of wonder that for three or four successive years we should have suffered from short crops? Is it not rather a marvel that we have not been afflicted with famine? For three years the world was deprived of the American cotton crop, and compelled to substitute more costly materials at high prices; and even since the war we have not been able to supply much more than half the average crop. The reduced supply of grain and of cotton, the great staples of food and clothing for the masses of the world's population, has laid the basis for higher prices for all other products, while that effect has been enhanced through a reduced supply of labor for every branch of industry. The consequence of this diminished production has been high prices everywhere. In England, there has been a steady decline in prices since the financial crisis of 1866, the general value of raw materials and manufactures at the present time being little different as regards many important articles of commerce from that of eight years ago; but such is the commercial

depression in other countries, that the moderation of prices has not induced a corresponding demand for goods. On the Continent of Europe, there is perhaps a sound basis for a more active condition of business, consumption having been economised and trade placed generally upon a conservative footing; but the tendency to recuperation is held in check by a state of armed peace and the threatening attitude of large armies newly equipped, and itching to test their prowess.

These are the chief causes of the prevailing commercial depression. In our own case, they are augmented temporarily by the preparations for a presidential election involving unusually exciting issues and calculated to interfere more than usual with the ordinary course of trade. There is, however, reason to hope that we have passed the climax of the reaction. The derangement of the relations of the several branches of production is being rapidly remedied. The special dearness of certain products is inducing an increase of their production, so that an equalization of values is likely to be soon attained. It is especially hopeful that the grain crops of the world are being brought up to their old proportions; so that, if the seasons next year should prove favorable, we may hope to have then recovered average prices for food, the most important step toward the regaining of a healthy state of trade. After a long period of inactivity and suspense, trade is apt to break loose suddenly from its fears, and with a half-desperate and half-hopeful feeling rush into new enterprises and make the utmost of its resources. It would seem possible that such an outburst may occur in Europe upon the first symptoms of the abatement of belligerent purposes; and, with such a change, the United States could not fail to sympathise beneficially.

THE NATIONAL BANKS.

On page 132 will be found tables of the official statement of the National Banks for July. The figures show several changes which deserve and will command special examination. First of all, one is struck by the large increase in the deposits which since April have risen 47 millions of dollars, the aggregate being now 575 millions. It is impossible to conceive a more striking proof of the accumulation of capital in the great monetary centres and monetary institutions of the country. It is now highly probable that the accumulation has reached its highest point for the season, and in a week or two we shall see a return current setting in from New York and other seaboard cities towards the interior. This movement may be expected to be more brisk than usual

for several reasons. The bounteous crops and the expected activity of the fall trade combine with many other causes to force on us the belief that a season of lively activity is before us, and that it will open earlier than usual. The reports of our associated banks will be scrutinized with extraordinary care for several weeks to come, and the symptoms of monetary activity will be looked for by our shrewd business men who aim to trim their ships to meet an expected gale.

We are far from thinking, however, that during this fall any panic in the money market is to be expected like that which desolated it last spring. Among the safeguards against such a catastrophe we may mention the 25 millions of three per cent certificates recently authorized. These will probably inflate the currency less than was predicted. At any rate they will ease the money market and will prevent any disturbance from the payment of the maturing compound notes.

As a further indication of the plethors of the loan market, we may mention the small increase of loans; which are only 28 millions more than ir April, while the deposits increased 47 millions. This shows how idle capital is accumulating here, and how difficult it is for our cap italists to lend that capital at remunerative rates. It would be well for the country and would render our internal banking machinery more properly adjusted to the wants that machinery has to supply if such a plethora as the present were met by a general sending home of the National bank notes for redemption. During the summer months the country needs less currency by 20 or 30 millions to do its work. The banks which issue this superfluous currency ought there fore to redeem it and to put it out again in the fall when it will be wanted for the exigencies of business. Such a spontaneous and self-regulating method of giving elasticity to the currency, is the great want of our National banking system, and it must inevitably be ere long supplied. Without this our money market can not work with that stability which in times of pressure is indispensable if we would have our industry and trade prosperous and exempt from preventable evils.

We must not omit to notice the great strength of the banks in their legal tender reserve which has considerably increased. As will be seen from our tables the aggregate of gold and greenbacks is 187 millions against 164 millions in April. These figures give a reserve of over 23½ per cent upon the liabilities, and show that the banks are stronger than the law requires, though not stronger than is necessary for their thorough security.

689,172 067,180 067,800 1,580,800

14,540,729 1 1,268,588

860-688 90 4,224,831 00 1,906,173 45 887 668 27 130,9-8 69 11,406 65 128,958 97

Undivided profits
National bank notes outstanding.
State bank notes outstanding.
Individual deposits
United States deposits

Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers Due to national banks..... Due to other banks and bankers....

NATIONAL BANKS OF EACH STATE-THEIR CONDITION JULY 6, 1868.

We are indebted to the Comptroller of the Currency for the following reports of the National Banks of each State redemption city for the quarter ending the first Monday of July, 1868. As will be seen we have grouped them As will be seen we have grouped them together in the following order:—First, the Eastern States, next the Middle States, then the Southern States, and last the Western States followed by the returns from the Territories. The reports of the Banks of all the States and Territories are included except Oregon, Montana and Idaho, and they are so far off that the reports have not yet been received by the Comptroller. In addition to the usual returns we add a separate table of the legal tender reserve held in the oities

REGOUROES

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* Exclusive of Philadelphia and Pittsburg.

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Washington. 8171,106 88 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98	240,000 00 66,224,012 80	\$1.80,000 0) 281,000 00 183,948 70 961,884 00 1,440 686 79 1,189 061 942,174 80 688,748 89	\$6,294,012 30
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* Exclusive of Washington City

		NATIONAL	BANKS C	F EAC	H STATI	E.		
	Cincinnati, 5,112,102 09 8,768,000 00 8,267,600 00 634,260 00 16,000 00 1,030,669 66	25, 259, 11 149, 039, 12 25, 238, 23 13, 290, 33 134, 735 105, 735 105, 600, 100 105,	94,664 38 10,673 30 135,466 00 185,400 00	\$15,447,863 18	8,651,000 00 599,658 61 225,150 63 8,941,215 00	3,7743 69 1,510,863 18 962 31 9,156,455 35 996,299 48	\$15,447,869 18	cinnati.
	Oblo.+ 864,800 118,500 416,200 805,466	777, 403 69 665, 609 18 143, 080 14 47, 413 99 848, 713 88 534, 609 00	2,086 68 137,894 88 2,180,480 00 378,670 00 373,000 00	\$ 19,002,739 76	15,604,700 00 2,215,504 78 924,121 94 18,191,063	24,013 10, 15,964,014 21 1,259,050 39 84,008 67 284,346 08 267,119 66	\$49,902,783 76	* Exclusive of Cincinnati
	Tennessee. 1 721,877 58 20, 1,179,800 00 14, 511,000 00 2, 479,050 00 1, 821,307 78 4,	erater .	81,858 76 19,737 87 851,810 00 164,840 00	\$6,194,951 00	1,625,300 00 155,747 58 141,846 85 923,163 00	9,761,397 43 846,969 49 141,796 49 80,957 23 67,153 94	\$6,194,251 00	*
	Louisville. 1972,204 44 905,000 00 150,000 00 80 660 00 102,666 90	28 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52	240 82 241,047 92 20,000 90 30,000 90	\$2 ,591,544 04	1,000,000 00 137,800 75 26,091 19 785 597 00	871,628 59 79,896 83 119,488 96 78,045 77	\$2,591,544 04	
	Kentucky, * 9,068,673 13 1,760,900 00 16,000 00 25,713 73 288,303 73		888. 868. 87.400 10,000	\$5,080,457 47	1,885,000 00 117,794 14 115,199 90 1,585,631 00	1,153,551 63 137,407 65 11,373 06 20,889 37 98,710 96	\$5,080,457 47	
M MOOO NOTES	Arkansse. 427,468 49 200,000 00 150,000 00 74,000 00 132,004 27		94,709 10 1,948 75 86,067 60	\$1,120,066 84 LIABILITIES.	200,000 00 32,260 18 11,681 63 179,415 00	556,415 46 88,957 84 80,044 84 81,913 89	\$1,110,666 84	
	Texas. 585,514 71 472,100 00 200,000 00 1,000 00 49,110 \$71,896 49	08,983,46 16,95 08 6,50 48 7,488 61 81,684 00	2055,952 17 6,653 85 216,884 08	\$ 2,133,990 83	55E,000 00 36,750 00 46,627 25 891,775 00	717,445 67 146,806 04 214,894 86 41,867 60 13,848 98	82,138,900 83	
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	Missiesippi. \$68,115 95 45,000 00	17,801 88	17,880 00	148,063 48	\$100,000 00 1,953 90 5,608 58 40,500 00		\$148,062 48	
	Lonis and discounts. U.S. bonds to secure circulatin U.S. bonds to secure denosits. U.S. bonds & secur. on hand. Other stoores, bonds and mort. Due from National Banks.	Due from other blas & bankers Real estate, for ture, &c. C rront expeases. Premition of the constitution of other banks.	Paction currency Exactional currency Compound interest notes Three per cent certificates	Total	Capital stock Surplus fund Undivided profits National bank notes outstand'g	Nate Dank potes catastaturg. Tradytdral deposits. United States deposits. Deposits of U. S. disbur, others Due to National Ranks. Due to other banks & bankers.	Total	* Exclusive of Louisville.

BESOURGES.

RESOURCE.

	Minnerota.	lissouri.*	St. Lou's.	+	serenworth.	rasi	Nevada.	Colorado.	Utah.
Loans and di-counts.	2,459,590 48 1,629,900 00	408,190 91 797,900 01	3,926,150 49	2801,980 189,000 91	2000 376 36 36 8600 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300	225.000 24 225.000 00	\$148,876 83 155,000 00	2431,125 50 297,00, 60	\$156,988 70 150,000 00
U. N. bonds to secure a posits.	100,000	150,000 00	485,000,00	13	800,000 00	9		150,000 00	
U. S. bonds & sec'ties on hand.	140,700 00	180,700 00	898,500 00	8	76,950 00	훓		60,500 00	14,200 00
Other s ocks, bonds and mort	64,117 10	123,195	969,836 96 96,836 96	øð i	27,648	918		1,699,80	
Due from National banks.	82 620,020	2000	1,000,200 56	0	175,000	?	20 KII'91	20 474 00	10,615 44
Doel cetate from the Ke Dank 8	114,150 %		000 070 000	83	200	Ş	200	81 888 2T	10 1 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
These estate, turn ture, &c	#1 000 01 10 01 01		200,000	Ŧc		8	19. 101 TA	20 44 70 C	14,0(1,92
Current expenses	2000 P	13,301	04,000 GB	> 6		3	:	25 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
Checks and other cash items	85.5	27.417 45	257,530,53	R G	10 OH	9	467 80	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	20,010 20
Bills of National banks	52,068 00	104,008 0	279,628 00	•	48,778 00	3	1,065 00	21,690 00	24.8
Bills of other banks	5,857 G	2 2 3	6,987,98	•	90000	9	100	100.00	
Fract ons currence	7 549 41	0 4 5 0 6 6 6 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	20,120	2 S	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	20,250	81,880 12	25.55 25.55	8 8 98 7 1
Le, al t nder notes.	442,608 00	866.440	1.864.518 00			949,409,00	26.785 00	157,645 00	20.680 00
Compound interest notes	88,110 00	36.450	197,470 00			8,280 00		00 009	
Three per cent certificates	5,000 00		450,000 00	•		5,000 00	:	:	:
Total	£5,889, 53 15	\$3,847,068 96	70 638,980,08	\$809,985 81	\$1,291,800 59	\$2,718,643 87	\$401,875 17	\$1,677 080 08	\$406,473 75
			ធ	ABILITIES.					
Capital stock	\$1,600,000 00	8	6,810,300	200,000 00	3 00,000 00		155,000 00	860,000 00	
Surplus fund	99,738 39	Ş:	739,748	28,540 68	52, K50 86		6.116 00	28,000 00	
National Bank notes outstand's	170,117	184,118 88	475,527	32,443 17	25,920 17	121, RF1 96	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	116, 00 57	
State bink noise outstanding	200	3	41 888	700,010	20,001	300	O OTO-TOT		00000
Individual deposits	2,290,085 44	1,809,285 40	6,987,706 98	877,688 99	491,669 32	1,128,077 96	86,855 00	717,718 18	68,887 88
U. S. deposits	120,341 00	86,848 06	400,018	8,481 80	46,935 15	189,077 08	:	25,010 62	:
Dep us of U. S. disburg gofficers		404			20%,709	461,839 11	:		
Due to other banks and bankers	35,365 51	15,679 68	775,681 14	7,888 89	11,98; 89	224,642 25	38 28 28	1,562 48	11,007 91
Total	\$5,889,052 15	\$3,847,068 98	\$20,598,289 07	\$809,385 81	\$:,294,800 89	\$2,718,548 57	\$404,875 17	\$1,677,080 08	1 405,478 15
* Exclusive of St. Lonia.	•			+ Exclusive of Leavenworth City	nworth City				•

LAWFUL MOMEY RESERVE OF NATIONAL BANKS IN CITIES EXCEPT NEW YORK, JULY 6, 1868.

						,
		9 4 0	Re	serve require	1-10 of 25%	A
N	o. of Aggregate		quired		which may	Aggregate amount of
Ba	nks Circulation	on to be	kept		consist of 8	
_ Cities. repe	orted. and Depos	its. on h	and.	% of 25%.*	Certificates.	quired.
Boston	46 \$77,598,994	65 87,78	,899 46	\$9,699,940 5	8 81,939,848 11	\$19,898,461 16
Albany Philadelphia	8 14,025,196 80 58,196,749	944 1.4U	1,719 64 0,674 2 7	1,758,149 54 6,699,592 8	5 250,629 91 1,889,918 57	8,506,299 11
Pittsburg	16 17,197,501	59 171	750 16	2,149,687 70	429,987 54	18,899,185 66 4,299,875 40
Reitimore	19 10 897 016	67 1,968	3,101 06	2,460,976 8	492,175 27	4.921,752 67
Washington New Orleans Louisville Cincinnati Cleveland Chicago Detroit	4 3,940,516 2 2,103,462	88 894	,051 69	499,564 61	98,519,99	985,129 22
New Orleans	3 2,103,462 4 1,249,750	87 210	348 98	262,982 86	52,586 78	525,865 73
Cincinneti	9 1,249,100 7 10,610,079	7 41 1 1 NR	1,975 (1 1,007 74	100,315 (0	81,243 57 965,251 98	812,487 58 2,652,519 85
Clevelandt	7 10,610,077 5 5,821,847	40 68	,184 74	727,730 99	145,546 18	1,455,461 85
Chicago	14 18,975,486 4 5,181,881	47 1,89	7,548 65 8,188 15	156,218 70 1,826,259 67 727,730 91 2,871,929 56	474,865 91	4,743,869 13
DOUGHT	Z 0,101,001	513	3,188 15	041,480 11) 128.XV7 U4	1,282,970 39
	5 8,144,081 2 1,040,840	1 09 814	408 11	892,010 11	78,602 08	786,020 27
Leavenworth‡ St. Louis	3 1,040,840 8 11,992,280	747 109 187 110	1,084 05 9,298 06	100,049 50 1,499,085 07	3 26,018 51 7 299,807 01	960.085 19 9,998,070 14
_		<u> </u>	<u> </u>			
Total 1	68 \$946,110,066	85 \$94,61	1,005 07 4	80,768,756 85	86,159,751 25	\$61,527,513 71
		-Reserve a	vailable		Aggregat	е
		_	Due fro		amount o	of
Cities.	On hand.	Per	Banks	in Per		
Boston	\$18,089,707 85	cent. 28 2-10	N. Y. 1	ity. cent 2 46 11 6-1	. sorve. 10 83 7,05 2,3 19	cen'. 81 84 8-10
Albany	9,180,484 51	15 2-10	2,241,74	5 59 15 9-	10 4,879,161	10 81 1-10
Philadelphia	17,090,159 47	81 7-10	2,774,78	8 67 5 1-1	lQ 19, 794, 946	14 86 8-10
Pittsburg	8,170,148 40	18 4-10	1,645,20	2 27 9 5-		67 27 9-10
Baltimore Washington .	4,856,858 01 767,996 63	34 6-10	1,304 19	848 66-: 087 8	10 6,160,551	49 8: 9-10
New Orleans	573,998 23	19 5-10 27 2-10	817,870 160,53	67 76-:	1,985 367 10 784,580	0 27 5-10 90 84 8-10
Louisville	820,687 00	25 6-10	68,41		IN 980 109	11 21
Cincinnati	2,020,659 23	19	809,49	198 76-3	10 2.880.151	20 26 6-10
Cleveland‡	796,469 49	18 4-10	527,80	0 68 9 1-1	lO 1,954,2 70	13 21 5-10
Chicago Detroit	4,070,489 84 7: 6,485 05	21 4-10 18 8-10	2,417,92 828,89	8 97 12 8-1 0 29 16 1-1	0 6,488,868	81 84 9-10 84 29 9-10
Milwaukee	486,260 97	15 4- 10	530,43	4 77 16 8-		74 82 2-10
Leavenworth:	189,858 68	18 4 10	61,24	6 96 5 9-	10 201,200	59 19 3-10
St. Louis	2,079,894 86	17 8-10	1,398,34		10 8,472,737	84 28 9-10
Total	\$57,101,497 16	28 2-10	34,101,59	3 200 9 79-1	CO \$81,903,098	86 82 99-100
	Ttoma	of Reserve	on hand			Amount of
	~(2-5 of 25% or		AN II JUU	. — — ¬		available Re-
	Circulation		mpound	Three per		erve in excess
Old	consist of	these.—	Interest	Cent Cer-	Amount of	of what is re-
Cities. Boston	Specie. La \$3,261,301 85 3 40,879 51	egal Tend.	Notes.	tificates.	Fpecie, etc.*	quired.
Albany	40.879 51	885,215	684,840	\$4,490,000 570,000	\$9,089,078 65 702,848 51	\$7,653,833 65 865,981 99
Philadelphia	288,714 47	10,118,245	1.488.200	8,180,000	9,949,971 17	6,895,780 43
Pittsburg	41,591 40	2,284,157	129,470	765,000	1,594,966 40	515,975 27
Faltimore	430,196 61	8,011,497	289,560	1,125.000	2,715,984 81	1,9:18,798 82
Washington New Orleans	61,803 63 102,688 23	146,658	319,540	240,000	118,278 98 468,006 28	100,938 28 208,665 18
Louisville	840 00	471,815 287,077	88,270	80,000	158,957 80	76,664 53
Cincinnati	84,664 22	1,165,595	185,400	585,000	9 6,137 72	177,681 85
Clevelandi	14,529 49	837,9⊱0	188,960	235,000	167,359 09	••••
Chicago Detroit	46,162 34	8,177.557	146.720	700,000	2,808,655 74	1,714,504 19
Milwaukee	1,687 05 10,583 97	506,2 8	103,540	95,000 40,000	412,902 05 811,306 67	253,354 95 280,675 47
Leavenworth;	2,028 68	874,969 109,665	60,758 18,160	40,000 10,000	98,898 63	200,010 51
tt. Louis	67,411 86	1,864,518	197,470	450,000	1,098,419 86	474,667 20
Total	\$3,898,957 16 \$	23,495,1028	5,672,488	\$14,585,000	\$29,858,408 56	\$19,675,580 65
						

^{*} One-half of 25 per cent, which may consist of balances due from approved associations in New York city, Three per Cents, or Compounds on hand.

† Amount of specie and legal tenders in excess of what is required to be kept on hand as reserve on circulation, 5. c., 2-5 of 25 per cent of circulation.

‡ In these two cities the aggregate amount of reserve is deficient as follows: in Cleveland \$201,191 73 and in Leavenworth \$58,884 53, the sum of which amounts —\$260,076 26—is deduct.d from the sum of the amounts in the last column to show the excess

lawful money reserve of national banes of the city of new york, july 6, 1868.

New York city		No. of Banks sported. 57	Circuls outstan \$85,88	ation ding.	exch. house) i anc s d and \$313	for clearing luc to Ban Bankers, 1,336,746	ig bal ks	Aggree Circulati Depos \$347,708	on and site.
Amount of Reserve required. \$61,925,998 46	Per cent. 25	2-5 of t co Lega Tende \$30,422	e re .	it require	d must oney.—	on hand 8-5 of the quired n sist of T Cent Ceri \$26,13	amt, re- nay con- 'hree per ificates.	depoi may c	tes, for sits only onsist of i. Notes. 2,190
Aggregate amount of available Reserve \$79,148,987 63		Per Cent. 81 9-10	T lo	Amoun pecie and l'enders in the amo quirec \$30,951,4	Legal n excess ount re- d.	avi eei of i	mount of allable R rve in ex the amou required. 7,222,996	e- cess int	Per cent- age of excess. 6 9-10

THE COMMERCIAL OUTLOOK.

The fall trade opens with unusual encouragements, and yet with some peculiarly perplexing doubts. In our last issue, we pointed out the injurious effects upon trade of a succession of short crops; it is satisfactory to be able to state that the country is now nearing the end of this cardinal cause of commercial depression. It may now be considered as almost beyond doubt that the present harvest will prove the most abundant in the history of the country. Nor are we likely to be deprived of the commercial advantage of cheaper bread through scarcity in Europe; for there also the yield of grain promises to go far toward restoring stocks to their usual volume, the chief essential to the recovery of average prices for food. It is not easy to over-estimate the importance to commerce of a good supply of breadstuffs. The cheapening of food removes the most stuborn impediment to the reduction of wages, the high rates of which have, for five years, been the bane of our industries. With a reduced cost of the main staple of subsistence, we are apt to have lower prices for the other articles of food; and with a general contraction of the costs of subsistence, consumers have the more to expend upon other commodities. An abundant harvest thus favors at the same time an increased and a cheaper production and an enlarged demand, which is but another phrase for a profitable and active trade.

This prospect bodes good for the country generally, and the agricultural sections especially. There is, however, some uncertainty overhanging the great staple upon which the South is directly dependent and in which all sections are indirectly concerned. It is now universally conceded that a crop of 3,000,000 bales of cotton is not to be thought of. Present accounts from some sections of the cotton region represent the crop as suffering from rains and the worm, and it is feared that one-hal

the crop of Alabama may be lost from this cause. It also remains to be seen how far the election excitement, acting upon the sensational propensity of the negroes, may divert labor from picking operations: the planters profess considerable apprehension on this ground. The South is likely to realize a handsome aggregate value for the crop, whatever may prove to be the vield; for with a light yield the price will correspondingly advance. It is hardly to be hoped, however, that the country is about to be benefited by a cheapening of the chief staple of clothing. contemporaneously with a decline in the price of food. We have a stock of but 75,000 bales of all qualities of cotton in the country to serve us until the new crop comes into the market; a condition of things by no means favorable to the season opening with low prices. The prospects of the cotton crop, therefore, cannot be reckoned among the causes helping to produce a generally healthier condition of trade, except so far as it promises to improve the trading position of the South. The sugar and rice crops of that section, however, give promise of a large increase, which again will have the important advantage to the whole Union of helping to cheapen food products.

There are certain fiscal considerations tending to impart confidence and steadiness to trade. Congress has declined to enact any further modifications of importance in the tariff, tending, as all such changes do, to embarrass our foreign trade. The pressure of political opinion has induced Congress to curtail the expenditures of the Government, and the internal taxes have been removed from all manufactures, a relief which, whether it may prove permanent or not, must have a material influence in encouraging trade. To this extent, we may congratulate ourselves upon having recovered from the derangements and extravagances incident to the late war. Although these changes are very far from amounting to the recovery of a normal condition of things, yet they indicate progress; they are a concession to a popular desire for a sounder condition of things; and they are the commencement of a course of recuperation which, though propelled rather by the popular instinct than statesmanship, must ultimately place affairs in a healthy condition. Thus much the commercial mind of the country will conclude; and trade will take courage accordingly.

In order, however, to arrive at a well balanced estimate of the future, it is necessary to take into the account certain facts and tendencies of a less favorable character. The political condition of the South is not such as to encourage enterprise in that section. Although a system of reconstruction has been established in most of the States, yet it remains to be seen how far political opposition may defeat its success, at least temporarily. The action of the Tennessee Legislature, in passing a law providing for

a militia force to meet a present political emergency, is not assuring; and is the less so from the fact that other States may deem the same course necessary in view of election contingencies. The presidential canvass is being conducted with more than ordinary acrimony and passion, and during the latter stages may be attended with developments calculated to disturb confidence. These excitements are always attended with a diversion of attention from trade during the busiest period of the fall season; and, this year, the interruption is likely to be greater than usual.

Again, the course of our foreign trade is not at present wholly satisfactory. While it may be reasonably presumed that we have now reached a period when the remittance of bonds can be no longer available to any material extent in settlement for our imports, we see our exports of produce declining and our imports increasing; a course of affairs which has called for an unprecedented export of specie this year, and which, with the remittance of the Alaska purchase-money, has reduced the supply of gold in the country to an unusually low point. This course of affairs is inducing an active rise in the gold premium, and is likely to result in a great deal of speculation for the next few weeks; which would not only embarrass our foreign trade, but produce a good deal of financial uneasiness.

We would fain hope that no hindrance to trade may arise from banking sources; and yet we must confess to some misgivings on this point. For two successive seasons, last fall and this spring, we have seen merchants and manufacturers seriously embarrassed through the banks showing a preference for stock loans over discounts. Several failures arose from this cause, and much of the recent depression of trade is due to it. And the present condition of the banks is such as to tempt them strongly to a repetition of this reprehensible policy. It appears from the July quarterly statement of the National banks of the United States that the loans and discounts are \$67,400,000 more than at the same period of 1867; and, considering the general quiet of trade and manufactures, it is reasonable to conclude that this expansion is due to an increase of loans upon securities. If then the banks are resolved upon paying due deference to the claims of their mercantile customers, it must be at the risk of their call borrowers; a risk which it requires much courage in the banks to challenge. The deposits of the interior banks with their New York correspondents appear to be very unusually large. When the crop movements set in, these deposits will be withdrawn; large amounts of grain paper will be sent here for discount; and the country banks will, in addition, require advances of currency. It is impossible to contemplate these movements without some anxiety as to the policy the banks may adopt toward the commercial community.

PHILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON AND BALTIMORE RAILBOAD.

The roads owned, leased and operated by the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company are described as follows:

Main Line: Philadelphia, Pa., to Bultimore, Md	 .öö	8.	95 80
Total length of single track owned	ŝ	05.	70
Southwark (Philadelphia) Railroad leased	.60 .60 .50	45.	12
Tutal langth (single track) owned, lessed and operated	5	esn.	69

—and to this total may be added probably 10 to 12 miles for side tracks on the leased railroads. With exception of the Southwark Railroad, which carries the main line into Philadelphia from South street to Queen street, these leased roads are in Delaware and Eastern Maryland, and at Anamessix Sound connect with steamers running to and from Norfolk, Va. The branch from Havre de Grace to Port Deposit will be met at the last named place by the Columbia and Port Deposit Railroad, and with it form a short route from the coal ports of the Susquehanna to the seaboard.

An article published in the MAGAZINE of May, 1866, gives an extended review of the condition of the Philadelphia Wilmington and Baltimore Company up to October 31, 1865. The present article is a supplement to that referred to.

ROLLING STOCK AND TRAIN OPERATIONS.

The company owned, at the close of each of the seven fiscal years closing with October 31, 1867, the following engines and cars:

October,	Loco-	_Carsi	n the reve	ral depa	rtm'e~
31st.	motives.		Freight.	Road.	Total.
1861		109	504	61	664
1863		110	680	61	801
1863	40	110	838	68	1.001
1864		109	948	88	1.145
1865		111	904	118	1,188
1866	52	84	870	118	1,086
1867	58	98	870	118	1,086

This enumeration includes the engines and cars used on the Delaware leased lines.

The mileage of trains, the number and mileage of passengers, and the

tons and mileage of freight in the same years are stated in the following exhibit:

Piscal	Train	Passe	ngers	Freight-			
vears.	mileage.	Number.	Mileage.	Tops.	Mileage.		
1860-61	489,780	629,098	28,128,521	165,383	9,558,108		
1861-69	582,615	854,498	48,573,777	175,972	12,168,450		
1869-63	675,865	1,041,961	54,301,469	217,034	15,612,542		
1868-64	780,587	1,851,416	68,560,989	240,298	16,418,260		
1864-65	981,465	1,385,991	77,791,162	285,939	18,549,685		
1865-66	880,956	1,098,259	not stated.	960,294	not stated.		
1866-67	892,876	983,934	not stated.	218,861	not stated.		

OPERATING ACCOUNTS-EARNINGS, EXPENSES, &C.

The following statements show the earnings, expenses, and profits of operating the road yearly for the seven years ending October 31, 1867:

Fiscal		Gross ea	ninge.—		Operating	Earnings 1	Dividend
Years.	Passeng's.	Freight.	Other.	Total.		less exp.	paid.
1960-61	. 1.067.275	868,553	68.847	1,494,676	609,885	824,830	864,000
1861-69			72,204	2,223,579	649,819	1.574,260	513,639
1869-68		619,562	86,553	2,540,248	955,561	1.5:8.686	690,077
1868-64		697,169	85,241	8,205,599	1,417,919	1.737.580	805,440
1814-65		771,176	64,681	8,828,464	2,258,909	1,574,554	982,847
1965-66		720.554	65,087	2,470,968	1,835,820	1.185.188	474,147
1866-67		818,511	110,721	9,489,581	1.541.800	890,780	856,838

The total income of the company for the same seven years was as exhibited in the following table:

Fiscal	Eurnings P.,	-Profits fr	om leas s	Other	Total
Years.			R. Delaware RR.		Income.
1860-61	. \$884,880 94	\$ 7,915 26	8	8	\$899,746 30
1861-69	1,574,860 18			·	1,574,260 18
1869-68	. 1,183,686 78	6,061 26	******	18,808 12	1,608,556 16
1968-64	1.787.580 84	23,835 83	40,976 18		1.807.892 85
1864-65	. 1.574.554 39	10,929 79			1,585,484 18
1865-66	. 1,185,188 00	9,899 28			1,145,087 28
1866-67		18,294 08	12,907 85	9,795 00	927,726 72

From which deduct the following disbursements:

~Loss on leases.~								
Fiscal	Interest	French-	Delaware	Sinking	Divid'ds	New	Total	
vears.	paid.	town RR	RR.	fund.	to stock.	works.	amount.	
1860-61	2155,219	8	258,060	246,666	\$864,000	\$97,044	8715,983	
1961-69			28,488	43,666	518,689	825,686	1.050.570	
1869-68			5.687	58,833	691,077	871 040	1.8C4.790	
1862-64	89,285				805,440	1.114,689	1,952,418	
1864-65	45,178		2,715	••••	989,847	1,016,733	2,026,970	
1865-66	51,187		84,603	••••	474,147	77,450	687,889	
1866-67	126.518			****	856,889	90,000	1.072.852	

In the year 1865-66 the April dividend alone was paid, the dividend days in that year having been changed from April and October to Jenuary and July. The interest column shows the interest paid less the interest received.

ABSTRACT OF BALANCE SHEET.

The financial condition of the company at the close of each of the seven years ending October 31, 1861-1867, both inclusive, is shown in the following compilation from the yearly balance sheets. The changes in

share capital and bonds from year to year till 1866 were chiefly the result of the conversion of the latter into stock. In the year named the bonded debt was increased by \$1,000,000, and in 1867 by \$415,000, which amounts were required for additional construction and improvements, including the bridge over the Susquehanna, second track (now completed), and other works. The addition to the construction account in the two last years amounted to the large sum of \$2,025,634 63:

	Capital	Funded	Ground	Current	Revenue	Total
Year.	stock.	debt.	rents.	accounts.	balances.	amount.
1861	\$5,600,000	\$9,455,500	\$20,000	\$175,998	\$490,507	\$8,742,000
1862		2,589,000	20,000	274,708	1,014,196	9.50P.405
1868		1,287,500	90,000	291,996	1,818,059	10.332,478
186L		812,000	2000	456,681	1,168,583	11,114,518
1865	8,978,8 0	496,000	90,000	459,895	727,046	10,669,943
1866	9,019,800	1,459,400	21,888	202,797	1,934,694	11,987,594
1867	9,059,800	1,825,000	20,000	463,230	1,038,568	12,467,099

Per contra, as follows, viz.:

	Railroad &	Real	Stock &	Fuel &		Advances
Year	Appurienances.	esta e.	securities.	material.	de carh. d	improvts
1861	\$7,766,137	\$905,650	\$143 ,840	\$55,318	\$578,549	\$58,509
1842	7,724,849	205,650	500,631	78,008	98%,519	60,252
1869		205,6 0	755,762	108,560	894,190	125,140
1864		¥05,650	598,661	158,581	888,546	161.158
1865		55,650	892,188	227,418	639,481	947,961
1846		55,650	425.084	238,501	448,175	855.411
1867			554,234	171,948	459,087	15 ,847

Included in the column headed "Railroad and appurtenances" is the amount of \$744,425, being the capital stock of the Newcastle and Frenchtown Railroad Company exchanged for capital stock of the P., W. and B. Company. The total capital of the N. and F. R. R. Company is \$744,520. Their separate organization is kept up for State purposes; nor are their accounts included in this company's, except so far as to show the profit and loss on operations, and the capital and cost of the road as above.

PROPORTIONAL DEDUCTIONS.

The following table shows the cost of the P., W. and B. R. R. (not including the N. and F. R. R..) absolute and per mile; the gross earnings, expenses and profits per mile; the expenses and earnings per cent, and the profits to cost of road per cent, with the dividends per cent to capital in each of the seven years ending Oct. 31, 1867:

		Earn'gs	Exp'es	Profits	Exp'es	Prolits Div.
Fiscal	Cost of road		per	per	per	to per
v: ars.	Absolute, Per m.	mile.	mile.	mile.	čent.	cost, p c cent
1861	\$7,021,718 \$78,148	\$15,369	\$6,832	29,217	40.80	10.81 634
1862		23,162	6.764	16,398	29.21	22.55 9
1868		26,461	9.964	16,497	87.66	21.10 10
1864		83,390	15,291	18,039	45.80	20.78 10
1865		89,880	23,478	16,402	58.88	18.88 10
1 966		25,789	18,915	11.8:4	54.04	11.79 10
1867		24,825	15.418	8.407	68.88	8.57 10

The stock of this company is chiefly held in Boston, and sales are seldom made in other than the Boston market. The following table shows the

monthly and yearly range of prices on a par of \$50 per share, for the five years 1863-1867, both inclusive:

PRICES OF SHARES IN THE BOSTON MARKET

	1863.	Dividends Ap 1864	ril and Octobe 1865.	1866.	Div. J. & J. 1867.
January		65 @68	68×0.78	57% @59%	54 @56
February		67 x 671 x	67% 669%	551(@571(55 Ø55¥
March	67 673	70% 674	60 0083	56 @5736	5434 @ 55 3
April	671400704	713677	54×663	5636@6236	52 1 054 1
May	18%@74%	70% @74	58×0062%	57% @ 4236	54 @56
June	67 Ø73	74 @75	58¾ Ø60 °	593(@60	52%@56%
July	68 16 0 1836	79 Ø75 1 4	40 0 066%	55% @57%	5834 @ 5434
August	66 % @73	74%@74%	65 @663	55 @57	5134 @55
September	67×@10×	65 @74%	61 @86	534 65616	58×0.55
October	67 % @69	63ר65	6014@63	55 @55%	51× @53×
November	66 k @68 k	68¥@68¥	58%@61%	56 @59	51%@54
December	66 @67%	67%@68%	59×@60	56 @59	58 <u>%</u> @54 <u>%</u>
Year	59×@74×	68¥@77	5814@79	531406214	511/0561/

LAKE SUPERIOR COPPER MINES.

The following return has recently been published, showing in detail the product of the Lake Superior copper mines for 1867:

PORTAGE LAKE DISTRICT.						
Mine. Pewabic mine		Lbs. 1,4:2	Mine. Albany and Boston mine	Tons 65	Lbs. 1,724	
Quincy mine	1,119	1,194	Concord mine	47	810	
Franklin mine.	96 3 500	1,408	D ugla mine	46	468	
Calumet mine		1,481	Sou h Pewabic mine	88	1,625	
Huron mine	562 508	1,067	Motol .			
Isle Royal mine	850	002 439	Total	6,494	565	
Hancock mine	832		Product in 1866	5,650	1,747	
Hecla mine Sheldon Columbia mine	815	1,138	Tu I- 4000			
		1,375	Increase in 1867	773	818	
Grand Portago mine	810	1,269				
KEWHENAW DISTRICT.						
Mine.	Tons.	Lbs.	Mine.	Tone.	Lbe.	
Copper Fa'ls	1.096	1.077	Madison	15	LD4.	
Pittsburg and Boston	908	1.479	Eagle River	5	1.5 1	
Central	788	1,714	Clark	š	1,3,3	
Pennsylvania	811	877	Mendota	2		
Phoenix	225	517			• • • • •	
Bay State	174	ŎĨĬ	Total	8 831	777	
St. Clair	116	1.035	Product of 1866	8 098	691	
Amygdaloid	107	1.620	1	0,000	OBT	
Ætna	58	1,623	Increase in 1867	778	086	
215tusq.,	••	21020	I Indicase III 1001	110	000	
	OCT	ONAGO	N DISTRICT.			
Mine.	Tons.	Lbs.	Mine.	Tons.	Lbs.	
Evergreen	. 323	839	Mine. Superior	. 49	169	
National	. 824	364	Flint Steel River	14	114	
Minesota		807				
Knowiton		1,267	_ Total	1.509	1.210	
Ridge		1,669	Product of 1866	1.701	1.250	
Rockland		1,618	1		-,	
Oginia		678	Decrease of 1867	. 192	040	
Caledonia		1,697			040	
			•			

For the purpose of comparing these returns with former years, we have

compiled the table below, showing the extent of the yearly production in the three several districts.

·Calendar	Keweenaw District.	Portage Lake District.	Octonagon District.	Total Tons.
Years.				
11858		1,184.1	2,658.6	6,075.6
1859	1.987.7	1,605.6	7.62 1.0	6.161.4
1460		2,797.6	8,668.4	8,426.9
1881	2.208.6	8.811.6	8.507.9	9.528.1
1862		8 942.5	2,780 6	9,128.4
1:63		4.121.1	2.029.6	8,697.8
1864		4,292 9	1,784.7	8,567.4
18-5		5,894.6	1,771.8	y ,798.6
1666		5,650.9	1,701.6	10,375.8
1867		6,494 8	1,509.6	11,785.3
Ten years	25,819.7	89,215.8	28,958.8	88,486.8

It thus appears that the annual production of mineral in the last ten years has increased from 6,075.6 tons to 11,735.3 tons, or about 93.15 per cent. In 1863 and 1864 production was reduced on account of the withdrawal of the miners from their pursuits for the purpose of increasing the strength of the army in the field. Since the latter date, however, immense progress has been made, and so rapid has been the development that the Lake Superior mines for the last two years have produced one-half the estimated consumption of copper within the United States. California, Vermont, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee together produce the other half. The imports from Canada, Cuba, Chili, &c., are counterbalanced by the export of our domestic copper. The estimated consumption of copper in the United States is from 25,000,000 to 50,000,000 pounds, the quantity varying more or less as it is affected by prices and other oircumstances.

The above table refers only to the amount of mineral produced. Some of this is smelted at the mines, but by far the largest portion is manufactured into ingot at Detroit, Buffalo, Pittsburg, &c. The loss in smelting varies in the different samples operated upon, but is on the average from 25 to 30 per cent. This is a comparatively small loss. In Wales ores containing as low as 8 or 10 per cent of metal are reduced and the operation is profitable.

The total value of the products of the mines worked since 1845, as estimated by Whitney in his *Metallic Wealth of the United States*, and other reliable authorities, is given as nearly exact as possible in the following table, the mineral being reduced to ingot:

From 1845 to 1854 inclusive			
1858	8,500 tons 4,900 tons 6,000 tons 8,000 tons 8,000 tons 8,000 tons 8,500 tons 8,500 tons 8,750 tons	at 525 per t n at 300 per ton at 825 per ton at 850 per ton	1,610,000 1,982,000 2,520,000 8,180,000
Total	90.054 tons		\$52,894,000

TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

The Board of Trade returns of Great Britain for May and five months ending May 31, have just been published. They show that the declared value of the exports of British and Irish produce and manufactures in May amounted to £14,670,035, against £15,936,864 in 1867, and £15,870,131 in 1866; the total for the five months being £70,668,103, against £72,123,393 and £78,327,710. The computed real value of the principal imports in April was £21,063,955, against £19,816,597 in 1867 and £24,034,877 in 1866. During the four months ending April 30 the value of the imports was computed at £68,373,049; against £64,142,642 in 1867, and £73,516,565 in 1866.

With regard to cotton the statement shows that in May there was imported 1,353,965 cwt.; of which 978,095 cwt. were from the United States, 104,494 cwt. from Brazil, 114,145 cwt. from Egypt, and 139,951 cwt. from the East Indies. In the corresponding month last year there was received 1,551,087 cwt., and in 1866 1,490,636 cwt. The following are the particulars for the five months:

cwt.	cwt.	cwt.
	2,690,611	8,877,886
2,734	4,068	41
8,145	23	
		857,971
		10,714
	007,197	607,810
	900,019	517,019
91,956	110,004	58,187
5,180,070	4,858,482	4,92 3,878
	2,471,929 2,734 8,145 833,708 76,794 551,951 1,649,553 91,956 5,180,070	cwt. cwt. cwt. 2,471,929 2,680,611 2,774 4,088 8,145 23 883,708 809,862 76,794 47,647 551,951 657,197 1,649,558 58,815 2,041 91,886 110,004

The exports of cotton and cotton goods in the five months are subjoined:

OF COTTON.			
To Russia, Northern ports	. 29,542 5,618 . 396,076 . 210,184	87,794 ,8,088 299,881	1868, 40,771 51,886 1,671 996,875 918,768 442,010
Total	. 1,795,029	1,108,697	1,051,980
OF COTTON GOOD	5.		
Piece goodsyds. 98	1966. 5,895,016 5,540,574 2,482,973	1867. 61,197,610 1,068,164,235 2,655,588	1968. 77,160,071 1,164,780,645 2,781,389

The following statement shows the quantities of goods exported to the United States during the five months ending May 31, in the present and last two years:

Alkali, ewts Beer and ale, bbls Coals, tons	1966.	1867.	1968.
	751,851	593,998	687,160
	6,143	8,176	9,740
	55,926	58,113	44,871
COTTOR MANUFACTURES— Piece goods, yards Thread, ibs. Earthenware and porcelain, pkgs. Usbardshear and millingar (yalpa)	68,470,107	58,100,941	43,691,085
	687,786	621,883	752,069
	49,217	47,557	38,995

HARDWARES AND CUTLERY-			
Knives, forks, &c. (value)	£199,180	107,750	68,782
Anvila, vices, &c. (value)	252,907	40.951	80.203
Manufactures of German silver, &c (value)	£202,358	202,181	249.841
	222400		149,011
Liner Manufactures-			
Piece goods, yards	58,805,694	41,576,#34	82,771,982
Thread, lbs	961,693	685,197	449,930
Metals-			•
Iron-Pig, &c., tons	40,101	49,965	23,190
Bar, &c., tons	27,982	19,825	14.082
Railroad, tons	48,666	87,299	119,606
Castings, tons	584	210	107
Hoops, sheets and boiler plates, tons	12.817	10.214	4,450
Wrought tons	4.939	8.096	1.660
Steel Unwrought, tons	8.589	8,946	5,410
Copper, wrought, cwts	5,191	9,947	1,139
Lead, pig. &c., tons	2,798	9,120	8,907
Lead, pig, &c., tons	483,020	897,698	518,785
Oil seed, galls	469,145	828,955	145,644
Salt. tons	96,115	68,613	67.546
SELK MANUFACTURES-		,	0.,020
Broad piece goods, &c., yards	409.275	215.539	155,455
Handkerchiefs, dozens	4,568	1,442	58
Ribbons, lbs	16,897	12,654	9.858
Other articles of silk (value)	£51,770	28,501	66,149
hilk manuf's mixed with other materials	£80,448	80,625	26,255
Spirite British cells	84,785	12,653	22,79
Spirits, British, galls	4.880	8.904	48,694
	24000	0,002	-0,004
Woolen and Worsped Manufactures—			
Cloth, yards	2,759,596	2,967,168	1,684,0%,
Carpets and druggets, yards	1,940,157	2,166.804	1,390,110
Shawls, rugs, &c., number	48,487	71,163	4r,60,
Worsted stuffs and waistcoatings, yards	87,000,457	21,970,640	28,441,72
			9

Annexed is a statement showing the extent of the exports of British and Irish produce and manufactures to the United States and France during the first five months of the present and last two years. The figures show a most important falling off in the extent of the trade with both countries. To the United States the decline, as compared with last year, is about 14,000,000 yards and lbs., and as much as 51,000,000 yards and lbs. as compared with 1866. To France the shipments exhibit a decline of about 11,700,000 yards and lbs., as compared with 1867, and of 3,000,000 yards and lbs. as compared with 1866. The statement is as follows:

man.	FIT	TOWTHEN	

Cotton piece goods	. 58,805,694 . 961,693 . 9,759,526	1867. 53,100,941 621,883 41,576,284 6%5,127 2,267,163 2,166,804 21,970,640	1968. 42,691,085 759,069 82,771,283 449,280 1,084 (27 1,390,119 28,442,725
Total	160,075,869	122,838,791	108,180,580
TO FRANCE.			
Cotton yarn. lbs. Cotton plece goods yds. Cotton thread lbs. Linen yarn lbs. Linen plece goods yds. Woolen yarn. lbs. Woolen cloth yds. Carpets and druggets yds. Worsted stuffs and waistcoatings yds.	1,235,519 767,721 1,027,0P8 5:,6 3 8,765,759	1,971,216 20,562,228 8,247 2,907,824 2,941,858 726,481 2,960,528 78,949 9,449,149	1,696,477 12,661,562 68,499 930,115 1,617,983 8,401,776 829,012 272,362 6,991,424
Total	81,441,744	40,240,975	28,469,009

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

The Money Market—Railroad and Miscelleneous Securities—Bonds sold at the New York Stock Exchange Board—Prices of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at London—General movement of Coin and Bullion at New York— Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

July has passed without any variation from the quiet usually characteristic of that month. The money market has retained its extreme ease, funds having been freely offered for temporary employment on Wall street at 3@4 per cent. Throughout the country there has been a marked quiet of business, and the banks of the interior have consequently allowed their balances with the banks of this city to accumulate to an unusual volume. It is due to this fact that the deposits and the loans now range higher than at any former period. The following comparison shows the totals of the statements of the New York banks on the 25th July, the 27th June, and at the close of July 1867:

Leans and discounts	July 25, 1868. \$250,845,000	June 27, 1868.	July 27, '67
Specie	20,804,000	7,758,000	7,768,00 0 88,549,000
Circulation	226.751.000	34,048.000 214,302,000	
Legal Tenders	72,285,000	78,858,000	70,174,000

The following are the rates of Loans and Discounts for the month of May:

Call loans				July 21.	
Loans on Bonds and Mortgage					
A 1, endorsed bills, 2 mos	6 @-	6 @—	6 @	6 @—	6 @
Good endorsed bills, 8 & 4 mos					
" single names					
Lower grades	6 @10	8 @10	8@10	8 @10	8 @10

It will be observed that the deposits are large in proportion to the amount of legal tenders; a fact suggestive of a sharp reaction from the present ease, in the event of a revival of business, consequent upon an abundant harvest and cheaper bread, causing the country banks to call home their deposits. present high prices of securities are very much the res lt of the extreme facil ty of borrowing upon stocks; and when the country requires the very large balances was advanced upon Wall street collaterals, it is obvious that there must be a sharp calling in of loans, and that the value of securities must shrink to the measure of the diminished ability of the banks for carrying them. the close of the month money has been freely offered to the brokers for 60 to 90 days; these offe s, however, seem to have come not from the banks but from parties carrying very large amounts of stocks, and are probably designed to mitigate the prevailing apprehension of difficulty in carrying stocks through the fall money market, a fear which at present checks speculat ve purchases of stocks. There appears to be some reason for supposing that certain large manipulators of stocks have become interested in bank shares for the purpose of enabling the n to control loans for their own speculative operations. This practice was resorted to in the spring, with much consequent inconvenience to trade; and it would appear that we are destined to see a similar tampering with bank management this fall.

There has been a brisker movement in stock apeculation during the month. The wealthy cliques who at present are almost the exclusive holders of stocks have promoted an active manipulation of their respective shares. It would, however, be a mistake to regard the sales registered at the stock boards as representing so much business done between the cliques and the public. Outside operators, though co-operating more freely than of late, have yet done comparatively little, and a very important proportion of the reported transactions are to be regarded as simply exchanges between the cliques and their agents-known as "washed sales." We think it proper to speak thus of the character of current business in Wall street, for the reason that there is just now a more than ordinary resort to finesse and tricky deceptions, against which the public need to be on their guard. The sales of railroad and miscellaneous stocks a both boards, in July, amount to 1,344,967 shares, against 1,183,114 shares in June, and 2,240,991 shares in July, 1867, as will appear from the following statement:

Classes. 1867. 1868. Increase.	
Bank shares	1,198
Railroad " 1,888,194 1,149,707	788 417
Coal " 81,565 9,280	29,253
Mining " 68,110 19.425	48,685
Improv'at " 47,595 14,890	38,255
Telegraph " 109,630 23,838	85,787
Steamship" 58,188 55,904	2,984
Expr'ss&c" 87,067 76,419 88,845	••••
Total—July 2,240,991 1,344,967 — since January 1 13,580,650 11,663,396	896,294 1,918,464

United States securities have been subjected to a somewhat severe test through the proposal in Congress to tax heavily the interest upon the debt, and in connection with the decharation of the Democratic platform in favor of the payment of Five Twenties in greenbacks. These symptoms of the current of opinion relative to the finances, have not appreciably affected the credit of the government in Europe; and the steadiness of bonds abroad, concurrently with the ease of money here, has sustained the market. Large shipments of bonds have been made to Europe, in return for coupons and bonds of 1848 sent home for collection. The active speculation in securities on the German bourses has also induced the shipment of bonds by the German bankers on own account. It is estimated that the total shipments for July amount to about \$10,000,000. The withdrawal of such a large amount of bonds from the market has helped to sustain prices; and it is reasonable to suppose that, but for this special is mand, quotations would have declined under the adverse causes above alluded to.

BONDS SOLD AT THE M. Y, STOCK EXCHANGE BOADD.

Classes, U. S. bonds U. S. notes St'e & city b'ds Company b'ds	4,170,600 8,683,00	1868. \$26,964,200 262,000 17,860,500 1,188, 00	Inc. \$16,092,300 13,677.500 578,500	Dec. 8,888,600
Total—July	\$18,640,500 106,941,480	\$45,095,:00 210,140,320	\$16,451,700 108,198,090	•••••

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New

York Stock Exchange Board in the month of July as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of	~6's,	1881.—,		-6's, (l	5-90 yrs	.) Cou	pon	5	's,10-40	7-80.
month.	Coup.	Reg.	1869.	1864.	1866.	new.	1867.		rs.C'pn	.8d er.
1	11834		112%	110%	110%	109	109%	109%	107	109%
2	1181	112%	118%	110%	1111	108%	109	109	107%	
8	118			110%	111¥	108%	108%		107	109
4	-				liday.					
6	118		1181	110%	11136	108%	108¥		107	
7		119%	1:8	110	111	108	10832		107	
8	118%	112%	118%	110¥	11134	10834	108%		1071	108%
9		1181	1181	110%	11136	108%	108%	108%	107%	108%
10		1181	118%	110%	11136	108%	108%	108%	107X	
11					111%	108%	108%	,-	107%	108%
13	118%	113%	1181	110%	1111	108%	108%			108%
14			118%	1103	1117	108%	108%	109		
15			1:8%	110%	111%	108%	108%	109	1071	108%
16	118%	••••	118%	11034	111%	109	109%	109₺	10734	
17	114		1143	111	112%	109	100%	109¥	1081	109%
18	11436		1144	1111	1123	100%	100%	109%	108%	1091
20	11434	•	114%	1111	1191	1001			1081	
\$1	115)	114%	1141	111%	1131	109%	10934	10936	108%	• • • •
22	1151	115×	114%	11136	112%	1091	100%	109%	108%	109
38	1151	115%	114%		1121	109%	109%		1081	
M	115%		11432	1111	1121	109%	109%	100 K	1081	
25		115%	11436	11137	1183	109¥	1093	109%	108%	,
\$7	11534	115%	114%	111%	113 K	1091	10936	109%	10834	
28	115%			1111	119%	1091	1094	100%	10836	
29	1153		11434		1121	109%	1(9)	109 %	108 €	
30	11534	115%	1141	11136	11234	109%	109%	1093	108%	108%
\$1	115%	1151	114%	111%	112%	108%	109%	1091	108%	
Piret	11834	112%	113%	110%	110%	109	100%	100%	107	10934
Lowest	118	1121	112%	110	110%	108	108%	108%	107	1093
Highest		115%	1143	111%	112%	109%	109%	109%	108%	109%
Rango	254	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	· 12	×	1%	1%
Last	115%	1151	114%	111 X	113%	108%	100%	1091	108%	108%
			7	/8	/8	/6				

The closing prices of Five-Twenties at Frankfort in each week ending with Thursday, were as follows:

July 2. July 9 Ju'y 16. July 23. July 20. Month. 71%@71% 71%@71% 76%@76% 76%@16% 76%@76% 76%@71%

The closing prices of Consols for money and certain American securities (viz U.S. 6's 5-20's 1862, Illinois Central and Erie shares) at London, on each day of the month of July are shown in the following statement:

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SEGURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	for	U. S.	securi Ill.C. sh's.	Erle		for	U.S.	secui Ill.C. sh's.	
Wedney [1] Thurs 9 Friday 3 Sat'day 4 Monday 6 Tuesd y 7 Wedn'y 8 Thursday 9 Friday 10 Sat'day 11 Monday 13 Tu'sday 14 Wedneday 15	94% 94% 95% 95% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94%	78 X	101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101%	45% 45% 46% 46 46 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45%	Wednerday	94% 91% 91% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94%	72% 72% 72% (Holi 72% 72% 72% 72%	96% 96% 95% day.) 96 95 94% 94% 91%	42X 48 48% 48% 43% 43X 48X 48X 48X 48X
Thursday 16 Friday 17 Saturday 19 Monday 20 Tuesday 21	94% 94% 94% 94%	73 % 73 % 73 % 73 %	9434 9534 9534	43321	Low) 27. Hig / 22. Rng / 22. Last	91% 96% 4% 94%	70% 73% 8% 73%	103	50% 8%

The following are the closing quotations at the regular board June 5, compared with those of the five preceding weeks:

	June 2	s. July 8.	J bly 10.	July 17.	July 34.	July 81 ·
Cumberland Coal		85		٠.,	· -	81
Quickeilver	2436	99	21	211	2134	22
Canton Co	4037		48			4814
Maria and and		• • • •	40	••••	• • • •	
Mariposa pref	₹3	• • • •	9	• • • •		834
New York Central	184¥	134%	184 %	188	184¥:	xd18232
Erie	69%	70%	7032	68%	6814	6834
Hudson River	140			00,8		1881
The line		- 300.	60.00	****	**	
Reading	104%	xd96%	96%	96%	95	943%
Michigan Southern	92 %	91 5%	9234	9234	9134	≖d88%
Michigan Central					118	11834
Cleveland and Pittsburg	9034	9734	87¥	86 %	88	8954
Oleveland and Maleda				OU X		
Cleveland and Toledo	108%	10834	108%		108	10234
Northwestern	69%	7:36	7934	79%	883≰	88%
" preferred	791∡	7932	81 %	81 🛣	8834	8334
Rock Island	105 €	20534	108%	1072	108	11032
Fort Wayne		cd109%	109	108%	109%	110%
Illinois Central	156	15734	158	149%	15134	151
Ohio and Mississippi	80%	29%	4	291	8034	30 %
					/-	

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of June and July, 1868:

1120000000 000.000 000 00.0			-,, =0	•		_		
D. II 3 (14 - 45 -	~	—Jun		~		J		
Railroad Stocks—		High.				Bigh.	L w.	
Alton & Terre Haut		48	48	48	40	46	40	44%
_do _ do _pref		68%	67	67×	66	68	66	67
Boston, Hartford & Erie	. 15%	151	16 %	15%	16	18%	16	18%
Buffalo N. Y. & Erie	. 85	85	85	.85	::::		****	***:
Chicago & Alton	139	188	139	188	1 38	138	137	18734
do do pref	. 180	186	180	186	189%	189⅓	128%	188)
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	. 151	154	151	154	164	165	164	165
do & Gt. Eastern	. 85	87%	85	8734	• • • •	••••	••••	
do & Northwest'n	. 68%	73	65 <u>%</u>	71 X	78,≰	84 %	73	82%
do do pref	. 80	84) {	773	77 %	79 X	8436	78%	823
do & Rock Island	. 97	105%	96%	10834	105%	1103	105	1103
Cleve., Col., Cin. & Ind	91%	93	903	903	90	90 %	883	88)
do Painesv. & Ashta		107	100%	100%	100%	101	99	30 €
do & Pittsburg	883K	911	8h%	89	89%	90	841	90
do & Toledo		110%	108	108%	1083	1041	1001	103
Del., Lack & Western		194%	128	123	118	118	118	118
Dabuque & Sioux city		78	78	78	75	78	75	78
Erie		71%	68	68%	70%	71	6734	6.34
do pref		76	75	75	75	7534	743	78
Harlem		127	122	122	128	124	123	124
do pref					124	124	122	122
Hannibal & St Joseph	8034	87	803	85 %	84	86	86	86
do do pref	86	91	86	87	9834	8834	87	87
Hudson River	141%	1481	138	140%	139	139	188	1383
Illinois Central	149	158	149	1673	153	159	141	151
Ind. & Cin innati	53	58	50	50	50	53	50	5134
Tallet & Chicago	00				91	91	91	91
Joliet & Chicago	801/	29	601/		28	50	28	99
Mar. & Cincin., 1st pref	281		28¥	2834				
do 3d pref	10%	10)	30	10	10	19	10	10
Michigan Central	120	191 🗶	117X	118	116%	119	1161	119
60 S. & N. Ind.	. 69	98%	8934	99	953	98	88%	88%
Mil. & P. du Ch'n, 1st pr		105	108	105	105	106	1043	106
dcdoed pr	98	98	98	98	99	100	99	993
Milwaukee & St. Paul	66 %	67	62%	66 X	66	77 %	65	76×
do do pref	78	791€	76⅓	78	783	85	78	883
Morris & Essex	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
New Jersey	.::::		.::::	-::::	128	198	138	198
do Central	119%	126	119%	19436	124%	194×	120	120%
New York Central	184	186%	184%	184	184%	186×	181	1823
do & N. Haven	151	151	145	145	145	145	146	140
Norwich & Worcester	90	88	90	92	92	93	92	98
Ohio & Mississippi	8034	81 %	29	29 %	29 ‰	80%	29	80}≰
_do do pref	7934	7936	79	79	733	783	78 %	783≰
Panama	329%	839	329×	830	8.0	880	88 0 -	880
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica	116	116%	1093	10934	110	110%	106%	110%
Reading	951	106%	98%	101	10134	1017	9434	9434
Reneseiaer & Saratoga	90	953	90	95×	95 %	95 X	95%	9634
	118	118	118	118	110	1:0	110	110
Second Avenue					40	4634	40	4636
Stonington			••••	• • • •	80	80	80	80
Toledo, Wab. & Western	5134	511	46	481	4814	5436	4814	5134
do do do pret	69	69	69	69	69	78%	69	783
== == =================================						/-		

Miscellaneous—								
Central Coal.	50	80	80	50				
Cumberland Coal	85%	85%	8814	>8	88	85	88	88
Del. & Hud. Canal Coal	168¥	168	128	18436	140	141	130	181
Pennsylvania Coal	/5				210	210	210	210
Pacific Mail	91	108%	95	991	100	101%	9734	101%
Atlantic do	80	80	80	80	2914	29%	28	28
Union Navigation	9634	2674	¥8¥	2614	26%	2016	26%	2634
Boston Water . ower	2034	26	17%	19	17	17	16	17
Canton	K1 12	51%	49	80	49	49	45	4834
Cary Improvement	/5				111	1134	10	10~
Branswick City	4	9	4	836	9	101	836	8%
Mariposa	5	5	8	4	4	4	4	4
do pref	834	934	634	8%	8%	934	834	9
Quicksiver	29 K	2932	22	22%	211	24	19%	24%
Manhattan Gas		,			2.0	210	210	210
West. Union Telegraph	88¥	88%	88%	841	31%	8514	8334	8514
Bankers & Brokers Ass.	111	114	106	106	106	106	9634	99
New York Gualo					4	436	4	434
Express-								
American	58	8434	42%	4636	47%	483	44%	45%
Adams		58	51%	52%	58	54	51%	593
United States.	56	56	45	48	48%	4934	45%	46
Merchant's Union	26	29	94	25 x	96 X	25	28	24.34
Wells, Fargo & Co	16 X	28	28%	263	25 X	273	34 ₃₄	277
and a mile as committees	~//	-0	-076	-078		-17	7276	~.

The gold premium, during the latter half of the month, has shown a strong upward tendency. The unprecedented y large exports of specie, and the increasing t ndency of the imports, concurrently with a falling off in the exports of produce, have produced an expectation that the supply of gold in the country is likely to be reduced to an unusually low point; while the agitation of financial ideas unfavorable to the public credit, and the prospect of a very excited presidential canvas have induced an unusually strong feeling among holders of gold. The supply of gold during the month has been \$3, 10,595 from California, \$4,700,000 rede ption of Loan of 1848, and \$18,798,213 in interest upon United States bonds, making a total of \$26,508,808. There has been withdrawn from the market, for export \$8.812,715, and for customs \$9,556,693, total \$18,369,308.

The following formula furnishes the details of the general movement of coin and bullion at this port for the month of July, 1867 and 1868, comparatively:

GENERAL MOVEMENT OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK.

In banks, near first Receipts from California. Imports of co.n and bullion. Coin interest paid. Redemption loan of 1848	2,662,189 64,891	1868. \$11,954,780 8,010,595 \$3,917 18,796,218 4,700,000	Increase. \$4,185.784 848,456 2,491.849 4,700,000	Decrease \$ 88,474
Total reported supply	\$26,801,897	\$38,489,455	\$11,687,558	8
Exports of coin and bullion	\$14,301.709 9,794,404	\$8,819,715 9,056,598	•••••	\$5,488,987 287,711
Total withdrawn	\$24,096,106	\$18,869,808	\$	\$5,796,698
Excess of reported supply	\$2,705,791	\$20,120,147	\$17,414,856	\$
Specie in banks at end	8,788,094	20,801,101	12,066,007	••••••
Derived from unreported sources	26,032,303	\$688,934	\$5,848,849	8

The following exhibits the fluctuations of the New York gold market in the month of June, 1868.

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st	Closing	Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st	Closing
Wednesday 1 Thursday 2 Friday 3 Saturday 4 Monday 6 Tuesday 7 Wednesday 7 Thursday 8	140% 140% 140% 140% 140% 140%	140½ (Holi 140½ (Holi 140½ 140½ 140½	140% 140% day). 140% 141 141 140%	140% 140% 140% 140% 140%	Thursday 23 Friday 94 Saturday 25 Moudsy 27 Tuesday 28 Wednesday 29 Thursday 30 Friday 31	143% 143% 143% 144% 144%	148¾ 148¾ 148¾ 148¾ 144 144¾	148% 148% 144% 144% 144% 145%	143 ½ 148 ½ 144 144 ½ 144 ½ 144 ½
Friday 11 Saturday 11 Monday 12 Tuesday 13 Wednesday 14 Thirsday 16 Friday 17 Saturday 18 Monday 20 Tuesday 21 Tuesday 22	1 140% 3 141% 4 142% 5 142% 6 142% 7 142% 6 143% 6 143%	140% 141% 141% 141% 142% 142% 143% 143%	141% 141% 142% 142% 142% 143% 143% 144 148%	141% 141% 141% 142% 142% 142% 143% 143%	July . 1868	138¼ 154½ 141 222 144¼ 109	138 147 138½ 222 123½ 108¾	140% 155% 146% 285 145 120%	140 149 144 255 1281/2 115

The following exhibits the quotations at New York for bankers 60 days bills on the principal European markets daily in the month of July, 1868:

700	RSE OF FORE	IGN EXCHANG	EE (60 DAYS)	AT NEW 1	ORK.	
	London. cents for	Paris. centimes	Amsterdam.	Bremen. cents for	Hamburg. cents for	Berlin. cents for
Days.	54 pence.	for dollar.	florin.	rix daler.	M. banco.	thaler.
1	110%@110%	513×@512×	41 4 @ 41%	79% @80	86%@36X	71%@73
3	110%@110%	5184@5124	41%@41%	79%@80	86 × @36 ×	71%@78
3	1104@110%	518% @512%	41%@41%	79%@80	26×@36×	71% @ 79
4			(Holiday	7).		
6	1101/01101/	5181/03121/	411/0/41%	79%@80	861/@361/	7136@72
7	1101/01101	5131/05121/	413/0413/	793(@80	36%@36%	7136072
8	110%@110%	5181/05121	41 1 @41 1	7936@80	36% @36%	71% @72
9 ~	110%@110%	513 4 @ 512 4	411/041%	79%@80	8 %@36%	7134@73
10	1104@110%	5131/051216	414 @41%	79% @80	36% @36%	71%@72
11	110%@110%	513%@512%	41 4 @ 41%	79%@80	36%@36%	71360072
18	110%@110%	513%@512%	411/0413/	79% @80	36%@36%	7136@72
14	1101/0110%	513%@512%	411/0413/	79%@80	36 1 @ 36 1	71%@72
15	110 @110%	5131, @5121	415/041%	79% @80	36%@36%	71% @72
16	110 @110%	5131 @51236	41 4 @41 3	79% @80	865 @365	71%@72
17	110 @110%	513%@512%	414 @41%	79% @80	3614 @ 3614	71%@72
18	110 @110%	5184@51216	411/041%	79% 混80	363, 6363	71%@72
20	110 @110%	513%@512%	411/041%	79%@80	361 @36	713, 6072
21	1104@	5131/@5121/	411/0411/	79% @80	365 @365	7134@72
22	1104@	513%@512%	415/041%	793 680	36%@36%	7134@72
23	110% @	518%@512%	411/041%	7916080	3634 (0.3634	71%@73
24	1104@	513%@512%	411/041%	79% @80	36% @36%	71%@78
25	11016	518%@512%	41 4 @ 41 %	7934 @80	8614 (0.3614)	7134@72
27	110%	513% @512%	415/041%	79% (08)	3614 (7.3614	71%@72
28	11010	513%@512%	411/041%	79%@80	36% @36%	7134@72
29	1104@	5131/05121/	415 @41%	793 @80	36%@36%	7136@72
80	110%@110%	518%@512%	41 1 @ 41%	79% @80	36%@36%	71% @72
31	110%@110%	518% @512%	411/0411/	79% @80	36%@36%	71%@72
July, 1868 July, 1867		618%@518% 517%@511%	411/041/ 401/041/	79 ¥ @ 80 78 @ 79 ¥	86 % @ 36 % 86	71%@72 71%@72%

THE FUNDING BILL.

The following is the Funding bill, as reported by the Committee of Conference, and passed by both Houses. The President has not signed it at latest advices and there is a difference of opinion as to whether it will become a law without his signature, Congress having taken a recess till Sept. 21, and not having adjourned:

Am Acr providing for the payment of the National Debt, and for the reduction of the rate of interest thereon.

e it enacted, exc., That the Secretary of the Tressury is hereby authorized to issue coupon or registered bonds of the United States in such form as he may pre-

scribe, and of denominations of \$100, or any multiple of that sum, redeemable in coin at the pleasure of the United States after thirty or forty years respectively, and bearing the following rates of yearly interest, payable semi-annually in coin, that is to say: The issue of bonds faling due in thirty years shall bear interest at four and a half per centum; and bonds falling due in forty years shall bear interest at four per centum, which said bonds, and the interest thereon, shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes or duties to the United States other than such income tax as may te assessed on other incomes, as well as from taxation in any form, by or under State, municipal, or local authority, and the said honds shall be exclusively used, par for par, for the redemption of, or in exchange for an equal amount of any of the present outstanding bonds of the United States known as the five-twenty bonds, and may be issued to an amount in the aggregate sufficient to cover the principal

of all such five-twenty bon s, and no more.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That there is hereby appropriated out of the duties derived from imported goods the sum of \$185,000,000 annually, which sum during each fiscal year, shall be applied to the payment of the interest, and to the reduction of the principal of the public debt, in such a manner as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, or as Congress may hereafter direct, and such reduction shall be in lieu of the sinking fund, contemplated by the fifth section of the act, entitled an "Act to authorize the issue of United States notes, and for the resumption or funding thereof, and for funding the floating debt of the United States,"

approved Feb. 25, 1862.

Sec. 8. And to it further enacted, That from and after the passage of this act, no percentage, deduction, commission, or compensation of any amount or kind shall be allowed to any person for the sale, negotiation, redemption, or exchange of any bonds or securities of the United States, or of any coin or bullion disposed of at the Treasury Department or elsewhere on account of the United States; and all acts and parts of acts authorizing or permitting, by construction or otherwise, the Secretary of the Tressury to appoint any agent other than some proper officer of his Department to make such sale, redem, tion, or exchange of boods and securities, are hereby repealed.

VIRGITIA DEBT STATEMENT.

The Treasurer of the State of Virginia has made the following exhibit of the State's in lebtedness, in a letter to Messra. Thomas Branch & Co., of Richmond:

> TREASURY OFFICE OF VIRGINIA, ¿ RICHMOND, June 19, 1868.

In reply to yours of this date asking a statement of the debt of the State, I horewith submit the following:

Amount of old registered debt	\$22,' 04,298 88
Amount of old coupon debt	12,973,000 00
Amount of new debt (funded interest)	6,844,957 (0
Amount of unneid interest yet to be funded	500.00.0 00
Amount of interest due to 1st July, 1868, on new debt—funded and yet 10 be	
iundêd Amount of unpeid interest to 1st July, 1868, on old debt—rate 6 per cen', and	791,246 00
Amount of unpeid interest to 1st July, 1868, on old debt-rate 6 per cent, and	
only 4 per cent paid	688,968 00
only 4 per cent paid	985,448 00
Amount of intere t due July, 1867, and January, 1868—and not collected	100,000 00
Total	\$44 ,855,915 38

Note.—In the old registered debt there is embraced \$2,043,655 44, which is held by the sinking fund and literary fund; but \$1,000,000 of bonds guaranteed by the State is not included as part of the debt in this statement.

LOUISIANA DEBT STATEMENT.

The New Orleans Republican gives	the following statement of the debt of
Louisiana, from the report of the State	Auditor; adding, however, the free school
fund bonds which he had omitted:	

idud donds anich be use confrec:	
Bonds loaned Consolidated BankBonds loaned Citizens Bank	\$541,000 00 4,297,338 38
Bonds issued in favor of Charity Hospital, Nashville Railroad, Mexican Gulf	1,000,000
Railroad and for reli f of S ate Treasury	1,897,000 00
Bonds to Jackson Railroad	884,000 00
Bonds to Opelon-as Railroad	66U,000 00
Bonds to Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad	298,000 00
Bonds to Baton Rouge and Gross Tete Kailroad	160,000 00
Bonds to Seminary fund	186,000 00
Bonds to Free School fund	529,000 00
Levee bonds	1,700,000 00
Bonds for payment of coupons	494,800 00
Additional Leves bonds	1,787,000 00
Floating debt	1,298,867 81
Total	A13L853L601 14

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Abstract statement, as appears from the books and Treasurer's returns in the Treasury Department, on the 1st of June and 1st of Augu t, 1868:

the freasury Department, on the				-	rugu t, 100	٠.
DERT	BEARING O				_	_
	June 1.		Aug st 1.		Increase.	Decrease.
5 per cont. bonds	\$230,813,4U					
6 '' '67 & '68			288,677,800	iii	100 00	8,582,641 80
6 4 (5-90's)						*******
Navy Pen. F'd 6 p.c		őő				18,000,000 00
Total	9.020 527.841	80	2.088.871.800	<u></u>	67.548.958 20	
			T DETEREST.	•	.,,	**********
6 per ct. (RR) bonds	\$25,902,00			00	\$6,308,000 00	8
8-y'ars com, int. n'tes	21.60 1.890		21,604,890	ñ	# 0,000,000 00	••••••
8-years 7-30 notes	105,610,650		— ,002,000		1	05,610,650 00
8 p. cent. certificates	50,000,000		80,000,000	00	*******	
Navy Pen. F'd 8 p.c		•••	18,000,000	œ	18,000,000 00	••••••
Total	908,117,540	00	116,814,890	00	*******	86,809,650 00
MATURED DES	T NOT PRES	ENT	ED FOR PAYN	CEN	T.	_
7-30 n. due Aug. 15, '67, Je & Jy 1, '68	\$947,500	00	\$8,438,800	00	\$7,486,800 00	8
6 p. c. comp. int. n'es	8,019,86		6,018,910		•••••	1,998,450 00
B'ds of Texas ind'ty	256,0		256,000		********	*******
Treasury notes (old)	155,211	64	154,511	64	•••••	700 00
March 81, 1843	6,000		1,927,941		1,919,941 80	
Treas. n's of Ma. 8,68	555,49		55 ,442	00	••••••	
Temporary loan	888,63		746,590	õ	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	187,119 00
Certifi. of indebt'ess	18,00	700	18,000	00	*********	5,000 00
Total	10,884,20	8 64	18,099,175	44	\$7,264, 972 80	••••••
DEB	T BEARING	(O I	NTERBST.			•
United States notes	8356,144,91	00	\$356,021,078	00	\$	\$193,189 00
Fractional currency	82,581,589		81,867,818		• • • • • • • • •	668,771 57
Gold certi. of deposit	20,398,186	00	22,414,000	00	2,115,820 00	••••••
Total	408,978,981	94	410,802,891	87	1,828,909 43	
	RECAPITU	LATI	OX.			
Bearing coin interest	. 2,030,537,84	1 80	3,088,871,800	00	67,548,968 30	CC 000 000 0
Matured debt	203,117,04	W W	18,099,175	44	7,264,972 80	90,302,000 00
Bearing no interest	409 978 0	31 0	410,802,891			
-						
Aggregate	2,648,758,5	86 8 6	2,638,588,756	81	•••••	10,164,809 87
Coin & cur. in Treas	183,507,6	79 6	110,054,976	14	•••••	28,458,408 50
Debt less coin and cur	2,510,945,8	06 7	9,528,584,480	0 67	18,288 598 98	

The following statement shows the amount of coin and currency separately at the dates in the foregoing table:

Coin	\$90,228,559 81 48,279,120 88	\$89,409,917 98	\$. 6,818,641 88 .16,684,762 12
Total coin & curre'y	183,507,679 64	110,054,976 1		.28,453,408 50
The annual interest payable				
1868 (exclusive of interest on the	e compound i	nterest notes)	estad mos	as follows.
ANNUAL INTER	=	•	-	- 10.10 WB ;
ARROAD INTER	June 1.	ON PUBLIC DE: August 1.		Decrease.
Coin-5 per cents		\$11,079,420 00	\$33,800 00	
" 6" 67 & 68	514,958 00	CITIONS AND OF	60.3000.00	514,959 50
" 6 " 1881		17,090,638 00	6 00	024,003.00
" 6 " (5-20°s)	89,685,835 00	94,983,866 00	5,801,080 00	
" 6 " (5-20's)	780,000 00			780,000 00
Total coin interest	8119.041.546 50	\$128,086,494 00 t	4.044.977 50	8
Currency-6 per cents		£8,928,898 40	878,480 00	
7.80 "		• , ,	010,200 00	7,709,577 83
" 8 "	2,500,000 00	1,890,000 00	890,000 00	1,100,011 00
Total currency inter't	\$12,059,990 75	\$5,118,898 40		\$6,941,097 85

ATLANTIC AND GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY.

The following terms have been agreed upon by the Debenture holders of this Company:

DEBENTURES £2,800,000, OR 14,000,000 DOLLARS.

1. The \$5,276,600 first and second divisional bonds in trust to be taken by the debenture holders in part liquidation of their claim.

2. For the Erie and Niagara, the New Liebon and the Oil Creek bonds and shares in trust, of the face value of \$931,000, and for the money in the hands of the trustees, the debenture holders are to receive in cash \$592,4 °C, or at 4s 6d per dollar. £18 ',290.

3. In substitution for over-due coupons on the divisional bonds in trust, to the 15th inst., amounting to \$1,171,000—income bonds, dollar for dollar, having ten and fifteen years to run and bearing 7 per cent in currency, from 15th November, 1868, are to be issued to the debenture holders pro rata—the coupons themselves to be held in trust, so that in the event of any failure in the payment either of interest or principal on the income bonds, the coupons may be revived as a first charge upon the undertaking.

Together these three items will amount to \$7,000,000 or 50 per cent of the debenture claims.

4. For the other moiety of the debenture claims, also amounting to \$7,00,000, the debenture holders are to have the option of taking dollar for dollar in Second Consolidated Mortgage Bonds, bearing 5 per cent interest, in sterling, from 15th November, 1870; the two years interest accruing between 15th November, 1868, and that date, to be paid in Income Bonds having twenty years to run, and bearing 7 per cent in currency, or the option of taking £ 80,000 in cash, being £10 for every £100 debenture held, which is equivalent to 20 per cent for the Second Consolidated Mortgage.

5. Income bonds for \$881,516 having ten and fifteen years to run, and bearing 7 per cent in currency from 15th November, 1868, are also to be issued to the debenture holders in respect to coupons accruing on the first divisional bonds, from 16th July, 1868, to 1st April, 1889, and on the second divisional bonds, from 17th July, 1868, to 1st April, 1870, from which dates the payment of accruing coupons to be resume !; the coupons themselves to be held in trust as in clause 3.

6. Income bonds for \$700,000, having twenty years to run, and bearing 7 per cent in currency, f om 15th November, 1868, are to be issued to the debenture holders in respect of one year's interest on the debentures to 15th November, 1868, at 5 per cent. The divisional coupons referred to in clause 3 and 5 are to be held collaterally to secure this issue also.

7. On the completion of this arrangement, the £2,800,000 debentures and the \$14,541,150 shares in the trust, are to be given up to the company for cancellation.

All claims against the trustees are to be abandoned and the hill in chancery to be withdrawn.

The effect of this arrangement will be as follows:

	Face value.	Market value.	Sterling.
Divisional bonds in trust.	\$5,236,600	\$8,141,960	£716,941
I roome t onds (see clause 8)	1,171,000) 700,000 } 881,516 }	1,126,258	258,408
Cash " 2	592,400	592,400	188,290
mortgage bonds bearing 5 per cent in steeling, from 15th November, 1870, for \$7,000,000	7,000,000	1,400,000	280,000
Total	\$:5,081,516	\$6,260,618	£1,878,689
—which will give for each debenture of £100—		_	
		Face	Market
		value, pr ct.	
Divisional bonds			25.24
Income bonds			9.05
Cash		4.76	4 76
Cash, or \$250-second consolidated mortgage bonds and	l income bonds f	or .	
two years' interest at 7 perct. currency	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	50.00	10.00
		114 99	49.05

[This calculation is made at the rate of 60 per cent for the divisional bonds and 50 per cent for the income bonds.]

RECRIPTS AND EXPENSES OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT.

Honorable David A. Wells, Special Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, in response to a letter of inquiry addressed to him has published a statement of the receipts and expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 80th, 1868, from which we extract the following:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE REVENUE,
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1868.

Hon. William B. Allison, M. C.:

IR.—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of July 9, and in response to the same I submit the following statements, premising, h wever, that only substantial accuracy can be claimed for the account of receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 80, 1868, inasmuch as sufficient time has not yet elapsed to allow of a perfect and exact settlement on the books of the Treasury Department of all the accounts of the last quarter of the last fiscal year:

RECEIPTS.

The rational receipts of revenue from all sources, for the fiscal year ending June 80, 1868, were substantially as follows:

Customs (golf)	
Miscellaneous (currency)	198,000,000 47,000,000
Aublic lands and direct tax (currency)	2,800,000
Total	\$406,800,000

EXPENDITURES.

If we divide the total expenditures of the last fiscal year into "crdinary expenses," or those which are required to support and maintain the Government, and "extraordinary expenses," or those which have been the unavoidable results of the war, we have the following classification:

Ordinary Expenditures.

_	Fiscal year 1867-68.	1868-69. Estimated or
C.yit List (legislative, executive, &c	Actual,	Appropriated.
Interio (In lans)	4,60 ,000 00	2,500,000
War Department. hngjueer Bureau (rivers and harbors).	56,718,410 00	17,800,000 88,081,018
		1,500,000
Total	K146.287. 879 67	800 821 019

Extraordinary] Expenditures.		
	Fiscal year	1869-9, esti-
	18 68 –8,	mated or
•	actual.	appropriated.
Interest, public debt	\$ 141,635,551	\$126,000,000
Peneions	28, 282, 676	25,000,000
Bounties	88,000,000	40,000,600
Freedmen's Bureau	8,215,C00	500,00J
Reconstruction expenses.	1,799,270	** ***
Reimburging States	10,330,188	*******
Payments for property lost or destroyed in the military service		
of the United States	5,111,300	6,000,200
Subsistence of Indians	1,000,000	1,000,000
National cemeteries	792,860	********
Commutation of prisioner's rations	152,000	*********
Total	\$325,818,845	\$198,5000,000
Reduction of Taxation.		
The amount of taxes abated or repealed since the close of th	e war has bee	n estimated as
follows:		an or transfer an
By act of July 18, 1868		. \$60,000,000
" March 2, 1867		
" Feb. 3, 1868 (exemption of raw cotton)		28,768,000
" March 81		48,500,000
AMAL VI. VP. 1	•••••	
Total		\$167,269,000

RAILROAD EARNINGS FOR JUNE.

The gross earnings of the under specified railroads for the month of June, in 1867 and 1868, and for the first six months of each year are exhibited in the subjoined statement:

gross randings for june, and for the first six m inths of 1867 and 1868

		шпе	51X .	montas—
Railroeds.	1867.	1868.	1867.	18+8.
Atlantic and Great Western	\$880,796	\$352,167	\$2,460,230	\$2,236,900
Chicago and Alton	842.857	878.461	1.597.612	1,302,662
Chicago and Northwestern	898,867	1,167,5 i4	4,596,294	5,841,628
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific	261,480	866,200	1,582,801	1,892,091
Detroit and Milwaukee	136,718	185,020	717.576	688,205
Illinois Central	516,494	548,019	8,022,838	2,875,066
Marietta and Cincinnati	96,585	95,924	587,598	572,815
Michigan Central	284,977	825,501	1.944.688	2,065,898
Michigan Southern & North'n Ind	804,282	868,550	2,050,703	2,822,298
Milwaukee and St. Paul	68,895	458,094	1,990,501	2,512,100
Ohio and Mississippi	240,185		1,549,307	1,883,079
Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago	507,451	601,946	8,880,836	
St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute	156,065	148,211		
Toledo, Wabash and Western			1.660,087	1.654.012
Western Union.	60,558		262.857	828,045
M. CPACIT CHICK	90,000	11,000	AUZ,OU (040,040
Total (15 roads)	21,722,642	\$5,877,678	27,704,906	80.196.255

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1:

-	NEW YORK	CITY BANK	RETURNS.		
Date. Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
January 4 \$249,741,297	\$12,724,614	834,134,391	\$187,070,786	\$62,111,201	\$483,266,304
January 11. 463,170,728	19, 222, 856	84.094.187	194,835,525	64,758,116	553,884,525
January 18 236,088,988	23,191,867	81.071.006	205,888 148	66,155,241	619,797,369
January 25 258,892,101	25,106,800	84.0-2.762	210,098,084	67,154,161	528,508,228
February 1 266,415.618	23,955,320	44.062.521	213,330,524	65,197,158	637,449,923
February 8 270,555,856	22,828,872	81,096,884	217,844,518	55,846,959	597, 242, 595
February 15 271,015,970	24, 192, 955	84,043,296	216,759,828	68,471,762	550,521,185
February 21 267,768,648	22,518,987	84,100,023	209,095,851	60,868,980	452,421,592
February 29 267.240.678	22,091,642	84.0 6.228	208,651,578	58,553,607	705,100,784
March 7 269,156,636	20,714,288	34,153 957	207,787,080	57,017,044	619,219,598
March 14 266,516,034	19,744,70!	84,218,881	201.188.470	54,788,866	691,277,641
March 21 261,416,900	17.944.808	84,212,571	191,191,526	52,261,086	649,482,341
March 28 257,878,247	17.828.867	84,190,808	186,525,128	52,123,078	557,843,908
April 4 254,287,891	17,077,299	84,227,108	280,956,846	51,709,706	567,788,188
April 11 252,986,725	16,848,150	84,194,272	179,851,880	51,982,609	401 971 451
April 18 254,817,986	16,776,549	84,218,581	181,838,523	60,988,060	623,713,923
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Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Legal Tend's.		
April 25		14,948,547	84,237,031	180,807,489		8· 2,784,154	
May 2	257,698,673	16,166,878	84,114,848	191.906,185	57,868,599	588,717,902	
May 9	265,755,888	21 286,910	84,205,409	199,276,568	57.541.>27	507,028,567	
May 16	267,794,788	20,939,142	84,193,249	201,813,805	57.618.095	480,186,908	
May 23	267,381,279	20,479,947	84,188 088	202,507 550	62,288,008	488,785,149	
May 80	268,117,490	17,861,088	84,145,606	201,746,964	65,688,964	609,118,948	
June 6	278,792,*67	14,828,581	84,188,159	209,089,655	68,822,098	640,663,329	
June 18	275,142,024	11,198,631	24,166,846	210,670,765	69,902,840	580,828,197	
June 20	274,117,608	9,124,880	84,119,120	211.484,887	72,567,583	553,9~8,817	
June 27	276,501, 86	7,758,800	84,048,791	214,302,307	78,858,303	516,726,075	
July 8	281,945,931	11,954,730	84,032,466	921,050,806	72,125,989	525,646,698	
July 11	281,147,708	19, 235, 318	84.068,202	224,820,141	68,531,549	591,756,395	
July 18	282,912,490	20,839,031	84,004,111	228,180,749	71,647,545	505,469,464	
July 25	280,345,255	20,804,101	88,968,878	246,761,663	71,235,583	437,169,337	
PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.							
Data	T a-ma	1 Mandana	Toome	Omasia	Olasaletten	Domonito	

FRIDENBULLIE BANK BAIUBRE.								
Date. J	Legal Tenders.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.			
January 4	. \$:6,782,483	\$59.00 : 304	\$385,913	\$10,689,000	\$86,621,274			
January 11		52,593,707	400,615	10,689,096	37,131,830			
January 18	. 16.827.428	53,018,196	820,978	10,641,752	87,457,089			
January 25		52,325,599	279,898	10,645,226	87,812,540			
February 1		52,604,916	948,678	10.688.927	57,922,287			
February 8		52,672,448	287,878	10,635 996	87 896,658			
February 15		52,582,146	268,157	10,668,828	87,010,520			
February 22		52,423,166	204,929	10,632,495	86,458,464			
February 29		52,459,757	211,365	10,634,484	85,798,814			
March 7		53,081,665	282,180	10,633,718	84,826,861			
March 14		53,867,611	251,051	10,681,899	94,528,550			
March 21		53,677,837	229,518	10,648,618	88,886,996			
March 28		58,450,878	199 838	10,648,606	32,428,890			
April 4		52,209,234	215,835	10,642,670	31,278,119			
April 11		52,256,949	250,240	10 640,982	89,255,671			
April 20		52, 989,780	222,229	10,640,479	88,910,952			
April 27		52,812 6:8	204,699	10,640,812	84,767,290			
May 4		53,888,740	814,366	10,681,044	85,109,987			
May 11		53,771,794	897,778	10,629,0 5	84,017,596			
May 18		58,491,588	8-8,595	10,689,665	86,080,063			
May 25		58, 68,225	290,802	10,661,276	86,000,297			
June 1	16,184,865	58,562,449	289,871	10,626,987	86,574,457			
June 8		53,491 364	226,581	10,630 945	42,910,499			
June 15		58,129,521	175,803	10,680,979	43,016,968			
June 22		53, 381, 820	182,711	10,681,920	48,943,569			
June 29		53,072,878	198,568	10,680,307	48,936,629			
July 6	16,443,158	53,653,471	243,996	10.625,426	44,894,898			
July 18	16,664,233	53,791,546	182,524	10,626,214	45,156,620			
July 20		58,994,618	183,252	10,647.851	45,687,975			
July 27		54,024,355	195,896	10,622,247	45,558,220			
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BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

	Legal					Circulation		
Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Tenders.	Deposits.	National.	State.		
January 8		\$1,466,946	\$15,543,169	\$40,856,022	\$94,686,559	\$228,780		
January 18		1,976,987	15,560,965	41,496,820	24,757,965	227,958		
January 20		926,949	15,832,769	41,904,161	24,700,001	217,873		
January 27		841,196	16,349,687	43,991,170	14.564.406	226,258		
February 8	96,895,960	777,627	16,788,229	49,891,198	24,628,103	221,160		
February 10	97,973,916	652,939	16,497,648	42,752,067	24,850,926	221,700		
February 17		605,740	16.561 401	41.502,550	24,850,055	220,452		
February 24		616,953	16,809,501	40,887,614	24,686,212	216,490		
March 2	100,243,692	688,832	16,804,846	40,954,986	24,876,089	2:5,214		
March 9	101, 59, 361	867,174	15,556,696	89,770,418	24,987,700	210,162		
March 16	101,499,611	918,485	14,5,2,812	89,276,514	25,062,418	197,790		
March 28	100,109,595	798,606	13,712,560	87,092,546	25,094,253	197,289		
March 30	90,132,268	685,034	18,736,032	86,184,640	24,983,417	197,079		
April 6	97,020,925	781,540	18,004,994	86,008,157	25,175,194	168,028		
April 13		878,487	12,522,035	86,422,929	24,218,014	167,018		
April 20	98,906,805	805,486	11,905,608	86,417,890	24,231,058	166,962		
April 27	98,002,343	577, 68	12,248.545	86,259,946	25,231,978	164,831		
May 4	97,624,197	815,469	12,656,190	87,685,406	25,908,284	160,885		
May 11	97,332,283	1,133,668	11,962,868	87,858,776	25,925,173	145,948		
May 18		1,186,881	12,199,422	87,844,748	25,234 465	160,941		
May 25		1,018,809	12,848,141	88,898,141	25,210,660	180,151		
June 1		766,558	14,188,806	40,811,569	25,904,939	159,560		
June 8		631,149	14,868,900	41,470,876	25,194,114	159,818		
June 15		561,990	14,378,575	41,788,706	25,190,565	159,150		
June 29		476,498	14,564,614	42,583,871	25,197,817	158,908		
June 29		436,699	15,195,550	49,506,816	25,182,929	158,819		
July 6		1,617,638	15,1,7,807	48,458,654	25,214,100	144,689		
July 18	101.498,516	1,198,529	15,743,211	48,116,765	25,916,184	141,588		
July 20	109,430,488	1,521,893	15,469,406	48,876,800	25,218,727	185,799		
July 27	102,408,771	785,641	15,837,748	43,580,894	95,954,906	142,450		

THE

MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE

AND

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER, 1868.

A CENTRAL LINE OF NAVIGATION FROM THE OHIO TO THE CHESAPRAKE BAY

BY R. W. HUGHES, VA.

(Continued from page 137, vol. 59, No. 2.)

OBJECTIONS TO THE RIVER AND GULF ROUTE.

Any reflecting mind would have concluded in 1820, when the success of steamboat navigation had been fully demonstrated on western waters, that the course of western trade was thereby determined; that it would never seek artificial lines of transportation where steam navigation could be applied; but would assuredly prefer the course of the Mississippi river to New Orleans and a market. But no sooner was the Eric canal opened in 1825, than produce from the region of the Mississippi began to seek that route to the seaboard. From the country in the region of the lakes, the new route had the advantage of being much shorter and more direct. From the country bordering upon the Ohio river, other considerations gave trade a northeastward direction towards the canal.

It is a well known fact that almost every article of up-country produce is liable to undergo a sweating, souring, and heating process from the warmth and humidity of the climate of the gulf. The loss in value from this deteriorating cause is sometimes very serious, and always greater or less; being variously estimated at from 5 to 25 per cent. on the value of

produce; except when the transit is made in the winter months. Assuming, however, that the average deterioration amounts only to 5 per cent on bacon, lard, butter, tobacco, and ten per cent on wheat and flour, we have an average loss of \$7 50 per ton on the former class of articles; and of \$5 per ton on the latter; a sum which is sufficient to give the control of this trade for most of the year to northern routes. The addition of these items to the comparative estimates of cost of transportation by various routes, given in the report of Mr. Lorraine and the memorial of the Iowa legislature, would make a still greater difference in favor of the Virginia route over that by way of the gulf.

Besides the objection of climate, there are dangers in the navigation of the Mississippi, from snags and other casualties. During the last twenty-five years much has been done to relieve this evil; but the high rates of river steamboat insurance still attest the magnitude of the dangers attending the navigation of the river. Mr. Barrow, in a report to the Senate of the United States in 1843, stated the amount of the losses on the Mississippi and its tributaries, from snags alone, at a million of dollars per annum.

The navigation of the gulf of Mexico is subject to the sudden storms and hurricanes incident to the West India climate. In his speech at the Memphis convention in 1845, Mr. Calhoun said on this subject: "With all the advantages possessed by the coasting trade between the gulf and Atlantic, be it ever so well secured against interruption, there is one great objection to which it is liable. The peninsula of Florida projects far south; which makes the voyage from New Orleans and the other ports of the gulf to the southern Atlantic cities, not only long and tedious, but liable to frequent and great accidents in its navigation. A voyage from this place (Memphis), for instance, to Charleston, would be a distance of certainly not less than two thousand five hundred miles, and is subject to as great losses as any voyage of equal extent in any part of the world. It was estimated some dozen years since, that the actual loss between Cuba, the Bahama Islands and Florida, was not less than half a million of dollars a year, and it may now, with the great increase of our commerce, be put at not less than a million."

These dangers, coupled with those incident to the navigation of the boisterous coast of the Carolinas, and combined with the great length of the voyage from St. Louis to New York of 4,000 miles, make up a most imposing and formidable array of objections to the river, gulf and seaboard.

The far-seeing mind of Chief Justice Marshall perceived the effect of these objections as early as 1812. In his report in advocacy of the Virginia canal line, that eminent man said: "The whole of that exten-

sive and fertile country [the valley of the Mississippi], a country increasing in wealth and population with a rapidity which baffles calculation, must make its importations up the Mississippi alone, or through the Atlantic states. When we take into view the certain growth of the country, we can scarcely suppose it possible that any commercial city on the banks of that river [near its mouth*] can keep pace with that growth and furnish a supply equal to the demand. The unfriendliness of the climate to human life will render this disparity between the commercial and agricultural capital still more sensible. It will tend still more to retard a population of that sound commercial character which would render some great city on that majestic river a safe emporium for the western world."

In answer to enquiries addressed by Mr. Cabell, former president of the Virginia canal, to eminent merchants largely engaged in trade, both in Richmond and New Orleans, he received the following replies. Several persons united in saying, that if the Virginia line should bring trade from the west to tide-water at two cents per ton per mile, (which is quadruple the charge at which it will be brought), it was their opinion "that the following articles would pay all the expenses of transportation and net the grower more in Richmond, than if taken to New Orleans free of charge; say tobacco, flour, pork, bacon, lard, butter, cheese, &c., for the following reasons:

"Independent of the freight down the river to New Orleans, these articles are all materially injured, by passing through a warm and humid climate; at New Orleans they have to pay exorbitant rates of drayage, storage, fire insurance and commission, and when shipped from thence to other markets, are subject to a rate of freight at times 50 per cent higher than from the James river." Genl. Steenbergen, an eminent man of business in the Ohio valley wrote, that "every avenue from the Ohio to the eastern cities at all practicable, and at prices of transportation that can possibly be borne by the shipper, is used in preference to the New Orleans route. It will always be the case. The climate and dangers of the one, against the certainty and even high prices of the other, will make the inland passage the favorite one."

Of late years, the construction at St. Louis and other points, of great stationary steam elevators for transferring grain from boat to boat, and the employment of floating steam machinery for performing the same office from boat to boat while in motion; and the substitution of barges towed in fleets by steam towboats, for the old plan of carrying the freight on the steamboat, has restored to water transportation an undisputed

^{*} The context shows that he referred to an importing city near the seaboard.

superiority over railroad carriage and diminished the objections which formerly existed to the route by the lower Mississippi and the gulf. But the injurious effects of the semi-tropical climate upon agricultural produce, the great length of the circuitous gulf route, and the dangers of the gulf and coast navigation, still constitute enduring objections to that route.

DEFECTS OF THE ST. LAWRENCE ROUTE.

The outlet of the St. Lawrence into the ocean is not less than 1,000 miles northeast from lake Ontario; about 700 miles of the line consisting of the river itself, and 300 miles of the gulf of St. Lawrence, into which it falls. As to its natural features, this line of navigation, in both of its divisions, was accurately described in 1838 by an eminent English engineer and traveler, Mr. Stevenson, who had made a professional tour of observation in the United States and British America. Mr. Stevenson says of this river:

"Receiving the whole surplus waters of the North American lakes, and the drainage of a great tract of country traversed by the numerous streams which join it in its course to the orean, the St. Lawrence, as regards the quantity of its discharge, presents abundant advantages for safe and easy navigation. The stream of the upper part of this river, however, is much distorted by numerous expansions and contractions of its banks, and also by declivities or falls in its bed, and clusters of small islands, which render its navigation exceedingly dangerous, and in some places wholly impracticable for all sorts of vessels excepting the Canadian batteaux, which are ethore flat-bottomed boats, built expressly for its navigation. In several parts of its course the river expands into extensive lakes; and in its waters, which are thus distributed over a great surface, numerous shoals occur, among which the shipchannel is generally tortuous and narrow, and only navigable in day-light. In some places again the St. Lawrence forces its way between high banks which encroach on its bed, and leave a comparatizely narrow gullet for its passage: and in others it flows over a steep, rugged bottom. These sudden contractions and declivities interrupt the peaceful flow of the stream, and produce chutes, as they are called, or rapids, some of which are wholly impassable for vessels of large size, and others can only be navigated in certain states of tide. The islands, which occur chiefly in the upper part of the river between Montreal and lake Ontario, also disturb the channel, and give rise to rapide which are no less detrimental in a comme cial point of view."

—[Stevenson's Civil Eng neering in America.

The navigation of the river is further embrarrassed by the general and strong current of the river, against which ascending vessels can make their way only by the aid of steam tow-boats of the most powerful description in any of the American waters. Since Mr. Stevenson wrote the rapids and shallows of the river have been flanked by canals and the falls of the Niagara river have been lapped by the Welland canal—all on the British side. The dimensions of these Canadian canals are as follows:

	Length in miles.	Depth in feet.	Size of locks,	Li t, N feet.	umber locks.
Lachine	Sŧ	10	200x45	441	5
Beauharnais	111	10	200x45	821	9
Cornwall	111	10	200x45	48	7
Farrand's Point		10	200x45	4	1
Rapid Plat	92	10	200x45	114	2
Point Iroquois	**	10	200x45	6	1
Gallop's		10	200x45	8	2
Welland	28	10	150 x26 }	880	17
•					-
Total	69			534 2	5 1

The St. Lawrence canals can pass vessels of 800 tons. The Welland canal can pass vessels of 400 tons. These canals connect the lower river and gulf of St. Lawrence with the chain of the great lakes.

Of the gulf of St. Lawrence, Mr. Stevenson gives the following description:

The navigation of the gulf of St. Lawrence, through which the river discharges itself into the Atlantic, is very hazardous. In addition to dangers arising from the masses of ice which are constantly to be met with, for nearly one half of the year, it is subject to dense and impenetrable fogs, and its rocky shores and desolate islands, affords neither comfort nor shelter to the shipwrecked mariner. One of the most desolate and dangerous of the islands in the gulf, is Anticoeti, which lies exactly opposite the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and is surrounded by reefs of rocks and shoalwater. Two light-houses have been erected on it, and also four houses of shelter, containing large stores of provisions, for the use of those who have the misfortune to be shipwrecked on its inhospitable shores.

In a memorial of citizens of New York, written by De Witt Clinton in 1816, addressed to the legislature of that state, in advocacy of the Erie canal, it is stated that "the St. Lawrence is generally locked by ice seven months in the year, during which time produce lies a dead weight on the hands of the owner." But Mr. Stevenson seems to imply shorter duration of the period of frost by remarking that it continues "for the space of at least five months in the year;" going on further to say: "The rigor of a Canadian winter, covering the face of the country with snow, and congealing every river, lake and harbor, produces a stagnation in trade which cannot fail to have a bad effect on the commerce of the country and the habits of the people, who are compelled to complete their whole business transactions during the summer and autumn months, and remain in a state of comparative indolence during the remainder of the year."

BRITISH PROJECTS IN CANADA.

These difficulties, attending the navigation of the St. Lawrence river and gulf, make that route a feeble competitor for the trade of the great West. Yet British enterprise and capital seem determined to overcome the disadvantages imposed by nature. Not to speak of stupendous railroads constructed from the upper lakes to points on the St. Lawrence, from which they are continued to Portland, Maine, and Boston, Massachusetts, the following plans of water navigations have been projected and are partially in progress.

The principal enterprise is that of a canal on the American side around the falls of Niagara, eight miles in length. It is proposed to make the locks 275 feet long, 46 feet wide, and 13 feet deep on the sills, giving capacity for the passage of vessels of twelve hundred tons.

There are many canals on the Canadian side projected, in progress or completed. The proposed Ottawa ship canal will pass from the easterly

side of Lake Huron up the French River to Lake Nippisingue; from thence by canal across the elevation to Trout Lake, at the head of Mattawaco River, and down it to its junction with the Ottawa, following the latter to Montreal. The length of the canal proper is 37½ miles, and the whole improvement will cost \$24,000,000. A recent location makes a line of canal proper 29.82 miles long, and a route of canal and improved river and lake navigation 401½ miles in length from Montreal to Lake Huron. It will effect a saving of distance, between Montreal and Chicago, of 842½ miles over the circuitous route of the great lakes. The locks on this route will be fifty feet wide, 250 feet long and 10 feet on the sills, which will pass vessels of one thousand tons. Lift 665½ feet.

The Georgian bay and Toronto canal will connect Toronto with Lake Huron by a route only 100 miles long, and 470 feet lift of locks. The locks will be 265 feet long, 55 wide, and 12 feet on the sills, costing \$22,000,000. By this route the distance between Chicago and Montreal, compared with that by Lake Erie and Ontario, or by the Welland canal, will be 428 miles less.

OBJECTIONS TO THE BOUTE OF THE GREAT LAKES.

The determined enterprise of the British capitalists and colonists who are undertaking the expensive works in Canada, which have just been described, proves two important facts. It proves how much water transportation is still valued and relied on even in latitudes of frost where canals can be used only about 200 days in the year; and it proves that there is some insupperable objection to navigation on the great lakes, especially those of Erie and Ontario, which it is of great importance to avoid, by shorter lines across the northern peninsula.

The nature of that objection can be learned from the following facts:

After various unsuccessful experiments, it is perfectly ascertained that ordinary canal bosts, such as are in use upon the Ohio and Erie canals, cannot be safely towed upon the stormy surface of the great lakes. The modern barge system cannot therefore, be applied on the lakes.

The board of the New York State canals, in their report for 1835, set forth the following state of facts:

The method of towing barges by means of steamboats has been very successfully practiced on the Hudson River; but on the lakes, though a great many steamboats have been in use for several years, the plan has not been a opted, because steamboats cannot manage barges in a storm.

* An intelligent gentleman of the considered it impracticable as a regular business for steamboats to tow vessels with safety on the lakes, unless the vessels were fitted with masts and rigging, and sufficiently manned so as to be conducted by sails in a storm; the t storms often rise very suddenly on these lakes, and with such violence as would compel a steamboat to cut loose vessels in tow in order to sustain herself.

Those who have not witnessed them can form no adequate idea of the

violence of lake storms. The annual damage sustained by the massive masonry of the piers by which the harbors are protected, in which stones weighing upwards of half a ton are sometimes raised from their beds and completely upturned; the range of lofty trees rooted up and thrown upon the bordering shores, and the numerous vessels driven ashore and totally lost or seriously damaged, furnishing striking evidences of the power of an agency which nothing can resist. They are even more powerful than the "ground swells" of the ocean near the shore. In all land-locked bodies of water the waves are short and sudden in their movements, proving very destructive to whatever obstacle is opposed to their fury; but there is a characteristic slowness in the long movement of the ocean's swell, which, it is generally acknowledged, renders it less destructive to marine works exposed to its action than the waves produced in land-locked lakes or seas.

From Mr. Woodbridge's report to the Senate of the United States in February, 1843, upon the subject of the trade of the lakes, it appears "that from 1834 to 1841, inclusive, the number of wrecks upon lake Michigan amounted to eighty nine vessels; that those wrecks were accompanied by a destruction of property to the value of \$1,052,450; and that one hundred and fifteen lives were sacrificed." The same report makes the disclosure, that during the year 1842 alone, "two steamboats, one ship, and seventeen schooners, were totally lost in the storms on the upper lakes; and that three other steamboats, two brigs, and ten schooners, were driven ashore, accompanied by the probable loss of nearly one half million of value in property, and more than a hundred lives."

From the shallowness of the water upon lake Erie, compared with that upon the other lakes, it is more easily and more permanently affected by frost, its navigation being generally obstructed by ice for some weeks every spring, after that of all the others is open and unimpeded. From the same cause this lake is likewise contradistinguished from all the others, by a slight current constantly setting from the West to East, which, together with the prevailing southwesterly winds, causes the floating ice in spring to drift down to accumulate to a vast extent about the head of the St. Lawrence river, thereby retarding the opening of the navigation at the entrance of the Erie and Welland causls some three weeks beyond the period at which it opens at the port of Erie upon the Southern side of the lake.

There is a significant fact disclosed by the last report of the New York canals. For the months of October and December of 1867, the receipts from tolls were about two millions, being a little more than half the receipts for the fiscal year, and more than half the estimated receipts for the next fiscal year. These figures show that the navigation closes just

when the demand for transportation is greatest, and the comparative smallness of receipts for the other five months of open navigation shows that the freight which cannot use this canal gets to market over other and much more expensive avenues of transportation.

It is probably owing to this serious disadvantage of the lake route that so little success has attended the various efforts which have been made to institute direct exports from the lakes to Europe. Notwithstanding all these efforts, the following list will show the whole number of vessels that have passed from the lakes to the ocean from 1846 to 1865 (excepting 1864, 1851, 1852, 1853 and 1849, for which the statistics are not available):

1846	1	1856	1 1	1862 6
		1857 2		
1848	1	1858 18	8	1865 11
1850	1	1859	7 j	
1854	1	1860 89	9	Total 159
1955	1	1861 7	7	

When the magnitude of the western lake trade, and when the costliness and perfection of the canals which have been constructed for the passage of ocean shipping are considered, this must be confessed to be a meagre exhibit, and it affords conclusive proof that trade avoids the outlet furnished by the St. Lawrence, rather than seeks it.

For the trade of the vast country lying in the States West and Southwest of the lakes, this route does not seem to furnish a cheap outlet. In an able paper on the duty of the Federal government, in connection with the navigation of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, Prof. Sylvester Waterhouse, of St. Louis, remarks: "Under all the existing difficulties (of this navigation), the freight of cereals from the Upper Mississippi to New York is far cheaper by way of New Orleans than it is by the lakes and the New York canal. The comparative rates of transportation from Dubuque, Iowa, to New York, are:

The present cost of shipping grain from Chicago to Cairo by rast, and thence via New Orleans to New York by water, is no greater than the freight to the same point by way of the lakes. The existing water tariff on wheat in bulk from Chicago to New York is—

By the lakes	44 cents.
From Chicago to Cairo by rail	20 cents,
Fom Cairo to New Orleans by water	12 "
From New Orleans to New York by water	12 "

So extreme is the cheapness of river carriage, that the rates of the southern route, increased by 300 miles of costly railroad transit, do not exceed those of the northern line. If we take a point on the Mississippi south of the latitude of Chicago, such as Dubuque, the saving is 30 cents a bushel by the New Orleans route. This gives 38 cents as the cost; and it is believed that after the improvement of the rapids of the Mississippi, and the erection of elevators for the transfer of grain in bulk, the freight of cereals from the upper Mississippi to New York, by way of New Orleans, will be reduced to twenty-five cents per bushel."

Such a reduction, and even the present low rates, will powerfully affect the movement of western grain; for even as early as in 1865, out of 48,000,000 bushels of grain shipped to Chicago, 15,000,000 were brought from points on the Mississippi; and it is officially stated that three-fifths of all the wheat received in 1865 at Milwaukee and Chicago came from the towns on the banks of the Mississippi.

THE VIRGINIA WATER-LINE THE BEST SUBSTITUTE.

The serious disadvantages which have been here detailed attending the navigation of the lakes and the St. Lawrence River and Gulf, coupled with the other consideration, that in the event of a war with Great Britain, this important channel of transportation of the produce of the West to the East would be obstructed, have combined to impress upon the public mind of the East the great importance of auxiliary lines of railroad lying wholly within the national jurisdiction.

This well-grounded appreciation of railroads which grew gradually into a railroad mania, operated for several years to turn public attention away for a period from all artificial water-line routes of transportation. But now, it is discovered, after the fullest experiment, that railroads are inadequate to the performance of the immense transportation required, and that they are liable to the popular objection of being in charge of close corporations, and are not, like canals, open to indiscriminate public use at moderate rates of charge.

The Virginia canal, owing to the costliness of the work, did not reach completion before the railroad fever had taken possession of the public; and it has had to wait for its consummation to that returning appreciation, which is now again felt, of cheap water transportation. It offers now a channel of navigation frem West to East shorter than any other, cheaper than any other, more expeditious, and more free from all obstructions arising from climate or a public enemy than all the rest. Its only rivals in capacity for western trade are the Mississippi and gulf route on one hand, and the great lake, Erie Canal and St. Lawrence River route on the other. Both of these boundary routes are circuitous, while this central

one is direct. Both of the others take American produce out of the Union, in transporting it from one part of the Union to the other, subjecting it to the dangers of war; and while one of them subjects our national products to the damaging effects of a semi-tropical climate, and the hazards of gulf and coast navigation, the other renders it liable to be seized and held for months by the ice, or wrecked and lost by the lake storms.

Emphatically, in the case of the Virginia line, it is true, in medio tutissimus ibis. It offers the safest, the shortest, the most central, the channels of outlet by water for western trade.

The rapid expansion and extension of inland navigation in the central basin of the continent is producing an increase in the quantity of trade demanding outlet to the seaboard, far exceeding the capacity of all existing avenues of outlet to discharge, and imperatively requiring the opening of a new line of direct water navigation to the seaboard equal in capacity to the Erie canal. The extent of this inland navigation will now be displayed in a few paragraphs.

VAST EXTENT OF OUR INLAND NAVIGATION.

The construction of a ship canal less than one mile in length between lakes Traver and Big Stone, in Minnesota, will unite the waters of the River St. Peter's with those of the great Red River of Northwest British The Red River of the North is navigable for steamboats for seven hundred miles to Lake Winnepeg; and from Lake Winnepeg this navigation is extended by the Saskatchawan seven hundred miles to the base of the Rocky Mountains, within a short distance of Frazier's gold digging. Thus navigation will soon be opened west of the Mississippi from St. Paul, on the Mississippi River, to Frazier's diggings in British Columbia, via the St. Peter's and Red rivers of the North. East of the river, the union of the headwaters of the Wisconsin and Fox rivers in Wisconsin, will make a navigable water route from the Mississippi to Green Bay, on Lake Michigan. Further south, one hundred miles of ship canal, from Chicago west to Peoria, with some improvements in the Illinois River, will make another navigable water route for large vessels from the Mississippi to Lake Michigan. A canal in Ohio connects Portsmouth, on the Ohio River, with Cleveland, on Lake Erie. Cincinnati, on the Ohio River, and Toledo, on Lake Erie, are connected by the Miami Canal. A canal from Toledo to Logansport, Indiana, with the Wabash River, unites the waters of the Ohio River with those of Lake Erie at Toledo. Should the wants of commerce require it, these latter canals can be enlarged through Ohio and Indiana to a capacity for passing steamboats of six hundred tons burden.

The proposed dimensions of the canal above described, as projected for uniting Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi with Green Bay on Lake Michigan, across the State of Wisconsin, are as follows:-The entire improvement will be 295 miles in length, of which 175 miles, chiefly of lake and river navigation, are in use. The locks will be 160 feet long by 35 feet wide. The upper Fox is not yet fully improved, but now passes barges of greater capacity than those of the Erie Canal. The dimensions of the water-line through Illinois will be, when the canal is enlarged, length 100 miles, with locks 350 feet long by 70 feet wide; cost \$10,000,000. These two latter works are not antagonistic, and will make a navigable water communication between the great chain of lakes, and upwards of twenty thousand miles of navigable rivers, including the Mississippi and its numerous tributaries, and the Red River of the North and Saskatchawan of British America. These improvements, in connection with the short ship canal, less than a mile long, between lakes Big Stone and Traver, will open steamboat navigation from Chicago or New Orleans to Lake Winnepeg, which is 700 miles distant from St. Paul. This great sheet of water is as large as Lake Ontario, and receives the Saskatchawan river from the west, which itself is navigable 700 miles to the Rocky mountains, within a distance of 50 miles from the Frazier's River gold mines. By means of these improvements and the various ship canals proposed or completed between Lake Michigan and the East, steamers from Quebec, New York or New Orleans could be passed to the headwaters of the Missouri, the Yellow Stone and the Saskatchawan, a distance of 5,000 miles of inland water navigation. This vast extension of navigation must exert a prodigious influence in stimulating western production, and produce an accumulation of trade requiring the open ing of every possible channel of outlet to the seaboard.

The great lakes have a shore line of 3,620 miles on the American side, and 2,629 miles on the side of Canada. Lakes Huron and Superior are navigably connected by a ship canal around the rapids of the St. Marie river, with locks 350 feet long and 50 feet wide, having 12 feet lift.

The present extent of steamboat navigation in the valley of the Mississippi river, is shown by the following table, prepared by Col. Long, of the United States Army:

EXTENT OF WESTERN STEAM NAVIGATION.

Mississippi and branches,	1	Iowa	110
Mississip, i proper	,000	Cedar	60
St. Croix	80	Des Moines	250
		Illinois	
Cnippeway	70	Maramec	60
Black	60	Ka-kaskia	150
Wisconsin	180	Big Muddy	5
Rock	250	Obion	69

Forked Deer	Bayou Sorrele
Big Hatchie 75	Bayou Chene 5
St. Francis 800	
White 500	Missouri and its branches.
Big Black 60	Missouri proper
Spring 50	Yellowstone 800
4 rkaneae 603	Platte river 40
Canadian	Kansas 150
Neoeho	Osage 275
Yazoo	Grand 90
Tallahatchee	
Tallabusha 100	Ohio and its branches.
Big Sunflower 80	Ohio proper
Little Sunflower 70	Alleghany 2 0
Big Black	Monongahela 60
Cumberland 400	Muekingum 70
Tennessee	Kanawha 65
	Big Sandy 50
Red River and branches.	Scioto 50
Red river proper1,500	Kentucky 62
Wachita	Salt river 5
Saline 100	Green 150
Little Missouri 50	Barren 80
Bayou D' Arbourc 60	Wabash 400
Bayou Bartholomew 150	Bayou Louis
Bayeu Bœuf	Tensas
Bayou Macon	Lacke Bistenaw 60
Bayou de Glaze 90	Lake Caddo 75
Bayou Carre 140	Sulphur Fork 100
Bayou Lafourche 60	Little River 65
Bayou Rouzs 40	Kiamichi
Bayou Plaquemine 12	Boggy 40
Bayou Teche 96	Bayou Pierre 150
Grand River 12	Atclafaloya 360

Here are nearly seventeen thousand miles of steamboat navigation It would be a moderate estimate to reckon the slack water navigation of these rivers, for boats other than steamboats, at the same number of miles in addition. And, if we accept the assertion of an eminent European engineer that any stream having a volume of water 19 feet wide and 18 inches deep may be made navigable, and is considered a commercial stream in Europe, then there are still as many miles in addition of navigable water in the great basin; making a total navigation of 50,000 miles for purposes of commerce.

THE BARGE SYSTEM ON THE WESTERN RIVERS. ITS TENDENCY TO DIVERT TRADE FROM THE LAKES TO THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, AND TO THE OHIO AND VIRGINIA CANAL.

The inadequacy of the present means of outlet for Western produce to the seaboard, other than the channel of the Mississippi, is universally acknowledged.* For the sake of cheapness, vast quantities of produce

^{*} In 1865 Mine esota alone produced 10,000,000 bushels of wheat. Three-fourths of this harvest could have been exported if facilities of cheap transportation had off red sufficient inducement. In 1866, higher prices—which produce the same effect as cheaper fright-led to the exportation of 8,000,000 of bushels. It is such a state of freight charges or of market prices as will leave a profit to the producer which brings out products to market.

must take the river and gulf route, or not go to market at all. Notwithstanding the objections which exist, and are universally entertained, to that route, its trade is rapidly increasing from the very necessity of the case. Within the last three years it has received so great an impetus, that improvements in the facilities for transferring produce from vessel to vessel. and for towing it upon the water, have become indispensable. The barge system has accordingly been substituted for the old one of placing the produce on large steamboats. Steam tugs of immense strength are employed. They carry no freight. They are simply the motive power-They save delay by taking fuel for the round trip. Landing only at the large cities, they stop barely long enough to attach a loaded barge. By this economy of time and steady movement, they equal the speed of steamboats. The Mohawk made its first trip from St. Louis to New Orleans in six days, with ten barges in tow. The management of the barges is precisely like that of freight cars. The barges are loaded in the absence of the steam tug. The tug arrives, leaves a train of barges, takes another and proceeds. The tug itself is always at work. It does not lie at the levees while the barges are unloading. Its largest stoppage is made for fuel. The power of these boats is enormous. The tugs plying on the Minnesota River sometimes tow 30,000 bushels of wheat apiece. The freight of a single trip would fill 85 railroad cars. Steamboats are obliged to remain in port two or three days for the shipment of freight. The heavy expense which this delay and the necessity of large crews involve. is a grave objection to the old system of transportation. The service of the steam tug requires but few men, and the cost of running is relatively low. The advantages which are claimed for the barge system are exhibited by the following table:

Stoppage at intermediate points	Tugs & b rges.	Stamboats. 6 hours.
Stoppage at terminal points	24 "	48 "
Crew	15 men.	50 "
Tennage	25,000 tone.	1,500 tone.
Daily expenses	\$200	\$1,000
Original cost	\$75,000	\$ 00,000

In addition to the ordinary precautions against fire, the barges have this unmistakable advantage over steamboats, they can be cut adrift from each other, and the fire restricted to the narrowest limits. The barges are very strongly built, and have water-tight compartments for the movement of grain in bulk. The transportation of grain from Minnesota to New Orleans by water costs no more than the freightage from the same point by railroad to Chicago. After the erection of a floating elevator at New Orleans, a hoat load of grain from St. Paul will not be handled again till it reaches the Crescent city.

The dimensions of the vessels employed on the river between St. Louis and New Orleans are as follows:

TOWBOATS.

		10 20212	•	
Light draft.	Depth of hold. $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet.	Breadth.	Length.	Tonnage.
34 feet.		80 feet.	180 feet.	6,500 bush coal
		BARGES.		
1 1-6 feet.	6 fest.	80 feet.	175 feet.	600 toma.
	8 "	84 "	190 "	1,000 "

The towboats have two engines each; the cylinders are 22 inches in diameter, with 20 inch stroke. One towboat will draw 8,000 tons of freight. The time from St. Louis to New Orleans is 6 days down, 10 days back; round trip, on the average, 18 days.

The Mississippi Valley Transportation Company has 5 towboats and 87 barges. They are crowded with business. They handle as much as 11,000 tons of freight in a week. The business is rapidly and largely developing. The barge system will soon supersede all other methods of transportation on western waters. An indispensable adjunct of it is the steam elevator for transferring grain from vessel to vessel in bulk. The St. Louis elevator cost \$450,000, and has a capacity of 1,250,000 bushels. It is able to handle 100,000 bushels a day. It began to receive grain in October, 1865. Before the 1st of January, 1866, its receipts amounted to 600,000 bushels, 200,000 of which were brought directly from Chicago. The local receipts at the elevator in 1866 were 1,376,700 bushels. Grain can now be shipped by way of St. Louis and New Orleans to New York and Europe 20 cents a bushel cheaper than it can be carried to the Atlantic by the other existing routes. The effects produced by barge system is thus described by a New Orleans correspondent of the New York Times:

New Ogleans, Sunday, April 5, 1868.

CHICAGO AND NEW ORLHANS.

Every one observes how this most enterprising people are prospecting for commercial expansion. Chicago owns about one-third of the whole tonnage of the Union. She controls the lakes, and is forcing her way by the St. Lawrence to the ocean. She is penetrating the upper country of the Northwest, and intercepting from St. Louis the productions of lows and Montana. Recently she has discovered that the Mississippi is the cheapest open way to the markets of the world, so she has sent her commercial explorers to mark her pathway to the ocean by way of New Orleans. The great Illinois Central Railroad has taken hold of the West India trade, and offered such inducements to western importers that Havana sends her products by this route instead of by New York. The Texas cattle dealers have adopted this route. Large capital has been put in grain elevators, and Western men who are here to conduct business claim confidently this important commerce. These explorers from the northwest seem delighted with the climate and local attractions of New Orleans, and with a rapid rail time between the snows of the north and the sunny trottoirs of New Orleans, we have crowds of business men, with their families, constantly among us. This has given an impulse to our Western trade, and has occasioned considerable investments in city and country real setate.

THE NORTHWEST ON POLITICS.

The giant northwest is, in fact, beginning to perceive and employ its physical ability in the commercial politics of the country. With the conviction that the Mississippi outlet was of indispensable importance, it has decreed that all obstacles to the navigation of that river shall be removed from its sources to its mouth. So the Des Moines Canal is under contract. It is to be 7 miles long, 800 feet wide, and 6 feet in depth. The smaller obstructions of the upper river, including the bridge at Rock Island, are to be removed, or so modified as no longer to impele navigation. Then the Government has ordered a dredgeboat, costing nearly \$400,000, to go to work on the Belize Passes. Besides this, St. Louis is declared a port of entry, and hereafter goods will be imported direct to that city. This will, no doubt, make a great change in the values imported by way of this Custom House. There are other evidences that this great internal power will make itself felt in the legislation and foreign policy of the Government. It is a leviathan, which has only made itself known, so far, by spouting and an occasional lash of its tail. When its power shall be fully awakened, it will enap the ropes and splinter the lifeboats of the politicians who are after it for its blubber alone. The character of national politics will be fixed by the millions who inhabit the northwest. They are mostly of European origin, believe in the divine right of the majority, think that the minority ought to be hanged for the treason of a difference of opinion. In a word, they have transfused the doctrine of European despotism into the forms of a popular government. Whenever this numerical power shall demonstrate itself, we may anticipate a moral revolution in the political administration of this Democratic Republic.

The employment of the barge system on the Ohio river will, as to all trade accessible to that stream, neutralize the objection to the overland portage from Parkersburg to tide water at Baltimore, by way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. At a recent meeting of the Board of Trade of New York, it appeared that transportation by rail to Cincinnati from that city cost 70 cents per hundred; while from Boston and Philadelphia along the Atlantic coast to the mouth of the Chesapeake, thence north to Baltimore, and thence by railroad to Cincinnati, the cost is 40 cents per hundred. The Baltimore Gazette of April 11th, 1868, gives the following table of freight charges respectively from New York and Baltimore to different points in the West on fourth-class goods:

	N. York Balti	rom !			From N.York.Ba	From ltimore
To Cincinnati	. 50	80	To	Chicago	. 55	88
To Louisville	. 66	48	To	Indianapolis	. 58	85
To St. Louis	. 94	56		-		

These differences are producing a great diversion to the Baltimore route from the more northern ones, and demonstrate the strong tendency of trade to seek the shortest crossing from the west to tide-water.

THE QUESTION OF BACK-LOADING-PRODUCTS OF THE KANAWHA VALLEY

Transportation by either of the two great routes of circuitous navigation, from the west to the sea, which have been considered, is conducted under the very costly disadvantage of a deficiency of return freights for the boats conveying the trade. The products moved eastward from the west, are gross and bulky, while the freights taken back to the west consist chiefly of articles much lighter and less bulky in proportion to their value. All the statistics of trade between east and west show, that the tonnage moving eastward exceeds by several fold, that moving westward. This condition of trade subjects the boats engaged in it to the necessity of returning westward either wholly or partially empty. In western New York, the deficiency of back-loading thus occasioned, has produced a very great development in the salt manufacture, and swollen that business in that locality probably to the largest salt manufacture in the world.

The reverse state of things now exists in the trade of the Ohio river. A very large portion of the western population derives its coal from the mines on the upper waters of the Ohio. This mineral is bulky in proportion to its value, and boats carrying it down from the region about Pittsburg to the places of consumption, having no sufficient return loading eastward in consequence of there being no outlet of navigation to the seaboard from the upper Ohio, do not return at all, and are broken up for fuel or lumber, and sold at a sacrifice.

The opening of the water-line from the Great Kanawha river, through Virginia to the Atlantic, will correct both of these serious disadvantages incident now to western trade. The boats or barges which shall carry the heavy and bulky farm produce of the far interior to the mouth of Chesapeake bay, will refill in returning with the fine bituminous coals of West Virginia, and carry them back to the very hearths of those western farmers from whose granaries they were loaded for the eastward voyage. The coals of West Virginia would themselves supply all the return tonnage which the boats moving east would require; but in the event of any deficiency in this respect, the Salines of the Kanawha Valley, now producing two millions of bushels of salt per annum, would multiply their production to any possible requirement.

It is well know to geological men that the veins of bituminous coal which pervade the entire western slope of the Appalachian chain of mountains, have their maximum aggregate thickness in the Kanawha Valley.

From a late authentic work on the subject to the Kanawha coals, the following extract is made: .

THE GREAT KANAWHA COAL FIELDS.

The coal fields of the Great Kanawha region, in West Virginia, are superior to those of Great Britain or Pennsylvania. They are regarded by eminent geologists as the finest deposit of coal in the world. The quality of Kanawha Cannel coal is equal to the best English Cannel; the quality of its bituminous coal is equal to the best found in Pennsylvania; and Kanawha splint coal, for smelting iron ore, is unsurpassed. The veins lie horizontally, and vary from three to fifteen feet in thickness; and the aggregate thickness of the various veins in some localities amounts to forty and even fifty feet of solid coal.

The advantages of the Great Kanawha Coal Fields over those near Pittsburg may

be summed up as follows:

1. The Kanawha Coal Fields contain as good bituminous coal as the best found on the Monongahela and Youghiogheny, and, in addition thereto, large deposits of Cannel Cal, equal in quality to the best English Cannel—none of which is found in the Monongahela coal fields.

2. The veins of coal are thicker and more numerous on the Kanawha than on the Monongahela. Veins of splint and bituminous coal on the Kanawha are from 4 to 15

feet thick, and the Cannel from 80 inches to 5 feet thick.

3. Coal lands on the Monongabela and Youghioghenv sell for \$300 and \$400 per acre, whilst better coal lands on the Kanawha can now be purchased from \$10 to \$20

4. The Kanawha coal fields are 280 miles nearer to Cincinn ti and the southwest cities than the Monongahela coal fields are. This gives to Kanawha coal an advantage of at least one cent per bushel in cost of transportation to such markets over the Monongahela and Youghiogheny coal.

5. The navigation of the Ohio at Point Pleasant is greatly better than it is at Pittsburg; therefore Kanawha coal can be more frequently shipped from Point Pleasant than Monongahela coal can from Pittsburg.

6. The navigation of the Kanawha and Lower Ohio is not interrupted by ice to

- the extent this the navigation of the Monongahe's and Upper Ohio is, as New River, the chief tributary of the Kanawha, rises in North Carolina—while the Alle ghany (which, with the Monongahela, forms the Ohio.) rises near Late Erie This gives to the Ohio River at Point Pleasant an advantage of two weeks and more every winter over the Ohio at Pittsburg-and at a time when fuel is most needed in Curcionate and Louisville.
- 7. The Kanawha coal fields are situated on what must be, in time, a great highway for the trade and travel of the Mississippi Valley to the Atlantic seaboard. The vast and rapidly increasing trade of he Great West is seeking new routes for transit to the cities of the seacoast; and the route through the Kanawha valley has advantages over all others in shortness of distance, grade of road, and mildness of climate.

COALS FOR THE SEABOARD CITIES AND FACTORIES.

The coals of the Kanawha region are now shipped around by way of New Orleans and the Gulf to New York, at a profit to the miner and dealer. The quality of the cannel coals of West Virginia is fully equal to that of the coals of England and Nova Scotia imported into New York. It has become of vital importance to the manufacturing interests of the seaboard cities to obtain adequate supplies of the best qualities of bituminous coals from shorter distances than those from which they are now derived, and at cheaper rates. The most intelligent manufacturers, and dealers in coal, of New York and the eastern cities, recognize the neces sity of a resort to the excellent cannel and bituminous coals of the Kanawha, Coal, Guyandotte, and Sandy rivers of West Virginia for fuel:-a fact which is fully established by the shipments that are now making o the coals of that region by the roundabout route of New Orleans to the Atlantic seaboard.

The opening of the Virginia Canal will finally settle the question of an adequate coal supply for the eastern cities, and forever relieve the appre. hension and scarcity now felt by eastern manufacturers on that vital subject. Valuable as this water-line will be to the West, as shown in these pages, its importance is doubled by the fact that the work is vital to the success of the manufacturing system of the East, as a means of supplying the best coals of the continent from the nearest mines by the most direct navigation and at the cheapest rates.

DUTY OF CONGRESS ON THE SUBJECT OF INLAND KAVIGATION.

"The invention of Fulton has, in reality for all practical purposes, converted the Mississippi, with all its great tributaries, into an inland sea. Regarding it as such, I am prepared to place it on the same footing with the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, the Chesapeake and Delaware bays, and the lakes, in reference to the superintendence of the general government over its navigation. It is manifest that it is far beyond the power of individuals or of separate States to supervise it, as there are eighteen States, including Texas and the Territories—more than half the Union—which lie within the valley of the Mississippi or border on its navigable tributaries."—J. C. Calhoun in Memphis Convention of 1845.

Pertinent to this question of Congressional duty, with reference to the Western rivers, there is an important provision in that great organic law of the northwest, the Ordinance of 1787. By that law, enacted by Congress for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio river, it is declared that "the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territories as to the citizens of the United States and those of other States that may be admitted into the Confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor." It may be asked-How can the people of the United States at large enjoy the benefits of this common right, unless they have avenues of access opened to them by a competent power! and how can the people of the country bordering those streams enjoy the benefit of their navigation if that inland navigation be not connected with the seaboard by direct lines of artificial navigation, opened by competent authority? This ordinance is in the nature of a compact between the General Government and the people of the States, and it reserves certain rights and imposes certain duties, in which all citizens of the United States are interested. It is a part of the fundamental law of the land. Reserving the rivers as common highways for all, it divests all the States, and each particular State, of any jurisdiction over them, and gives Congress full power to extend their advantages to every citizen of the Union.

Having guaranteed to all the people the navigation of these rivers forever, the United States is bound to open avenues to them from all directions, and keep them in a condition to be freely navigated and fully enjoyed. But how can an inland navigation be fully enjoyed if Congress shall supply no direct and convenient outlet to the seaboard and to the markets of the world? It is now conceded that Congress has power, as proprietor of the public lands, to do what any prudent landowner may do for the enhancement of the value of his patrimony, and can lawfully appropriate part of its lands in aid of public works which would commensurately enhance the lands retained. If this be so, what method could be conceived of that would more certainly enhance the value of every acre of public lands in the West than the opening of another canal of the capacity of the Erie, on a more central, more southern, and shorter route?

The attentive reader of these pages cannot fail to have arrived at the conviction that water navigation affords greater advantages to greater numbers of people, at lower rates, and for far more numerous tons of produce than railroad transportation. Yet railroads have received nearly all the bounties which Congress has been willing to bestow upon public roads.

The Commissioner of the General Land Office, in his report for 1865 (pp. 34-5) gives the following information:

"The immense railroad grants [of land by Congress] embrace, by estimate, the quantity of 125,000,000 of acres, exceeding by 8,000 000 of acres the aggregate area of the States of Maine, New Hampehire, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. These enormous grants are within about one-fourth of being twice the united area of England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, and islands of the British seas, and less than a tenth of being equal to the French Empire proper, with its 89 departments and its 37,510 communes.

"Why is it that the Congress of the United States, as the national trustee, charged under the Constitution with the disposal of the public lands, have made grants on such a stupendous scale as this? The answer is found not merely in the indemnifying principle of duplicating the reserved sections, but in the higher purpose of opening speedy communication by the iron railway across the continent to unite the great industrial interests of the Atlantic slope, the valley of the Mississippi, and the declivity from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific."

Does not a line of direct eastward navigation, promising similar results to those which followed the opening of the Erie Canal, present a very strong claim upon the bounty of Congress?

A CROWNING ACT OF RECONSTRUCTION.

The effect upon public opinion in the Southern States of liberal grants of aid by Congress in behalf of public works of national importance within their borders, would be unspeakably happy. And no act of such assistance would be more gratefully received, or be more beneficial in result, than a donation of lands and loan of bonds in behalf of so important an enterprise as the completion of the Virginia water-line. Such an act, giving earnest of a broad beneficent policy, would exert as great an influence in securing thorough and permanent reconstruction as any measure that could be adopted by the Federal power. It would completely identify Virginia with the Great West, and utterly and finally

obliterate every sentiment and trace of sectional alienation. It would give that bounding prosperity to the State which brings solace for every grievance, and sweeps away every remnant of the poverty and privation which are the sure nurses of disaffection and resentment. The completion of a great line of trade across the territory of Virginia would bind that great leading Southern State to the bosom of the Union by the strong ties of prosperous commerce, and hold her in indissoluble allegiance for all time to come.

The bestowal of such a bounty at a period of so much need as the present upon a commonwealth which, at a former era of the national history, made notable sacrifices in behalf of the national cause, would be a requital not inappropriate, and would do as much to restore an era of good feeling and sterling loyalty as any measure that could be taken to that end.*

MONEY OR CURRENCY IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RCONOMY.

There is an article upon the subject of currency in the June number of the MAGAZINE by Mr. Chas. H Carroll, in which he discusses to a considerable extent the economical principles which appear to him relevant to the question, though, as it seems to me, he has not given due weight to others of equal importance.

In combatting the assumption that an increase of currency at the West would lower the rate of interest, Mr. Carroll takes occasion to say that "interest is not the price of money merely; it is the rent of capital. It is not, therefore, currency that is needed at the West, but capital, since the more capital there is the less is its rent; and capital can only be obtained by labor, or it is the fruit of labor, wherever and however obtained."

We shall not attempt to discuss all the principles involved in this paragraph, as that would open up most of the difficult problems of political economy, for which we have neither time nor space at present, and it would, to some extent, be a repetition of matter contained in articles lately contributed to this magazine.

That interest is the rent of capital permanently invested upon undoubted security, under ordinary circumstances, none will deny; but under the present system and practice of banking, gold-getting, stock-jobbing, &c., and the very extensive financial operations of almost all the governments of the world, that principle can have but the least possible effect at present in regulating the interest or discount on money.

In Europe we find that the interest of money or discounts fluctuate continually, and even from 14 to 10 per cent; and these constant variations also take place in New York and all the large cities of the Union, which seems to argue that the rate of profit and the quantity of capital have but very little influence upon the rate of interest. That the increase of capital should lower the rate of interest or profit, is one of the fallacies of Adam Smith, which receives countenance from no other English economist. There is certainly as much real capital at the West at present, proportionally to the number of people, but, perhaps, not the same proportion of exchargeable wealth as in older States; and, although this last circumstance might command a larger circulation of currency, it would be a fallacy to assume that it would lower the rate of interest; notwithstanding, a lower rate of interest might be an incident of that state of society. Nevertheless, what would cheapen loans would increase prices, and such an amount of currency must eventually be withdrawn; if of bank paper, with fluctuation and loss, and if of gold and silver it would flow off naturally, with a little less inconvenience. But if one principle of political economy has been better ascertained and oftener demonstrated than another, it is that the amount of money in circulation in any given locality must necessarily conform to the exchangeable value of the commodities which have to be exchanged; and therefore no unnecessary or artificial increase of currency can be permanently maintained in circulation for any length of time. Nor is it logical to assume that an "increase of currency in relation to capital is a safe way to increase the rate of interest." It might cause it to fluctuate and induce other inconveniences, but it could not permanently increase it.

Many years ago I made the assertion in this magazine that any superior increase of money must develop its own employment, as there can be no use nor scope for it in circulation without increasing prices, or of pushing out of circulation a like quantity of some other kind of money. An undue increase of money must therefore always be forced into the loan market, and its first effect, no doubt, will be to lower the price of loans (rate of discount); but afterwards, when commerce becomes deranged in consequence, and the demand for loans increased, their price will be regulated only by the exigencies of the borrower and the ability and disposition of the lender.

It is assumed, however, by political economists in general that there is a natural or necessary rate of profit to which all businesses, more or less, tend, and which, to some extent, regulates the interest of money, and no doubt this may have been true before the era of banking, and ought to be true still. We may be satisfied of one thing, nevertheless,—that the principle in question has not at present the least possible effect upon the

interest or discount on loans. We must therefore beg leave to differ with Mr. Carroll's proposition, although we may think it just as futile as he does to attempt to lower the rate of interest permanently by an increase of money. Nor are we more fortunate with respect to the next proposition, as we can see no necessary connection between a high rate of interest and the exportation of money; yet Mr. Carroll seems to think that one is the cause and the other the effect.

He says: "I presented the example of California, and stated that money runs away from a high rate of interest all the world over, as it runs away from that State, where it is from 24 to 30 per cent per annumto New York, where it is from 6 to 9 per cent; thence to London, where it is 4 per cent; and thence to Paris, Hamburg, &c., where it is only 2 or 3 per cent.

Now I venture to say there is no truth or reality in this theory laid down by Mr. Carroll. That money will necessarily be exported from where it is relatively cheap or in excess, there can be no doubt. In Europe, under such circumstances, we see exactly the same phenomenon of the exportation of the metals from countries where the rate of interest is comparatively low to countries where it is comparatively high, and it is always this comparative low rate of interest which is the predisposing cause of exportation, and, as we should very naturally assume, the rate of interest is increased for the purpose of compelling the gold to return, or at least to prevent further exportation.

With respect to gold leaving California while interest is at 25 or 30 per cent, I can only say that it is a very natural circumstance, as a stream must always be highest at its source. Gold leaves California because it is continually produced there. If you could contract the issues by raising the rate of interest, you would soon see gold returning to California, as it does to London or Paris, under the same operation; but to make Mr. Carroll's doctrines feasible this stream of gold should stop and remain where interest is at the lowest point. This, however, is not the case, for it has no sooner arrived in England and Paris than it again takes its flight up the Levant towards Asia, Hindostan and China, where interest is understood to be at a much higher rate than in Europe.

It is very true that gold or "money is but one of the exchangeable commodities of commerce, and that the demand for it is without limit;" but we say, under present circumstances: Money is neither wealth nor capital; it is only a convenience by which labor is eased or time saved. Mr. Carroll claims that it is capital, and in this instance seems rather at issue with himself, for in that case it ought to remain in California to be applied to reproduction and, according to his teaching, to lower the rate of interest. But it is true, notwithstanding, "that the miners and the

State of California are as much enriched by producing it (money), although cheapening it all the while, as they would be by producing a like value of wheat." That is to say, with this qualification, unless the wheat were consumed at home; but supposing the wheat to be exported, it might have been added that they have a much better chance of being enriched by the production of the gold than the wheat, as the same exchangeable value could not always be guaranteed for the wheat, but gold cannot be produced in excess under present monetary arrangements. All the banks in the world might be glutted and gorged with gold, but the demand for loans and discounts would never cease, and, therefore, gold will continue to be produced in California and elsewhere, and to follow its usual course.

It is quite against the conclusions of political economy, that any commodity can be thus constantly produced and constantly cheapened unless the facilities for such production are continually increased; so that the same amount of labor must produce a sufficiently increased quantity of the commodity to demand an equal exchangeable value of any other product. This also presumes an effectual demand; or, in other words, an increased consumption to the full extent of the increased production, or the commodity will cheapen from redundancy, which must cause a cessation of production eventually. There cannot, therefore, according to the principles of political economy, be any effectual demand for a constantly increasing amount of money, without a constant increase in price; and certainly very little increase could possibly get into circulation unless loaned out to jobbers and speculators.

The reason why California gets rich by the production of gold, is not because gold is either capital or wealth, but because the absurd regulations of commerce effectually protect that production from the effects of redundany. If a bushel of wheat were made the measure of value for all other commodities, as well as the equivalent, which should satisfy all debts at a certain price, much beyond its cost of production, the demand for wheat would constantly increase; so that all ag iculturalists that could would produce wheat, and get rich at the expense of the community; in the same manner, if not to the same extent, as California gets rich at the expense of the world, by the production of an unnecessary amount of gold. Suppose that all the laws were repealed in the different countries of the world which stipulate the quantity of gold to be contained in the various coins which are a legal tender in those countries, what would be the consequence? Gold getting would very soon colapse in California as every where else, nobody would require gold, it would be nearly an useless commodity; that intenseness of value would cease; it would cease to run its regular course from country to country as at present, until it reaches the remotest corners of the earth. Each country that required it in future, would have to import it directly from the mines for its own purposes; but it would not necessarily be required for currency, and none would be wanted to pay the balances of foreign exchange.

We must get rid of our prejudices in favor of the standard of value, then we should get rid of the evils of monetary fluctuation, as well as the tax of the constant production of gold. The governments might issue the money, which could always be kept at par, by reference to the price of gold or of foreign exchange. Gold would then have a price, which it has not at present. All other commodities have a price in gold, but gold has no price in other commodities; and notwithstanding the dictum of our friend Carroll and Professor Leiber, there are and must be such terms and acts as buying and selling, they are the necessary outgrowth of the monetary system, and, therefore, will be used as long as it continues, and must be correct. A certain weight of gold being the universal medium and measure by which all other things are exchanged, without any reference whatever to any change which may have taken place in its own value or quantity necessarily gives price to all other commodities. The value or price of gold is axed for the time being, and can only be cheapened eventually by the slow increase of its quantity in the universal market of the world. Money is the commodity which every one reserves to purchase all other things, and is not a consumable article; and in the estimation of the public its value never varies. Therefore it is never sold, nor exchanged, nor bartered, technically, so to speak, nobody haggles about its price, it merely buys all other commodities, and, as Mr. Carroll says: "it is the only universal recompense accepted without question." This property money will always retain, and for that reason its relative quantity should never be allowed to increase. And it would make no difference if, as Mr. Carroll suggests, we were to call the coin by the name of a weight, if all values were still to be measured by it, and all debts liquidated with a like quantity. There was a time no doubt when gold and silver were not the standards by which other things were exchanged, but gradually became so as commerce became more extensively practised. Most students of the Bible are aware, no doubt, that the words "pieces of silver," and "pieces of money," are translated in the margin "Lambs," lambs of silver, &c. The Romans also valued other things by reference to cattle. But enough upon this point, as it is not at present of the least importance.

Mr. Carroll, after assuming that the rapid strides to wealth making at present by California, puts to shame the speculative theory of certain scholars and writers that money is not capital, proceeds to say, "it would be as absurd to oppose the cheapening of money by its increase, as if Indian corn or wheat, by an increase of crops."

Now this seems to be an unaccountable error on the part of Mr. Carroll, unless it may be that he is extensively interested in the production of gold. In that case, we should suppose that his interest had blinded his judgement. Indian corn or wheat can be consumed, and there is always a demand for it at some price, and if it happens to be otherwise it is in some locality which has not sufficient means of transport, or it is prevented from finding a profitable market by the effect of some absurd tariff regulation or other; but notwithstanding these infrequent instances the price of grain steadily appreciates, whereas it is far otherwise with money; it is not a useful or consumable commodity. But to proceed: the next sentence is rather paradoxical, it is as follows: "But to cheapen money as currency, without increasing it as capital, to compensate the depreciation and to supply the export demand which that depreciation creates is quite another thing; that should be restrained as rigidly as counterfeiting; for it amounts to the same thing in its effects upon the wealth of the nation." How can the addition of any commodity be an increase of capital if its exchangeable value depreciates in the ratio of its addition? This admission is fatal to the hypothesis that gold is capital. No addition can be made to wealth, or value, by an increase of currency. It is true that Mill, as well as Smith, is blind and inconsistent upon this point. He believes that a country exporting gold from an excess of money, obtains value in return; but this is only the case in a country that produces gold, as they seldom export any other produce but for which they have also peculiar facilities of raising. But let us hear what Mr. Mill says upon the point at issue, (page 299).

"It is to be remarked that this ratio would be precisely that in which the quantity of money had been increased. If the whole money in circulation was doubled prices would be doubled. If it was only increased one-fourth, prices would rise one-fourth. There would be one fourth more money, all of which would be used to purchase goods of some description

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Even if some prices were raised more and others less, the average would be one-fourth. This is a necessary consequence of the fact that a fourth more money would have been given for the same quantity of goods."

According to this, nothing can be obtained by an increase of money—
it is an evil and a tax. Mr. Carroll is very much against an increase of
currency in contradistinction to money, but I think it preposterous that
the world should be taxed to humor the silly conceit that money is
wealth.

I have no issue with Mr. Carroll upon the subject of banking, he is welcome to fight it as hard as he can, and I think the community are

much indebted to him for the many clear and forcible exposures he has given to it; though, I confess, that I can see no difference in principle between the English, French or American systems, their operations all tend to increase money, and they differ only in unimportant details.

The banks of the United States are enabled through the fixed standard of value to add to their profits or capital every year the proportionate amount of the increase of the currency of the world which is constantly taking place; and they could do this legitimately, if managed with prudence, under a system of specie payments; therefore, there can be no reason why it should not be done under present circumstances; and it seems to follow, as a matter of course, that the banks and Government of the United States will never return to specie payments without an absolute reduction of the currency.

After quoting a short paragraph from De Quincy, apparently intended to skow that there is resident in each and every commodity some mysterious force which induces it to be exchanged for some other commodity regardless of the principle of supply and demand. Mr. Carroll proceeds as follows:—"It is by this law of equivalents, this isodynamic, or equal force and intensity of value, tending to an equilibrium constantly but never resting, that money moves from place to place, and that every fraction of capital is attracted by and to every other fraction of capital throughout the commercial world."

It seems somewhat difficult to understand this specious proposition-"this law of equivalents, or equal force and intensity of value." Nothing, however, is plainer than the rule, supply and demand being equal, that a commodity, being the product of a given amount of labor, will always exchange for another commodity being the product of a similar quantity; but money is not naturally an equivalent for any commodity as money, it being neither wealth nor capital, but representave only. Nobody wants it for itself, but merely to purchase something else, or to pay for some other commodity already consumed. It is only when gold and silvershall cease to be money that they will be in a condition to be bartered or exchanged against other commodities possessing an equivalent amount of value or labor. Until then, a great part of their assumed value is fictitious and of the same nature as money of paper. It is true that the laws and customs of the world have made a certain weight of the precious metals equivalent to a certain amount of labor, although it may not have cost one fourth of it. The arrangement is just of the same nature, and nearly as artificial, as making a greenback a legal tender for debts and taxes; excepting that gold cannot be quite produced in unlimited quantities. A greenback is much cheaper and more convenient to the community, but because we have not sufficient confidence in the wisdom

and honesty of the government, we give the banks and the producers of the precious metals the opportunity to rob us of the full amount of that constant addition to the currency which we have just noted. And whether we altar or abolish the system or not, fidelity to science demands that we should expose our error, notwithstanding it may have the sanction of timehonored names.

Money, then, is not an international equivalent, as the exports or imports of a country must always be balanced by an equal amount of labor exclusive of money, exactly as if no money existed. Gold and silver are merely surplus commodities, purchased at a monopoly price through the fiction of a standard value, and circulated gratis from those countries that are unfortunate enough either to import them direct from the mines or to produce them in sufficient quantities to increase price, having at the same time a large preponderance of other commodities to export.

If the principles of political economy laid down by all standard writers be true, there can be no necessary demand for money beyond the amount sufficient to keep the prices of other commodities steady and uniform. If it increases beyond that rate it must cheapen from over-supply. This, all parties admit, though Smith and Mill both assume that this incident would shortly react upon the interest of the producer and force him to cease his production. But they seem to forget that the markets of the of the whole world would have to be glutted before that period arrived; and therefore a vast amount of injury would accrue to some particular nations in the mean time. If Congress were to repeal the law which designates the amount of gold to be contained in a dollar, no one would be injured, but gold would be no longer imported at New York from California to be sent to other countries, it must take a less circuitous route. But suppose all countries should become wise and abolish their standard of value. Each country must then import all the gold she might require directly from the mines for her own purposes; but currency would hardly be one of them, at least for some time to come. That expense would be saved to the world in future whether at present it be borne equally or not; and gold would cease to be required in future to balance the exchanges between nation and nation.

Mill seems to differ with us, however, upon this subject of the demand for money. He says (page 298) "The demand for money differs from the demand for other things, in this, that it is limited only by the means of the purchaser. The demand for other things is for so much and no more, but there is always a demand for as much money as can be got."

Now it seems to me that these two demands must always be equal, the one precisely balancing the other. It perhaps might be admissible to assume that the desires of man are insatiable; but we are speaking of the

principles of a science which are said to check and balance each other. No doubt all traders having commodities to sell would like to dispose of them, at least as early as their neighbors, and would endeavor to do so, if they could obtain the cost, and the profit, upon their goods; but at this point their demand ceases. It is not an affectual demand for money; but only a desire for profit. Therefore an increased quantity of money could never get into circulation from such a demand, unless artificially created, and loaned for the purpose of speculation. And yet California gets rid of her money, and gets value in return, and would do the same thing if she produced three times as much; as she could pay her debts with it; as she does at present in any country in the world. And she may, notwithstanding, export a few millions worth of agricultural produce, for which she may have peculiar facilities of production. But her trade will probably be fitful, and chiefly with neighboring countries similarly circumstanced with herself. It is possible, also, that she may produce, if she has cheap labor, the coarsest kinds of clothing for domestic use, but beyond this she will hardly progress while the production of gold is profitable.

A bank currency no doubt would be an evil to California, as it has been to all other countries where it has been used; but it could not permanently increase prices even in California, nor lower the rate of interest. It is not necessary, however, that California should be troubled with such a currency, any more than with the credit system which has been built upon it. All honest people, if they were intelligent, would vote for the abolition of bank currency, as well as the credit system, and all other modes of unduly increasing money. Mr. Carroll talks of the law of equivalents, but no such thing exists, nor can exist, except by accident, under the present system of money and banking. And it is of no use splitting hairs upon the subject of notes, or bills on time, being money, or merely securities for money, as nothing can possibly be gained by it. Mr. Carroll is mistaken, however, Mr. Mill agrees with him, upon the very point upon which he seems to think they differ. Let us quote (page 314):

"A bill of exchange, when merely discounted and kept in the portfolio of the discounter until it falls due, does not perform the functions of money, but is itself bought and sold for money. It is no more currency than the public funds or any other securities." Mr. Carroll expresses himself to the following effect upon the same point.

"The effect of selling such bills in market is to convey the equitable ownership of so much of his goods or capital; it is to demand money or currency, and so far to appreciate general prices.

Now to me, these two ideas seem to be equivalent to each other, or rather they appear to be the same, though Mr. Mill does not carry it out to the same extent. It is not important, however, what relation any par-

ticular kind of bill or note, manipulated in a particular manner, bears to the currency, as all bills given for goods under a regular system of credit, will be sure to create others long before the goods are consumed; therefore, if any of them should be dishonored, the equitable ownership of the goods, which might have been conveyed half a dozen times, might not prove very good security in the end, and perhaps no security at all. But what is the use of following out these fanciful distinctions? Suppose we admit with Mr. Mill at once, "That bank notes, bills, as cheques, as such, do not act on prices at all; but what does act on prices is credit, in whatever shape given, and whether it gives rise to any transferable instruments capable of passing into circulation or not."

Here we have the whole matter in a nutshell. Whatever accelerates consumption, without demanding in return an equivalent production, must increase price, by altering the relative quantity of commodities to money or currency; operating exactly, upon the same principle, as an undue increase of money.

No doubt the whole credit or banking system ought to be abolished without delay, but the world will not be very easily pursuaded to abolish paper money. But if the subject should ever be really understood, it will abolish banks and banking, as there is no real necessity for such institutions as at present conducted. Banks of deposit for security and convenience merely, and not for the loaning of money, would be useful, and, therefore, admissible under strict regulations.

An inconvertible government currency, always kept at par with the currencies of other countries, would be infinitely preferable to the present system of banking and bank paper. The undue increase of money, and the credit system engendered by it, creates all kinds of uncertainty and fraud, and all kinds of commercial immorality, speculation and stockjobbing and the thousand social evils which grow out of it, and cannot be abated without the total destruction of this rotten foundation.

A government currency would benefit the whole people, while this system of fraud and wickedness is for the benefit only of a class of private individuals. Therefore it ought to be abolished without delay—the subject taking precedence of all others in the mind and action of the statesman as the most important and effective movement towards the much needed social reform. In fact, without it all other efforts at moralization must fail.

RICHARD SULLEY.

THE NEW WAR RUMORS FROM EUROPE.

One clear and luminous fact emerges from the cloud of war rumors which once more covers the surface of things political in Europe. This is the immense increase of importance which economical questions have gained over dynastic and political questions in the cabinets of Western Europe during the last ten years. It is quite possible that this fact may not avail to prevent an absolute shock of war on the Continent; but it is quite certain also that thanks to this fact, or rather to the influences which it shows us to be at work in the bosom of the European world, the shock of war if it comes will be greatly circumscribed in its sphere, and curtailed in its duration. Let us make this plain, for to do so, will be to render our readers a better service than we can do them by entering upon general speculations as to the truth or the falsehood of the fears and hopes with which the Atlantic Cable has been alternately charged during the last month.

The attention of diplomats, statesmen and the press in Europe has during this last fortnight been particularly fixed upon the relations of Belgium to the two great powers-France and Prussia-whose duel for the control of the Continent, all the world is now watching with an uneasy apprehension, lest at any moment the combatants may exchange the pen for the sword, and the protocols of prime ministers for the fieldbatteries of marshals. Placed, like what the railway men call "a buffer," between the frontiers of France and those of Prussia, Belgium occupies a political position not less compromising than her geographical position. She is in no received sense of the word a "nationality." Her people are neither sprung from one race, nor do they speak a common lauguage; nor are they united by the ties and the associations of a long cemented political unity. Although nearly twice as populous as Switzerland, Belgium cannot be pretended to be nearly so strong and wellestablished a political fact in the European family as is the Helvetic Republic. For the Swiss, though widely separated from one another by blood and by religion, made up of Catholics in one canton and of Protestants in another, here speaking an antique dialect of the Italian, and there a modern patois of the German, Franks in Geneva and Romansch in the Tessin, are still essentially and predominently Swiss. As Swiss they have been banded together in war and peace for centuries, as Swiss they have conquered and kept a national independence which stands them in the stead of national greatness. Nothing like this can be said of the Belgians. The only concentrated and vigorous nationality which can be said to exist within the Kingdom of Leopold II., the Flemish, has nothing in common with the very modern history of the actual Belgium,

and overlaps the frontiers of France even more completely than the Basque nationality of Northeastern Spain overlaps the Pyrenees, or than the Savoyard nationality of Northwestern Italy overlaps the Alps. Belgium was called into existence a little less than forty years ago, partly by the resistance of the Flemish Catholics to the union with Protestant Holland, which had been forced upon them by the Great Powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and partly by the co operation of France, which had her own objections to the perpetuation of a really powerful State on her Northeastern frontiers. England also, for reasons of her own, in 1839, joined in a guarantee of the independence of Belgium, and until within the last decade, it has been a recognized fact in European politics that Belgium must be considered, for all practical purposes, as an outwork of British power and British policy on the Continent.

The events of the last two years, which have so gravely modified the relations of Prussia with France have now brought forward the annexation of Belgium by the French Empire as one of the by no means remote possibilities of the existing situation; and the discussions excited by the mere suggestion of so important a consummation have thrown into a strong light the great change which has been wrought by recent economical influences in the relations of Belgium with France and with England, and of those two great powers with each other. While France maintained her protective policy, Belgium bore to the trade of Great Britain, with the central part of the European Continent, a relation not unlike that borne by Portugal to the trade of Great Britain with the Peninsula. Belgium, it is true, had a protective tariff of her own, and in this respect she cannot be exactly compared with Portugal, which for years had practically been a coast line of British "tree ports" on the South Atlantic. But the Belgian tariff was far less restrictive than the French; and it was the commercial policy of Belgium on the one hand to make herself a grand depot of contraband trade with France, and of imitations of the French manufactures, and on the other hand, to secure the import trade of Great Britain by a partial discrimination in favor of British products. While this state of affairs continued England was the necessary friend, ally and defender of Belgian independence. Lord Palmerston always made the maintenance of Belgium one of the cardinal points of his European system; and it was a maxim of British politics that France must never on any account be permitted to make herself mistress of the formidable harbor and fortress of Antwerp.

The customs-reform inaugurated between England and the Continent by the co operation of the Emperor Napoleon with Cobden, Chevalier, and other enlightened economists in England and France, has, however, put an end to this state of affairs. In 1865 the Belgian government, acting in harmony with England and with France, systematized the Belgian
tariff, and recast its whole code of customs duty. All differential duties
were suppressed, a general tax of ten per cent imposed on manufactured
goods and raw materials, with the exception of iron, and castings of iron
admitted free of duty.

The result of these economical changes in the legislation of the three countries has been to make the union of Belgium with France desirable rather than undesirable to England. Such an union would at once increase the already enormous trade of Great Britain, both with France and Belgium. How greatly it would develop what would then become the internal trade of Belgium united with France, we may judge, in a measure, from the simple fact that the trade of independent Belgium with France, which, in the six years between 1856 and 1862 had increased only from 200,000,000 francs to 321,000,000 francs, rose in a single year after the commercial revision of 1865 from 350,000,000 france to 442,000,000 francs. But the point on which we desire to fix the reader's atttention to-day is not so much the probable advantages to Belgium, to France or to Great Britain of a union between the Belgian monarchy and the French empire as the instructive and striking fact that by simply opening the door of trade between England and France and Belgium, the Emperor Napoleon has in three year's time undone the political work of a generation, and made possible at least without the firing of a French or British gun in anger, that which even ten years ago could not have been attempted without involving France and Great Britain in a tremend-The opposition which a project of annexation between France and Belgium would now encounter will come not from England, but from Prussia and from a party in Belgium itself. The reigning sovereign of Belgium is a member of the House of Orleans. Brussels, which is, in fact, a kind of little Paris, has throughout the whole period of the empire, been the refuge of discontented or exiled Frenchmen, who have there been able to print and to say the things and the books suppressed by the police of Napoleon in the French capital. A large and respectable party of Belgians, too, regard with extreme dislike the existing regime in France, and would be very averse to the swamping of the Belgian Parliament in the Corps Legislatif of Imperial France. Prussia, too, will do her best to persuade Belgium that it will be better to see Holland absorbed by the North German Empire, and to put herself under the protection of that empire against France, than to join with France in preventing the extension of the North German Empire by Holland to the North Sea.

These influences and others of less weight and power will, no doubt, conspire to adjourn the absorption of Belgium by France, or to make

that absorption the price of a severe continental war. On this head speculation may indulge itself liberally. But as it is demonstrably certain that the most powerful bulwark of Belgian independence has already been destroyed by the pacific operation of great commercial laws, so we may be permitted to believe and to hope that by the operation of the same laws in other regions of Europe, whatever convulsions may attend the completion of the new order of things abroad will be notably mitigated and robbed of their power for working protracted evil.

THE GOLD PREMIUM.

The wide fluctuations of late in the gold premium, and the possibility that the price may settle at a higher point than has ruled during the past year gives rise to much uneasiness amongst those directly connected with foreign trade. The illusion which for a while existed that the gold premium was to decline gradually until it reached par, and then the banks and government would resume specie payment without any effort, has quite passed away. Of course there never was any founds. tion whatever for such an expectation. The idea would never have had sufficient buoyancy to float itself had it not been for the vitality given it by the low rate (25 per cent) which obtained for some time in 1866 Some argued that if it had fallen to such a point why should it not go further; failing to realize that the decline was a temporary one induced by temporary causes. Gold is now merchandize. Its price within certain limits is the result of supply and demand. A free sale of bonds in Europe during 1866, together with large shipments of cotton at high prices, furnished all the exchange the market required. Hence, there being but little demand for gold except for duties, the Treasury, by more than supplying that demand, established temporarily a low rate for it. But it is not our object at present to suggest what point gold s to reach hereafter, or whether even the price now ruling will be main tained, but simply to enquire whether (the actual depreciation of the currency remaining the same) a further advance in the gold premium will be advantageous or otherwise to the general interests of the country.

The immediate effects of such an advance are self evident. Take our greatest branch of production, agriculture. We will suppose for the sake of simplicity, that two commodities represent the agricultural interests of the country, Cotton and Wheat, for as these are affected, so will the value of all exportable products be determined. If, then, gold goes up to 100 per cent premium, and cotton is worth in New Orleans, in gold, 16 cents to ship to Liverpool, the planter will get 32 cents minus commissions, &c. If, on the other hand, the premium is but 50 per cent

the cotton will sell for 24 cents in currency, and will realize but about three-fourths as much as if the gold were at 100. Very clearly (all other things remaining stationary), it is greatly for the planters' interest that the premium be advanced as much as possible, since the higher it goes the more he gets of what he is obliged to accept as money.

The same will be true of the western farmer. If his wheat is worth \$1 50 in gold at New York for export (and whatever it is worth for that purpose will determine its price), and the gold premium is 100, he will get \$3 00 per bushel for his wheat in currency; while if the premium is but 50 per cent he will receive but \$2 25. The farmer, then, will desire that the premium should be very high—because the higher it is the richer he is in greenbacks, unless the expenses of production correspondingly increase.

The position of the wool grower is unlike that of the producers of cotton or grain. As there is no surplus of wool that must necessarily be exported, the currency price of it will not be directly raised by the advance of gold premium, as in the case of cotton and breadstuffs, but so far as wool is protected by the tariff, the protection will increase as the premium on gold rises. For example, if the duties are 20 per cent in gold, and the premium on gold 50, the protection is equal to 30 per cent in currency; but, should the gold advance to 100, the protection is 40 per cent, and so far as foreign competition is concerned, the wool grower may demand a higher price than he otherwise could; but, on the other hand, if he would purchase foreign stock or raw material, the price of it will of course be enhanced by the rise of gold.

Another great national interest is that of the cotton manufacturers, who are also situated quite differently from those engaged in agriculture; for, as the premium on gold advances, so the currency price of their raw material rises, as we have just seen, while at the same time the protection afforded by tariff duties is increased. But the export trade in manufactured cottons having been annihilated by the depreciated currency of the country, the manufacturer cannot gain in the price of his commodities from the rise of the gold premium as the planter does upon his cotton. Furthermore, if his goods are of such a character that the protection, when the premium on gold is 50 per cent, is sufficient to prevent foreign competition, then the rise of the premium above that point is of no advantage to him, but, on the contrary, he will suffer by the enhanced prices of foreign articles he may be obliged to consume.

The remaining interest we shall notice is that of labor. How does a rise in the gold premium affect wages and salaries? They will rise, but not instantaneously, nor to an equal extent with the general rise of those commodities that are particularly influenced by the price of gold.

The events of the last five years have demonstrated in a remarkable manner the effects upon wages of a general rise of prices occasioned by a depreciation of the currency. Probably at no time, nor in any part of the world, has the result of a false standard of value upon prices and wages been so fully exhibited as in the United States within the last five years; and the evidence is most conclusive that wages neither rise as soon, nor as high, as the commodities which the laborer consumes. It has been satisfactorily ascertained that the rise of wages, take all kinds of labor and services together, is but about half as much as that of commodities. We cannot go into the reasons for this, but the fact is not disputed that wages do not rise in proportion to the rise of those things which labor creates, when the rise is occasioned by an expanded currency. It this be true, then the laboring class must lose by the advancing premium on gold, so far as that causes a temporary rise of prices.

From this brief and necessarily imperfect sketch of the direct effects of a rise in the gold premium, it is quite apparent that there is a wide difference in its influence upon different classes—no two being affected in precisely the same manner, or to the same extent; and it would also appear on a close examination that what is gained by a particular interest in one direction, is lost in another; that while the farmer and planter gain by a rise of prices occasioned by an advance in gold, they lose this advantage in the additional price they pay for whatever they consume, and in the rise in wages. The same is true of every other interest, except labor, in regard to which there is this distinction, that while other interests may gain more than they lose, labor must lose more than it can gain; and therefore it is that upon the laboring classes falls mainly the loss which the country suffers from a defective standard of value. A little reflection upon the gains and losses to which we have referred, is sufficient to convince any intelligent mind, that under an irredeemable and depreciated currency the whole trade and industry of the country is in a perturbed and unnatural condition; the fluctuations in gold so affecting values that chance reigns instead of law, chaos instead of order.

But there is a point below which it is not desirable (while the currency remains the same) that the gold premium should fall; for the premium should always be so high as to represent as fairly as possible the real depreciation of the existing currency. The value of gold as measured by the currency, should be the same as the value of commodities in general when measured by the same standard. Gold should be no cheaper than other articles of commerce, for if so the country will be drained of it. That is the process that has been going on in the United States for the last three years. The fact that we have a large amount of National bonds, and that Europeans are willing to buy them at the low

rate, (about 70 cents on the dollar) at which they have been selling, has enabled us in the past to pay our increasing foreign balances with them. This has temporarily checked, or, we should say, diminished the outflow of gold. But with about fifty millions of gold interest to pay in the future, we should most fear any influences used to keep down the price making gold cheaper than other commodities. A depreciated currency causes of itself evil enough, as we all too well know; but a depreciated currency continually doctored by legislation, and restrained in its movements by official interference, is far more injurious in its final results. We may be able to depress the price of gold for a time, or in other words cheapen it, while we thus increase our imports and decrease the currency value of every exportable article; but like a rising river the natural flow of which has been stayed by artificial means, when it once breaks away from its bonds, the injurious results will only be the more widespread and complete.

There is but one conclusion we will draw in view of these facts, and that is that the general interests of the country require a speedy return to a specie basis. How long can we submit to the drain of gold and bonds which for the past few years has been going on? If our trade balance in the past has been against us so that we have been compelled to ship a large amount of government securities to settle it, how will it stand when this bond movement stops, and with our foreign interest account added?

PACIFIC BAILBOAD OF MISSOURI.

The Pacific Railroad of Missouri extends from St. Louis directly west to the Kansas line, 283 miles, where it forms a close connection with the Union Pacific (E. Div.) Railroad, already completed to Coyote, 356 miles beyond that point, making the whole distance from the Mississippi River to the present western terminus of the joint lines, 369 miles. It also connects at Kansas City with the Missouri River Railroad, extending thence to Leavenworth, 33 miles, and operated under lease by the Pacific Company.

This company is one of the great Land-Grant and State-Aid corporations of Missouri. It was chartered February 12, 1849, and organized January 30, 1850. In June of the latter year the surveys for the projected line were commenced, and July 4, 1851, the formal breaking of ground took place. Construction was carried on with frequent interruptions through the following fifteen years, and was completed only in October, 1865, when the whole line was brought into operation. The details of operations through the intermediate years are

given in an article published in the Chronicus of October 27, 1866. We refer to this article also for other valuable statistics not repeated in our present number.

The Southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad, constructed chiefly on credit and State aid, and which formerly belonged to this company, has been sold to a new organization, and will form the first link in the projected Atlantic and Pacific Railroad. In the following review its accounts have been separated from those of the present Pacific Company.

The equipment of the Pacific Railroad is now sufficient for the business transacted on it. The number of engines placed on the road since the commencement of operations has been 63. On the 1st March, 1868, there were on the line 52, 5 of the 63 having been condemned, and 6 turned over to the Southwest branch. At the same date the company had 41 passenger, 6 mail, 17 baggage and express, 30 caboose, 270 box, 224 flat, 175 stock, and 7 other cars; also 25 stationary engines for pumping water. The sleeping car company had 4 cars on the road, and the St. Louis and Pacific Express freight line 50 box cars.

The list of engines and cars owned and in use by the company on the first of March, 1864-68, both inclusive, was as follows:

Locomotives	1864 . 38	1865.	1866. - 48	1867. 47	1868. 53
Passen, er Train Cars— Passenger. Mail. Baggage and express.		26 6 8	81 7 17	41	41 6 17
Freight Tr-in Cars— Caboose		90 184	28 289	29 209	80 970
Fl.t	88	218 28 4	211 163 15	991 144 7	224 175 7

The mileage made by engines in the same five years, with the total cost and cost per mile for repairs, &c., is shown in the following exhibit:

1864.	1865,	1866.	1867.	1868.
Engine mileage	698,977 \$233,895	881,488 284 8,94 3	1,199,660 8464 ,8 29	1 405,886 2523,484
Cost of rep'rs, etc., per m	88⅓ c.	48c.	88% c.	87.★c.

These figures, meagre as they are, will serve to explain in some measure the general operating expenses given in the following paragraph.

The gross earnings from operations in the years ending with February, 1864–1868, both inclusive, have been as exhibited in the following comparative statement:

	1864.	1865.	1966.	1967.	1868.
Passenger earnings	818,790 41	458,880 41	681,245 11	1,166,818 81	1,264,398 01
Freight earnings	560,744 59	609,973 14		1,465,878 95	
Mail earnings	25,850 00 8,860 95	80,487 56 5,197 64	87,996 25 1,089 00	44,188 98	45,049 92
Total gross earnings	906,745 95 546,161 99	1,097,967 69 886,488 28	1,794,856 22 1,893,580 06	2,675,574 84 1,956,644 84	8,008,681 81 2,090,626 88
Nett resenue	260,588 96	211,484 46	400,896 14	719,280 00	978,054 98

The gross earnings were divided proportionately as follows:

Operating exp's, p.c	60,98	80.74	77.66	78.10	67.61
Nett revenue, p. C	39 97	19 26	22,34	96.90	83 .89

The increase of gross earnings, operating expenses and nett revenue yearly, over each preceding years, is shown in the annexed statement:

	1864	1865	1866	1867	1868
	Over	over	over	over	over
	1868.	1864.	1865.	1866.	1867.
Gross carnings, per cent	88.85	21.09	68,42	49.18	12.25
Operating expenses, p. cent	20.69	62 81	57 19	40.41	8.78
Nett revenue, per cent	58 57		89.05	79.44	85 29
Nett revenue decreased		41.84			

The following shows the average length (miles) of road operated in each of the above years, and the gross earnings, operating expenses and net revenue per mile:

		1 864 5 .	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.
Miles of road operated	194	214		268	288
Gross earnings, per mile	\$4,678 95	25,130 49	27,120 46	\$9,458 88	210,618 71
Operating expenses, per mile	9.815 26	4.149 44	5,539 88	6.918 94	7.175 86
Nett revenue, per mile	1,858 69	988 25	1,590 57	9.541 44	4.488 83

The whole line from St. Louis to Kansas City (283 miles) was brought into operation October 2, 1865. For the year ending February 29, 1866, the gross earnings per mile were \$7,100 46, and in the year ending February 29, 1868, they were \$10,613 71, an increase of \$3,493 25, or 49.07 per cent. The operating expenses in the latter year were greater than the gross earnings of the former year. In the meanwhile the nett revenue rose from \$1,590 57 per mile to \$3,438 \$5, an increase of \$1.847 78, or 116 per cent. The decrease in operating expenses is remarkable: in 1864 5 they were 80.74 per cent of gross earnings, and in 1867-8 67.61 per cent, a decrease equivalent to 16.26 per cent. These facts are encouraging; they show not only that the business of the line is rapidly increasing, but also that it has been managed with an intelligent economy that augurs well for the future of the enterprise. One great drawback has been experienced in the fact that the guage of the road is different from that of the lines connecting at either terminus. The guage of the Pacific (Mo.) Railroad is 5 feet 6 inches, while the guage of the Illinois lines, and also of the Union Pacific (E. D.) Railroad is 4 feet 84 inches. To remedy this anomaly and to secure more complete connections the company have decided to change the guage of their road to that of the neighboring roads. This will secure a great uniform line of roads from New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, &c., to the furthest west. Improvements in the way of auxillary lines will be adopted. The Osage Valley and Southern Kansas Railroad, nearly completed from Boonville to Tipton is the pioneer. Its ultimate destination is Fort Scott in Kansas. The Pacific Company have taken a thirty years' lease of this road, and will probably open the first section early in September.

In order to show the progress of the Pacific (Mo.) Bailroad ab initio we compile from the record the following statement of the mileage operated, and the earnings thereon yearly, since the opening of the first section in December, 1852:

Years.	Miles.	Barnings.	Years.	Miles.	Earnings.
1852 (8 days)	6	\$108 15	1850-61	174	2638,644 28
1988 (year)		41,888 19	1861-69	189	457,183 69
1854-55 (14 mos.)	71	97,178 39	1869-63	189	679,956 06
1905-56			1868-64		906,745 95
1856-57		496,985 97	1864-65	214	1.097.967 69
1807-68		668,846 50	1865-86	252	1.794.856 22
1658-59			1866-67		2,675,874 84
1650-60		648,600 00	1867-68	989	8,008,681 81

The financial condition of the company, March 1, 1864-68, yearly, is shown in the following exhibit, being abstracts from the general balance sheets made up at date:

	1864.	1965.	1966.	1867.	1968.
	8	8	8	8	8
Capital stock	8,498,715		8,581,598		8,614,515
State loan		7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000
Land grant sales and rents	109,188	119,483	181,995		
Transportation receipts	5,567,957	6,645,800	8,401,010	11,092,480	18,468,595
Mortgage construction b'ds		1,814,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
St. Louis county bonds	•••	19,850	700,000	700,000	700,000
Real estate (land) bonds					149,000
Real estate (land) bonds	48,144	341,900	911,688	1,100,836	649,555
Accounts audited	75,908	408,008	288,754	255,807	156,726
Total	.16,294,845	19,239,880	24,534,847	25,458,089	27,952,682

Against which aggregates are charged the following, viz.:

•		•	•		٠.		
Construction		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	. 8,507,998	10,115,738	11,938,188	11,418,794	11,479,625
Rolling stock, etc.			. 761,447	1,101,970	1,504,015	2,049,674	2,195,655
Missouri River Re	ulroad			• • • • •		6,511	10,901
Office expenses			. 119,471	183,635			194,478
Contingencies			. 78,096				
interest account			. 718.898	750,941	958,297	1,176,259	1,388,358
Discount on cor	astruction,.		•	•	=	•	
&c., bonds		· • • • · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	. 8,860				
Commission on p	urchases		. 17,875				
Interest, disc'ts d	commis		. 1,187,994	1,141,078	1,288,988	1,288,988	1,28 9,980
Land grant expen	ses		. 5,857			6,884	7,943
Transportation ex	гред зев^ф .		. 4,616,148	5 579,681	6,896,161	8,852,806	10,888,052
Balance, March 1.	· · ······	••••••	. 898,449	877,482	439,156	489,086	447,297
Total			16,294,845	19,929,880	32,534,847	25,458,089	27,952,684

RAILBOAD STOCKS AND BARNINGS.

We have repeatedly directed attention to certain considerations connected with the management of our railroads, calculated to affect injuriously the value of their stocks for investment. The now unsettled condition of the stock market, and the fall in the prices of leading shares, comes in as a direct confirmation of our views. For several months past, the stock market has been in a "cliqued" condition. The major

Including \$1,232,731 54 charged against transportation receipts for interest on State bonds prior to January, 1859.

portion of the stocks of the principal roads has been bought up by combinations of capitalists, who, having secured the direction of the companies' affairs, conduct the management with a view to the inflation of the value of the stocks. In some instances, the necessary expenditures for keeping the roads in condition have been severely curtailed, so as to secure larger net earnings and pay increased dividends; and in others, where a cash dividend has not been fairly earned, large dividends in stock have been made, (said to represent money sunk in the permanent improvement of the roads), the addition to the share capital of the principal roads upon the New York Stock Exchange having been fully \$45,000,000 within the last fifteen months. By these means, and by holding the prices of stocks steady under the fluctuations of the money market, the aim has been to establish a higher scale of prices for stocks, and thereby enable the cliques to sell out at a profit. The result of this policy is now beginning to appear. The public seem to have understood the tactics, and have stood aloof from the stock market with remarkable persistency, the transactions at the boards during the summer months having been little over half what they were at the same period of 1867, although the extreme ease of money has been very favorable to speculation; and, judging from the very general testimony of brokers, we should conclude that parties holding stocks as an investment have unloaded, to a large extent, upon the combinations at the late high prices. These combinations having thus proved a failure, the more conservative members of them are becoming wearied of a fruitless effort to practice upon the public, and are said to be throwing their stocks upon the market. The near approach of the usual activity in money connected with crop movements, warns them that they cannot hope to carry their burdens through the fall months without embarrassment, and the more so because the banks have very prudently declined to make time advances upon stocks, a course which they have heretofore adopted with very ser,ous inconvenience to the commercial interests of the country, but which they feel indisposed any further to follow. The consequence of this realizing movement has been a considerable fall in the price of railroad shares generally, but in Erie and New York Central especially. Erie has fallen from the late average price of 70 to 441; while New York Central has fallen about 10 per cent. The decline in these stocks has been, to a certain extent, connected with schemes for controlling Erie so as to run the road in opposition to the Central Company. On Wednesday the Erie transfer books were closed, about thirty days in advance of the usual period, with the purpose, as is stated, of insuring the continuance in power of the present management of the road, a majority of the stock standing registered in their

names at that date; and it is now reported that the directors have bought four lines of Sound steamers, and leased the Boston and Providence Railroad, with a view to diverting eastern traffic from the New York Central road, the funds for said object to be raised by the issue of \$6,000,000 more of convertible bonds. At present we are not aware whether these things are accomplished facts; but negotiations have certainly been in progress to the effect stated. These developments are but another illustration of the reckless management of our railroads, and have materially aggravated the demoralization of the stock market.

The late improvement in the railroad earnings has doubtless laid a basis for a proportionate increase of confidence in stocks, as a source of investment, had the management been at all conservative or prudent. But the public have so entirely lost confidence in the stability of stocks, that they appear indisposed to take them, except at prices below what may be considered a fair value, based upon earnings; and nothing but a thorough reform of management can restore this lost confidence. These remarks, we are glad to say, do not apply to all the roads. We think we have discovered a growing disposition in some boards to separate themselves from all suspicion of using the property they hold in trust for their own private ends. Legislation also can do much to increase this improving tendency and check this evil wherever it exists. We have called the attention of our legislators frequently to this subject. If every State would require every railroad corporation existing under its laws to publish monthly a statement of its earnings and expenses, and a more detailed account quarterly, directors would be robbed of much of their present speculative power. Other remedies have been suggested by us from time to time, and we have not space to repeat them here; but we think if the publication referred to is required, one long step on the road to a thorough reform in management will have been taken.

From the subjoined statement it will be seen that the gross earnings of the principal roads for July exceed those of the same month of 1867 by about 9 per cent; while for the first seven months of the year there is an average gain of 10 per cent. There has been a slight increase in the mileage of the roads, but not sufficient to affect this result; the average gross earnings per mile, for the seven months, being \$5,311 against \$4,891 in 1867, an increase of 10 per cent. It is to be presumed that there has been also an increase of expenses; but probably not in proportion to the gain in earnings, the cost of some materials of repair, especially iron, having declined during the interim. The large amount of grain to be moved over the roads the next six months is likely to keep up this increased rate of earnings. The gross earnings of the

under-specified railroads for the month of July, in 1867 and 1868, and for the first seven months of each year are exhibited in the subjoined statement:

gross earnings for July, and for the pirst seven months of 1867 and 1868.

·	July		Seven Months		
Railroads.	1867.	1868.	1907.	1868.	
Atlantic and Great Western	. \$406,116	8:41,966	\$2,860,846	\$3,578,166	
Chicago and Alton	. 854,944	405,617	1,951,856	2,208,279	
Chicago and Northwestern	. 880,894	1,091,466	5,476,618	6,988,089	
Chicago and Northwestern	. 274,800	899 800	1,857,601	2 221 891	
Cleveland and Pittaburg	. 210,184	379,978	1,297,158	1,898,100	
Illinois Central	. 525,242	576,458	8,549,075	8,501,594	
Marietta and Cincinnati	. 106,594	108,418	694,187	680,788	
Michigan Central	. 818.021	821,018	2,257,709	2,406,411	
Michigan South. & North. Ind	. 812,879	301,500	2,368,861	2,618,798	
Milwaukee and St. Paul	. 865,156	428,200	2,355,557	2,985,800	
Ohio and Mississippi	. 984,688	194,455	1,783,940	1,577,584	
Pittsburg, F.t W. & Chicago	. 587.381	571,834	8,917,747	4,888,784	
Toledo, Wabash and Western	. 309,591	288,888	1,969,698	1,987,855	
Western Union	. 58,263	59,763	821,119	882,807	
Metal (04 OCO 9777	OK 990 KOO	290 KOK 917	0 9K 7700 011	

The following statement shows the gross earnings per mile of the same roads during the first seven months of the two years:

gross earnings per mile during pirst seven months of 1867 and 1868.

	Miles		-Rarnings		_Differ'e_	
Railroads.	1867.	1868.	1967.	1868.	Incr.	Dec.
Atlantic & Great Western	507	507	\$5,649	\$5,085	8	\$557
Chicago and Alton	280	280	6,971	7 886	915	·
Chicago and Northwestern	1,159	1,159	4,754	6,019	1,265	• • • •
Chicago, Rock Isl. & Pacific	410	452	4,581	4,916	786	
Cleveland and Pittsburg.,	220	239	5,664	6,068	419	
Illinois Central	708	708	6,011	4,946	•••	66
Marietta and Cincinnati	251	251	2,488	2,712	224	
Michigan Central	285	285	7,933	5,999	591	
Michigan South. & North. Ind	524	594	4,507	4,984	477	•••
Milwankee and St. Paul	827	897	2,861	8,549	688	• • •
Ohio and Mississippi	840	840	5,946	4,637	•• .	603
Pittsburg, Ft. W. & Chicago	468	468	8,871	9,271	900	
Toledo, Wabash and Western	521	521	2,778	8,719	• • • •	59
Western Union	180	180	1,784	2,127	848	• • •
Total	6,682	6,724	\$4,891	\$5,811	\$430	\$

CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS.

The July quarterly statement of the condition of the National banks, published in our last number, presents some features to which the attention of the banking interest needs to be directed, and the interesting and elaborate table given below, furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency, affords all the details necessary for making the examination. In certain respects, the return is a satisfactory one; in others, it is not so. The deposits show a very large increase upon those of the same period of last year, there being in all the banks of the country \$575,644,604 of individual deposits, against \$537,882,949 for the same period of 1867. This indicates a relaxed condition of business, and is so far an unheasthy symptom. The generally low rates of interest are a natural result of this plethora of idle funds, and simply means that at present business is not antificiently remunerative to tempt capital into employment. When legit-

imate business, however, is least active, speculation is apt to be most so; and the present condition of the loans aptly illustrates this rule. The loans and discounts of the banks stood, on the first Monday of July, at the very large total of \$655,525,346, which is about \$67,000,000 over the aggregate at the same period of 1867. Considering that the general business of the country is unusually dull, none of this increase can be regarded as due to an addition to the discounts, and it is, therefore, to be concluded that the expansion is mainly upon demand loans, consisting chiefly of advances upon stock collaterals. The amount of railroad stocks has been increased during the year \$40,000,000 to \$50,000,000 by share dividends or by other issues of new stock, and the prices of stocks are generally much higher than a year ago, as will be seen from the following comparison of prices of leading shares:

	28, '67.	8. '68.		28, '67.	8, '68. 79%
New York Central	104%	184%	Northwestern pref	65%	79%
Erie	66%		Rock Island Fort Wayne	95% 109%	103% x.d109%
Michigan Southern	. 78%	91 %	Illinois Central	191	157%
Michigan Central		119			
Northwestern	43%	75%	Total prices	89614	1,082%

It is thus seen that railroad shares ranged, at near the date of the quarterly statement, about 20 per cent above the prices of a year previous; which, of course, called for a proportionate increase of advances upon this class of securities. This is an expansion of loaning operations in a direction least to be desired, inasmuch as it indicates a growth of speculation rather than of legitimate business operations. The expansion implies a certain degree of danger, when the trade of the country assumes more activity; but it is the speculators rather than the banks that are threatened.

It cannot be said that the loans and discounts of the banks are out of reasonable proportion to either their capital or deposits. The capital and deposits combined amount to \$995,451,511, against \$655,525,346 of loans and discounts; so that the loanable resources are 52 per cent in excess of the advances actually made. In 1860 the capital and deposits together aggregated \$675,000,000, while the loans and discounts were \$892,000,000. So that the condition of the banks, in respect to loans, is much more conservative now than eight years ago. There is, however, this difference between the two periods; the banks in 1860 made their advances to a larger extent upon capital than at present, their capital being \$422,000,000, and deposits \$253,000,000; while the capital of the national banks now is \$419,806,511, and the deposits \$575,644,604. Or. to present the difference in another aspect, in 1860 the capital was 62 per cent of the loans, and in 1868, 54 per cent; while the deposits were in 1860, 364 per cent of the loans, and in 1868, 88 per cent. But although the loans now are less upon capital and more upon deposits than in 1860. yet considering the very large amount of deposits, it can hardly be fairly

Currency.

assumed that the loans are imprudently expanded. The very large amount of deposits, as compared with eight years ago, very strikingly illustrates the present comparative stagnancy of trade; and, at the same time, it suggests a ready explanation of the fact of the prices of securities being so much higher than in former years.

But the Comptroller's exhibit given below is particularly important as showing the condition of the reserves of the banks, since these figures give us light as to their stability. No subject is so important to the people; and if they are once convinced that the financial machinery is working more smoothly, more efficiently, and with more safety than any other we are likely to have in its place, we shall soon hear far less in favor of those unfortunate destructive measures which are urged before each succeeding Congress. Fears have been expressed lest the contraction of the greenback circulation, and especially the redemption of the Compound Interest Notes, would induce the banks to run upon a much smaller reserve. These apprehensions are now, however, proved to have been groundless. The official returns show that the banks are much more than living up to the law. The New York city banks held, at the date of the statement, \$17,200,000 of available reserve, in excess of the amount required by sections 31 and 32 of the National Currency Act, the surplus being 6.9 per cent over the legal requirement. In the other cities named in section 31 of the Act, there is an excess of reserve amounting to \$19,600,000 or 7.92 per cent beyond the legal limit of 25 per cent. The per centage of excess is largest at Philadelphia, being there 11.8; and next at Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans. At Cincinnati, the available reserve is only 1.6 per cent beyond the amount required; while at Cleveland and Leavenworth it falls below the limit. These points are illustrated in an official exhibit given in our last issue. The table subjoined gives an analysis of the reserve of those banks required to maintain a reserve of 15 per cent, commonly designated the country banks. While in the redemption cities the reserve averages 71 per cent beyond the lawful requirement, the reserve of the country banks averages nearly 9 per cent in excess; a fact which satisfactorily refutes the impression that the latter class of banks have not maintained a very conservative regard for their reserve. The reserve stands lowest in the District of Columbia, Utah and Texas, where the excess ranges from 2.2 to 4.2 per cent; and highest in the Southern States, ranging from 21.4 per cent in Georgia, to 46 per cent in South Carolina. In the New England States the ratio of excess is comparatively low, ranging from 6.4 per cent in Vermont to 8.6 per cent in New Hampshire. In New York State the excess is 7.7 per cent, in Pennsylvania 7.8 per cent, and in New Jersey 9.9 per cent. In the Western States the excess varies between 6.2 per cent in Indiana to 17.4 per cent in Iowa. The amount of reserve required at the date of the statement, to be kept in the vaults of the country banks was \$25,100,000; whereas they actually held \$48,800,000. That portion of required reserve allowed by law to consist of balances due from redeeming agents was \$31,700,000, while the actual amount was \$51,700,000. In a word the as a whole, must be viewed as satisfactory, not only as measured by standard, but also as tested by the requirements of conservative Below we give the exhibit as sent us by the Comptroller of the

PRATEMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE LAWFUL MONEY EXECTION 81, AS RECTIONS 81 AND 88 OF THE MATIONAL CURRENCY ACT, OF MATIONAL BANK OF LACE BANK ON THE BANK OF THE CONDITION OF RACH BANK ON THE MORNIAG OF MONDAY, JULY 6, 1868.

POPULATION OF POPULATION OF TOO					Document	Sandana d		
			Deposits in-		•	8-8 of 18% which		
	No. of		ances due to	Aggregate of	quired to be kept in the	may consist of		Aggregate Amount of
	Banks	Circulation	Banks and	Circul tion		from redeem-	Per	Reserve
FStates, &c.	reported.	outstanding.	bankera	and Depos ts.		ing agents.	cent.	required.
Maine	8	87,488,896	86,988,781	\$18,429,107	\$80£,836	8 1,207,980	21	89,018,816
New Hampshire	3:	4,275,808	.41.80Z	6,717,110	408,096	604,590	16	1,007,586
Vermont	3	200,000	2, 678, 041	8,401,735	50.100	756,155	2	1,280,266
Massachusetts	161	81,515,840	20,644,150	54,356,990	2,349,590	4,874,300	22	8,125,906
Thode Island	8	12,617,196	7.841,885	19,988,530	1,196,811	1,794,467	2	65.08.00 65.00
Connecticut	a	17,656,561	14,566,458	88,888,019	1,988,881	9,900,071	12	4.888.458
New York	2	80,994,910	48,196,718	78,419,928	4,706,196	7,057,798	2	11,769,988
New Jersey	Z	8,888,050	14,555,890	22,918,889	1,496,608	2,154,905	2	8,591,608
Pennsylvania	15	90,847,459	96,978,811	47,886,870	9,869,578	790, 967	22	7,178,940
Delaware	==	1.915,845	1,451,639	2,667,484	160,049	940,078	2	100
Maryland	61	1,795,958	2,738,598	4,548,845	971,480	47.146	2	OTR. BTB
Matrice of Columbia	-	89.490	68,761	168,191	165.6	14.257	15	S .
Viroinia	9	9.053.420	4.087.800	6.141.290	268.478	567.709	1	981.182
West Virginia	¥	1,948,719	9. KTS. RT8	4.644.265	978 6.68	417 994	¥	ADA RET
Mosth Carolina	1	37.5 280	811.597	1 197 867	67.645	101) ,	140
Active Carolina	•	148,000	1 Kelt 446	1 671 598		150.499	2	
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Alabama	R,		180,010		000	007.00	9;	0040
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Toxage	•	001,100	1,061,078	1,470,000	20,00	138,141	2;	
Arkansas		179,415	664, 868	871,667	008,400	78,4%	2	180,750
Kentucky		1,586,621	1,830,690	9,967.361	172,025	256,052	2	180,081
Tennessee		983,163	8, 284, 780	4.807.96%	F-100	878,716	2	681.194
Opto		18, 978, 576	17,421,466	89,605,041	1,841,708	2 762 558	22	4,604.916
Indiana	e	10,985,230	8,601,801	19,567,040	1,175,223	1,762,888	2	988,056
Illinois	3	5,407,510	10,894,183	15,741,642	£.48	1,416,747	20	28 3.1.246
Michigan	3	2,775,586	4,127,896	6,906,481	414,905	681 ,803	2	1,085,514
Wisconsin	젊	1,747,519	S. 275, 252	5,022,811	801,868	451,052	2	738,491
JOWS	4	8,147,461	7,645,975	10,788,486	96,730	971,400	5	1,619,015
Minnesota		1,378,776	9,410,986	8,780,718	200,120	841 074	2	563,456
Missouri	2	988	1,805,688	2,559,623	158,677	200,766	2	35.00 35.00
Kabras	6 0	159,816	386,124	543,440	25	000	2	818
Nebraska	~	168,700	1,825,630	1,974,880	119,659	179 488	2	200
Colorado Territory	20 1	96,	310'636 610'636	1,068,019	25.5	W.471	2	168,468
Utab	-t 1	38.58	3,5	200,400	AGET	18.580	2	104,05
Nevada	-	181,010	20,100	21.7'£02	130,81	1AD'AT	9	02,0(8
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Total amount of ex-	cess of reserve.	578.143 574.759	544,978	1.305.200	2,524,816	9.390,156	8,749,899	248,408 283,048	3.515	858,508	280,854	768.814	811,089	172,694	KSR 916	86,894	224,043	418,149	1.236 183	1,749,297	785,800	1.8.8.228	264.997	240,614	688,487	150,908	38,540	\$37,646,861
exceeds what by the amounts of Other items	making up	8714,419 511.432	888,170	1,827,780	8,819,788	2,045,005	2,160,085	205,768	OR O'CON	910.4	88,919 818,919	865.670	75,184	34 ,123	158.841	808	8,756	74,558	60,805	778,459	890,012	954.318	19,775		866.946	28,718	::	\$34,962,622
Reserve	and Legal Tenders	2522,749 209,829	322,485	606.780	1,079,016	1.217.570	8,208,585	129,737	10,784	622,097	361,688	404.670	978,880	171,801	10,400	78,081	296,180	587,078	1.681.485	1,595,886	668,611	1.387.668	396 877	355,195	948,077	171,880	14,568 61,815	\$26,8.9,686
Three per cent	Certifi-	00000	000,000	1 18 000	000	1,000 dis	940,000	55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55	20,0	16.000	25,000	:	0000	:	:	•	10,000		120,000	100,000		0000	\$:	200	:	::	
(2-5 of 16% of deposits may con-	sist of) Comp'nds.	98, 430 104, 430	109,090	25.660 899,660	627,030	458.430	842,700	82.50		67,820	81,820	4,000	38,060	:										25. 25. 26.			::	\$6,727,830 \$1,940,000
ms of Reservant Control Contro	Legal Tendora	459,749	617,780	1.281.074	1,975,950	17:20 667	4, 65,667	192,481	15.00 00.00 00.00 00.00	638.877	441,403	450.048	1,018,653	125,590	15,000	8 . 087	384,971	551,810	9 278 ADR	1,896,604	196,418	1.512.948	448,658	266,449 96,564	405	157,645	5, 28 5, 55 5, 55	\$35,731,968
/2-5 of 15% o lation mu	Specie.																										2 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	2,119,441
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	available Per reserve, cent.																											100,545,583 28 9-10
Aggregate amount of		1.684.819	1,805,233	4.884.049	7,858,969	5.481.864	10,948, "83	648,581	25 FEB. (20)	1,270,656	984,019	1.019.644	1,480,086	260,648	750 810	167.044	654, 136	1,040,844	4.164.288	4,110,548	200,000	8,608,283	888,454	787.787 919	999,685	819,756		23 9-10
Aggregate amount of	available reserve.	18 4-10 \$5.891,458 14 1-10 1.584,819	11 5-10 1,805,283	18 1-10 4.284,019	18 9-10 7,868,969	14.8-10 5.981.664	10 948, 83	18.8-10 648,581	6.9-10	91-10 1,279,636	7.5-10 984,019	80 6-10 1.019.644	78-10 1,440,098	12.7-10 269,628	10.7 10 759.810	167.044	7 7-10 654,136	8 1-10 1,040,844	7 4-10 4.164.288	19 1-10 4,110,548	19 6-10 1,881,865	16 5-10 8.502 283	8 2-10 888,454	11 9-10 729,787	36 4-10 999.685	819,756	28,12 28,12 28,08 28,12 28,08	\$51,705,601 128.0 \$100,545,583 289.10
available	Per available cent, reserve.	81,796,970 18 4-10 \$2,891,458 646,002 14 1-10 1,582,819	970,236 11 5-10 1,805,283	2,604,688 18 7-10 4,384,019	4,592,830 18 9-10 7,358,969	3.487.080 14.8-10 5.481.664	4,781,680 10 10,988, 83	827,619 12 8-10 648,581	10.898 6.9-10 27.948	560,964 91-10 1,979,636	849,987 7.5-10 984,013	511.940 80 6-10 1.019.644	819,788 78-10 1,480,086	88,888 12 7-10 269,648	010 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	78.848 9 167,644	220,400 7 7-10 654,136	841,985 81-10 1,049,844	1.458.188 7.4-10 4.164.288	1,907,707 12 1-10 4,110,548	871,301 126-10 1,851,365	1.785,487 16 5-10 8.502,283	810,740 8 2-10 888,454	204,859 11 9-10 734,767	726,205 86 4-10 999,685	126,684 11 6-10 819,756	15,570 7.5-10 88,259 18,044 5.9-10 71,230	128.0 \$100,545,583 289-10
available	On hand, cent, agents, cent, reserve,	81,796,970 18 4-10 \$2,891,458 646,002 14 1-10 1,582,819	834,996 9 9-10 970,286 11 5-10 1,805,233 K 102 110 9 4-10 9 000 107 14 0-10 19 000 0-10	1,781,460 8 9-10 8,604,688 18 1-10 4,384,049	2,865,489 8 9-10 4,692,880 18 9-10 7,858,969	2,544,583 10 6-10 3,487,080 14,8-10 5,481,664	6,142,148 12 8-10 4,781,680 10 10,928, 83	820,918 12 827,612 12 3-10 648,581	16.850 10.8-10 10.898 6.9-10 97.848	718,733 11 7-10 560,964 9 1-10 1,979,656	586,025 12 6-10 849,987 7 5-10 934,013	607.695 30 4-10 511.940 30 6-10 1.019.544	1,170,154 28 6-10 819,788 7 8-10 1,480,986	187,945 28 9-10 88,283 12 7-10 269,628	44,000 44 1-10 001 020 1 0-10 10,410 004 10 10 10 10,410 001 001 008 10 10 10 710 750 210	88,796 10.9-10 78,848 9 167,644	4.8,737 151-10 880,400 7.7-10 634,186	200,408 16 8-10 841,885 81-10 1,040,844	049 18 8-10 1.458.188 7 4-10 4.164.288	536 18 9-10 1,907,707 12 1-10 4,110,548	168 189-10 871,201 186-10 1,851,265	811 15 9-10 1.785, 427 16 5-10 8.502, 283	714 18 8-10 810,740 8 2-10 888,454	16 4-10 804,859 11 9-10 734,767	18 4-10 726, 205 86 4-10 999, 685	17 8 10 126,684 11 6-10 819,756	15,570 7.5-10 88,259 18,044 5.9-10 71,230	\$51,705,601 128.0 \$100,545,583 289.10

Of the above Banks having balances, to be counted as part of their reserve, due from Associations, there are in-

New York City	894,			
Boston	811,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	9,885,279	
Albany	29		984.836	68
Philagelphia		"	8.847.768	56
Pittaburg		64	814,485	25
Baltimore		64	891.965	ÃÕ
New Orleans		**	48 994	77
Louisville	7	44	27.811	ÃÃ
Cincinnati	me	amounting to	1.890.582	
Clareland			29.848	
Cleveland			8,185,668	
Chicago		***************************************		
Detroit		, :	29,253	
Milwaukee	16		970,519	
St. Louis	18	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	807,821	71
Total			\$51,7:5,501	46

WATERING OF RAILPOAD STOCKS.

Much has been said of late with regard to the burden which is being placed upon our internal commerce by the stock dividends of railroad corporations. Of course additions to stock or bonds of any company beyond the requirements of construction make necessary an increase in the transportation charges to pay interest on debt and capital. The extent of this practice we propose to illustrate by one through route from New York to the West. The roads constituting this, route are named not because their extra stock issues have been in excess of others, but simply, as we said, for illustration.

The plan of thus increasing railroad capital appears to have been initiated by the New York Central Railroad Company in 1853. This company in that year was, as our readers are aware, formed by the consolidation of eleven independent companies, whose roads made up the great line between the Hudson, at Albany and Troy, and Lake Erie, at Buffalo. The share capital of these companies amounted together to \$22,858,600 as follows:

Albany and Scheneciady	\$1,835,800	Syracuse & Utica Direct	\$600,000
Schenectady and Troy	650,000	Rochester, L'port & N. Falls	2.016.109
Utica and Schenectady	4,500,000	Rochester and Syracuse	5,606,700
Mohawk Valley	1,575,000	Buffalo and Rochester	8,000,000
Syracuse and Utica	2,700,000	Buffalo and Lockport	675,009

This amount was increased to \$23,067,400, by the conversion of convertible bonds; and further, by the addition of the stocks of the Buffalo and Niagara Falls Railroad, \$565,000; of the Lewiston Railroad, 217,600; and the Rochester and Lake Ontario Railroad, \$150,000—which companies were united with the Central subsequent to the general consolidation. These additions brought the capital stock up to the neighborhood of \$24,000,000, since increased by the conversion of bonds and the purchase of the Athens Branch Railroad to \$28,537,000.

The stocks of the several companies varied largely in productive value, and hence were received into the new company at a premium above the

Schenectady and Troy stock, which was made par, being the lowest in the scale. The convertible bonds shared the same treatment. To pay this premium the company issued Six Per Cent Debt Certificates, the principal payable through the instrumentality of a sinking fund by May 1, 1883. These were issued to the stockholders of the old companies, in accordance with rates agreed upon in the articles of consolidation, and as shown in the following statement:

	Stock	Rates of t	ore- Am't
	& convert-	mium aw	r'd. of
Companies.	ible bonds.	Per cent	pre'm.
Albany and S henectady	\$1,621,800	17	\$275,706
Titica and Scheneciady	4,500,000	55	2,475,000
Mohawk Vail- y	1,575,000	55	866,250
Syracuse and Utics		50	1,350,000
Syracuse and Utica Direct	600,000	50	800,000
Poche ter and Syracuse	5.608.700	80	1.682,610
Roche ter, Lockpo t and Niagara Falls	2,155,100	95	538,694
Buffalo and Lockport.		25	168,750
Buffulo and Rocherter	8,000,000	40	1,200,000
Rochester and Lake Ontario.	150,000	25	87,500
Schenectady and Troy	650,000	•	
Total	\$98,985,600		\$8,894,500

No premium was allowed the Schenectady and Troy stock. Of these certificates, \$2,604,546 have been retired by the operations of the sinking fund, leaving outstanding \$6,189,954. Not a cent of the \$8,894,500 issued is represented by property, but is made a charge, principal and interest, against "future income." As respects the Mohawk Valley Railroad, the charges for stock and premium have never been availed of, that line being still in abeyance, with no intention of having it brought into use. Here, then, we have at least \$11,000,000 calling for 6 per cent or \$660,000 a year to be paid from traffic receipts; or in other words, all this amount and a yearly sinking fund contribution for the final settlement of the principal is drawn from the public for the sole benefit of the holders of these certificates, which are in reality so much guaranteed stock.

Leaving Buffalo west, the Buffalo and Erie Railroad, 88 miles in length, extends to Erie. This has for many years been a 10 per cent stock. It is a consolidation (1867) of the Buffalo and State line, the capital of which company was \$2,200,000, and the Erie and Northeast, whose capital was \$600,000, or, together, \$2,800,000. The consolidated company came out with a capital of \$5,000,000, the increase going into the pockets of its few stockholders. Should the usual 10 per cent dividend be paid hereafter, this operation loads the public with a contribution to private pockets for no tangible advantage of the sum of \$220,000 a year forever.

The Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Company's Railroad extends from Erie to Cleveland, 96 miles, and is another link in this through route. In 1861 its stock capital was \$3,000,000, and its bonds \$1,353,000. In that year a stock dividend of 4 per cent was distributed. In 1862, 10 per cent in stock and $13\frac{1}{3}$ in bonds were given to the stockholders, and in 1863

10 per cent in stock. In 1865, 25 per cent was divided, and in 1867, 75 per cent in stock and 20 per cent in bonds. These several distributions brought the stock up \$8,750,000 and the bonds to \$2,500,000, being an increase by stock and bond issues amounting to \$6,897,000, or more than twice the amount of the original capital. In the meanwhile the cost of the road advanced from \$3,986,537 to \$4,868,427, or less than one million. These extra dividends on outstanding capital from 1861 to 1867, both inclusive, were no less than 157\frac{1}{2} per cent. What this dividend would be on the original capital, is simply a matter of arithmetical calculation. But these are only the extra-dividends. The total dividend yearly was 14, 38\frac{1}{2}, 23, 26, 35, 10 and 95 per cent respectively, and the amount distributed \$9,388,000, or 319 per cent on \$3,000,000 in seven years.

The Cleveland and Toledo Railroad (in all 148 miles) carries the Lake Shore Line by one arm to Sandusky and by another arm to Toledo. In 1867 it was leased to the Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Company, which agreed to pay its stockholders dividends equal to those paid on its own stock. Previous to the execution of this lease the company divided 25 per cent in stock, increasing its capital from \$5,000,000 to \$6,500,000.

The Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati Railroad, which leaves the lake at Cleveland in the direction of Cincinnati, has also inflated its capital, in 1862 by a division of 5 per cent on \$4,746,200, or \$237,310; and in 1863 by 20 per cent on \$5,000,000, or \$1,000,000. Its capital is now \$6,000,000, one fourth part of which is not represented by property.

The Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad carries the Lake Shore Line into Chicago. The main line has a length of 242 miles, and the total length is 516 miles. It is a great but unfortunate enterprise, and has never had opportunity to expand its non-earning capital. It is borne down by unremunerative laterals and branches, but has nevertheless added to its capital and bonded debt in settlement of dividends accumulated on its guaranteed stock and the conversion of the same. Probably a million and a half has been added to capital on these accounts.

Transferring our review to the place of beginning (Albany and Troy), we have the Hudson River Railroad. This company doubled their capital in 1867, raising it from about \$7,000,000 to \$14,000,000. Only 50 per cent of the increase was paid in, and that was applied to the purchase of St. John's Park in New York City, and improvements required on the line of the road. The balance is a present to stockholders.

As stated above, we have selected the companies spoken of simply because the are conspicuous for their position and direction, forming one continuous line from the seaboard to the beginning of the Great Western system of railroads, and are among the best known on the Continent. They have their peers in other parts of the country. For instance, the

Philadelphia and Reading Railroad have declared the following stock dividends:

On Common Stock—1846, 12 per cent; 1847, 12 per cent; 1852, 8 per cent; 1854, 10 per cent; 1855, 4 per cent; 1862, 7 per cent; 1868, 7 per cent; 1864, 15 per cent; 1865, 10 per cent; 1866, 10 per cent; 1867, 5 per cent, and 1868, 5 per cent. Total, 105 per cent.

On Freferred Stock, (payable in common stock)—1863, 31 per cent; 1864, 15 per cent; 1865, 10 per cent; 1866, 10 per cent; 1867, 5 per cent, and 1868, 5 per cent.

Total, 48 per cent.

It should be stated that the dividends of 1865 and 1866 were made payable in stock or cash, at the option of the stockholder. At these dates the stock was considerably above par in New York.

In a word, wherever business has been prosperous, and dividends large, stocks have been increased by distributions undervarious pretenses. Is it wise to allow a continuance of this policy?

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE LEGAL TENDERS.

Wall street has been during the last month troubling itself about certain rumors which have been set afloat to the effect that the Legal Tender Act is about to be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The story is supposed to have been started from the Treasury Department, and Chief Justice Chase is declared to have concurred in the decision. Some of our financial prophets have accordingly been busy searching out the probable consequences of such a decision and how its operation would affect banks and bank notes, mercantile debts and mortgage securities, existing engagements and future contracts. Before we follow these gentlemen into so tangled and pathless a jungle, it is probably worth while to challenge the fact which they make their starting point. Perhaps we may find that they have been wrong at the start. If no such decision as they talk of is imminent, nor any decision tending to disturb the foundations of our greenback currency, or to impair contracts made in its standard dollars, or to produce any general perturbation whatever, then our ingenious friends have spent their labor upon imaginary difficulties, and there is nothing to do but to wait and see their "castles in the air" vanish, frowning but harmless.

Now, in the first place, this report is no new thing. It is a very old story. Several years ago it was quite current. And it has several times perished and died away, only to revive again like some oftuprooted but vivacious weed. The truth is that dishonest debtors have in a few cases been availing themselves of the ambiguity of the acts of February and July, 1863, by which greenbacks are made "a lawful money and legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private,

within the United States, except duties on imports and interest upon bonds." By a perversion of the plain meaning of this statute these men, after making contracts to pay so many dollars in coin, have tendered greenback dollars to their creditor, who has appealed to the Supreme Court for redress. Several such cases are at this momen pending. And it is no doubt to a misinterpreted rumor about one of these cases that we are indebted for the stories that have been disturbing the equilibrium of the financial circles around us.

Another mischievous perversion of the legal tender act is the proposal to pay off some 500 millions of old Five-Twenties by a new special issue of greenbacks. If greenbacks are a legal tender for "all debts public and private," these greenbacks, it is argued, will pay off the Five-Twenties, for these are a public debt. And "since greenbacks can be had for the mere cost of printing" these wise men argue, there is a vast saving in the scheme. This monstrous and absurd proposal has fewer abettors than it once had. There is no doubt that well-meaning persons have given the Supreme Court "canard" a more welcome hearing in consequence of their dread of an inundation of paper money to pay off the Five-Twenties.

However this may be, it is certain that in an active commercial country like ours, the thousands of millions of dollars of semi-matured indebtedness which at all moments exist in various forms throughout the country, must not be disturbed by any decision of the Supreme Court in any such way that if we have made a bona fide engagement to pay a currency dollar we shall be compelled to pay one third more, that is a dollar in coin.

The same thing may be said of our banks. No holder of a bank note which represents currency dollars will be permitted to acquire, from any decision of the Supreme Court, any right to demand gold coin for his note at par. Such a contingency would break every bank in the country, and would bring on us an overwhelming flood of misfortune, financial chaos and irremediable ruin.

In such instances as these, which, in some form or other, are continually occurring, we have a suggestive commentary on the evils of paper money when depreciated so that the currency dollar shall be worth less than the standard dollar of coin. Here we have two currencies side by side—a gold and silver currency of the old standard, and a new standard paper currency, every dollar of which is worth considerably less than coin. In these small paper money dollars for six years the nation has founded its contracts and done its vast business, so that every dollar of our vast changing current of mercantile indebtedness has been incurred on the basis of the small paper dollar throughout the country. This,

then, is the great problem of specie resumption. How shall we transmute this vast mass of obligations so that although they have been incurred in small paper dollars they shall be payable and shall be liquidated in the larger standard of the coin dollar? and how shall we do all this so that no debtor shall pay any more than his contract, and that neither debtor nor creditor shall lose or suffer any injustice.

Of course any sudden change, such as would result from the prophesied decision, would entail fearful consequences upon the country, and these threatening results will present themselves with unusual force to any court having the question of the constitutionality of the legal tender act before it. Not that the consequences of a decision are to rule where the law is plain, but if there is doubt as to the law, or, in other words, if there is any ground upon which the court can consistently uphold the act, they will do so rather than entail upon the country the ruin which a contrary decision would inevitably bring. All know the influence such considerations have, during times past, had in modifying and directing the conclusions of our judiciary, and we have reason to believe they will be no less potent now.

But it may be claimed that to affirm that the government has the right to issue when it pleases legal tenders, would be the greatest of all evils. Very likely this is so; yet it is unnecessary to hold any such doctrine in order that what has been done may be upheld. The court may decide, and very likely will decide, that this power, under ordinary circumstances, is not delegated by the constitution, and that new legislation to issue legal tenders now would be an unauthorized act, and therefore void. But where that act is necessary as a means for preserving the life of the nation, such a power must be one of the incidents of every government. Of course many will insist that it was not necessary: that the war might have been successfully prosecuted without it. We shall not argue the point. Congress affirmed that it was necessary, and a very large majority of the people were, and still are, of a like opinion. The United States Court can now very reasonably he of the same mind. They see the harm and wholesale injury which threaten the country if they decide the legal tender clause to be void, and hence will be inclined to hold that it was an act necessary for preserving the life of the nation, even if they do decide that under any other circumstances such legislation would be unauthorized and void.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILBOAD.

The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company is a consolidation under date of August 20, 1866, of the Chicago and Rock Island Company of Illinois and the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific (late Mississippi and Missouri) Company of Iowa, and at the date of the last annual report (just published) which refers to the year ending March 31, 1868, the consolidation owned and operated the following lines:

Chicago and Rock Island RR — Chicago, Ill, to Ro k Island, Ill. Rock Isl nd Bridse & RR.— Rock Island, I'l., to Davenport, Iowa Chicago, R. I. & Pacific RR.— Island, I'l., to De- Moine, Iowa Oakaloosa Extension RR.— Wilton, Iowa, to Washington, Iowa	1 175	nileb*
Total owned by company	408 n	iles.
Total owned, leased and operated	454 n	iles.

The track between Kellogg and Des Moines, 44 miles, was completed Sept. 9, 1867. On the first of August, 1868, the track was laid from Des Moines, 30 miles west, and the grading and bridging completed to Middle River, about 22 miles further, to which latter point the track was to be completed by the 15th of the same month (probably now in use). The remainder of the line to the Missouri is rapidly progressing, and it is anticipated that next year a bridge will be built over the river to connect the Rock Island road with the Union Pacific, thus making, on the completion of the latter road, an unbroken line from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The equipment of the line has been increased during the past year, and it is designed to continue to add to it by construction and purchase as the increasing business of the road may require. For this purpose large shops have been erected near Chicago and tools and machinery contracted for. These will be occupied in the fall of the current year. The following is a statement showing the amount of the motive and carrying power in use on the road at the close of the years named:

	1861-2.	1862-8.	1863-4.	1864-5.	1665-6.		1867-8.
Eagines (eosi)	59	61	61	59	65	{ 57 85	88 87
						·	
Engines of all kinds		61	61	09	65	92	93
Passenger, &c., c.rs	960	57 960	59 1,195	68 1,459	68 1,568	66 1,780	70 2,010
Cars of all kinds	1,017	1,017	1,964	1,5:3	1,681	1,846	9,080

In the statements which follow, the annual accounts for the past six years are given, showing the changes in the condition of the company from year to year:

MILEAGE OF ENGINES HAULING TRAINS.

Engines. Pass nger Freight	1869-9. 854,267 579,115 97,502	1863-4. 948,8.8 734,008 90,004	1864-5. 817, 83 783,056 82,014	1865–6. 864,870 741,5×7 98,594	1866-7. 46 ,7 3 1,058.186 95,408	1867-8, 575,218 1,150,489 171, 28 5
Total Cost per mile	1,080 884	1,162,880	1,212,656	1 284,8 7	1,681,807	1,896,987
run(cents)	20.78	21.15	83.11	88.89	88.68	82,64

PASSENGER TRAFFIO-ITS DIRECTION AND AMOUNT.

Passenger-thro'	29,352	45,180	70,234	61,871	44,491	51,883
" -way	223,892	279,:14	893,683	876,878	418,609	507,471
" -west	122,566			204,348	242,684	200,051
" east	130,678		286,019	233,401	920 416	271,258
Pae'gs of all k'ds	258,244	824,944	463,866	437,744	463,100	560,894
" one mile 1		20,401,500	29,888,967	26,984,579	22,701,661	28,185,470
Rate per pas'ger p. mile(cts.)	3.06	8 15	8.41	3.73	4.36	4.19

PREIGHT TRAFFIC-ITS DIRECTION AND AMOUNT.

Loaded care, W	. 16,396	9C,811	94.015	28,995	26,186	85, 746
" Kast	81, 228	81,589	82,708	81,099	80,176	39.359
" " W & E	47,628		56,728	55,097	66,353	75,195
Tons (2,000 lbs), carried	879,879	441,570	472,557	459,986	598,914	654,435
Tons, per load	7,99	8.42	8 46	×.35	9.05	8.14
Tons one mile	88,558,469	56,589,150	68,414 891	59,218,8.6	79,565,908	87,529,493
Rate per ton per mile(cts).	2.69	2.56	8.50	8.45	8.05	8 85

The following is a statement of the business between the Illinois and Iowa shores, illustrated by the number of loaded cars and tons of freight, and number of foot passengers passing over the Mississippi River Bridge at Rock Island in the same years:

		1862-3.	1868-4.	1864-5.	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.
Loaded	(Going west	5,866	7,998	9,918	8,488	11,947	12,529
Cars.	⟨ Going east	8,306	10,116	10,109	9.067	12,680	11,833
Cars.	Bo h ways		18,114	20,023	17.505	28,877	24,361
Freight	(Going west		50,741	68.844	59.578	88.582	108,849
(tons).	⟨Going emat	71,549	89,914	81,167	82,753	123,56a	11,400
	() oth w ys		140,655	150,001	148,325	212,144	217,249
Foot	Going west	4 ,977	70,962	57,884	50,719	41,712	37.412
Pass ng-	{ Going east	40,166	69 4 33	58 371	50,963	41,451	37,258
ers.	Both ways	80,448	140,894	115,755	101,675	88,168	74,670

It will be seen by this that the trade between Iowa and Illinois has increased from 110,581 tons in 1862-3, to 217,249 tons in 1867-8, or by 106,668 tons or 96.4 per cent, viz.: going West by 64,810 tons or 166.0 per cent, and going East by 47,858 tons or 58.5 per cent.

The navigation at this point on the Mississippi is illustrated by the number of steamers, barges, and rafts passing the draw of the bridge, yearly, as follows:

1862-3,	1863-4.	1864-5.	1:65-6.	1866-7	1867-8
(Going north 858	106	163	478	679	462
Steamers. Ging south	933	167	458	673	468
(Both ways 707	898	829	926	1,851	930
Golog north	155	125	233	.815	214
Barges. { boing south	129	110	255	486	238
But ways	284	235	493	F43	482
Rafts going south	276	296	576	33 8	684

FINANCIAL RESULTS OF OPERATIONS.

T e gross earnings from operations, the cost of working the road and machinery, and the profits from this source of revenue yearly for the same years, are shown in the following condensed abstract:

	1869-8.	1883-4	1864-5.	1865-6.	1866-7.	18:7-8:
	8		8	8		1,181,564
Passenger earnings	448 997	648,775	1,0/1,779	1.005.879	186,989	1,181,564
Freigh earnings	1.034.830	1,448,965	2,222,309	2,016,306	2,12 . 94	2 9:4.5 4
Mail ea nings	21.200		21,200			
Exp ess, ren s, &o	.9,794	85,985	94,102	110,857	135.048	29d, 168
Motel necessarian	4 2 30 4 44	0.140.407	9 20 000	0.124.002	0 274 000	4 421 11714
Total ros earni gs	1,089,141	3,145.060	(יוואס,יות הס	8,104.250	8,014,038	4'401'8.84
Working, entis, &c	8: 0,987	1,040,462	1,467,681	1,711,404	1 921,903	2.0:0,192
Watt on town (04-)			1.00	440.00	4.00.00	
Nett ear. ings (profits)	728,154	1,103,4.8	1,831,709	1,442,781	1,746,181	5, 01,18

The net earnings or profits were disposed of as follows:

.						
Peoria & Bureau Valley RR	\$195,000	\$125,000	\$195,007	\$125,000	\$1\$5,000	\$125,000
United States taxes	5,358	16,415	64 770	98,793	52,291	89,110
Tax on real estate	35,001	88,978	54,818	63,463	106,301	107,930
Legal expenses	8,908	4,061	5,608	7 36%	8,590	23,594
Extraordinary repairs, &c	45.791	67,754	68,190	46,488		
Interest on funded debt	100,135	109,690	179,589	101,685	956,139	576,940
Interest on bridge bonds		22,934	40,000	40,000	40,000	
Dividends (incl. U. S. tax)		843,493	875,041	631,579	890.879	957.891
Balance to income account			1,056,950	838,689	386,986	679,087

GERRAL ACCOUNT-LEDGER BALANCES.

The financial condition of the company at the close of the fiscal years,

22 20010, 10 220112 (2 120 1	1868.	1964.	1885.	1866.	1867.	1868.
	8	8	8	8	8	8
Capital stock	5 608,000	6,000,000	6,0 00,007		9,100,000	14,000,000
Mortgage bonds	1,897 000	1,8/7,000	1,397,000	1,897.000	8,099,594	8,280,000
Income bonds	70,000	70,000	58,500	51,000	47, 09	49,000
Chic., R L& rac. BH. of lows					685,486	590,859
Sundries	12,078	•••••		••••		146,964
Bal. of Income	660,961	917,888	2,034,083	2,367,764	63 L753	1,151,665
Total	7,743,630	8,444,838	9,484,558	10,815,766	18,506,768	24,160,781
Accounted for in the ex	thibit fo	llowing,	viz.:			
R'd & equipment	7,069,727	7,499,483	7,480,928		15,818,893	17,251,483
Fuel & materiale		156,976	207,260			::*:::
Other assets, &c	401,414	282,523	745,788			8,609,809
Cash and bills	209,830	625,700	736.661	881,483	1,475,771	8,800,046
Total	7,743,037	8,444,633	9,485,583	10,815,764	18,506,768	94,160,781

GENERAL REVIEW FOR TEN YEARS.

The following table gives the cost of the road and equipment (estimating the cost of the Peoria and Bureau Valley Bailroad at \$1,250,000); and the earnings, expenses and profits from operations, &c., yearly, for the ten years ending March 31, 1868:

-	Cost of	-	Ordinary		Interest		
	road and	Gross	operating				
Years.	equipment	carnings.	expenses.				ixes, &c.
1859-50	\$8,096,119	\$889,840	\$537,668	\$851,658	\$97,790	\$	\$99,685
1859-6)	8,163,554	1,098, 84	649,661	471,978	97 790	167,597	44,181
1860-61		1,164,018	708,054	455,964	97,990		120,184
1861-61		*1.054.701	*531.887	528,817	*97,790	168,090	89.866
1862-63		1.529.141	800,987	728,154	100,183	826, 230	74,796
1863-64		9.148.875	1.010.462	1.108,418	101,690	848,488	889,142
1861-65		8,859,300	1.467.681	1.891,709	102.582	875.011	1,056,250
1965-66		8,151,235	1,711,454	1 442.781	101.585	681.579	881,682
1806-67						8±0.879	886,988
1867-65	18,501,488	4,451,974					609,087

In the following table will be found deductions from the foregoing, giving the cost of road, &c., per mile, the earnings &c., per mile, and the rates of expenses to earnings and of profits to cost, with the dividends, &c., annually:

• •	Miles	Cost of	Per	mile of	road-	Expenses	Profits	
	of r ad	rond	Barn.	Bx-	Pro-	to		ivi-
Years.	open.	per mile	ings.	penses.		Earnings.	cost. de	ends.
1853-59	228.4	\$35,903	\$8,898	\$9,854	\$ 1.589		4.48	nil.
1859-60	223.4	85,803	4,789	2,726	2,068		5.76	3
1860 61	3 28,4	86.1.0	5,096	8,100			5.53	nil.
1861-63	928.4	86,985	4,617	2,816	2,291		6 31	6
1869-63	228 4	26,488	6,695	8,705			8 19	•
1563-64	228.4	38,067	9,336	4,556		48 53	1: 70	6
1864-65	. 22 8.4		14,939				9 0.75	8
1865-66	. 228.4		13,834				15.51	10
1666-67	. 410.0		10,512				18.83	10
1867-68		40,752	10,475	4,754	5,721	45.89	18.14	10

^{*} Operations for 9 months only.

The average length of road operated in 1866-7 was 340 miles, and in 1867-8 about 425 miles.

MARKET VALUE OF STOCK AT NEW YORK.

The monthly ranges of prices in the New York market of the stock of the company are shown in the subjoined statement (dividends April and October):

,	862-8	1863-4.	1864-5.	1965-6.	1866-7	1867-8.
April 59	84-564	88 4 - 95	110 -184	8 1-103	110 -1231	25 1- 931
May 50		94 -108	105 -119	91 -105	90 - 951	8H- 921
June 69		981-104	110 -1171	98 -103	91 - 954	87 1- 961
July 60	01-681	98 -106	2071-114	1014-1094	944-103	9' +-104
August (5	种种	1081-117	1091-:141	103 -109	1021-1:0	944-1084
September 60		108 -118	95 -1091	10-1 1181	1084-1174	99 -105
October 7	71-651	1061-1111	851- 97	105 -11 1	106 -1114	94 -104
Nov mber 7		102 -1111	99 -110	1041-1091	100 -1121	941- 971
December 7		106 -1284	1011-1081	1054-1084	102 -10 I	94- 994
January 8:		1221-1494	881-1051	961- 091	91 -1/41	984-100 1
February 87		1171-1441	801- 981	98 -107	95 -1004	96 -102
March 8	95	1191-1274	854-100	1044-1184	921 961	964-10 94
Year 5	34-96§ ·	884-1494	841-184	814-1184	90 -1231	861 106

ST. LOUIS, ALTON AND TERRE HAUTE BAILBOAD.

The lines of railroad owned by the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Company are made up as follows:

Main line Terre Haute, 'ind., to Akton, Ill. Branch lines { Wood River (Akton) Iunct., Ill., to Bloody Island, Ill	175 m 20 14	" iles·
Total length of road owned by the company	909	u

The main line of this road was constructed by the Terre Haute and Alton Railroad Company, chartered in Illinois, January 28, and in Indiana, February 11, 1851. Construction was commenced in May, 1852, and worked from both termini. On the 13th November, 1854, the section from Terre Haute to Paris, 19 miles, and on the 3d December that from Paris to Grandview, 9 miles, were opened, and on the 11th December of the same year the section from Alton to Litchfield, 38 miles. In 1855 (Jan. 26) the road was opened to the Embarras River, 14 miles from Grandview, and (July 2) to Mattoon, 14 miles beyond the Embarras. In the same year the western division was completed (June 25) from Litchfield to Hillsboro', 11 miles, and (Nov. 12) from Hillsboro' to Pana, 28 miles. The remaining gap between Mattoon and Pana, 42 miles, were closed up on the 1st March, and the whole line opened to traffic on the 1st April, 1856. The Believille and Illinoistown Railroad Company was chartered June 21, 1852, with authority to construct a road between those two places, and also a line from Wood River, a point on the Terre Haute and Alton Railroad, 41 miles east of Alton to Illinoistown. The first was completed in the fall of 1854, and the latter, subsequently extended to Bloody Island, opposite St. Louis in October, 1856. By agreement these roads, so necessary

to the Terre Haute and Alton Company in the transaction of their St. Louis business, were consolidated with the main line under date of October 30, 1856, the consolidated company taking the title of Terre Haute, Alton and St. Louis Railroad Company. The capital stock and funded debt of the company at the date of consolidation was as follows:

Capital stock 1st mortgage bonds	.(7a) 1,000,000	B. & I. \$498,7'0 (7a) 6 0,000 (7-) 500,000	Consolid'n. \$8.170,800 1,600,000 2,500,000
Stock and bonds	95,679,050	\$1,598,750	\$7,270,800

Soon after this consolidation the company became embarrassed, and defaulted on all their bonds (including two issues under the consolidation); and in December, 1859, went into liquidation. The bondholders and other creditors, however, agreed upon terms of reorganization, which were carried into effect on the 1st July, 1862, the consolidated company taking the name of the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad Company, to distinguish them from their predecessors. The basis on which the reorganization was consummated was as follows: The 1st mortgage bonds and certain other liabilities of the old company, with all back interest to June 30, 1862, were converted into new 1st bonds. This issue embraces two series of \$1,000,000 each, the one marked A, with coupons payable October and April 1, and the other, B, with coupons payable January and July 1, the first coupon to be paid Oct. 1, 1862, and Jan. 1, 1863, respectively. A sinking fund of \$25,000 per annum, commencing with Jan. 1, 1864, was provided for the final redemption of these bonds. The second bonds, and certain other liabilities, with interest to Jan. 1, 1863, were exchanged for new second bonds. This issue was divided into two classes, viz.: "preferred" \$2,800,000, and "income" \$1,700,000, both to carry interest from Jan. 1, 1863. The preferred bonds were issued in two series, C and D, each of \$1,400,000, the coupons of C being payable February and August 1, and of D, May and November 1, annually. All these bonds are sevens, and redeemable in 1894. The third and fourth bonds of the old company, and other junior liabilities, with interest added to Jan. 1, 1863, were changed for 7 per cent preferred stock, the issue of which was limited to \$1,700,000, increasable only under the expressed sanction of a majority of the stock and bondholders. The first dividend was payable May 1, 1864, and if not paid was to become accumulative and a charge against income. The common stock of the old company was converted into new common stock at the rate of 40 per cent of its face. The result of these conversions placed the capital of the new company at \$10,700,000. the same as it stood up to 1867, when the preferred stock was increased by a 20 per cent dividend in kind, issued in liquidation of arrears of interest up to Jan 1, 1867. The addition to the amount of liabilities under this issue was \$340,000, increasing the capital account to \$11,040,000. In 1867 the main line of the company's railroad was leased to the Indianapolis and St. Louis company, a corporation engaged in the construction of a railroad between Indianapolis and Terre Haute. Since this lease the Bellville branch is the only line operated by this company. It is essentially a coal road, and derives the greater part of its revenues from the transportation of that mineral to St. Louis. "A negotiation has been pending for some time with the Bellville and Southern Illinois Railroad Company for the extension of the branch to Duquoin, and it is hoped that some satisfactory arrangement will yet be made." Should this project be accomplished a very direct line will be formed between St. Louis and Cairo at the confluence of the Ohio with the Mississippi. The terms of the contract referred to above are set forth in the company's report for 1867, as follows:

"An operating contract with the Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad Company was duly executed, and actual possession of the road and its equipment was formally delivered to that company on the 11th day of September last, since which date the main line has been operated under the contract. By the terms of the contract it took effect on the first of June previous, from which last date up to the 11th of September it was operated on account of and for the Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad Company, and the accounts have been adjusted accordingly. By the terms of the operating contract they are to put the road, with its equipment, in good condition and equal in every respect to first class roads of the Western States, and so to keep and maintain it. They are to pay to this company 80 per cent of the first \$2,000,000 of gross earning; 25 per cent of the next or third million, and 20 per cent of all earnings above that during the existence of the contract (99 years). These payments are to be made in a onthly instalments, with an agreed minimum of \$37,500 per month, or \$450,000 per annum. The performance of this contract is guaranted by the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Company, one-third; the Indianopolis, Cincinnati and Latayette Railroad Company, one-third; and the Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Railroad Company, jointly, one-third."

The stock of engines and cars used in operating the road at the date of reorganization, and on the 1st January, 1864-68, both inclusive, is shown in the statement which follows:

Engines (word)(coal)	••••	80	1864 8; 10	. 1865 80 16	1866. 80 16	1867. 80 16	1968. A 1968. A 1969.
Total engines	••••	87 28	42 28	46 25	46 95	46 28	the n
Baggage and express cars	••••	8 4	5 4 5	5 4 5	5 4 5	5 6 4	dat Gerra
Caboos cars Box freight cars (common)		940	90 938 81	91 949 93	21 242 93	91 949 108	for the tractor of contractor
" (Blu Line)	• • • •	:: 60	17 12 94	17 13 93	17 19 92	23 12 88	ment se cor erting
Platform ca·s G. avel and coal cars		85	165 819	188 828	188 828	149 878	etate d to ti
Total cars		588	988	1,033	1,082	1,051	Spie

The following statement shows the gross earnings, working expenses

and cost of improvements, and revenue after all costs, yearly since the reorganization of the company, July 1, 1862:

1	962 (6 m) 1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.	1967.
Passenger carnings	\$174,095	\$511,284	\$655,146	\$858,960	\$820,568	\$767,194
Freight earnings	429,659				1,291,258	
All other ea nings	29,027		164,281	185,621	138,820	185,899
Opera ing expenses	*****			1,415,875		
Extraordinary expenses	••••	212,805	298,898	886,809	100,596	*****
Total expenses	854,981	1,181,888	1,588,807	1,752,185	1.723,878	1,691,858
Revenue over costs	978.480	428,579	500,768	488 558	526,764	196,54
Total gross earnings	682,713	1,554,918	2,084,074	2,940,748	2,250,142	2,218,462

The income account, showing the whole financial transactions of the company yearly, is condensed in the following statement:

		. 1864. . 12 mos.		1866. 12 mos.	1867. 12 mos.
Balance from last year	87,667	\$ 294,928	201,449	89,507	\$ 47, 272
> arnings from all sources	2,211,168	2,084,074	2,240,748	2,150,142	1,080,819
Contr ctors of main line, from June 1 to Nov. 80, 80 per cent. f gross earnings, \$1,088.001 48 Contractors of main line for Dec (minimum; ex-		••••	••••	•••••	811,400
cess payable February 1, 1868)	••••				37,500 5,570
THE GLOST OF OF STOCE COTT SCORE SCORE STOCKED					0,010
Total	2,248,880	2,878,802	2,442,198	2,839,650	1,482,562

-which amounts are charged with the following:

Paymen's for improvements, new iron and rolling stock, and t at sportation	1.497.764	1.588.807	1.759.185	1.728.878	777,168
Coupon - and sinking fund	455,837	598,545	600,500	494,000	494,000
Paid to Wi gins F. rry Co	291,228	901,449	69,507	75,000 47,272	161,894
Total		2.378.802	2.449.193	9.889.650	1.432.569

The earnings from all sources for 1867 are divided thus: Earnings on all the lines from January 1 to June 1 (5 months), \$842,447 19, and on the Belleville Branch Line only, from June 1 to December 31 (7 months), \$188,872 56. The earnings on the Main Line for the 6 months (June 1 to Nov. 30), as shown in the account, amounted to \$1,038,001 48, of which 30 per cent (\$311,400 44) was paid by the contractors to the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad Company. The amount set down for the month of December (\$37,500) is the minimum stipulated for by the company in their contract with the lessees. The payments for improvements, &c., for 1867 are for all lines to June 1 (\$857,141 33 less amount assumed by contractors for locomotives and supplies on hand \$118,089 09) \$739,052 24. The payments for the Belleville Branch for the last 7 months of the year are stated separately at \$98,116 10—total as above, \$777,168 34.

The first balance sheet of the reorganized company bears date January,

1864. The following abstract shows the financial condition of the company at that date and yearly thereafter:

	1864.	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
Capital stock—common	2,9 0,000	2,300,000	2,300,000	2,800,000	2,801,000
" - preferred	1,700,000	1,700,000	1,700.0 0	1,700,001	2,040,000
Bonds—1st mortg ge	2,200,000	2,200,0:0	2,900,000	2,201,000	9,200,000
" -2d mor., pref	2,800 000	2,900,000	2,800,000		2.100,000
-2d mort., income	1,700,000	1,700,000	1,700,000	1,700,00	1,700,000
Stock and bonds	10 600,000	10,700,000	10,700,000	10,700 000	11,040,000
Rarnings from Ju y 1, 1862	9.187.695	4.271.609	6.512,448	8.763.545	9,645,088
Due on accounts	219,242	804,861	200,118	142,411	162,465
Sales of real estate	14,790	25,280	48,080	57,647	••••
to July 1, 1862, and since collected	87,667	87,683	57,683	87,683	87,689
Contractors, main line		••••	• • • •	• • • •	848,900
Interest					5,496
Total	12 - 59 895	15.850.898	17,498,819	19.700.826	21,199,507

Per contra, the following charges are made:

	-				
Cost of property, as reorganized	10,400,000	10,700,000	10,700,000	10,700,000	11,040,000
Accounts and ted					
Charter iab lities	19,149				17.444
Profit and loss		1,490			8.821
Cash in Bank of N. America	661. ú70				18,915
Cash on hand	65,138			142,657	
Due on accourts	945,851			168,689	
Contractors, main line	,			•	179,148
1st mortgage, conpous	••••	802,864	448.7 9	598,557	787,877
2d mort, pref. ccupons	••••	820,940		709,065	918,274
2d mort., income coupons	••••	211,207	828,941	446,489	
Interest on pref. stock	••••	111,128	294.811	28 . 311	237,937
Winking fond	••••				
Sinking fund	•••	25,000	87,500	67,592	01,000
M-4-1	10.000.000	48.000.00	15 400 040	10 504 000	01 100 202
Total	12,059,825	15,350,878	17,498,819	19,700,886	31,199,007

The increase in the capital account in 1867 was caused by a divident of 20 per cent in kind to the preferred stock in settlement of accumulated interest. This amounted to \$340,000, otherwise the account has remained without alteration since July 1, 1862.

The stocks of the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad Company are occasionally but not frequently sold at the New York stock boards. So far as sales have been reported, we give the monthly range for the two years 1866 and 1867:

,	c Common			Preferred.			
	1866.	1867.	1866,	1867.			
January	83 @.83	81 @39%	56 @71×	60 @67			
February	80 @x8	88 @35	t8 @61	6234 (2068)			
March	24 @35	814044	59×62.61	(0)4 (0)14			
April	80 @38	81 6 45	61 @64	60 @61			
May	10 @3436	85 1/0 40 1/	61 @6414	66 607034			
June	80 @ 2°	40% @58%	61 668	75 (0.55)			
July	81 @85	50 0.55	6434@nv 34	83 @84			
August	8416041	50 @51	6: 6078	74 @83			
September	86366034		71 00:1%	67 Ø67			
October	88 x @ 50 x	49 @51	72%(478	64 @6834			
November	88 62.68	50 a50	69 6 2.78	66%(2.67			
December	87 % @41		65 @65	66 667			
Year	29 Ø53	30%@58%	56 @78	56 @85%			

The common stock is now quoted at 36@37½ and the preferred at 60 @69.

THE HAY CROP.

The failure of the usual second hay crop, and partial failure of the root and green crops of England, in consequence of the protracted severe drought, has directed attention to the hay crop of the United States, and the more so because there has recently been an unusually large shipment of the product from this port. That there must be a scarcity of cattle food in Great Britain until next summer there can, we suppose, be little doubt, judging from the general tenor of reports; and the deficiency will doubtless require to be supplied, to a certain extent, from other countries. The bearing of this state of things, however, upon the foreign demand for our own hay crop may be easily over-estimated. As in all cases of deficient supply substitution must first be duly allowed for. The principal demand for cattle food comes from the farmers who are always strongly disinclined to increase the costs of feeding their live stock. If their crop of hay or clover falls short they are not apt to buy, but to increase the rations of coarser feed; which has been facilitated by the now general use of the strawcutter; and if the turnip crop fails, they simply feed their horned cattle more plentifully with straw and manufactured food. The high price of oats and beans only induces the farmer to sell them in preference to distributing them among his own cattle. He undoubtedly suffers in the deterioration of the condition of his stock, and perhaps in the diminution of his next year's supply of straw manure; but here the evil ends. This process of substitution, together with the economy of consumption, go far toward compensating for the loss of supply, and the result is that little in the shape of cattle food has to be imported. The scarcity of this class of products is calculated to tell most directly upon oats and Indian corn; for the former is apt to come in from foreign countries upon an advance in the home prices; while the latter is available for the production of manufactured cattle food, which is now used to a large extent in the towns of England, though little among the farmers.

In view of these facts, it is not difficult to estimate what may be the effect of the drought in England upon our own hay crop. The foundation is a very slender one for counting upon any large additions to our exports from this source, an expectation which has been encouraged in some quarters. The exports of hay from New York for the last four weeks have been 8,631 bales, worth about \$20,000, which is about one-fifth of the average annual shipments from this port. This, to be sure, shows a large increase; but the shipments are in value still insignificant, and appear to have been made principally on shipowners' account, and merely in the way of stowage and for filling up deficient cargoes. The bulkiness of such freight prohibits it from being available to any important extent for shipment to Liverpool. Hay, indeed, is a purely domestic crop.

and, although exceedingly valuable as such, is not raised in sufficient quantity to admit of our supplying a trans-Atlantic deficiency, even were it susceptible of importation thither. Three-fourths of our entire exports go to the near ports of the West Indies and Mexico, while ordinarily our shipments to England are nominal. The following statement shows the exports of hay from the United States for four late years, and the ports to which they were destined:

	!	368-'64 -	19	64-'65.—	18	65-'66	18	66-'67
Ports of destinat'n	. Tas	. Value.		. Value.	Tons.	Value.	Tons	Value.
England		\$	928	\$27,161		\$		\$
British vor h Am	1.898	28,279	8 17		189	2,768	26	777
British Columbia			700		788	10,850	256	8,068
Rus-lan Am rica			85		94	483	18	199
British West I.d.			1,682		1,783	88,178	1,186	26,167
DLITTER ACRE TOT	2,501		55		7, 30	684		
French W I & C							14	899
Spanish West Ind			2,830		8,964	72,158	1,946	40,014
Danish West Ind			17		21	451		78
Dutch W.L. & Col	83	883	27	810	96	2,086	74	1,981
Bremen		****	• • • •	• • • •			26	768
Agores, &c	1	85	2	38			• • • •	
Canary Islands		••••		• • • •	•••		15	CTS
Liberia								
Havtl & San Dom			648		208	8.717	47	1.174
M xico					1,748	29,223	2,058	83,489
entral America		•	-,6		1,120	23		78
		145			- 1	27	8	10
N. Granada & Ven					:		•••	••••
Chili and Peru			180		11	165	• • • •	••••
Brazil		187	Þ	100	84	1,481	: 3	55
Pacific ports & Is	19		1	40	15	*260	41	516
China and Japan	48	1,978			71	896	67	1,560
•								
Total	4.836	\$117,569	8,457	\$198,784	8.976	2159,016	5,028	\$109,776
Average per ton	_,,,,,,	28 49		23 51	-,,,,	17 71	-,,	21 83
TAGEN POT ANT	• • • • •	20 10	• • • •	~00	• • • •	-1,11	••••	AL 00

It is not easy, however, to over-estimate the importance of this crop as a product for home consumption. It ranks, in point of value, with our most important productions, even rivalling the cotton crop, but, not appearing in the local export returns, its value is less generally appreciated. Exclusive of the Southern States, the value of the crop is estimated, in official returns, at \$247,000,000 in 1863, at \$365,000,000 in 1864, at \$273,000,000 in 1865, and at \$306,000,000 in 1866. The quantity of hay (absolute and per acre in tons) and the value per ton thereof at the place of production, as shown in the statistics of the Department of Agriculture for the seasons of 1864, '65, '66, and '67, were as follows:

	1	9 84-5		· /1	°65-6		18	1 06-7	
	-Q anti	·y.—	Value	. —Quant	ity.¬ ˈ	Value,	-Quart	ity.— `	Value,
States.	Absolute	, p. s.	p. t	A beolute). p. a.	p. t.	A osolut	e. p. s.	p. t.
Maine	1,085,705	Ũ.88	\$ 1 00	1,429,511	1.00	\$ 11 81	957,772	Ø 80	\$19 28
N. Mamp		1.00	31 00	798,897	1.00	14 70	665,395	0.34	17.88
Vermont	850,127	1.00	17 95	991,814	1.99	11 50	862,878	1.00	15 61
Massachus		1.00	29 (20	844,178	1.88	31 00	742,872	1 CO	26 89
R. Island	62,044	1.00	81 50	64,812	1.18	22 50	58,879	1.00	31 06
Connectic't	446,956	1.20	27 00	596,191	1.25	28 50	586,527	1.40	25 60
New York		1.12	23 05	5,288,852	1.40	12 83	4,759,516	1.20	16 18
New Je sey		1.57	26 73	461,958	1.75	18 89	869,506	1.96	25 00
Pennsylva	1,796,836	1.80	24 55	2,463,545	1.60	11 98	1,970,586	1.90	16 14
Delaware		1 50	80 00	29,800	1.25	17 00	: 6,820		17 50
Maryland		1.38	27 00	181,341	1.50	16 48	181,341	1.80	20 27
Kentucky		1.83	20 16	197.801	1.40	12 10	115,844	1.87	12 80
Ohio	1.4:5,096	1.18	19 88	2,158,021	1.06	8 00	1,963,799	1.80	11 00
Indiana		1.50	17 81	1,251,646	1.66	9 40	1,08 ,982	1.28	944
Michigan		1.12	19 88	1,231,278	1.80	12 17	1,218,959	1.80	13 75
Illinois	2,166,725	1.50	15 88	2,600,070	1.50	9 80	2,840,063	1.47	9 27
Wis contin	789,765	1.14	18 00	1,066,182	1.50	10 14	1.151.477	1.30	12 25
Minnesota	248,239	1.50	9 86	274,917	1.70	8 59	860,000	1.50	10 00
Iowa.	814,764	1.68	9 51	1.018,455	1.75	7 86	1.161.039	1.90	6 20
Missouri	899,599	1.43	18 12	519,479	1.75	12 88	654,544	1.90	9 91
Kansas	82,569	1.67	18 00	118,848	2.00	8 00	123,082	2 00	7 18
Nebraska	18,891	1.88	7 88	29,425	2.00	5 64	29,720	1.50	6 48
			<u> </u>	<u> </u>					
Total	L116,691	1.30 \$	20 18 2	8,588,740	1.44 \$	11 68 X	1,894,861	1,28 \$	14 46

The hay crop of the Southern States in the season of 1866 was as follows:

-Quantity	Value.	Quantity.—	Value,
Absolute. p. a.	p. t.	Absolute, p. a. Louisiana	p. t.
Virginia 203,698 1.30	£14 28	Louisiana \$36,50: 1 00	\$30 00
North Carolina 168,229 1.30	18 00	Texas 15, 43 1.50	00 \$د ّ
Bouth Carolina 70,069 1.00	22 00	Arkansas 7,578 1.30	36 43
Georgia	23 62	Tennessee 140,5-0 1.40	18 68
Florida 9.754 8.00	20 62		
Alabama 80,854 1.00	18 68	Total	817 81
Mississippi 99.611 0.87	97.50		

The following compares the total crops of 1863, '64, '65, and '66:

		- Abso ute		Tons,	Val	ue.—
	Product : tons.	Acr age.	Value.	p. a.	p. t.	p. a.
1863*		15,641,504	\$947,680,855	1.17	\$ 13 48	\$15 83
1864	18,116,691	15,084,584	865,707,074	1.20	20 13	24 82
1865	98,598,740	16,838,852	278,812,617	1.44	11 68	16 77
1866	21,894,861	17,265,112	806,782,957	1.28	14 46	17 80
1866 (. States)		671.682	14,828,880	1.19	17 81	21 28

These statistics are suggestive. It will be noted that the value of the crop runs very irregularly with the yield. In 1863, when the yield averaged 1.17 tons per acre, the price vas \$13 48 per ton while in 1865, with a yield of 1.44 tons, the price averaged only \$11 63., This apparent discrepancy, however, is to be accounted for from the fact that the crop was 4,800,000 tons greater in 1865 than in 1863. The yield per acre and the value will be seen from an examination of the table to vary very widely in the several States, the yield being most abundant in New Jersey, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Kansas.

TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

The British Board of Trade returns for June and the six months ending June 30, have been published. They show that the outward trade has fallen off not only from last year, but also from the previous month, owing, no doubt, to the diminution in the trade with China, the United States and France. During the month the declared value of the exports of British and Irish produce and manufactures amounted to £13,933,054, against £15,490,091 last year and £14,630,120 in 1866; while in the six months ending June 30 it reached a total of £84,601,157 against £87,613,484 in 1867 and £92,857,830 in 1866. The computed real value of the imports in the five months ending May 31 was £90,167,617, against £88,547,811 last year and £98,315,826 in 1866.

In June the imports of cotton reached a total of 1,086,630 cwt., of which 608,910 cwt were from the United States, 98,923 from Brazil, 4,820 from Turkey, 139,655 from Egypt, 211,964 from British India, and 22,358 from other countries. The total received in June last year was 1,293,724

^{*} Kentucky and Nebraska were not returned in 1868.

cwt., and, in 1866, 1,677,672 cwt. The following figures show the imports into the United Kingdom in the six months ending June 30:

	1866,	1867.	1868.
From-	cwt.	cwt.	cwt.
United States	8,281,089	8,401,488	8,986,796
Bahamas and Bermudas	5,981	9.916	. 41
Mexico	8, 145	22	••••
Brazil	408,678	897,878	456,194
Turkey	78,581	58.307	15,584
Revot	619,588	702 881	747,465
British India		939,586	728,988
China		4.707	
Other countries	189,681	141,596	88,495
Total	6,857,742	5,647,908	6,015,508

As regards the exports of cotton there is a considerable falling off as compared with last year. In the six months the diminution is about 280,000 cwt., the heaviest decline being in the shipments to Russia and Prussia. The following are the particulars for the six months:

	1866,	1867,	1868,
To-	cwt.	cwt.	cwt.
Russ's	199,4 71	158,546	70,198
Prussia	81.868	114.937	56,947
Hanover	5.618	3.214	1.671
Hanse Towns	405,076	865.014	816,088
Holland	286,531	254.127	258, 362
Other countries	742,874	577,887	488,189
Total	1,550,958	1,469,165	1,181,490

The exports of cotton piece goods were less in June, current year, than in the corresponding month in 1867, in consequence of diminished shipments to Egypt, the Continent and the United States. The official return however, shows extensive shipments to India and China. The following are the total exports in the six months:

	1806.	1867.	1868.
Yarnlbs.	68,481,909	76.133.031	87,484,788
Piece goodsyds.	1.196.185.538	1.804.110.080	1,878,769,414
Threadlbs.		3,214,965	3.219.022

The annexed return shows the exports of the principal British and Irish productions and manufactures to the United States during the first six months of the current year, compared with 1867 and 1866:

Alkail, cwts	1966.	1967.	1868,
	869,897	692.709	798,918
	7,545	9,758	10,807
	65,141	67,601	55,187
Octron Manufactures Piece goods, yards. Thread, ibs. Earthenware and porcelain, pkgs. Haberdashery and millinery (value).	69,867,098	57,474,454	45,469,869
	821,757	788,163	883,112
	57,708	54,987	45,904
	£75±,818	596,981	475,793
HARDWARES AND CUTLERY— Knives, forks, &c. (value) Anvils, vices, &c. (value) Manufactures of German silver, &c. (value)	£145,544	190,405	78,171
	£55,540	47,986	35,459
	£345,396	368,745	165,758
:Linen Manufactures— Piece goods, yards	61,871,909	45,694,395	88,848,57 8
	1,139,750	749,834	549,676

Matale—			
Iron-Pig, &c., tons	44,782	57,905	81,889
Bar, &c., tons	30,866	22,018	18,056
Railroad, tons	54,896	97.078	148,544
Castings, tons	695	216	919
Hoops, sheets and boiler plates, tons	15,0:1	18,482	5,789
Wrought, tons.	5,589	8,661	1.745
Steel Unwrought, tons	9,980	10,981	6,641
Copper, wrought, cwts	5,618	2,947	1,189
Lead, pig, &c., tons	2,918	5,698	8,900
Time plates, cwts	554,040	491,582	645,119
Oil seed, galls	747,189	1,170,879	156,204
Salt, tons	100,119	70,842	75,125
SILK MANUFACTURES—			
Broad piece goods, &c., yards	481,645	227,028	178,495
Handkerchiefs, dozens.	4,623	2,393	118
Ribbons, lbs.	17,007	12.854	838.0
Other articles of silk (value)	£68,758	26,049	69.370
> ilk manuf's mixed with other materials.	£35,1¥7	88,907	81,874
Spirits, British, galis	57.821	14.885	80,769
Wool, ibs	4.880	8,904	48,894
WOOLEN AND WORSTED MANUPACTURES-	-,	-,	
	0 144 BOF	0.007 200	4 200 000
Cloth, yards	8,144,885	2,884,596	1,783 819
Carpets and druggets, yards.	9,851,809	2,335,984	1,554,590
Shawls, rugs, &c., number.	58,808	71,979	50,555
Worsted stuffs and waistcoatings, yards	42,466,342	28,553,440	81,804,881

BRITISH STATISTICS.

From official documents we gather the following statistics relating to the National Debt, as also to the progress of commerce in Great Britain and Ireland:

At the close of the financial year on the 31st of March, 1855, the funded debt amounted to £752,064,119; the unfunded debt was £23.151,400; and the estimated capital of terminable angulties, £26,763,244; making the total amount of the National Debt £881,978,763. A year later, at the corresponding date in 1856, at the close of the Crimean war, the amount was £829,579,798; at the like date in 1857, £331,722,963; in 1858, £826.134,640; in 1869, £823,934,—880; in 1860, £819,070,310; in 1861, £818,048,896; in 1862, £817,389,290; in 1863, £817,559,322; in 1864, £813,230,134; in 1865, £808,269,398; in 1866, £802,842,949; in 1867, £800,848,847; and on the 31st of March, 1868, £797,—031,650;—viz., £741,190,328 funded debt, £7.911,100 unfunded, and £47,—930,222, the estimated capital value of the terminable annuities, which in that year amounted to £3,447,270. Since 1855 the increase of debt incurred for the Crimean war has been wiped out, and the proportion of debt payable by terminable annuities has been materially increased.

The total gross revenue of the country for the year ended March, 1868, amounted to £69,600,218 sterling. Of this sum £22,650,000 was derived from customs, and £2.,162,000 from excise duties; £9,541,000 from stamps; £6,177,000 from property and income tax, and £3,509,000 for other taxes; £4,630,000 from the post office, £345,000 from crown lands, and £2,586,218 from miscellaneous receipts. The charges of collection of revenue amounted to £4,883,294, and the total expenditure, after deducting charges of collection, to £66,3 3,038 which is thus epitomized:—£26,571,750 for interest and management of the National Debt; £11,193,757 for the civil list and civil charges of all kinds; £15.418,582 for the army, including ordnance and all other military charges; and £11,168,949 for the navy. The customs revenue was derived—from duties

on sugar and molasses, amounting to £5,582,473; on tea, to £2,827,317; on coffee, to £390,161; on corp. meal and flour, to £869,323; on spirits, to £4,298,-403: on wine, to £1.468.993, on tobacco and snuff, to \$6.542,250; on other imported articles, to £581,481; and on miscellaneous receipts, to £104,580. The excise duties consisted of £10,511,530 derived from spirits, £6,302,419 from malt. £2.640,237 from licences, and £736,152 from other receipts. By an abstract of alterations of taxes from 1853 to 1867, it is found that taxes were repealed or reduced to the extent of £40,292,904, and were imposed to the extent of £28,448,596, causing at the end of 1867 an actual diminution to the extent of £11,844,308 sterling. The total value of imports during the past year was £275,249,853, or £9 2s. 6d. per head of population of the United Kingdom. The total value of exports (British, foreign and colonial produce) was £226,067,136, and the total value of imports and exports represented £16 12s. 5d. per head of the population. The actual receipts t the Exchequer fell short of the sum estimated in the 'udget by a sum of £369,782, and the actual payments out of the Exchequer (excluding fortifications) were less than those estimated in the budget (including supplemental votes) by £50,785.

ASSISTANT TREASURER'S STATEMENT FOR AUGUST.

The following is the official statement of the business of the office of the Assistant Treasurer of the United States, in New York, for the month of August 1868:

RECEIPTS AND DISRITRARWENTS.

Balance, July 81, 1868	\$80,183,185 56
Receipts during the month: \$12,983,888 91 On account of customs \$9,075,921 00 do Gold notes \$9,075,921 00 do Internal revenue \$299,692 47 do Three year cent. Certificates \$12,885,000 00 do Post-office Department \$81,983 45 do Transfers \$17,251,000 00 do Patent fees \$3,09 90 do Miscellaneous \$4,520,446 53 do Disbursing accounts \$24,180,294 83 do Assay office \$1,341 85 do Assay	
do Interest accounts	- 81, 258,234 64
Total	\$161,886,490 00
Payments during the month:	
Treasury drafts \$50,387,076 99 Post-office drafts 253,163 85 Disbursing accounts 21,887,485 71 Assay-Office 149,104 69	
Interest accounts, vis.:	
In coin	- 78,890,963 05
Balance	\$87,555,452 17
Balance to Cr. Treasurer U. S. \$70,168,120 14 Balance to Cr. disbursing accounts 15,038,596 60 Balance to Cr. Assay oftice 2,838,785 43 Receip s for Customs in the month of August, 1868 Receipts for Customs in the month of August, 1867	\$19,969,883 91 12,903,740 08
. Decrease for August, 1868	\$639,856 17

UNITED STATES ASSAY OFFICE FOR AUGUST.

Below we give the statement of business at the United States Arsay Office at New York for the month ending August 31, 1868:

DEPOSITS OF SOLD.

Foreign coin. Foreign bullion. United States bullion.	\$8,900 00 144,100 00 1,802,500 00-\$1,455,500 00
DEPOSITS OF SILVER, INCLUDING PURCHASI	16.
Foreign coins. Foreign bullion United States bullion (contained in gold). Montana. Colarado Lake Superior. Nevada. Total deposits, payable in bars. 1 otal deposits, payable in coins. Gold bars stamped.	100,000 00 1.526.000 no

SAN FRANCISCO TREASURE MOVEMENT FOR SIX MONTHS.

We have received from Thomas P. Kettell, the San Francisco Commercial List of July 13, containing a review of the trade of San Francisco for the six months ending June 30th, from which we extract the following:

The receipts of bullion, as reported by Wells, Fargo & Co., distinguishing that from Nevada, have been for aix months in three years as follows:

Nevada	10,829,958	1867. \$9,841,949 9,647,5°7 1,519,958 1,638,857	1868, \$6,481,497 10,229,996 1,470,428 1,495,502
Total	\$21,187,788	\$22,198,291	\$19,678,855

The great decline, as compared with last year, is in the Nevada product; but there

has been an increase in the gold of the Northern California mines.

These are the returns of the express company which embrace nearly all the bullion that comes do n. Much comes, however, in private hands, but which finds its way either to the mint, to the custom house or for export. These returns account for rather more than the express deliveries, as follows:

Gold bars at mint	9,582,510 16 848,193 45	1868. \$8,928,660 41 11,046,894 64 884,852 79 6,170,797 77 715,897 18
Total coined and shipped	\$25,606,611 79 22,193,291 09	\$22,226,582 92 19,678,855 00
Excess over reported receipts	\$3,418,820 79	\$1,568,177 92

This excess indicates the quantities that came down through irregular channels. It is obvious that these figures do not embrace the stocks of bullion on hand, as thus some \$600,0.0 0 was shipped on the first week of July, which was on hand at the close of June; but the amount on hand January 1st was about the same as that held July 1st. ence the figures give nearly the actual movement for the quarter. The official report of the exports of treasure, showing the destination, embraces the coin ship ment with the bullion, and is not to be relied upon as an indication of the actual gold product of the coast.

The shipment of treasure for the six months, distinguishing the kinds of metals sent forward have been as in the following to tables, showing the description by each conj veyance:

EXPORT OF TREASURE VIA PANAMA PER STEAMERS.

	Gold bars.	Silver bars.	Gold coin.	Totals.
Jan. 1	\$757,768 18	\$169,884 89	267,088 01	\$994,705 58
* 11	701,922 85	497,078 48	1:4,000 00	1.812.995 83
44 18	508,884 96	232,629 92	72,986 78	609,501 66
" 80	639,236 58	808,187 89	146,991 96	*1,098,161 88
Feb. 10	644,979 73	830,568 64	83,988 00	1,058,781 27
18	279,827 26	176,786 48	105,803 59	501.416 28
4 99	851,098 62	277,813 60	25,654 94	654,061 16
Mar. 5	874 000 00	100,000 67	•	474,000 67
* 10	806,654 90	•	55,853 17	369,006 07
18	460.035 49	298,768 96	31,000 00	701,799 44
4 25	808,000 00	Wen' 100 20	W11000 00	808,000 00
4 81	558, 45 82	880,998 06	19 632 00	958,830 83
Apr. 6	60,900 (4)	198,179 09	19 032 U	
	870,176 80			474,579 09
***************************************	814,500 00	848,406 59	22,000 00	740,582 89
20:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::		000 000 00	04.010.04	814,500 00
***************************************	265,866 70	868,879 56	94,619 84	679,858 60
_ " 80	496,570 41	184,981 71	46,196 96	696,999 08
May 5	98,597 33	115,103 67	48****	208,700 00
6	426.S18 84	185,804 48	49,260 25	610,838 02
" 14	584,805 25	876,970 01	46,945 16	1,006,820 52
" 90 ,		196,777 28		196,777 28
" 🥦	586.985 68	118,876 65	96,184 06	676,496 89
· 80	626,864 85	415,860 11	80,578 54	1,072,298 00
June 5		118,108 69		118,108 69
" 6 ·····	526,928 72	76,95 8 86	18,500 00	622,882 58
⁶⁶ 18	887,107 66	447,964 04	10,000 00	†859, 87 1 80
" 23	816,225 79	185,412 66	25,744 63	527,888 06
" 80	205,899 77	281,067 29	80,700 00	470,667 16
Total 6 months '68\$1	1,016,824 64	\$6,170,797 77		\$18,498,1 69 29
Total 1867	9,582,540 16	5,459,871 85	1,766,188 78	16,801,600 79
		• •		• •
EXPORT TO CHIMA, E	TC., PER ST	EAMERS AND SA	IL VESSELS.	
·	•			
Gold ba			. Mex. do lars	
Jan. 18 \$111,700) 10 \$58,58	31 24 839 ,8 83 U	3176,58 1 00	18878,844 84
1,100	0 00	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		1,100 00
Feb. 19	59,70	77 81		RU DOM CO
" 29	107,4			
Mar. 7 48,08		89,105 0		
14 14		78 95	44 4 4 4 6	
4 19	A4'0	56 87	•	64 FAA 55

Jan. 18	Gold bars. \$111,700 10	Filver bars. \$58,581 24	Gold coin. 239,833 00	Mex. do lars. \$176,581 00	Total. \$378,844 84	
⁴ 18		*******		•••••	1,100 00	
Feb. 19		59,707 81	******	****	59,207 81	
" 29		107,458 11		86,00 0 00	148,468 11	
Mar. 7			89,10 5 00	208,877 00	\$291,189 47	
14		59,673 25	•••••	41,174 00	98,847 15	
		84,566 87	•••••	*****	84,566 87	
4 94		85,104 05 125,006 28	26,029 00	121,760 00	85,104 (5 1850,887 58	
Apr. 18		•	•	1,000 00	1,000 10	
June 8		191,628 16	60,888 25	225,884 00	**695,478 41	
		to Japan.				
Jan. 18		50,716 66		154,649 50	205,859 46	
June 8	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	******	•••••	8,000 00	8,000 60	
	10	VICTORIA.				
Jan. 21		••••	95,000 00		25,000 00	
Apr. 4		• • • • • • • • •	50,000 00	•••••	50,000 00	
TO SANDWICH IBLANDS.						
Feb. 8		••••••	25,000 00	•••••	25,000 00	
Mar. 17	• ••••••	•••••	25,000 00	*******	25,000 00	
Total 6 mon's	\$874,506 39 848,193 45	\$715,897 18 2,520,155 68	\$989,849 25 146,419 00		\$2,868,017 85 8,789,947 78	

^{33.785 50} foreign gold coin included in total. 15,000 Mexican dol'ars included in total. 12,200 gold dust included in total.

⁴⁶ 66

By recapitulation, the whole treasure exported has been as follows:

Total		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	\$24,859,708 51
Daties, coin	\$18,498,169 29 4,028,531 87	\$2,868,017 85	\$90,861,187 14 4 025,591 87
silver bars. Gold coin Gold dust Mexican dollars Foreign gold coin	1,261,811 88	715,897 18 289,349 25 10,846 60 972,918 50	6,886,191 46 1,851,667 63 10,346 60 987,918 50 8,785 50
Gold bym	Via Is hmus. \$11,046,824 64	China, &c. \$374,506 89	Total. \$11,491,880 96 6,886,194 95

There has been a great decline in the ahipments of silver to China, mostly owing to the derangement of the exchanges there, in the attempt to change the customary usance on England. At the same time the opposition lines to the East greatly reduced the cost of treasure in that direction, and therefore not only reduced the quantity of silver sent to China but increased that sent to the East, at the same time reducing the quantity of silver to be refined in the local refineries, because only fine ailver is sent to China, and crude bars are shipped East. The mines also produced less than last year. The gold production is arrived at by taking the official returns of all the bullion bars received. These are as follo as for gold:

	1867.	1866.
Depo-ited at mint	\$7,7 ∪1,909 11	\$3,918,660 41
Shipped i er steamers	9,589,510 16	11.046,824 64
ste me s, dust	17,907 54	******
" seil, Uhina, etc	843 198 45	874,106 89
sail, China, dust		10.846 60
Total gold	\$17,750,518 26	\$15,849,991 87

This approximates the actual gold product by accounting for all the gold received. The remittances of silver in the last six months, as compared with the corresponding six months of 1866 and 1867, were as follows:

	Per steamers.	To China.	Total
1866	\$8,558,964	\$9,107,856	\$5,465,690
1867		8. 20 155	7,974,006
1808		715,897	6,886,194

This rise and fall in the silver exports indicates the Nevada production. It is to be understood that the bars sent to China are fine, while those sent East are partly gold; hence the total value of the China shipments would be fifty por cent greater in unparted bars, or \$3,780,232 last year, which with the Eastern shipments would make \$9,284. 83 Novada bare. This year the total value would be \$7,243,8 2 showing a decline of \$1,990,241 in Nevada bars, which is the measure of the diminished production in that region.

The coin movement for the same period has been as follows:

Coinage	1967. \$7,701,909 11		
ShippedDutles	5,578,931 00	4,03 -,531 87	5,595,182 00
Excess coinage			\$1.666,521 59

This small supply of co'n has been the result of the low rates of transportation which have carried the bullion East. The movement of coin to and from the interior has been as follows:

F ret qua-ter	Ser t	From	Surplus
	inland.	interior.	s · nt.
	\$1,239,4 \8	\$1,497,619	\$791,739
	2,947,013	1,8:8 885	1,142,627
Total elx months		\$3,801,004 2,554,859	\$1.914,416 \$,169,714

The internal drain has not been quite so great as at the same time last year.

H. McCulloch, Secretary.

UNITED STATES DEET.

The subjoined letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, shows the amount of the several gold-bearing loans of the United States outstanding July 1, 1868:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, July 15, 1868.
In reply to your letter of 18th inst., inquiring the amount outstanding of various

loans,	I wo	uld respectfu	lly stat	e that	on July 1,	1868, th	ere was of-	
Five p Five Five	ercen	1	874.				••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	\$7,022,00 ⁰ \$0,010,00 ⁰ 106,440,80 ⁰
Six Six	64 64	bonds of 184'	7-8 outs	anding.				6,678,44 ² 288,677,20 ⁰
Six Six	"	five-twentie	Jun~ 8	0. 1864.	"			125.551.300
Six Six	66 66	"	1865, a 1865, c 1867.	ongols, J	an. & J.ly,	outstand:	Dg	334,97 9,9 50
Bix	44	**	1868,	"	46	**	••••••	

The 1865 con-ols, 1867's and 1868's cannot be definitely given, as these loans are being continually increased on account of the exchange of Seven-Thirty notes.

To Messrs. HENRY CLEWS & Co., New York.

Comparing the above with the Public Debt Statement of June 1 we notice the following changes:

Ten-Forties. Five-Twenties, 1869.	514,180 500	July 1, *\$198,449,800 514,774,600
Five-T wenties. 1864-'65-'67	8,589,642	1,022,435,400 17,6 8,250 6,87-,442 27,022,000
8 xes of 1881	\$88,677,200	283,677,900 23,060, 88,893

POSTAL CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

A Postal Convention has just been concluded between the United States and the Pritish Post-office Department for establishing and regulating an exchange of mails between the United States, the Straits settlements and the British East Indies by means conjointly of the line of United States mail steamers plying between San Francisco and Hong Kong, and of the line of British mail packets plying between Hong Kong and Singapore, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Aden. Its leading provisions are as follows: On and after the lat of November. 1868, (the date on which this Convention is to be carried into operation) the postage to be lev ed and collected in the United States upon correspondence of all kinds posted in the United States and addressed to the Straits settlements or the British East Indies for transmission by this route, will be ten cents per single rate of half ounce or under on letters; two cents each on newspapers, and eight cents per four ounces or fraction thereof on books, packet-, patterns and samples. The correspondence thus prepaid in the United States will be delivered at the proper destinations in the British East India possessions free of all charges whatever. Pre-payment is obligatory on newspapers, book packets and patterns, but letters posted unpaid, or in ufficiently paid, will, nevertheless, be forwarded and charged at

^{*} Now within \$1,550,200 of the authorized limit.

the place of destination in the Straits settlements or the British E at Indies with a postage of ten pence (twenty cents) per single rate, together with a fine of sixpence (twelve cents). Paid correspondence of all kinds received from the Straits settlements and the British East Indies by this route will be delivered at the office of destination in the United States free of all charge whatever; but unpaid or insufficiently paid letters so received will be charged on delivery with a postage of ten cents per single rate of half an ounce or under, together with a fine of twelve cents each. No accounts will be kept between the respective post departments of the correspondence thus exchanged, each department retaining all the postage which it collects both on paid matter sent and unpaid matter received. New York and San Francisco are the offices of exchange on the side of the United States, and Singapore, Oelcutta, Madras, Bombay and Aden are the exchange offices in the Straits settlements and the British East Indies.—Washington Despatch.

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

The Money Market—Rates of Loans and Discounts—U. S. Securities—Bonds sold at the New York took Exchange Bo rd—Prices of Government recurities at New York—Course of Consols and American recurities at London—Closing prices of all the Kulwaya d Miscellaneous Securities—Course of Gold—Ge eral Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York

August has been characterised by the usual ase in the money market. The banks have held large amounts of idle funds, the deposits of the Western banks having perhaps been unusually large; and, with but a moderate demand for discounts, the supply on call has been very abundant at 3@4 per cent, with a brief interval at 4225 per cent. About the 10th of the month there was a very active demand from the West, which continued for two weeks, causing a loss of about \$10,000,000 of currency, chiefly national bank notes. This demand was to prowide for the moving of the earlier grain crop in the more Southern sections of the West, and was followed by a suspension of remittances. The outflow of currency almost exhausted the supply of bank bills, but had little effect upon the loan market. The loanable resources of the banks, however, were undoubtedly largely curtailed, and the fact of the rate of interest on call loans not being enhanced was perhaps due to the banks anticipating a renewal of the Westward outflow in September, and holding themselves prepared for such a novement whenever it may occur. In August of last year the movement corresponded closely with that of last month, the banks sending a large amount of currency West from the 10th to the 25th of the month, after which the shipments fell off, and the rate of inter-But in September the outflow of currency was est declined one per cent. renewed, with the loss of a large amount of legal tender, and the advance of the rate of interest to seven per cent in gold toward the close of the month.

The following comparison shows the totals of the statements of the New York banks at the close of each week in August and at the close of August. 1867:

	Angust 8.	August 15.	Angust 23.	A ugust 29.	Sept. 8, '07
Loans and discounts	\$379,755,756	£277,908,610	\$275.94^.781	\$971,780,726	\$94,767,06
Sp cle	24,784,487	22,958,850	19 768,681	16,949,108	7,271,5
Circulation	84.074 374	84.1 4.067	84.187.627	84,113,199	₩88,715,128
Depos ts	281, 16,492	228,561,087	216,435,405	210.814.646	140,592,815
Legal Tenders	74,051,548	72,985,481	69,757,645	67,767,376	67,982,571

Tre following are the rates of Loans and Discounts for the month of August;:

	August 7.	August 14.	August 21.	August 28.
Call loans	8 @ 4	8 @ 4	4 @ 5	8 @ 4
Loans on Bonds and Mortgage	−@ 7	−@ 7	−@ 7	— @ 7
A 1, endorsed bills, 2 mos	6 @—	6 @	6 @	6 @—
Good endorsed bills, 8 & 4 mos	−@ 7	@ 7	– ⊚ 7	—@ 7
" single names	7 @ 71	7 @ 71	7 @ 71	7 @ 71
Lower grades	8 @10	8 @10	8 @10 T	8 @ 10 ¯

The transactions in securiti s have exhibited rather more activity than in July. The speculative combinations upon the leading stocks having found it impracticable to effect long loans, so as to enable them to carry their stocks through the usual fall activity in money, appear to have turned their attention to distributing their load upon the market, and have been successful to a considerable extent, although at the expense of some reduction in prices. Late in the month the returning ease in the money market revived the spirit of speculation, and produced a general advance in the price of securities, further facilitating the distribution of stocks by the cliques; and at the close of August, railroad shares appear to have been much more generally held by brokers and the smaller class of operators than for some months past. The sales of the various classes of shares at both boards for the month aggregate 1,151,003 shares, which is an increase over the same period of last year of 18,227 shares, as may be seen in the following statement:

	•				
Classes.		1867.	1868.	Increase.	. Dec
nk shares		2.467	2,882		135
			1.008,995	72.819	
oal "			2,421		2,423
			6.700		12.220
	***************************************	-27.22			
aprov'nt'	***************************************		7,200	••••	2,205
elegraph ''	*******	98,114	28,660	••••	74,454
eamship"		88,666	83,957	291	••••
xpr'sa&c'	***************************************	88,744	70,808	87,064	
		4 400 500	4 4 7 4 000	10.01	
TOTAL-A	ngust	1,188,776	1,151,008	18,927	
" — si ı	nce January 1	14,668,626	12,818,389	• • • • •	1,850,237

United States securities have exhibited very considerable speculative activity. The shipment of bonds to Europe continued during the earlier part of the month, and the total sent during July and August is estimated at #25,000,000 to \$30,000,000. These shipments have been almost wholly consignments upon speculation, and it yet remains to be seen whether they will be all ultimately distributed or some part will be returned; for the moment, however, this movement has the effect of taking off a large amount of bonds thrown upon this market by home investors, under apprehensions created by the agitation of financial questions. There has been considerable fluctuation in prices, encouraged by the operations of large dealers, who have alternately had to buy heavy amounts from dome tic holders and been able to sell freely to foreign bankers. The month closes with generally lower quotations, and apparently with large supplies in the hands of the larger brokers.

BONDS SOLD AT THE N	, Y, STOCK	EXCHANGE B	DARD,	
Classes.	1867.	1866.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds	\$15,772,150	\$29,482,650	\$18,660,500	8
7. S. notes	4.458.00		• • • • • •	4,456,450
St'e & city b'ds	1,978,500		6,232,400	******
Company b'ds	728,000	989, 00	261,500	••••
		•		
Total—August	\$22,981,850	\$33,629,800	\$15,697,950	
" -since Jan. 1	123,256,990	248,770,190	125,513,180	****

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of August as represented by the latest sate officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF	COLEBRANA	SPATIBITITES A	T NEW YORK.

Day of	~6's, 1	.881.~		-6's, (t	-20 yrs.) Coup	on	5'	8.10-40
month.	Coup.	Reg.	1862.	1864.	1865.			968. yrs	
1	115%		118%	1111	1121	108%	109		10816
8	11534	1151	1143	110%	1121	108%	108%	109	108%
4	115%		114	110%		108	108%	108%	109
5	116	115%	114%	111	119%	108%	109	109	109%
6	116		1143	110%	11234	106%	109	109	109%
7	115%		1:4%	/-	112%	108%	1083	108%	109 X
8	115%		114%	110%	1123	108%	108%	109	108%
10	115%	1151	115	111	112%	109	109%	109	109%
11	115%	115%	114%	110%	113%	100	108%	10934	109%
19	115%		114%	110%	11234	1091	1093	109%	1003
18	115%	115%	114%	110%	11234	1091	1093	109%	109%
14	1143	/6	114%	100%	112	108%	108%	105%	109
15	115		1.8%	/5	11134	108	108	20-78	10816
17			1182	1091	1117	108	107%	107%	108%
18	114	*****	118%	10 🕏	11137	107%	107%	107	108%
19	118%		118%	108%	110%	107%	107%	107%	1063
2)		118	118%	108%	iiix	107%	107	107%	108%
91		1181	1181	10836	111%	107%	107¥	108)	108%
92	118%	220/8	1182	109	1111	107%	107%	107%	108%
94	113%		1187	108%	1112	1071	107%	107×	1081
25	118%	118	118%	108%	110%	1071	107%	107	108
16	1184	113%	118%	1091	110%	1081	1083	108	1081
57	714	118%	1134	109%	iiix	108%	107%	108	1083
98	i14¥	114	114%	110	1117	108%	108%	108%	108%
29	114%	_	114%	110%	119	108%	1:8%	108%	106%
11	114%	114	114	109%	111%	108	108		109
•••••••••••	44776	444		100%	44478	10078	100	•••••	100
First	115%	1151	112%	1111	11936	108%	109	109	10834
Lowest	118%	113	118%	108%	110%	107%	107%	107¥	103%
Highest	116	115%	115	1111	112%	109%	149%	109%	103%
Range	2%	13%	1%	2%	21/4	13	20578	21/2	134
Last	1141	11473	114	1002	1112	1082	108	1084	100

The closing prices of Five-Twenties at Frankfort in each week ending with Thursday, were as follows:

Aug 6. 75%	Aug. 12.	Ang. 20.	Aug 27.	Month. 75@75¥
70%	'10¥	70 <u>14</u>	10	1002103

The closing prices of Consols for money and certain American securities (viz U. S. 6's 5-20's 1862, Illinois Central and Erie shares) at London, on each day of the month of August are shown in the following statement:

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

			securi					secui	
Date.			Ill.C.					Ill.C.	
Bat'day 1	94%	79	94%	48%	aturday29			day.)	
Monday 8	94%		94	49%	Monday24	94		9134	
Tuesd y 4		71X		41	Tu-sday25	9134			8176
Wedn'y 5 Thursday 6	94	71%		89	Wednesday 26 Thursday 27	94%			
Friday 7			91% 91%	28	Friday28	94	TIX		811
Bat'day 8	98%	nx		X732	Saturday29	94	72%		81
Monday10	94%		92	872	Tuesday	98%	73	9134	80
Tu'sday	94	71%		977	1 -				
Wednesday 19	98%	72	923	87	Lowest	98%	71%		
Thursday	93%	71%	928	8636	Highest				
Priday14		71%		86	Range	*	1	416	185
Saturday	9436		99	41.	I a - 1 a -	91%	70%	8434	80
Mond 1 y		71%	91 % 91	912	Low) 87	96%			50%
Wedney19		71%	91	812	Hig of	4%		171	
Thurs90	9872	71%		81	Last	98%		91%	
Priday21	982	712	91	81		/ -		/3/	

The following table will how the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of July and August, 1868:

Taring and the money of a	uiy &L	Jul	Kuot, 1			A na	ust -	
Railroad Stocks-	Open	High.	Low.	Clos.	Onen	bigh.	Low.	Clos.
Alton & Terre Haut	. 40	ыigh.	40	44%	Opon.	~	227 44.	0.00.
do do pref	. 66	68	66	67				
Roston Hartford & Rris	16	18%	16	18%	1934	24	181	2114
Chicago & Alton	. 188	188	137	187	1.6%	144	186	142
Chicago & Alton do do pref. Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.	1891	18934	128%	1883	188%	145	1881	145
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	. 164	165	164	165	170	178	170	171
do & Gt Eastern					40	40	40	40
do & Northwest'n	. 78¥∢	84% 84% 11:0%	78	82%	821/ 81/4	8814	80	833
do do pref	. 79¥∕	84 14	781	82 X	81 🔏	88%	79 €	883
do & Rock Island.	105%	1103	105	110%	1101	1123	971	1013
Cleve., Col., Cin & Ind	. 90	WUX.	8314	88)¥	88 -	88	81	82
do Painesv. & Ashta	. 100 %	101	99	36.X	100	100	97 %	98
do & Pittsburg	. 89%∢	90	8414	90 -	8914	8934 10754	85	86%
do & Toledo	108	1043	102)	103	102%	107%	9836	101%
Del., Lack & Western	118	118	118	118	118	130	118	119
Del., Lack & Western	75	78	75	78	72 16 68 16 78 16	7236 6836	7236	73%
Erie	. 70 %	71	67%	6°34	88%	68%	46 X	48
_do pref	75	75%	74%	75	781	783	68	69
Harlem	128	124	198	194	••••	••••	••••	• • • •
do pref	. 194	194	122	122	****	٠.::،	****	****
Hannioal & St. Joseph	85	86	86	86	85%	85%	84	84 83
do do prei	981	8836	87	87	86	86	.88	
Hudson River	1897	189	188	1883	140	140	188	140
Illinois Central Ind. & Cin innati	103	159	144	151	151	151%	142)/	140%
Tollar & Chicago	50	53	50 91	5136	• • • •	• • • •	• • • •	••••
Joliet & Chicago Mar. & Cincin, lat pref do 3d pref Michigan Central	. 90	91 29	58	91 29	28	28	28	28
An 9d prof	10	10	10		20	360	20	20
Michigan Control	1181/	119	1164	10 119	1191	121	118	110
do S. & N. Ind.	9:3	98	883	88%	881	883	83	84%
Mil & P do Ch'n 1stne	105	106	104	106	106	107	106	107
Mil. & P. du Ch'n, 1st pr	199	100	99	991	100		100	104
Milwankes & St. Pani	RA	77X	65	76%	76	77	69	76
An An heaf	7121.	85	78	88	84	8434	79%	88 %
Morris & Rusey	65	65	65	65	63	64	63	64
New Haven & Hartford	-				218	235	218	225
Morris & Essex. New Haven & Hartford. New Jersey.	128	128	128	128				
do Central	19434	124%	120	120%	121	121	118	119
New York Central	1841	186%	1814	182%	1821	1883	122%	125 K
New York Central do & N. Haven	145	145	145	145	145	145%	148	148
Womenich & Womenetes	OG.	93	92	92	91	91	91	91
Ohio & Mississippi do do pref Panama Pitteb., Ft. W. & Chica. Rasding Panama & Rasding	294	80%	29	8034	80%	80%	281	2814
do do pref	731	787	78%	78%	714	79	77%	78
Panama	8.0	880	880	880	840	868	840	368
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica	110	110%	1061	110%	110%	110	105	1081
Reading	10134	101	911	94%	94%	95	8834	905₹
Rensselser & Saratogs	95%	95%	95%	95 X				
Rome & Watertown	119	1:0	110	110	••••	••••		•••
Second Avenue	40	46¾	40	4634	• • • •	••••		• • • •
Stonington	80	80	80	80	80	60	80	80
Stonington Toledo, Wab. & Western	4814	54 X	48%	5136	51	58%	49	58 <u>%</u>
do do do piet	69	54 ¾ 78 ¾	69	7834	78	78	78	78
Miscellaneous-								
American Coal	****	****	••••		45	45	45	45
Cumberland Coal Del. & Hud. Canal Coal	83	85	83	88	80	8l	29	29
Del. & Hud. Canal Coal	140	141	130	181	1 1	181	119%	127
Pennsylvania Coal	210	210	210	210	200	200	200	200
Pacine Mail	100	101%	971	101%	1013	104%	98%	10136
Atlantic do	29%	29 X	28	28	15	19%	15	1936
Union Navigation	26%	XIV.	263	281	27	2714	17	37.75
Boston Water ower	17	17 49	16	17	17%	173	15%	153
Canton	111		45	484 10	48	48	45%	45%
Canton Cary Improvement Brunswick City	41,78	10%	10		10%	111	10%	11
Merinose	Ø.	103	836	8%	876	8¾	836	836
Mariposa	81/	934	834	ā	7	7	7	***
Quicksi'ver.	211	24	19%	25 X			20	2134
Quicksi'ver.	9.0	210	310	210	21%	2274	~~	~178
Manhattan Gas	31%	851	8834	35 <u>¼</u>	35	85	98	8434
Bankers & Brokers Ass	106	106	96 🔏	99	99	105	99	106
New York Guano	-04	436	4	434		200		
Express-	•	-75	•	4/3	••••	••••		••••
American	47%	4814	4436	45%	451/	4514	40	41
Adame	58	54	51 %	25 X	45% 52%	58	46	48
United States	48%	4914	45%	46	46	4616	41	42%
United States. Merchant's Union	2E 🔏	25	23 ~	24 K	24%	24%	18%	21
Wells, Fargo & Co	25%	27%	24 🗶	27	263	27 %	941	2434

The course of the gold premium has fluctuated widely. The month opened with a very strong feel ng caused by fears of a commercial drain of gold to Europe and by the anticipation of election excitement, carrying the price up to 150 du ing the first week of the month When the large extent of our shipments of bords became understood, the upward tendency abated, and parties holding largely for a further rise became sellers, being satisfied that the irregularities of the foreign trade movement were largely set off by the export of securities The specie movement of the month has been of a somewhat irregular character. The receipts from California were \$736,853 below toose of August, 1867; but, per contra, we have received from foreign ports \$335,833 more than last year, while the Treasury has paid \$601,380 in the way of interest more than then, and has disbursed \$372,150 in the payment of bonds of 1847 and 1848. The Alaska purchase money, \$7,200, 0, on being paid to the agents of the Russian government, went into one of the banks, and of the total amount over \$6,000, 00 was remitted in the form of bills, thus augmenting the supply of coin on the market. As will be seen from a subjoined statement, the supply on the market for August was \$19,537,153 in excess of that of 1867. In the same month of last year, however, there was \$8,939,720 received from unreported sources, chiefly from Tressury sales; while no supply whatever came from that source last month. The exports of specie for the month was \$1,559,776 in exc se of that of August, The amount of specie in the banks at the close of the month was \$9,677,513 in excess of that at the same period of 1867.

The f llowing formula will show the movement of coin and bullion during the

month of August, 1867 and 1868, comparatively:

GENERAL MOVEMENT OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK.

1	1967.	186 8.	Increase.	Decrease
In banks, near first	\$8,788,094	\$20,502,737	\$11,764,648	8
Receipts from California	8,967,100	8,230,247	•	786,853
Imports of coin and bullion	492,000	827,883		
Coin interest paid	621,067	1,222,447	601,880	
Redemption of loan of 1847-148		372,150	872,150	******
Un account of Alaska purchase	•••••	7,200,000	7,200,000	•••••
Total reported supply	\$18,818,961	\$33,355,414	\$19,537,158	8
Exports of coin and bullion	\$2 639,178	\$4,198,954	1,559,776	\$
Customs duties	12.101.740	12,263,884		689,836
ORBIOTHS GRAND III	20,000,100	200,0001		
Total withdrawn	\$15,542,918	\$16,462,888	\$919,920	\$
Excess of reported supply	\$	\$16,892,576	216.892,576	\$
Exc. ss of withdrawals	1,724,657	420,000,000	•	1,721,657
Specie in banks at end	7,271,505	16,949,108		*****
Derived from unreported sources	\$8,996,253	\$56,583	\$.	\$ 8,9 3 9,7 2 0
	4 37			

The following exhibits the fluctuations of the New York gold market in the month of August, 1868.

		COL	RSE (F GOI	D AT NEW YORK.				
Date.	Openi	Lowest	High'st.	Closing.	Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st	Closing
Saturday 1 Monday 3 Tuesday 4 Wednesday 5 Thursday 6 Priday 7 Saturday 8 Monday 10	145% 145% 147% 149% 148% 147% 146%	145% 145% 147 148% 147% 147 146%	145% 146% 148% 150 148% 147% 147%	145% 146% 148% 148% 147% 147% 146%	Saturday 22 Mor day 24 Tnesday 25 Wednesday 26 Thursday 27 Friday 28 Saturday 29 Monday 31	144 % 145 % 144 % 144 % 145 % 144 %	144% 144% 144 144% 144%	145 146 145 14 14 145 145 145	145% 144% 145 144%
Taesday 11 Wednesday 12 Tharsday 18 Friday 4 Saturday 15 Monday 17 Tuesday 18 Wednesday 19 Thursday 90	146% 147% 147% 146% 146% 140% 145%	146½ 147½ 146¾ 146¾ 146¾ 145¾ 144¾	146% 147% 148 146% 147% 146% 145%	146% 146% 146% 146% 146% 145%	Ang. 1868. 1867. 1866. 1865. 1865. 1864. 1863. 1863.	139% 149 144% 255 120%	189% 146% 140% 231% 122%	142% 152% 145% 261% 129%	147% 144% 238 127%
Friday 91	1/87/	14972	14/11/	14412	S'ce Jan 1, 1988	1831/	1331/	150	14444

The following exhibits the quotations at New York for bankers 60 days bills on the principal European markets daily in the month of August, 1868:

COURSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (60 DAYS) AT NEW YORK.

Days.	London. cents for	Paris. centimes for dollar.	Amsterdam. cents for florin.	Bremen. cents for rix daler.	Hamburg. cents for M. banco.	Berlin. cents for thaler.
1	110 @ 1016	513% @	414(0)	79%(0,80	36%(0.16%	72 607234
8	110 @1101	515 @513%		79%@79%	36%@36%	71%@72
4	110 @1101	515 @518%	411/00411/	79%@19%	26%@36%	713/0072
5	110 @1101	515 @513%	411/0413/	79%@79%	36% @36%	7116072
6	110 @1101	515 @51834	4114@4114	79% @79%	36%@36%	71140072
7	110 @1101	515 @513%		79% @79%	36%@36%	71%@79
8	109%@110	515 @51436	411/041%	79% @79%	36%@36%	71% @72
10	110 @	51436@51336	41%@41%	79% @79%	35 @36%	71%@72
11	109%@109%	515 @514%	41%@41%	79% @79%	36 @361	713/0/72
19	109%@	516%@514%	41%@41%	79%@79%		71%@72
18	109%@109%	517%@516%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	71%@72%
14	109% @109%	517%@516%	41 @415	79%@79%	36 @3614	71%@71%
15	10 3 @109 %	517% @516%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	71% @71%
17	109% @109%	517%@516%	41 @413	79%@79%	36 @36%	71%@71%
18	109%@1 9%	517% @51	41 @415	79%@79%	36 @36%	71%@71%
19	109%@109%	517%@516%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	71%@71%
90	109%@109%	517%@516%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	715 @7136
21	1094@104%	517%@516%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	71%@71%
22	1091/01093/	517% @515%		79%@79%	36 @36%	71% @71%
24	1091 @109%	517%@516%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	71% @71%
25	1093 @10934	517%@516%	41 @41%	79% @79%	36 @3636	71%@71%
96	1091 @1091	517%@516%		7936@7156	36 @86%	71%@71%
27		51136051736		791 @7 %	35%@35%	7136@7136
28	109 @	5184 @51736		795 @793	35% @35%	7136@71%
29	109 @	518%@517%		794 @7936	35% @35%	7136@71%
81	108%@109%	518%@517%		7914@7934	35% @35%	71%@71%
Aug., 1868	108%@110%	518%@518%	40%@41%	79×@80	85 14 @ 36 14	711/0721
Aug., 1867		5182 6512%		78 679 X	85 × @86 ×	71%079%

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Abstract statement, as appears from the books and Treasurer's returns in the Treasury Department, on the 1st of Augu t and 1st of September, 1868:

DEST	BEARING OO	Ш	Interes:	r.			
5 per cent. bonds		00		400	00	Increase.	Decrease.
6 " (5-20's)						88,119,950 00	•••••
Total	2,088,371,600	00	2,096,491,	750	00	8,119,950 00	•••••
. DEST BI	ARING CURE	EN	CY INTER	EST.			
6 per ct. (RR) bonds	\$82,210,000 21,604,890 50,000,000	00	\$35,814 10,595,	,000 410	800	\$3,104,000 00	11,009,490 00
8 p. cent. certificates Navy Pen. F'd 3 p.c	18,00,000		18,000	000	8	12,200,000 00	
Total	116,814,890	00	121,114	,410	00	\$4,209,520 00	
MATURED DE							
7-80 n. due Aug. 1, '67, J'e & J'y 15, '6	\$8,438,800						\$8,783,900 00
6 p. c. comp. int. 11'es	6,018,910		5,033			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	950 ,420 (/0
B'ds of Texas ind'ty	256,000			0 0		********	400.00
Treasury notes (old).	154,511	64	164	,111	64	•••••	400 00
B'ds of Apr. 15, 1812, Jan 28, 1847 &	, , ,,,,	~	4 050	۰۰۰	^		000 041 00
Mar 81, 1848	1,937,941		1,259,			••••	667,741 80
Treas. n's of Ma. 8,68				492			1,600 00
Temporary loan				,920			
Certifi. of indebt'ess	18,000	w	10,	000	w		
Total	19,099,175	44	12,665	218	64	\$	5,483,961 80
DEB	T BEARING P	TO 1	NTEREST				
United States notes	\$856,021,078	3 00	\$356.023	.073	00	\$	\$
Fractional currency						•••	65,600 00
Gold certi. of deposit							
Total	410,802,89	87	412,984	,911	87	2,682,020_00	

RECAPITULATION.

Bearing coin interest	18,099,175 44	\$ 1,096,491,750 00 121,114,410 00 12,665,218 64 412,984,911 87	8,119,950 00 4,299,520 00 2.682,020 00	\$ 5,488,961 80
Aggregate	2,688,588,756 81	9,648,256,285 01	9,667,528 20	
Coin & cur. in Treas	110,054,276 14	107,641,971 98	••••	2,412,804 16
Debt less coin and cur	2,528,534,480 67	9,585,614,818 08	12,079,989 86	•••••

The following statement shows the amount of coin and currency separately at the dates in the foregoing table:

COLM AND CURRENCY IN TREASURY.

Coin	\$83,409,917 98 \$6,644,858 ±1	\$92,570,901 21 15,071,070 77	\$9,160.983 28 \$ 11,578,287 44
Total coin & curre'y	110,054,276 14	107,641,971 98	2,412,804 16

The annual interest payable on the debt, as existing August 1, and September 1, 1868 (exclusive of interest on the compound interest notes), compares as follows:

ANNUAL INTEREST PAYABLE ON PUBLIC DEBT.

Total currency inter't	\$3,822,600 00	\$4,874,990 00	552,890 00	\$
Currency—6 per cents	\$1,982,600 00 1,890,000 00	\$2,118,840 00 2,256,150 00	186,240 00 866,150 00	
Total coin interest	8128,086,424 00	\$128,578,621 00	\$487,197 00	\$
Ooin—5 per cents	August 1. \$11,079,490 00 17,020,688 00 98,983,866 00	September 1. \$11,079,420 00 17,020,688 00 95,478,568 00	487,197 00	Decrease.

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Stolen Fifty Dollar Bank Notes of the First National Bank of New Jersey.—Returns of the New York, Philadelphia and Boston Banks.

A very important question of law has been raised the past month by the discovery of one of the fifty dollar bank notes of the First National Bank of Jersey Oity, which was stolen from the Department at Washington before it was signed by the officers of the bank. The thief, or one of his confederates, has forged the requisite signatures, and the note, after passing probably through the hands of ten thousand innocent holders, has at length been stopped. It was deposited in one of our city banks, forwarded to the Jersey bank for redemption, and so was detected. Now the question arises who is to lose the amount. Is the Jersey bank, on which the note was forged to make it good? Or must the last holder to whom it can be traced bear the loss? Or is the burden to fall on the Department through whose negligence or misfortune the theft was made and the loss in the first instance incurred?

In some form these questions will be submitted to the courts, and how they

will be decided we do not presume to affirm. There are, however, one or two other questions on which we will inform our readers. The first is, as to the amount of such stolen national notes which are in circulation. If this point is incapable of being ascertained, the public confidence in the National Bank currency will be very much shaken, for the people in general cannot tell whether the signatures are forged, and no one will know how to distinguish the spurious notes from the true one. Even at the Department itself the discrimination can scarce'y be made if, as is not impossible, the numbers of the notes have been altered-Moreover, it makes a great difference to the public whether or no the aggregate amount of these stolen notes is large, of what denominations they are, and on which of the 1,639 National Banks the forgeries have been done. In the last annual report of the Comptroller of the Currency we find the following statement of the whole case. We quote from page 3:

It is an unpleasant task, but neverth-less the performance of a duty, to submit the following statement relative to the abstraction at various times of unfinished national bank notes:

In the sum or of 1864 it was ascertained that packages of notes forwarded to certain Western banks were each found to be short of the required amount by one impression (a sheet containing four notes). This happened at intervals for several months. Then, for nearly a year, no losses occurred. But in the fail of 1865, impressions been to be missed from the packages of notes in the counting room of the office; and in December a package containing \$4,500 in fifty and one hundred dollar notes of the National City Bank of Lyon, Massachusetts, was missed. From this time there was a cessation in the thefts, until about the first of May last, when a package containing \$1,000 in fifties and hundreds of the First National Bank of Jersey City, New Jersey, was stolen.

At each of the periods when these frauds took place, investigations were instituted, and ditigent efforts were made to discover the perpetrator, but without success. The last rolber was discovered almost immediately upon its taking place, and vigorous measures were at once taken to detect and bring the guilty pirty to justice. There is reason to believe the effort was not unsuccessful, as a man who had neen employed in the counting room from the time of its first organisation, in a confidential capacity, was arrested and upon examination before the proper authorisis, held under bonds until the next session of the grand jury of the District. As this has not yet taken place, the case is still pending; it is, therefore, not deemed expedient to enter more into details at pleasent, as the whole matter is in a fair way to be investigated by the Criminal Court.

A full official list of the stolen impressions is appended to the report, which is as follows:

Impres- Designation and					Bank	Treasury	
sions * name of Bank.		_171	ata		Number.	Number.	4
BIOTE - Hamo or warmer							
1 First, Peru, I'l	0	O	Ð			18,565	820
1First, acon, Ill	- 5	- 5	5	- 5	1.201	894,600	20
1Fi st La Salle, Ill	5	- 6	5	5	1.962	211.586	90
1Firet, Cant n, Ill	Ř	×	Ř	Š	1,144	996,281	20
1 Fi s., ('a ton, I'll	ž	ž	ž	Ď	1,145	696,272	
		0	õ				20
1 First, Centre ille, Iowa		5	0	5	2,000	45,134	20
1First, Milwaukee, Wis	- 5	5	5	5	2,827	817.016	20
1Fir-t, Washington, Iowa	. 5	- 5	6	5	843	834.067	90
1 Mechanics', hicago, Ill			10	20	900	149,179	50
1 Appieton, Lowell, Mas	15	10	Υğ	~6	3,000		
1 Appleton, Lower, mas	. 5	. 5	5			810,144	20
1 Merchanie', Milw ukee, Wis	. 5	ಾ	5	5	998	• • •	200
1Sussex, Newton, N. J	. 5	- 5	5	5	1,565	463,589	20
1 Mecha ics', Bo-t-n, Mass	. 5	- 5	5	- 5	2,553	404.244	20
1C ut.al, Cherry Valley, v. Y	10	10	10	10	188	498.897	40
t Tomas mana & Tomadora N V	47	47	17				
1Importers' & Traders, N Y	Υñ	TÕ	ΤÕ	10	8,835	507,848	40
1 Wa hington, Boston, Mass	. 5	- 5	5	5	7,904	• • • •	20
1Tremont, Boston, Mass.	. 5	- 5	5	5	8,466	****	20
1 A lantic, Hoston, Mass	5	5	5	5		****	20
1Revere, Boston, Mass	ĸ	ĸ	5	5	1,443		20
1Revere, Doctor, mass		٥				••••	
1Ti ga, Owego, N. Y		5		5	905		20
1Lee, Lee, Mass	. 5	5	5	5	8,6 01	••••	20

Impres- Desig ation and					Bank	Tressary	
a one n m of Renk	_	Pl:	ite.	_	Numbe	r. Number.	Amt.
1. Firet, Knights own, Ind	5	5	5	5	419		20
1Nat. Stare B'k, Lafayette, Ind	5	5	5	5	1	••••	20
1 Salem N t. Bank. Co., N. J	5	5	5	8	1.500		20
1Mech, & Farm., Albany, N. Y	5	5	5	5	1,73 :	••••	20
1Savannah N. K'k, Savannah, Ga	5	5	5	5	1,999	••••	20
2Pacific, New York	5	8	5	5	500	••••	20
1Chicopes, Springfield, Mass	- 5	5	8	5	8,767	•••	20
1 Nat. Union, Kinderhook, N. Y	- 5	5	5			• • • •	20
1Norwalk Norwalk, Ohio	5	5	5	5		••••	٨0
1Metacomet, Fall River, Mass	5	5		5	10,064	••••	20
1Nat B'k of republic, N. Y	5	5	5	5	646		20
1 Third. Baitir ore, Md	5	5	5	5	6,159		90
1Third, Baltimore, Md	5	5	5	5	6,167		20
1 Was hington, Westerly, R. I	5	- 5	5	5	660	••••	20
1Mechanics', Newark, N. J	10	10	10	10	1		40
1People s', P tt. burg, Pa	10	10	10	20	4.840		50
1Rockport, Roc p rr. Mas	10	10	10	20		••••	50
1 Newark City, Newark, N. J			50	100	218	••••	180
80Nat. City Bank, Lyon, Mass			50	100	121-150	68,796-46,825	4,500
80First, Jersey City, N. J	••		50	100	671-750	19,609-19,688	19,000
Matal amount							A17 740

Such is the whole story. When properly understood it is calculated to reasure the public mind. For, in the first place, the aggregate amount is small, only \$17,560 altogether. Secondly, the denomination of the notes and the banks are known, and, we trust, will be widely promulgated, and finally the Government is, perhaps, responsible to an innocent holder. For the bills were all finished so far as the Government endorsement is concerned, and it was while in the possession of the Government officers that they were stolen. It is obviously of the most pressing necessity that no cloud should rest upon the credit of the national currency. The principle involved in this case is vastly wider and more for reaching in its scope than would appear from the somewhat trivial incident out of which it has arisen.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1:

_					
	NEW YORK	CITY BANK	RETURNS.		
Date. Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's,	Ag. clear'gs.
January 4. \$249,741,297	\$19,794,614	834, 184, 391	\$187,070,786	\$62,111,201	\$483,266,304
January 11. 45 ,170,723	19,422,856	84,094,187	194,885,525	64,753,116	558,884,525
January 18 256,038,938	23,191.867	84,0 1,004	205,888 148	66.155.241	619,797,369
January 27 258 392,101	25,106,800	84,0 2,762	210,093,084	67, 154, 161	528,503,228
February 1 266,415 618	98,955,890	44,062,521	213.330,524	65,197,158	637, 449, 928
February 8 170,555,356	22,828,872	81,096,831	217,844,5+8	55,846,259	59 . 242.595
February 15 271.015,970	24,192,955	84,048,296	216,759,828	63,471,762	550, 21, 185
February 21 267,768,648	22,513,987	84,100,023	09,095,851	69.86~.9:0	452,421,592
February 29 . 267,240,678	22,091,642	84,0 6,228	208,651,578	58,553,607	705,100 784
March 7 269,156,636	20,714,238	34,153 957	207,787,080	57, 17,044	619.219,598
March 14 266,816,0 4	19,744,70!	84,218 881	:01,188,470	54,798,866	691,277,641
March 21 261,4:6,900	17.944.808	84,212,571	191,191,526	52, 261,086	649,482,341
March 28 257,378,947	17,828,867	84,190,808	186,525,128	52 123,178	557.843,908
April 4 254,287,891	17,077,299	84,227,108	280,956,846	51,709,706	567,783,138
April 11 252,936,725	16,843,150	84,194,273	179,851,880	51,982,609	493,371,451
April 18 254,817,936	16,776,549	84,218,581	181,832,523	50.~83,660	623,713,923
April 25 252,814,617	14,943,547	84,227,621	180,307,489	53,864,757	8 2,784,154
May 2 257.623,672	16,166,878	84,114,848	191.206,135	57,863,549	588,717,822
May 9 265,755,888	21 286,910	84.203,409	199,276,568	67,541, 27	5 7,028,567
May 16 267,724,788	20,989,142	84,193,249	201,314,805	57 613,095	480,186,908
May 23 267,881,279	20,479,947	84,183 (38	212,507,550	62,2 3 3,∈02	4-8.73 142
May 30 268,117,490	17,861,088	84,145,606	201,746,964	65,633,964	6-2,118,248
June 6 278,792, 67	14,828,581	84,188,159	209,089,655	68,8:2,023	640.463,329
June 18 275,142,024	11,198,681	84,166,846	210,670,765	69.202 840	580.328,197
June 20 274,117,648	9,124,880	84,119,120	211,484,387	72,567.582	553,9-3,817
June 27 276,501, 36	7,758,800	84.0+8,721	214,302,207	78.553.843	516,726 075
July 8 281,943,931	11,954,730	84,03.,4+6	221,050,806	72.125,939	525,646,698
July 11 284,147,708	19,235,848	84.068,202	2:4,820,141	68,544,544	591.756,895
July 18 283,919,490	90,899,081	84,004.111	228, 180,749	71 847,545	505,462,464
July 25 280,345,255	20,804,101	88,943,878	240,761,663	72,2 :5,58 i	497,109,387
August 1 279,811,657	20,502,787	83,957,805	223,101,867	73, 88, 61	409. 34.169

^{*} Date of theft of the first was Sept. 18, 1864 and the last in 1867.

Date. Loans. August 8 279,705,786 August 15 277,708,630 August 22 275,815,781 August 23 271,780,726	Specie. 24,784,427 22,913,65) 19 768,681 16,949,108	Circulation. 81,074,874 84,114,087 84,187,687 84,112,139	Deposits. 281 716,498 223,561,087 210,485,405 210,834,646	Legal Tend's. 74.051,5:8 73 9 5,481 69,757,645 67,757,376	Ag.clear'gs. 587 004,381 482,513,952 610,308,551 480,785,665
	PHILADE	LPHIA BANK E	ETURNS.		
Date. Leg January 4. \$ \$ \$ January 14. \$ \$ \$ January 18.	PRILADE: al Tenders. 6,789,432 6,037,995 6,837,423 6,837,423 6,837,423 6,837,423 6,837,423 7,064,181 7,573,149 7,573,151 7,573	LPHIA BANK E LOADS, \$52.00 .904 \$52,593, :07 53,013,196 52,392,599 52,604.916 52,672,448 52,452,166 52,452,146 52,452,166 53,452,757 58,081,665 58,367,611 58,677,337 58,450,578 58,299,294 59,256,949 59,288,780 52,812,624 52,56,949 52,881,780 53,817,794 53,491,583 53,583,740 53,681,985 55,582,449 55,691,395 55,582,449	Specie. \$255,912 400,615 380,973 400,615 380,973 395 348,673 395,187 904,929 211,365 233,160 251,061 229,518 192 838 215,835 250,240 232,299 204,699 314,366 397,773 8: 8,525 250,369 239,271 226,581 175,308	Circulation. \$10,639,000 10,639,006 10,641,759 10,645,286 10,638,927 10,638,927 10,638,495 10,632,495 10,638,495 10,638,713 10,631,599 10,642,670 10,642,670 10,640,312 10,631,643 10,631,643 10,631,643 10,632,675 10,632,675 10,632,675 10,632,675 10,632,675 10,632,675 10,632,675 10,632,675 10,632,675	Deposits. \$36,831,374 \$36,831,374 \$7,181,630 \$7,187,689 \$7,878,96,653 \$7,010,520 \$8,455,464 \$4,826,961 \$3,472,119 \$3,255 671 \$3,970,952 \$4,767,190 \$5,109,957 \$6,020,065 \$6,020,065 \$4,574,457 \$42,910,499 \$8,574,457 \$8,5
June 29	5,993,145 6,414,877 6,443,153 6,664,232 6,747,440 6,855,894 7,402,177 7,792,508 7,519,300 7,-14,195 7,516,325	53,851,830 53,072,878 53,053,471 53,791,546 53,994,618 54,024,955 54,741,168 51,592,015 54,674,758 55,151,724 55,255,474	182,711 198,568 293,596 183,594 183,359 195,896 187,291 184,007 194,590 185,186 181,268	10,681,920 10,680,807 10,685,496 10,696,214 10,698,947 10,692,947 10,692,947 10,692,751 10,692,751 10,692,581	48, 948, 562 48, 936, 629 44, 934, 896 45, 156, 620 45, 687, 975 45, 5-8, 920 47, 915, 867 45, 94-, 718 46, 98, 787 45, 985, 616 46, 063, 150

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Ca	pital Jan. 1	, 1866, \$41,90	00,000.)		
	=	Legal	•	Circula	tion-
Date. Loans,	Specie.	Tenders.	Deposits.	National.	State.
January 8 \$31.960,249	\$1,468,946	\$ 15,548,169	\$40,856,023	\$34,68 6,559	\$228,780
January 18 97,800,239	1,376,987	15,560,965	41,496,320	24,757,965	227,958
January 20 97,433,463	926,942	15,832,769	41,904,161	94,700,001	217,872
January 27 97,433,435	841,196	16,849,687	43,991,170	14,564, 06	226,238
February 8 96,895,260	777,627	16,788,229	42,891,128	24,628,103	221,660
February 10 97,973,916	652,939	16,497,648	42,752,067	24,850,926	221,700
February 17 98,218,828	605,740	16.561 4 1	41 502,550	24,850,055	220,452
February 24 97,469,436	616,953	16,809,501	40,887,614	24,686,212	216,490
March 2 100,243,692	683,842	16,804,846	40,954,986	21,876,089	2 5,214
March 9	867,174	15,556,696	39,770,418	24,967,700	210,162
March 16 101,499,611	918 ,48 5	14,5,2,342	89,276,514	25,042,418	197,720
March 23	798,606	13,7:2,560	87,022,546	25,094,253	197, 289
March 80	685,084	18,786,088	36,184,640	94,988,417	197,079
April 6 97,020,925	731,540	18,004,924	86,008,157	25,175,194	168,028
April 13 97,850,280	873,487	12,522,035	86,422,929	24,213,014	167,018
April 20 98,906,805	805,486	11,905,608	86,417,890	24,231,058	166,969
April 27 98,002,343	577, 63	12,2 8 545	36,259,946	25,231,978	164,831
May 4 97,624,197	815,469	12,656,190	87,685,406	25,208,234	160,885
May 11 97,332,283	1,133,668	11,962,868	87,858,776	25,225,173	145,248
May 18 96,988,524	1,184,881	12,199,422	87,844,742	25,234 465	160,241
May 25 97,041,720	1,018,809	12,848,141	88,898,141	25,210,660	160,151
June 1 97,458,997	766,553	14,188,806	40,811,569	25,204,939	159,560
June 8 98 116,632	681,149	14,868,900	41,470,876	25,194,114	159,318
June 15 99,513,988	561,990	14,373,575	41,738,706	25,190,565	159,150
June 29 99,389,632	476,438	14,561,614	42,553,871	25,197,817	158,908
June 29 99,477,074	486,699	15,195,550	42,506,816	25,182,920	158,812
July 6 100,110,830	1,617,638	15, 7,307	48,458,654	25,214,10-)	144,689
July 13 101.498,516	1,198,529	15,743,211	43,116,765	25,216,181	141,538
July 20 1/2,430,433	1,521,893	15,469,406	43,376,300	25,21~,7.7	13799
July 27 102,408,771	785,641	15,837,718	43,580,894	25,254,906	142,450
August 8 102, 80 658	7:6,254	15,796,059	43,389,523	25,016, 199	••••
Angust 10 108,860,686	634,968	15,758,958	44,962,268	25, 197, 164	• • • • • •
Angust 17 108,956,603	664,698	15,551,590	43,702,50i	25,189.658	• • • •
August 24 108,6 4,691	779,192	16,810.8#3	42,860,049	25,214,5 6	••••
August 81 108,550,020	767,819	15,848,796	41,214,607	25,190,091	••••

THE

MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE

AND

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1868.

AMERICAN SECURITIES IN EUROPE.

It is much to be regretted that so little can be definitely ascertained respecting the amount of American obligations held in Europe. The question has very important bearings, both theoretic and practical; and now that there is a possibility of the speculative mania on the Continent of Europe attracting to Germany more of our bonds than can be permanently carried there, it is especially important to be able to form a satisfactory estimate of the amount of our loans held abroad. The materials for an estimate are scant and shadowy; but, carefully used, they nevertheless may indicate a conclusion approximately accurate. The Director of the Bureau of Statistics recently attempted a solution of this problem in a letter to the Philadelphia *Press*, but with a result which we cannot but regard as calculated to seriously mislead the public mind. The Director remarks:

In the year 1854 American securities were held abroad to the nominal amount of \$222,225,815, of which United States stocks amounted to \$27,000,000, the balance being stocks and bonds of States, cities, and railroad and other private companies. The real amount which these securities cost to foreigners is estimated at \$200,000,000 gold. Before the war broke out it is considered probable that this amount of American securities held by foreigners had fully doubled, for, with the exception of the temporary check of 1857, this was an era of almost continued prosperity, during which the opportunity for the favorable investment of foreign capital in the United States were

very great and much sought after. Be this as it may, we have no precise data on the point until the year 1868, when, at the instance of the Secretary of the Treasury. I ascertained from direct inquires on the point, that there were held by foreigness American securities to the nominal value of \$600,000,000, as follows:

United States stocks, approximate. State, mu icipal and other stocks, approximate Railroad companies, stocks. Railroad companies, bonds.	\$850,000,000 150,000,000 48,801,550 50,667,000
Total	

The real amount which these securities cost is estimated as follows:

United States stocks, \$ All the rest,	175,000 ,00 0 178,637 ,965
Tetal, in gold	348,627,985

It would thus appear that American securities which cost \$200,00°,000 in gold were held by foreigners in 1854. It is be ieved that this amount was subsequently increased to \$400,000,000 before the breaking out of the war in 1861. During the following years nearly all of the State and corporation securities were remitted to this country in exchange for United State stocks, which were thrown upon the market during the war at prices varing from thirty-eight to sixty cents in specie per nomin I dollar. Assuming that little or no change has occurred since 1867—an assumption that is therably safe—the value of American securities now held by foreigners is, therefore, but one hundred and forty-eight millions of dollars greater than it was fourteen years ago, and no greater, but rather less, than it was immediately before the breaking out of the war, the only noticeable thing connected with the whole subject being the fact that the securities of the several States and corporations, costing nearly par in 1854, have been exchanged for the securities of the Federal Government, which cost during the war, on the average, not over half par. This is due to the fact that the former, with but rare exceptions, paid their interest in paper, while the latter paid in gold. There are but few American, State, or corporation stocks now held in Europe besides a small amount of Massachusett 5's, a still smaller amount of Virginia 5's stock, and a few Erie and Atlantic and Great Western shares.

We do not care to inquire into the accuracy of the Director's statement of the amount of our securities held abroad in 1854. The minuteness of his figures suggests the supposition that he possesses complete and accurate data relative to that period; which it is to be regretted he has not given to the public, especially as it is generally understood that there is no material upon which to base such a precise estimate. It is also quite possible, and perhaps probable, that he is right in supposing that the amount of our securities held abroad was nearly doubled between 1854 and 1861. The point of real consequence is in ascertaining what amount is held in Europe now. The Director states the amount, in the Fall of 1866, at \$600,000,000, including \$350,000,000 of Government bonds, and \$250,-000,000 of State, municipal and corporate securities. These figures are said to be based upon "direct inquiries." It would be interesting to know where the inquiries were directed, and what ground they covered. minuteness of his figures relative to railroad stocks and bonds, incites curiosity to know how such precise data could be ascertained; for practical men entertain a very decided opinion that accurate information upon t: e matter is an impossibility. We are unable to reconcile these figures with

the Director's assertion that "there are but few American, State or corporation stocks now held in Europe, besides a small amount of Macsachusett's 5's, a still smaller amount of Virginia 5's stock, and a few Erie and Atlantic and Great Western shares.

Our railroads have issued a considerable amount of bonds payable in sterling money, all of which are constantly held abroad. The principal of such loans now running are as follows:

STERLING BONDS ISSUED BY AMERICAN RAILROADS.

Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, sterling	bonds	\$484,000
Bastern Railroad (Mass), sterling bonds		
PRODUCTION OF THE PRODUCT OF THE PRO		2,126,000
Phila i-lphia and Reading Railroad sterling t		
Baltimore & Uhio Railroad (Md. guar.)		
PROGRAM HAMILTON WAT LONG	"	
Marietta and Cincinnati wantong	46abo	
DAFL of wild will Astress transfer	44	
michipan Central Rati Cad	****** ******************	8 7,000
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad box	nds (Frankfort)	1.552,000
Troy & Greenfield Railroad " "	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	509,000
Mobile and Ohio Railroad " "		4,193,000
To this we may add the following sterling ca	anal and water bonds	
To this we may add the following sterling ca Boston Water Bonds	\$1,949,000 4,875,000 815,000	
Boston Water Bonds	\$1,949,000 4,875,000 815,000 1,860,000	
Boston Water Bonds	\$1,949,000 4,875,000 815,000 1,860,000	
Boston Water Bonds. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds lilinois Canal Bonds Total canal sterling bonds. Add further for d. liar bonds, railroad and ot	\$1,949,000 4,875,000 1,880,000 her, including \$35,000,000 of Atlantic	\$8,980,000
Boston Water Bonds	\$1,949,000 4,875,000 1,880,000 her, including \$35,000,000 of Atlantic	\$8,980,000
Boston Water Bonds. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds lilinois Canal Bonds Total canal sterling bonds. Add further for d. liar bonds, railroad and ot	\$1,949,000 4,875,000 1,880,000 her, including \$35,000,000 of Atlantic	\$8,980,000
Boston Water Bonds. Cheespeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds Illinois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. llar bonds, railread and ot and Great Western bonds and 36,000,000 II Add farther for railread stocks:	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 518,000 1,860,000 her, including \$36,000,000 of Atlantic	\$8,980,000 60,000,600
Boston Water Bonds. Cheespeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds lilinois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. llar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U Add farther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western.	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 519,000 1,860,000 1,860,000 Atlantic	\$8,980,000 60,000,000
Boston Water Bonds. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds llimois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. llar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U Add further for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western.	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 519,000 1,860,000 1,860,000 Atlantic	\$3,980,000 60,000,000
Boston Water Bonds. Cheespeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds lilinois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. llar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U Add farther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western. Erie. Ill nois Central	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 515,000 1,860,000 Alantic linois Central \$15,^00,000 6,000,000 17,500,000	\$3,960,000 60,000,000
Boston Water Bonds. Chesapeako and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquebanna and Tide-water Canal Bonds Illimois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. liar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U Add forther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western. Erie. Ill nois Central Philadel-bhia and Reading.	\$1,949,000 4.875,000 519,000 1,860,000 1,860,000 Atlantic linois Central \$15,000,000 6,000,000 17,500,000 10,000,000	\$3,960,000 60,000,000
Boston Water Bonds. Cheespeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds lilinois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. llar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U Add farther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western. Erie. Ill nois Central	\$1,949,000 4.875,000 519,000 1,860,000 1,860,000 Atlantic linois Central \$15,000,000 6,000,000 17,500,000 10,000,000	\$3,960,000 60,000,000
Boston Water Bonds. Cheespeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds Illinois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. llar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U. Add ferther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western. Erie. Ill nois Central Philadelphia and Reading. All other roads.	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 1,860,000 1,860,000 Atlantic linois Central \$15,400,000 6,003,000 17,500,000 10,000,000 7,500,000	\$8,960,000 60,000,600
Boston Water Bonds. Chesapeako and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquebanna and Tide-water Canal Bonds Illimois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. liar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U Add forther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western. Erie. Ill nois Central Philadel-bhia and Reading.	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 1,860,000 1,860,000 Atlantic linois Central \$15,400,000 6,003,000 17,500,000 10,000,000 7,500,000	\$3,960,000 60,000,000
Boston Water Bonds. Cheespeake and Ohio Canal Bonds. Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds lilinois Canal Bonds. Total canal sterling bonds. Add firther for d. liar bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U. Add farther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western. Erie. Ill nois Central Philadelphia and Reading. All other roads. Total railroad stocks.	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 1,850,000 1,860,000 Atlantic linois Central \$15,^00,000 6,000,000 7,500,000 7,500,000	\$8,980,000 60,000,000
Boston Water Bonds Cheespeake and Ohio Canal Bonds Susquehsnna and Tide-water Canal Bonds Illinois Canal Bonds Total canal sterling bonds. Add furtner for d. Har bonds, railroad and ot and Great Western bonds and \$6,000,000 U Add ferther for railroad stocks: At antic and Great Western Erie. Ill nois Central Philadelphia and Reading All other roads.	\$1,949,000 4,375,000 1,850,000 1,860,000 Atlantic linois Central \$15,^00,000 6,000,000 7,500,000 7,500,000	\$8,960,000 60,000,000

These estimates of the amount of railroad shares held by foreigners are based upon inquiry at the transfer offices of the companies. Assuming their approximate accuracy, it would appear that about \$160,000,000 of bonds and stocks issued by our transportation corporations are now he'd in Europe; an estimate which exceeds by \$60,000,000 that of the Director as to the amount held two years ago. Our official Statistician, in a communication to the New York Times of the 28th ult., says that since 1866 about \$150,000,000 of State and corporation securities have been returned in exchange for an equal amount of United States bonds, so that now, he supposes, about \$500,000,000 of Governments and \$100;000,000 of other securities are held out of the United States. We do not:

think this supposition at all accords with the experience of those engaged in the negotiation of our securities with foreigners. It is doubtless true that a large additional amount of United States bonds has been sent out within the last two years; and it is possible that the Director's estimate of \$150,000,000 may not be far from the truth, especially as fully \$30,000,000 is generally conceded to have been exported within the last two months. But, at the same time, it is notorious that the improved earnings and condition of our railroads, concurrently with the plethora of money in Europe, have extended the market for our railroad stocks, so that they are more largely held abroad than at any other time. No portion of the \$42,500,000 of sterling canal and railroad bonds could be returned, having no regular market here; the bonds and stock of the Atlantic and Great Western road are still held principally in England: and three fourths of the whole \$25,000,000 of Illinois Central stock has gone abroad. To say the least, therefore, there can have been no reduction of foreign investments in our transportation securities. Nor does it accord either with our observance of the course of the market, or with probability, that any material amount of State stocks have been returned within the period specified. The stocks held abroad are chiefly those of the Southern and border States; and as these have been steadily appreciating in value, under the prospect of an early resumption of regular payments of interest, there has been every inducement for foreign holders to retain them. The Director appears to have an exaggerated idea of the amount of this class of securities held in Europe. The amount of investments in "State, municipal and other stocks" (exclusive of railroad) he takes to be \$150,000,000. Now, as the total amount of the debts of the Southern and border States, including their bonds issued to railroad and other companies, is only about \$125,000,000, this estimate must be viewed as eggregiously exaggerated; and the more so as only a small proportion of the \$150,000,000 can be apportioned to municipal and miscellaneous stocks. We think that \$60,000,000 will be very generally endorsed by foreign bankers as the probable amount of State stocks proper held abroad.

Much surprise has also been felt in financial circles at the Directors estimate of the amount of United States bonds held abroad, viz., \$500,000,000. Of course, he could only guess at the amount, for there is no record of either shipments or arrivals of bonds, and it is quite impracticable to procure from all our foreign bankers a statement of the result of their transactions extending over a period of five orsix years; but the Director can hardly have informed himself sufficiently to make an intelligent guess, representing the average opinion of dealers. It is susceptible of easy demonstration that this estimate is far below the truth

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The issue of the Five-Twenties of 1862 is \$514,000,000; and from the extreme scarcity of those bonds it is very generally conceded that they are nearly all held abroad. Of the Sixes of 1881 there are \$283,000,000 outstanding; which also are principally in the hands of foreigners. The preference for Ten-Forties, on account of the specific pledge for the payment of the principal in gold, cannot have drawn out of the country less than \$25,000,000 of those bonds; while the minor amounts of all other issues combined cannot be estimated at less than \$50,000,000. So that the total amount of United States bonds held abroad must be very nearly \$700,000,000, or possibly more. Putting together, then, the foregoing items, we have the following result, as the amount of all kinds of American securities held in Europe:

United States bonds	£700,000,(00
Sterling bonds issued by Railroad Companies	88,500,000
" issued by Canal and Water Companies	8.9(0.000
Dollar bonds of Rai roads and other Companies	60,000,000
Railroad s ocks	56,000,000
State bonds	60,000,000
Miscellaneous stocks	20,000,000
Total estimated amount of American securities held abroad	\$938,400,000

We thus see that European investors hold our securities to the extent of nearly one thousand million dollars, distributed among the various classes of investments. Of this total, \$76,000,000 consists of stocks, which carry no obligation to pay principal, but only convey to the holder a proprietary interest and entitle him to a share of the profits of the corporation issuing them. The balance of \$862,000,000 is made up of bonds, specifying an obligation to pay a given amount of principal with interest. There is an important difference in the bearing of these two classes of securities upon our financial interests. The stocks take nothing out of the country but what has been earned; and the remittance of dividends upon this class of investments, being only proportioned to the prosperity of the corporation issuing the stock, cannot be deemed open to objection upon economic grounds. With respect to the bonded obligations held abroad, and especially the large portion consisting of government obligations, a different opinion very generally prevails.

The \$700,000,000 of United States bonds estimated to be held in Europe, perhaps have not realized to the American sellers more, on an average, than $57\frac{1}{2}$ on the par in gold; while the \$162,000,000 of corporation, State and other bonds have not realised for us much over 75; so that upon \$862,000,000 of obligations which will probably be, for the main part, liquidated in gold, we have received only about \$525,000,000 in gold. The fact then is, that Europe has bought up \$862,000,000 of claims upon us at an average discount of 40 per cent; upon which the holders will ultimately realise a difference approximating \$340,000,000

It is unquestionably a great misfortune that we should have had to put out this enormous amount of debt at such a heavy depreciation; nor is it less surely a heavy drain upon our resources that we should have to pay 9@10 per cent. interest upon the capital actually received for these obligations.

The question of real interest, however, is whether it would have been on the whole better for the country that these securities should have been retained at home, and the difference between the value at which they were exported and that at which they will be redeemed secured by our own people. The answer is not so obvious as it appears to be. is clear that in that case our own citizens would have received the advantage accruing on both principal and interest which has gone into the hands of foreigners; but it is not to be overlooked that the general trade and industry of the country would be equally taxed to provide interest and to pay the principal whether the obligations were held at home or abroad; so that, so far as respects national fiscal interests, it is immaterial where the bonds are held. When our people parted with their bonds to foreigners they did so for a consideration; deeming that consideration more valuable to them than the securities. Were they mistaken? Tie obligations have been sent out mainly in the way of settlement of trade balances; so that the country has received in exchange actual capital in the form of raw materials, merchandise and produce. These importations, which but for the export of securities could not have been made, have become a part of our actual possessions, promoting enjoyment, sustaining and employing population, and aiding the development of the country and the reproduction of capital. Will the use of the capital thus received in exchange for our bonds yield a sufficient return to pay the interest and compensate us for the depreciation at which the bonds were sold? If it will, the exchange is not a bad bargain. The fact of such an enormous amount of national securities going out of the country is not likely to have occurred without some substantial cause. The industrial and commercial bent of our people causes them to prefer the active employment of capital to living idly upon mere paper investments. A distinctive bondholding class as little accords with our commercial habits as with our social and political sympathies. We can make larger profits upon the active employment of capital than are realised in the same way in Europe; and under these circumstances the exchange of American bonds for European capital has much about it that is natural and reasonable. The retention of the whole of our Government obligations at home would have had a tendency to foster social distinctions by no means consonant with democratic institutions. It would have multiplied our idle population and strengthened the aristocratic bias among the wealthier classes, by the

same process as the accumulation of a large national debt in England has consolidated the class distinctions of that country. Had we, in the United States, a larger population corresponding to the nonproductive bondholding class of Europe, fewer of our national securities would have left the country. Our capitalists, however, prefer the enterprise and excitement of a business life to retired inactivity; they have immense virgin as well developed resources offering a high rate of remuneration for industry; and giving this preference to trade, industry and agriculture over bonded investments, they hold bonds at a value which induces foreigners to accept them in exchange for real capital.

It is clear then, taking all the circumstances into consideration, that our bonds have gone to Europe because they were of more value to Europeans than to ourselves, and because the capital we received in exchange is of more value to us than the bonds. We have no doubt that the ultimate course of events will show that this exchange has been more beneficial to us than it now appears to be. It is reasonable to expect that ere long we shall attain a financial position which will enable us to reduce the rate of interest upon the public debt, thereby limiting our interest remittances to Europe. Those who predict disaster upon the ultimate payment of the Government obligations held abroad will learn that the rapid payment of large national debts is a thing more easily promised than fulfilled, and that such liquidations have to follow the commercial convenience of the country. Should Congress be prudent enough to effect a reduction of the interest upon the debt consistently with the bondholders' ideas of good faith, it is quite likely that a still further large amount of our securities will go abroad, owing to the disparity between the interest upon bonds and our profits upon the active employment of capital; and in that event there will be the less inducement to hasten the liquidation of the debt. It would then be argued that it would pay us better to allow foreigners to carry our obligations at a low rate of interest than to pay them off in hard capital, the profit upon which, in our own hands, would greatly exceed what we should save by terminating our interest payments to the bondholders.

We frequently hear it urged, as an objection against our bonds being held abroad, that upon the occurrence of political or financial irregularities in Europe or at home, we are liable to have large amounts of securities sent back, with the result of serious derangement to our monetary and trading movements. It is not to be denied that there is a certain force in this objection; and yet, we think, it is much exaggerated in the popular apprehension. There are natural laws which under all circumstances must place this liability under restraint. War or panic in Europe would naturally be accompanied with a fall in the price of our bonds. Provided the

decline at London or Frankfort were greater than at New York, there would be a return of bonds to this side, which might have to be paid for in gold. But the moment it was found that the return of bonds was in such volume as to threaten inconvenience here, the price of bonds at New York would fall to a oint stopping their export from Europe. This self-regulating tendency of the market may always be relied upon to prevent any serious inconvenience from this source.

At the outbreak of the war in Germany, in 1866, Five-Twenties fellin Europe to such an extent as to induce a return of bonds to this side
generally estimated at \$10,000,000; immediately following there was a
preference for our securities, owing to our Government not being involved
in the European complications, and a re-export of bonds set in, which did
not stop until about \$15,000,000 of Five-Twenties had been sent out.
This case is precisely in point, and shows how little is to be apprehended
from derangements of this character. Upon a review of the main considerations affecting the question, therefore, we conclude that it is not such
a great misfortune as is generally imagined that so large a proportion of
our obligations are held abroad.

BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE.

At the meeting of the British Association which has just come to a conclusion at Norwich several papers upon subjects interesting to our subscribers were read. We give abstracts of some of these communications.

THE MANUFACTURE OF STEEL.

In the Mechanical Section, Mr. F. Kohn read a paper on the recent progress of steel manufacture. He had at the previous meeting at Dundee drawn attention to a process of manufacturing steel upon the open hearth of a Siemens' furnace, by the mutual reation of pig iron and wrought iron upon each other, a process which had been in operation for some time in France, and had more recently been resorted to in England. This process realized the old idea of melting wrought iron in a bath of liquid pig iron, and thereby converting the whole mass into steel. It was distinguished from previous unsuccessful attempts by the high temperature, and the non-oxidising flame produced by the regenerative gas furnace of Mr. Siemens, and by the method of charging the decarburised iron into the bath of pig iron in measured quantities. The process had been experimented upon in Birmingham and Bolton, and was being worked commercially in Middlesborough. Mr. Kohn here described in

detail the construction of the Middlesborough furnaces, and the mode in which the process was carried out by the workmen, and stated that the production of any desired temper of steel could by this process be relied upon with absolute certainty. In the most successful charges made by Messrs. Samuelson, the owners of the ironworks referred to at Middlesborough, the ball was made from a mixture of white Swedish iron and of Spiegleisen, and a quantity of the latter was added at the end of the operation. In these charges, Cleveland bars entered in the proportion of one half. The steel thus produced was very soft and of fine quality, and was chiefly used for boiler plates. The prime cost of the steel thus manufactured was about £7 10s. per ton, which was the same as the prime cost of the Bessemer steel ingots made from hematite pig iron. The process seemed to be one of vast importance to the ironmasters of many localities. It was applicable to the conversion of old materials of wrought iron and steel, could utilise the waste and offal of other processes of steel manufacture, and could be introduced into localities where the ore had hitherto been deemed unfavorable to the production of steel. Mr. Kohn was of opinion that there need be no rivalry between the new process and the Bessemer process, as the two worked with different materials.

Mr. Siemens said one of the chief applications of the new process described by Mr. Kohn was that of the conversion of old iron rails into steel.

Dr. Fairbairn expressed his belief that in the process of time the improvements now being made in the manufacture of steel would tend to reduce its price almost to the present price of iron.

. THE ECONOMICAL MANUFACTURE OF IRON.

On the 23d inst., Mr. J. Jones read a paper on some points affecting the economical production of iron. The author alluded, in the first place, to the national importance of utilising to the fullest extent the minerals necessary in the manufacturing of iron. He estimated the production of pig iron in Great Britain at 4,500,000 tons per annum, and the make of finished iron at about 3,000,000 tons, when trade was brisk, and adduced these statistics to show the immense issues involved in the improvement he wished to notice. He then referred to the economical application of fuel in the iron manufacture, more particularly in the finished iron processes, and remarked that the newer blast furnace plant left little to be accomplished in the economical use of fuel, except in utilising the waste products given off in cooking the fuel. In puddling, however, great waste of fuel went on, and two modifications of the ordinary puddling furnance were to be noticed as calculated to save from 20 to 25 per cent

of fuel, and to consume all the smoke usually produced. The Wilson furnance, in its most improved form, consisted of a sloping chamber into which the fuel was fed at the top, and the volatile matters generally forming smoke were reduced by passing over the incandescent mass of fuel farther along the chamber. The air for combustion was delivered into the furnace in a heated condition, and a steam jet was delivered underneath the grate, by means of which the formation of clinkers was avoided. The Newport furnace (Middlesborough) had a chamber constructed in the ordinary chimney stack, and in this were placed a couple of cast-iron pipes with a partition reaching nearly to the top. These pipes were heated by the waste gases from the puddling furnace, and through them the air required for combustion was forced by means of a steam jet, and was delivered in front of the grate in a highly heated condition. These furnaces, of which a considerable number were in operation at the Newport Works, effected a saving of at least 35 per cent in The structural modification would involve comparatively little outlay, and the saving to be effected would recoup itself in a single year. The economy represented by applying the new plans to the whole iron trade would amount to about 1,500,000 tons of coal per annum. The author next proceeded to describe the manufacture of iron by what is termed the Radcliffe process, which had been for some time in operation at the Consett Iron Works, Newcastle. The puddled iron, which was usually allowed to get cool; then cut up, piled, heated, rolled into blooms, re-heated, and finally rolled into finished iron after a complicated series of operations, was, by the new method, finished off by a continuous and simple process. Five or more puddled balls were put together into a large bloom, under a very heavy steam hammer, shingled down into a bloom, passed for a short time through a heating furnace, and rolled off into finished iron not more than half an hour after the iron left the puddling furnace. Specimens of iron made by the process were exhibited. A great saving in the cost of manufacture was represented by this process in all departments of the manufacture of finished iron, and it was calculated that a saving of 1,500,000 tons of coal alone would result from the general application of this system. Particular stress was said upon the fact that in carrying out this process no extensive or expensive alteration of existing works was required, and a saving of from 31 to 4 cwt. of puddled iron would be secured upon each ton of finished rails or plates now turned out, the cost of making malleable iron being reduced to a very considerable extent. The importance of the whole question in a national point of view was also dwelt upon.

Mr. Bramwell said he believed that we in England owed the method

we had adopted in the utilization of the waste gases to our continental neighbors. There could be no doubt that those who were worst off for fuel were the most economical in its use. The weight of coke used in the production of a ton of iron depended very much on the amount of iron in the ore, a lean ore requiring a larger consumption of fuel than a rich ore. He was afraid that, as a rule, the waste gases were not utilized as they might be. The author of the paper had alluded to a plan by which the pig iron was not suffered to get cold; this plan had been often proposed, and had even been tried, but it was found that there were certain difficulties in the way, and people were chary of resorting to it; when this plan was adopted, it was not till the pig iron was cold that they could ascertain its quality; but if it were run direct from the blast into the puddling furnace, it would be difficult to know the nature of the charge. As to the Wilson furnace, no doubt it was one in which the fuel would be well burnt. He believed that the invention of Mr. Siemens would set people thinking, and that those who did not adopt his furnace would, at all events, be driven to adopt something which would be a vast improvement on the old method. The Radcliffe process had been known for some years. It was one by which four or five puddle balls were put together, and he thought the plan was a right one, although it was difficult. He concurred with what had been said by Prof. Cooper at a recent aitting as to the desirability of obtaining uniformity of quality in the manufacture of iron and steel.

Mr. Webster, Q. C., passed a strong eulogium on Mr. Siemens' furnace, and said the main difficulty in getting real improvements generally introduced among the manufacturers was owing to the fact that they frequently involved costly adaptations of machinery.

DYNAMITE, THE NEW BLASTING AGENT.

Mr. A. Nobel read the following paper on "Dynamite, a recent preparation of the nitro glycerine as an explosive agent":

Scientific and other papers have lately given much attention to a new blasting agent named "Dynamite." It is nothing but nitro-glycerine absorbed in highly-porous silica; and if I have given it a new name, it is not by way of disguise, but its explosive powers are so much altered as fully to warrant a new denomination.

Dynamite consists of 75 per cent of nitro-glycerine, and 25 per cent of porous silica. Hence it appears to possess only three-fourths of the power of nitro-glycerine, the specific gravity of both substances being very nearly the same. But practically there is no advantage in the greater concentration of power of nitro glycerine. It cannot, or at least

ought not to be poured direct into the borehole, since it easily causes accidents by leakage into crevices, where it explodes under the miners' tools. It must, therefore, be used in cartridges, which leave considerable windage; whereas dynamite, being somewhat pasty, easily yields to the slightest pressure, so as completely to fill up the sides of the borehole and leave no windage whatever. For this reason a given height of dynamite charge in a hole will contain quite as much nitro-glycerine as when the latter is used in its pure liquid state.

It is necessary, even at the risk of some lengthiness, to make this point clearly understood, for if the advantages otherwise desired from the transformation of nitro-glycerine into dynamite were obtained at the expense of a great depreciation of its power, the substitute might be a safe but not a useful one.

As it is, the block of wrought iron here deposited will bear testimony to its great power. It was originally a cylinder of 11 feet diameter and 12 feet height, of best scrap iron, and cut off from a shaft. The borehole through its centre was exactly one foot, and the charge of six ounces was put in without securing either end by any sort of plug or tamping. The cylinder was blown at Merstham on the 14th of July, in the presence of a large audience. Allowing for the hole, and putting the tensile strength of the iron at 20 tons per square inch, the strain necessary to effect the rupture must have been equal to 2,400 tons; and since there was no plug at either end of the hole, it is evident that the charge was too much for the work. Besides blasting the cylinder, it had hurled the one-half here deposited with such violence against a three-quarter boiler-plate at some distance as to break it.

No wonder that a substance which tells so well on iron should be effective against rock.

Coupled with this great power is a safety, for proofs of which I will simply refer to the test publicly made both at Glasgow and Merstham. A box containing about 8 lbs. of dynamite (equal in power to 80 lbs. of gunpowder) was placed over a fire where it slowly burned away; and another box with the same quantity was hurled from a height of more than 60 feet on the rock below, no explosion ensuing from the concussion sustained.

It is difficult to see what more can be required from a blasting material in order to be called safe; but some experiments made lately at Stockholm have put it to a still more severe test. A weight of 200 lbs. was dropped from a height of 20 feet on a box containing dynamite, which it smashed, of course, yet no explosion took place. An account of this experiment is to be found in the Stockholm paper, Afton Aladit, of this month.

Such a test can leave no doubt that dynamite offers sufficient safety

against concussion for all practical purposes, and we may say, as a Prussian Military Commission recently reported, that it appears to be the safest of all known explosives.

To those not fully acquainted with the nature of nitro-glycerine, it seems puzzling that a mere absorption should be sufficient to produce such a radical change in its essential properties, but when we come to examine the matter closely it is easily accounted for.

The greatest and almost the only drawback on nitro-glycerine is its liquid form. Much as has been written on the danger of congealed nitro-glycerine, I can confidently assert that if the solid form was its natural state at the ordinary temperature, we should hardly have had to deplore a single one of those fatal accidents which it has caused. Moreover, it is a very erroneous notion that crystallized nitro-glycerine is more sensitive to concussion than the liquid one; the reverse is the case, and in a very remarkable degree; but that is immaterial to the present question, and I only mention it to show how fancy notions take root and defy even the plain truth of simple investigation.

Nearly all the calamities caused by nitro-glycerine have, in my opinion, been owing to leakage, which for practical reasons it is very difficult to prevent, and are therefore indirectly chargeable to its liquid state. A substance sensitive to concussion, unless it is quite unmanageable, like chloride of nitrogen, can easily be protected against occidents by wrapping it in a soft material, but if that substance is a liquid and a leakage takes place, it becomes subject to the danger of direct percussion; and if nitroglycerine in that condition becomes exposed to the sun's rays, the heat which it takes up renders it so sensitive as to become dangerous under the slightest blow.

From the very first beginning I have given special attention to the packing of nitro-glycerine, but much to my regret I must say that it is as yet far from satisfactory. Casks are not tight enough for oily liquids, and the property of nitro-glycerine to expand when it congeals has obliged me to resort to square tins. These are left unpacked in the factory for a month at least, to ascertain whether they are tight, yet I can scarcely remember a single instance of a cart or cargo of nitro-glycerine having reached its destination without a case or more of leakage. The reason is probably to be found in the pressure to which the tin becomes exposed when the air which is confined inside, as well as the nitro-glycerine, becomes expanded by an increase of the external temperature.

Whatever be the cause, it is certainly wrong to lay the blame on nitroglycerine for what has been due only to a practical difficulty. Let us suppose, for instance, the case of gunpowder being transported in casks dropping continuously out part of the contents. A missing accident would almost be a rarity, and it is really a proof of the safe properties of nitro-glycerine that accidents have occurred almost only on those occasions (as at Aspinwall and San Francisco) when it was forwarded under a wrong declaration, and consequently the necessity of cautious handling could not be known.

These hints will give sufficient insight into the importance of converting nitro-glycerine into a solid. It is not only a theory or some demonstrative experiments on which I base that assertion, but also on practical experience. Dynamite has only recently grown to be an article of commerce, yet the quantity sold hitherto exceeds fifty tons, and the most serious accident it has caused was the case of a man who, having lighted the fuse, kept the cartridge in his hand till it exploded and blew off his arm. No explosive can be safe against accidents of that kind.

Besides the security derived from its solid form, dynamite has over nitro-glycerine other special advantages. Its sensitiveness to concussion is, as I have already stated, reduced in a very high degree; and since fire does not cause it to explode, it offers great security for transportation and stowage. Besides, it is quite natural that miners should prefer, as more practical, a solid to a liquid explosive. Dynamite is now generally sold in ready-made cartridges, and nearly all the workman has to do is to put them in his borecole and fire.

Having now compared the two explosives, nitro-glycerine and dynamite, and shown the reasons why the latter, with equal power, is far superior to the former in point of safety and facility for use, I will briefly point out the sterling properties which render nitro-glycerine such a highly valuable blasting agent. The merits of dynamite are essentially the same, so that what is said of one is in the same measure applicable to the other.

The miner's work is divided into two parts, viz., to make a chamber for the explosive, and to charge it. If that chamber was a matter of small expense, it might be very immaterial whether the amount of power required to do the work occupied a great or small bulk. But drilling holes in any rock, and especially in a hard one, is a slow and tedious labor, and there are mines where it takes a man three days' hard work to make a one-inch bore of only 24 inches in depth. Three days' labor, exclusive of tools, represents at least 9s., yet the charge of gunpowder which can be lodged in such a hole is at most 6 oz., or a value of less than 2d. It is easy, from such an example, to see why the miners should be anxious for a more powerful explosive, and ready to pay a much higher price for it. The instance here given is almost an extreme one, yet, even in rock of very little hardness, the cost of labor always greatly exceeds the value of the explosive used. It needs no explanation why an explosive containing, within the same bulk, ten times more power than gunpowder should

greatly reduce the number of boreholes, and warrant a common saying amongst the workmen in Sweden, that they would blast with nitro-glycerine, even if they could get gunpowder for nothing.

I have been frequently asked for a positive statement as to the economy in labor which the use of dynamite effects. This, however, is a question which cannot be answered in a positive manner, for every kind of rock would require a special estimate, based on its hardness, the nature of the strata, &c., and which greatly varies, not only in different localities, but within the limit of a single mine. Everyone will, therefore, have to form his own estimate; but as far as I have been able to ascertain, the use of dynamite and nitro-glycerine generally cause a reduction of at least one-third on the general cost of blasting, which is a very great saving indeed, considering that the cost of the explosive rarely figures more than 10 per cent of the expense.

I am, however, not in a position to give on this subject as full information as I might desire. The miners are generally extremely sparing in communications of that kind. Amongst my correspondents I can find only one who gives a clear and positive statement in figures of the saving effected: it is Mr. Alexander, manager of the Phœnix mine, on Lake Superior. This letter is dated February 2, 1868, and the mine up to that time used 7,000 lbs. of nitro-glycerine (they have no dynamite yet), so that the result is certainly based on sufficient practical experience. The material had been purchased from New York at the price of \$1.50 per pound, irrespective of the cost of transportation to Lake Superior.

Another statement of figures is that of Mr. Nordenfelt, Director of the Great Northern Railway in Sweden, who, as far back as the 19th of July, 1865, asserted that the use of nitro-glycerine had allowed his contracting for blastings with a reduction of 25 per cent.

Mr. Unge, who has blasted with nitro-glycerine an extensive tunnel through Stockholm, states the saving to have been 23 per cent on the cost of blasting, and the progress of the tunnel 87 per cent quicker than when gunpowder was used.

These results show that, even in the present state of comparative inexperience in the use of the new explosive, a great economy is obtained.

The saving of labor which dynamite causes is its greatest feature. Next to that we must class the saving of time. Nearly every mine is dependent on the progress of its shafts and pits, and as for railway tunnels, the famous one through Mont Cenis is only a glaring example of the necessity of quickening the tedious work.

Next to the saving of time ranks its peculiar adaptability of wet ground, since water has no effect on the charge. Every miner has had more or less experience how difficult it is to blast with gunpowder wherever the rock is water bleeding, which is only too common.

Another sterling advantage of dynamite is that it needs no tamping, and, consequently, does away with a great number of minor accidents, which are little thought of in general, being too common to be reported in the daily papers, but form, nevertheless, a very long and sad list of continued calamity. I was told in Cornwall that by far the greater number of accidents occurring in the mines of that county are due to the act of tamping. It is abuse, I admit, for a hole may be tamped without firing the charge, still it is very desirable to provide against a source of accidents, which, after centuries of experience, still continues to exact so numerous victims.

It would be a great drawback on advantages here set forth if, as has been sometimes asserted, the fumes of nitro-glycerine of dynamite were of a noxious nature. The best answer, perhaps, to those who maintain that opinion is, that a great number of mines are daily using it for underground work, and that the miners do not at all complain. The truth is, that when nitro-glycerine is allowed to leak into the crevice of a borehole, it does not all explode, and being dispersed in the atmosphere, causes a severe headache. It is, however, easily remedied by using cartridges, which prevent leakage, and in the case of dynamite, which is a solid, that inconvenience falls away entirely. Since that explosive became introduced no complaints have been made, and the workmen in many mines assert that dynamite cannot be nitro-glycerine, because the fumes are so different.

So far as regards its properties. And now we will examine the practical results.

The introduction of dynamite is so recent that its advantages over other blasting agents cannot be proved by statistics; but in all except danger it is so analogous to nitro-glycerine, that the results obtained with the latter will allow us to form a clear estimate of its commercial value. Sweden is the only country where nitro-glycerine has been in use ever since 1865; it is therefore the most conclusive example. The sales in that country, as extracted from the books of the Nitro-glycerine Company, at Stockholm, were in 1865, 33,258 lbs.; in 1866, 48,785 lbs.; in 1867, 76,575 lbs.; and during the first six months of the present year reached 64,293 lbs. These figures show a steady and rapid increase. The quantities are not enormous, but it should be borne in mind that Sweden, although an extensive country, is not a very productive one, and that Cornwall alone consumes three times as much gunpowder as the whole of Sweden. The sale of 221,900 lbs. of nitro-glycerine in that country, equal to at least 21 million pounds of gunpowder, is therefore a proof of decided success. If the material had over gunpowder the advantage of cheapness, weight for weight, the demand might possibly be ascribed to futile and mistaken economy; but as one pound of nitro-glycerine costs the miners as much

as eight pounds of gunpowder, it is evident that it must do some work, or he would not have it.

It has, no doubt, greatly facilitated the introduction of nitro-glycerine in Sweden, that the transportation, storage, and use of the quantity above mentioned, has caused no accident of any serious nature, and positively a less total of minor accidents than if gunpowder had been used in its stead. That immunity from danger is, in all probability, due to the colder climate of Sweden, which allows of nitro-glycerine being transported, nearly all the year round, in a congealed state, its freezing point being as high as 50 degrees.

In this country nitro-glycerine, notwithstanding the strong dislike which generally prevails against it, has been constantly used in the quarries of North Wales since 1866, and is in high favor with the miners. Two quarries alone (Brynderven and Driwrwic) have, up to this time, consumed about £3,000 worth of the material, or about nine tons; and its remaining stationary in North Wales is owing only to the circumstance that the manufacture and sale of the article has not been in this country, as in Sweden, an organised business.

The workmen in Wales pay for the material which they consume the price of 3s. 3d. per lb., while gunpowder costs only $4\frac{1}{2}d$., and if they continue to do so for years, it proves that they derive a benefit from its use. Still a slate quarry is far from showing it at its greatest advantage, which can only become prominent in hard rock.

Whatever success nitro-glycerine has realized, it will certainly be admitted that it is not due to popular favor. No improvement has ever worked its way under a more crushing weight of opposition, and the very fact of its valuable properties. Gun cotton, which has been repeatedly pushed since more than twenty years, has not been used for blasting in all that time as much as nitro glycerine in six months. Why? Because the miners had no advantage at all in using it.

In mentioning gun-cotton, it is but just to state that it has been highly improved of late by Professor Abel, I believe, and is sold now in a condensed state, in which it forms a good blasting agent, and ranks as such next to dynamite. Only a few years ago, the attempts which I witnessed to make gun-cotton take the place of gunpowder appeared to me to be perfectly fruitless. Bulk for bulk, it had less power, and that power was even more expansive than the power which it was meant to supersede. A new explosive cannot be introduced when the economical advantages are on the wrong side, and is next to impossible to get adopted by miners unless the advantages are very great, and of a passable nature. But compressed gun-cotton is decidedly superior to gunpowder as a blasting agent, and if it cannot compete with dynamite, it is only because the manufactur

ing cost of the latter is less, while it possesses at least three times more power, and effects a far great saving of labor. Details are only a matter of time and improvements, while the intrinsic merits of a substance decide the place which it is to occupy.

I know nothing, with the exception of, perhaps, a liability to spontaneous combustion, which could possibly warrant the absolute prohibition of a Now, as for nitrated organic compounds in general, it is a decidedly erroneous notion that there is any such drawback attached to them. That notion has sprung up in laboratories because the chemist has no suitable means at hand for thoroughly neutralizing the adhering acid. It is well known that the continued action of nitric acid decomposes nearly every organic compound. It is therefore clear that unless nitrated compounds are rid of adhering nitric acid they will decompose chemical in course of time. Hence we read in nearly every work, that nitro-glycerine is gradually decomposed, deposing oxalic acid, while such a change has never occurred in the same article manufactured on a large scale. With suitable apparatus, it takes less than an hour to completely neutralise a ton of nitro-glycerine; and as farther control, a small quantity of every day's produce, after it has been well mixed so as to be fully unform. is sealed and kept for inspection. That practice has now been carried on for eighteen months, and shows not the slightest vestige of decomposition in any of the numerous samples.

Having to store la e quantities, not only in six factories, but also in numerous depots, it is but natural that I should have been anxious myself to investigate the matter. In the case of dynamite, it is true that spontaneous combustion could mean only its catching fire and burning without explosion, since internal or external heating must naturally have the same effect; still spontaneous combustion, even where no explosiion can ensue is a serious vil.

Professor Rankine asked how the dynamite was exploded.

M. Nobel said it was exploded by a percussion cap. The force obtained could be seen in the piece of iron exhibited. A large piece of wrought iron, more than a foot high and a foot in diameter, had been riven in two as if by a wedge, by the explosition of six ounces of dynamite, without the use of a plug.

In answer to other questions, M. Nobel stated the explosive force of dynamite as compared with gunpowder was as ten to one, but at present its cost was eight to one.

THE METRIC QUESTION.

The report was read by Professor Leone Levi from the Committee on Uniformity of Moneys, Weights, and Measures. The committee are of

opinion that the only method of attaining the desired object would be the adoption of the metric system. They are convinced that they cannot introduce even the decimal scale in the present system. It should be remembered that the metre was no longer an abstract idea of the scientific conception. It was a definite length, that length of a concrete object, deposited at the archieves of the Paris Mint, and exactly copied from standards within our reach. The time was past finding out the best national unit, and we must be satisfied with what we had gotviz.: a unit really universal from its wide diffusion among modern nations. The committee were pleased to report that a bill to establish metric weights and measures had been introduced by Mr. Ewart, and had met with a most satisfactory reception from both sides of the house. Public opinion having manifested itself so strong in favor of the metric system, the committee hoped that her Majesty's government would proceed further in the direction of introducing it as soon as it was practicable; and they urged that the government should, without delay adopt metric weight and measures in the post office, in the dockyards, and in the customs. Abroad the metric system was making constant progress. ing the year it was adopted in North Germany, and Austria was preparing to follow in the same course. With reference to the measurement of tonnage, the committee had learnt that the Chancellor of the North German Confederation having moved the Federal Council that the presiding power should be authorized to open negotiations with Great Britain, and subsequently with other maritime powers, including the United States of America, for establishing an international system of ship measurement on the basis of the English system, the Council resolved that the proposed system should be based upon the metrical principle, instead of the English tonnage In Spain, the metric system of weights and measures had been rendered compulsory from July, 1868; and the last meeting of the International Statistical Congress, held at Florence, unanimously recommended the universal adoption of a uniform system of weights and measures founded on the metridecimal system. As many as thirteen countries, including France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the Roman States, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Mexico, Chili, Brazil, New Granada, and other South American Republics, with an aggregate population of upwards 146,000,000, had established one uniform decimal founded on the metre. Seven more countries, with an gate population of 68,000,000, had also adopted parts of the same, while this country and the United States, having gether 60,000,000, had introduced the same in a permissive manner. In India, the Government of the Bengal Presidency recom

mended the adoption of the metric system as the best means of introducing simplicity and unity in the weights and measures of that vast empire-As regarded international coinage, the committee had already reported the result of two conferences held in Paris in June, 1867. A report of the official conference having been presented to her Majesty's Government, a royal commission was issued to consider and report upon the recommendations of the conference and their adaptability to the circumstances of the United Kingdom, and whether it would be desirable to make any and what changes in the coinage of the United Kingdom, in order to establish, either wholly or partially, such uniformity as the conference had in contemplation. The Commissioners had completed their labors and presented their report to Parliament, but the same had not yet been published. A report of the unofficial International Conference on Weights and Measures and Coins had also been communicated by Prof. Leone Levi to Lord Stanley, and laid before Parliament. During the year a bill was presented to the United States Congress for placing the coinage in direct relation to the French, by reducing the value of the half-eagle 34 per cent, so that it might be worth 25 francs. The bill was read a second time, and a clause granting compensation for the difference to holders of the existing coinage, and of obligations in the existing currency; but the bill stood over for consideration, probably till the report of the Royal Commission was made known. Canada had introduced a bill to the same effect. Spain had engaged to coin gold pieces of 10 francs and 25 francs. The German Parliament had passed a resolution in favor of a decimal currency. Movements to some extent in the same direction had also been made in Austria and Italy. The committee was of opinion that in the event of an international coinage being agreed upon, it would be highly important to secure the publication of such information periodically, and for all countries; and they would recommend the same to the earnest attention of the Board of Trade. In conclusion, the committee expressed their opinion that the great object at which they aimed was steadily advancing.

INTERNATIONAL COINAGE.

Prof. Leone Levi, F.S.A., F.S.S., read a paper on "The Present State of the Question of International Coinage." Having shown the practical character of the question at issue, and the importance attached to it by the juries of International Exhibitions, the Statistical Congresses, the Chambers of Commerce, the Society of Arts, and other public bodies, the learned professor examined the respective advantage of either adopting a new unit altogether for all nations, or one of the exceeding unit by all o them, or a correlation of all the different units. The first plan of adopt

ing a five or ten grains of gold as a new unit would be impracticable. because it would require a general recoinage by all nations. The second plan, that of choosing one from the existing units, was better, and the choice would depend on the number of persons among whom the same unit is already in circulation, the amount of trade which is regulated by such unit, the amount of coinage of the same already issued, and the relative convenience of the different tystems. As regards the population, the pound issued by England has 30,000,000; the franc of France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, has 70,000,000; the dollar by the United States has 31,000,000; the florin by Austria has 37,000,000; the thaler by Germany and Prussia has 54,000,000, and the rouble by European Russia having 59,000,000. The franc, therefore, prevails among the largest number of persons. As regards trade, whilst the imports and exports of England amount to £500,000,000, those of France, Italy Belgium and Switzerland amount to £480,000,000, and those of the United States £105,000,000. England here has the pre-eminence, though not so decided as one might imagine; and as regarded the amount of coinage issued, whilst up to 1850 the issue of gold coin in England far exceeded that of France and the United States, it has not been so since that time. From 1793 to 1866, France issued £262,500,000 of gold coins; the United Kingdom, from 1816 to 1866, £187,000,000; the United States, from 1792 to 1849, £169,000,000. Since 1850, France £197,000,000; the United Kingdom, £91,000,000; the United States, £152,000,000. As regards the relative convenience of the different systems, it was a fact that whilst this country has been for years laboring to establish a decimal coinage, France and the United States long possessed it, whilst, moreover, for international purposes, the pound was too large a unit. In three, therefore, out of the four elements, France has the advantage, and that justified the Congress to take the French coin as a basis. But the Congress did not recommend the franc as a unit for all nations : nor did it recommend the pound. As a step in advance, it recommended a mode for harmonizing the different systems in existence, according to which we alter the pound to twenty-five france exactly, instead of twentyfive france twenty, as it is now intrinsically worth. Can this be done? Should this compromise be accepted, the evil was that it would cause a great change in all the monetary systems. It would require us to lower, though in an infinitesimal manner, the gold standard, and yet leave all the existing units in existence. The accounts would still be kept in different ways: the divisional coins would in no wise agree, and we would not get a good decimal coinage. The learned Professor thought the 10franc piece in gold of the value of 100 pence (slightly diminished in their present relative value), with a unit of 100 francs or £4 for larger financia1 operations, the best unit offered for all nations. Such a unit, divided into ten silver pieces of 10d. each, would also give an excellent decimal coinage, producing immense facilities in education and great ease in calculations. Then we would have one unit identically alike everywhere, instead of the hundred units now in existence, and the identity would be obtained, not only in the gold unit, but in its subordinate coins of silver and copper. Allowing that the International Monetary Congress had immensely advanced the question, he trusted that the report of the Royal Commissioners would recommend the holding of another conference for the purpose of considering the possibility of agreeing in one common system of coinage, instead of the proposed adoption of many systems.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN EARTHQUAKES.

It is impossible, of course, to form any trustworthy estimate of the probable effects upon trade and commerce of the terrible estastrophe which has just overtaken the Pacific coast of South America, until we receive more exact details than have yet reached us of the extent of the region actually affected. But such information as we already have justifies the belief that the secondary consequences of this calamity will be almost as disastrous as its immediate effects were appalling. From a careful collation of the hasty, vague and, in some instances, contradictory accounts which came to us by the last South American mail, it appears that the various shocks of this (in modern times) unprecedented series of earthquakes were felt throughout more than forty degrees of latitude, and across the whole belt of the continent from the Andes to the Pacific. Several score of comparatively flourishing cities and villages were more or less laid in ruins, some of them being literally swallowed up by the earth as were the cities of Central China in the terrible earthquakes of the twelfth century. The productive power of at least two of the South American republics, Ecuador and Peru, must have been seriously crippled, not only by the loss of life among the inhabitants but by the destruction of accumulated property, the result of three centuries of civilization, by the conversion of what had been fertile soils into barren wastes or lakes of water, and by the absolute disappearance of some of their richest mining districts. This latter calamity is distinctly stated to have happened to Peru in the case of the important mines of Huancavelica. The commercial relations both of Ecuador and of Peru with Europe are more extensive than their relations with the United States; but the latter are sufficiently important to make it certain that the results of this great disaster will in some measure be felt by

ourselves. This, however, is but a trifling consideration in the presence of so dire an affliction as has thus overtaken a people with whom it is our destiny to be much more closely connected with every year that passes; and without pausing to measure even hypothetically our direct part in their suffering, it becomes us to take prompt steps for affording them such relief as our ample means and the practical sagacity of our mercantile community can so easily command. It is eminently proper that the Chamber of Commerce of New York should take the initiative in this work. And there can be no doubt that an appeal to the public at large, if made by a responsible Committee of the Chamber upon accurate information of the extent and nature of the relief most needed, would be heartily and hand-somely responded to.

This being done, or while this is doing, it is equally desirable that some plan should be devised and carried out either by the Federal Government, or by the Chamber of Commerce, for availing ourselves of the extraordinary opportunity which is now afforded us, for getting at some really valuable information as to the nature of the changes wrought in the mineralogy and geology of the planet by convulsions of this magnitude. The South American earthquakes present us with an instance occurring, so to speak, under our very eyes, of those terrific cosmical convulsions by which in the primæval ages the crust-forms of the earth were determined. Were there no general scientific interest in the subject sufficient to make it worth our while to seize upon so rare an occasion of enlightening ourselves as to the process by which the crust of the earth has been made what it is, we have in our own Pacific States a direct and most serious practical interest to consult in this matter. It was long since observed by European geologists of eminence, that the visible direction of the great fissures left in the earth's surface by ancient convulsions, might enable us to follow the progressive movement of these explosions of the subterranean forces. It is certain that every earthquake, by diminishing the cohesive force of a more or less considerable segment of the fissure, must facilitate the infiltration of the earth's superficial waters into the centres of explosion, and so prepare fresh disturbances of the same kind. California and Oregon are in the direct line northward of these fearful South American convulsions. Is there no reason to fear that the forces which have just produced such terrible effects upon the earth's crust in the Southern Continent, may at no distant day bring about a similar series of catastrophes in the Northern Continent also! It is commonly thought, we believe, that the earthquake belts, as they may be called, range in the direction of latitude rather than of longitade. But that this is an error clearly appears, for example, from the fact that the eruptions of Vesuvius, and the earthquakes attendant upon them. have frequently been attended or followed by earthquakes and explosions in and around the Icelandic volcanoes. It would at all events be possible, and it would certainly be important to gather some valuable indications as to this point, from the traces of the recent earthquakes in South America while they are yet fresh, and still bear their formidable story legibly upon their fronts.

Nor would an investigation such as we suggest be valuable only from its bearings upon the possible future of our Northern hemisphere. The position of the great metalliferous veins of the earth necessarily bears the most intimate relations to the geographical distribution of the earth's crust, or, in other words, to the furrows made by the central fire. Whether the metallic salts were brought through these furrows by the action of the infiltrating waters; or whether the veins of metal were poured molten in masses through the crust from below makes no practical difference. either case it is through the furrows formed by igneous action that the penetration took place, and consequently the distribution of the precious metals depends upon the situation of these deep interior "solutions of continuity," which are caused by the volcanic movements in the underworld. The reported disappearance of the silver veins of Huancavelica induces the belief that from a close examination of the effects of the earthquakes in that district alone, information of the highest practical importance to our mining interests in the United States may be procured. A series of investigations, made by a French geologist, M. de Chancourtois, some years ago, into the bituminous deposits of Seyssel and Clermont, revealed the fact that these deposits occupied lines of position exactly parallel to the direction of the system of superficial upheavals in the Low Countries. And a report written by M. Gauldree Boilleau, now Consul General of France in New York, which appeared some years ago in the French Annales des Mines, on the oil region of North America, showed that the chiefoil deposits of the United States are situated on a line which prolongs the net-work of fissures through which the Saint Lawrence passes to the sea.

But without going too far into details of a strictly scientific nature, it is surely plain that we have an immense practical interest in a close, efficient, intelligent examination of the light which the phenomena of the South American earthquakes must throw upon the method and the immediate effects of these mighty and awful processes of nature. It has been justly said that our knowledge of the globe we live on can only be made even tolerably complete by a study of what may be called its subterraneau meteorology. The Japanese have for centuries past shown a keen insight into this truth, for they have kept a current register of "hurricanes and earthquakes," as intimately connected phenomena, ever since a date at which the Western world was still listening for the spirits of the air in the whirlwind, and trembling at the anger of demons in the muttered thunder of the inner globe.

THE GEORGIA RAILROAD AND THE ATLANTIC AND WEST POINT RAILROAD.

These two railroads stretch across the State of Georgia, from Augusta to West Point, a distance of 258 miles, and are operated under the same presidency. On the east the seaboard is reached by the South Carolina Railroad, the distance from Augusta to Charleston being 137 miles, and on the west the Gulf is reached by the Montgomery and West Point Railroad 884 miles, the Alabana and Florida Railroad 114 miles, and the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad 72 miles-total distance, southwest from West Point to Mobile, 274 miles, or from Charleston to Mobile The Western and Atlantic (State) Railroad extends from Atlanta to Chattanooga, 138 miles, forming the connecting link between the seaboard and the northwestern system to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The distance from Charleston to Chattanooga is 523 miles. are faults, however, in the line within Georgia; it is exceedingly crooked, . following natural rather than engineered lines, and has met with constantly increasing competition from the more direct and later constructed lines. Hence we find that through business is leaving it for the more favored roads; and it is feared that this through business will have disappeared altogether in a very few years.

GEORGIA RAILROAD AND BANKING COMPANY.

The lines of this company are as follows:

Main Line—Augusta, Ga., to Atlanta. Ga	,	171 r	niles.	
Branch Line Camak, G., to War e ton, Ga	3	61	**	
Total length owned and operated		282 T	niles .	

The following statement shows the amount of motive and carrying power on the lines at the close of the last year (March 31, 1868): Locomotive engines (in good order 17, in running order 14, in shops 12, and condemned 4) 47; and cars (passenger 23, haggage 10, hox 269, cab. 14, stock 27, platform 105, coal 12, and shanty 15) 475. Two additional locomotives were ordered; and during the year 59 box, 1 passenger, and 2 baggage cars had been built at the company's shops, and 3 passenger cars re-built-

The business of the roads, and the earnings and expenses for the last ten years have been as follows:

		Business-					Div'd,
Fircal	Cotton.	Grain,	Flour,	Gross	Working	Net	per
Years.	bales.	bushels.	bb s.	receipts.	expenses.		cent .
1858-59	219.218	916,291	121,189	1.154 624	610,218	544,866	8
1839-60		258,241	48,189	1,159,188	681,144	528,044	8
1860-61		309,497	9.967	660,460	704,751	155 709	2
1861-62		278,446	19,445	859,598	521,310	8%,208	(Not know here.)
18628		27.848	82,198	1,120,318	469.886	650,476	ÄÄ
1863-64		2.,020		2,275,854	1.916.848	859,006	M.A
1864-65				8.842.017	8,056,949	285,068	.3
1865-66	107 976/	May 15. '65 i	to Mar 81.	66)1.155.897	640,478	514,919	25
1866-67			8,623	1,185,141	628,078	518,068	63%
1867-68		664,662	14.159	1,003,798	511,834	491,889	632

After paying interest on bonds, and incidental expenses (but including dividends, interest, rent, &c., received), the net profits from May 15, 1865, to March 31, 1868 (34½ months) were \$1,567,369. From this sum must be deducted for reconstruction and the retirement of bank circulation, nearly \$1,200,000. In the meanwhile four dividends have been paid to the stockholder, two of 3 and two of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, but this has been effected to a considerable extent by drawing on the reserved fund. The dividend has amounted to \$270,140 a year, exclusive of the government tax.

The following is a statement of the financial condition of the company at three periods, viz.: April 1, 1860, 1866 and 1868, or at the commencement, at the close of the late war and at the present time:

Capital stock	1860. 84,156,000 819 500 740,846 1,946,649 178,259 185,409 239,114 1,069,580	1866. \$4,186,000 290,500 1,184,085 11,251 61,004 5,644 418,811	1869, \$4,166,000 869,500 963,183 1,085,030 46,639 14,683 8,659 129,476
Total	88,128,843	\$6,121,745	£ 6,788, 895
Against which are charged as follows:			
Road and outfit		\$4, 156,000	\$4,156,000 184,859
Real estate	198,409 85 000	186,959 85,000	85,000
Road expenses, interest, &c	693,307	*****	917,678
Materials on hand	151,799	*****	84,548
Stocks owned	952,150	1,051,670	1,081,990
Bonds owned	51,500	170,500	66,400
Bills and notes	1,199,188	61,486	26,654
Notes of other banks	169,85*	858,789	211,817
Current accounts	78,528	8,804	8 421
Specie	528,621	58,104 89,488	9,744 67,984
Total	88,128,848	\$6,121,745	\$6,788,895

The floating debt is stated at the sum of \$52,734; but as it is thought that no more of the bank circulation will be brought in for redemption this is simply a nominal liability. The stock of the company is now quoted at 80@85.

2. ATLANTA AND WEST POINT RAILROAD.

The Atlanta and West Point Railroad, commencing at Atlanta, the western terminus of the Georgia Railroad, extends in a southwest direction to West Point, the eastern terminus of the Montgomery and West Point Railroad, the distance between the two points being 86.74 miles.

The rolling stock consisted at the close of the last year (June 30, 1868) of: locomotives 14, chiefly in good order; and cars, as follows: passenger 6, baggage 21, express 1, cab 2, box 49, stock 15, platform 21, and shanty 1—total 99. Six freight cars are to be added during the current year.

\$1,817,2>\$ 64

\$1,846,682 59

The number of passengers carried in the year 1867-'68 was 42,982, and the quantity of freight carried was 40,480 tons, including 45,507 bales of cotton. The following shows the earnings and expenses of the lines during the last three years:

Passenger \$187,655 10 \$188,911 41 \$123,839 58 Freight 193,271 60 293,638 83 2905,738 58 Mail 5,468 70 6,563 44 7 028 07 Express 17,539 89 12,739 77 8,763 24 Mis elianeous 11,473 78 4,694 61 7,157 14 Gross earnings \$45,61037 \$891,476 81 \$55,652 48 Motive power 64,337 58 72,922 46 71,216 50 Maintenance of way 68 214 90 72,476 55 72,613 11 Mordinary expenses 6,463 78 11,574 15 9,598 18 Extraordinary expenses 2185,746 85 \$219,376 80 \$210,905 52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,280 13 29,197 85 Total expenses \$360,762 89 \$392,596 42 \$389,408 87 Earnings less expenses \$254,648 28 \$68 80 89 \$111,666 71 Dividends paid (4)49,288 00 (8)9,37,007 00 (6)98,576 00		1805-6.		1865-7.	1867-8.
Freight 193,271 60 203,638 83 205,738 65 Mail 5,448 70 6,628 44 7038 07 Express 17,559 89 12,739 77 8,763 24 Mis elements 11,473 38 4,694 61 7,187 14 Gross earnings \$46,60 15 \$82,209 14 \$56,632 48 Motive power 6,433 58 72,928 46 71,216 50 Maint nance of care 6,433 78 11,574 15 9,538 48 Ordinary expenses 3185,746 35 \$219,376 30 \$210,205 52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,290 13 29,197 85 Total expenses \$360,768 39 \$322,564 2838,408 87	Passenger	\$187,655	10	\$158,911 41	\$129,889 58
Mail 5,468 70 6,563 44 7,080 77 Express 17,539 89 12,739 77 8,763 24 Mis elianeous 11,473 38 4,694 81 7,187 14 Gross earnings \$4:5,41037 \$891,476 81 \$851,070 08 Transportation \$46,690 15 \$69,802 14 \$56,852 48 Motive power 64,337 58 73,922 46 71,216 50 Maintenance of way 68 214 90 72,676 55 72,613 11 Maint nance of care 6,463 73 11,574 15 9,538 42 Ordinary expenses \$195,746 85 \$219,876 80 \$20,205 52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,390 13 29,197 52 Total expenses \$360,768 89 \$322,596 42 \$239,408 37	Freight	198,271	60	208.638 88	305,788 (6
Express 17,539 89 12,739 77 8,763 24 Mis. elianeous 11,473 38 4,694 81 7,167 14 Gross earnings \$4:5,410 17 \$391,476 81 \$351,070 08 Transportation 24,690 15 56,292 14 \$56,562 48 Motive power 64,337 58 73,922 46 71,216 50 Maintenance of way 68 214 90 72,678 55 72,618 11 Maint nance of care 6,463 73 11,574 15 9,598 48 Ordinary expenses \$185,746 85 \$219,376 80 \$210,305 52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,390 13 29,197 85 Total expenses \$360,768 59 \$322,596 42 \$239,408 87	Mail	5,468	70	6,569 44	7 098 07
Mis-ellaneous 11,473-38 4,684-81 7,167-14 Gross earnings \$4:5,41037 \$891,476-81 \$551,070-08 Transportation \$46,690-15 \$63,282-16 \$56,832-48 Motive power 64,387-58 72,922-46 71,316-80 Maintenance of way 68-214-90 72,676-55 72,613-11 Maint nance of care 6,403-73 11,574-15 9,598-48 Ordinary expenses \$185,746-85 \$219,876-80 \$210,905-52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016-04 103,280-13 29,197-85 Total expenses \$360,768-89 \$322,596-42 \$389,408-87	Express	17,589	89	12,789 77	8,768 24
Gross earnings \$4:5,4103? \$391,476 81 \$561,070 08 Transportation \$46,690 15 \$69,269 14 \$56,562 48 Motive power 64,337 58 72,928 46 71,216 50 Maintenance of way 68 214 90 72,676 55 72,613 11 Maint nance of cars 6,463 78 11,574 15 9,538 18 Ordinary expenses \$185,746 85 \$319,876 80 \$210,905 52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,220 12 29,197 85 Total expenses \$360,768 89 \$322,596 42 \$289,408 37	Kis ellaneous	11,475	88		
Motive power 64,387 58 72,928 46 71,916 50 Maintenance of way 68 914 90 72,676 55 72,618 11 Maint nance of care 6,463 78 11,574 15 9,598 48 Ordinary expenses \$195,746 85 \$319,876 80 \$210,905 58 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,320 13 29,197 85 Total expenses \$360,768 89 \$323,596 42 \$329,408 87	Gross earnings				
Motive power 64,337 58 72,823 46 71,816 50 72,613 11 72,676 55 72,613 11 13,614 10 72,676 55 72,613 11 14,676 55 72,613 11 14,676 15 9,588 48 Ordinary expenses \$195,746 35 \$219,876 80 \$210,905 52 \$210,905 52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,320 13 29,197 85 Total expenses \$360,763 39 \$323,596 42 \$289,408 37	Transportation.	246.6 90	15	\$69,909 14	256,869 48
Maint nance of way 68 914 90 72,676 55 72,013 11 Maint nance of care 6,463 78 11,574 15 9,588 48 Ordinary expenses \$185,746 85 \$219,876 80 \$219,876 80 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,290 13 29,197 85 Total expenses \$860,768 89 \$323,596 42 \$289,408 87	Motive power	64.887	58	79,928 46	71,216 50
Maint nance of care 6,463 78 11,574 15 9,598 48 Ordinary expenses \$185,746 85 \$219,876 80 \$210,905 52 Extraordinary expenses 175,016 04 103,280 18 29,197 85 Total expenses \$360,768 89 \$322,595 42 \$329,408 87	Maintenance of way	68 214	90	72,676 55	
Extraordinary expenses	Maint nance of cars	6,463	78	11,574 15	9,588 48
Extraordinary expenses	Ordinary expenses.	2185,746	85	2219,876 80	\$210,205 53
	Extraordinary expenses	175,016	04	103,320 13	
	Total expenses	\$860,768 8	89	\$322,596 42	- ,
Dividends paid	Earnings less expenses	254.648	48	268 890 39	
	Dividends paid	(4)49,988 (00	(8)() 87,067 00	(8) 98,576 00

The number of passengers and tons of freight carried in the same years was as follows:

Passengers carried	47.958	49,980 40,48 ₅
Tons of freight carried	46,569	40,48
Average fare per passenger	\$8 86 %	83 80
Avera e freight per ton	4.48	5.08
Ordinary expenses to gros earnings44.8 p.c	54.1 p.c.	59.9 p c.
Total expenses to gross earnings	82,4 '"	68.9 "
Nett earnings to calital 4.4	5.6 "	9.0 "

The annual balance sheets of July 1, 1866-67-68, showing the financial condition of the company at date, compare as follows:

Capital stock	1866. et 989 900 00	1867. \$1,282,200 00	1968. \$1,282,200 00
Ronded deht	86 500 10	85,500 00	47,0 0 00
Dividends unpaid	804.00	16,569 11	3 25 2 00
Carrent accounts	X1.A10 OA	40,0 5 89	4,860 62
Profit and loss	5,600 68	22,857 59	81,470 09
Total	\$1,297,090 68	\$1,846,682 59	\$1,817,282 64
Against which are made the fe	ollowing charges	:	
Against which are made the fo	\$1,200,078 76	\$1.200.078 76	\$1,200,280 26
Against which are made the for Road and outfit	\$1,900,078 76		21,779 90
Against which are made the for Road and outfit	\$1,200,078 76 \$2,779 80	\$1,200,078 76 22,779 20	22,779 90 11,861 50
Against which are made the for Road and outfit. Bills receivab e	\$1,200,078 76 \$2,779 @0	\$1,200,078 76 22,779 20 2,500 00	92,779 90 11,861 50 2,500 00
Against which are made the for Road and outfit	\$1,200,078 76 \$2,779 80 \$2,5 0 00 \$9,638 28	\$1,200,078 76 22,779 20	22,779 90 11,861 50

The stock of this company is now quoted at 95@100.

Total \$1,997,020 63

RAILROADS IN GEORGIA.

The following statement shows the length and cost of the railroads (including equipment) in Georgia at the close of the last fiscal year, and

also the gross and nett earnings	of each li	ine, and t	he rate	of the	lividend s
paid to stockholders during the y	ear:	•			Divi- Value
	Length	Cost of	Karn	ngs c	lend, of
Railroads.	of lines.				p. c. Stock.
Atlanta and West Point	84.74	\$1,900,930		\$111,667	
Atlantic and Gulf	938 00)			•	
Forida extension	49.00	5,041,987	619,875	253,971	11. 59- 54
Central of Georgia	190 46	4,479,000	1	(776,808	10 125-180
Augusta & bavan. (leased)	58.25	1 023 902	2220,918	78,000	
Milledg'v. & Eatont'n (")	88 81	888,100	(11,000	
Georgia	171.00)		,	(24,000	
Warrenton Branch	4.00	ľ			
Washington Branch	18.00	- 4,156,000	1,008,728	491,889	61 30-85
Athens Branch	89.00				
Macon and Western	100.00		568,846	184 000	81 105-115
Sonthwestern	108.101	1,000,000	900,000	105,000	26 100-110
Butler Branch	23.00				
Enfala Branch	59.08	- 8,809,887	1,006,958	408,959	9 102-105
Fort Gaines Branch	21.89				
Western and Atlantic	31.08)	B 000 000	1 020 101	FOR BOO	۵۱
Western and Atlantic No returns received from—	100.00	0,000,000	1,979,191	990'.138	21
Particular received from—	40.00	800 000			21 a 47 - 3
Barnesvi le and Thomaston	16.00	200,000			dismantled
Brunswick and Albany	60.00	1,200,000			r, and prob-
Etowah	8.87	120,000		ot restor	
Muscogee	. 50.00	1,000,000		eration.	{
Rome and Kingston	90.00	250,000	,		(
In progress and partly open—	00.00	440.000			
Macon and Augusta	22.00	440,000		o far as	(25 - 20
Macon and Brunswick	60.00	1,16),186	r eta	ted.	{:: :: = ::
Milledgeville and Augusta	11.00	110,000)		(·· ·· - ··
Roads operated	1.883.88	26,767,952	7.050,106	2,879,110	
Roads not returned	154.87	9,770,000	.,	.,,	
Roads in progress, &c	88.00	1,710,186			
Total	1,571.20	81,948,068	 -		

From the above table it will be seen that the roads making returns aggregated 1,333.33 miles and cost \$26,767,952, or in round numbers \$20,000 a mile. Their gross earnings for the year were \$7,050,106, or about \$5,287 per mile, and their nett earnings \$2,879,110, or about \$2,160 per mile. A large portion of the gross earnings were expended in extraordinary repairs and renewals. The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad is scarcely completed. The Western and Atlantic Railroad is owned by the State, and paid into the treasury from earnings \$131,161, which is equivalent to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on its assumed cost of \$5,000,000. The present debt of Georgia on account of the road, however, is only \$3,440,000.

RAILBOAD BABNINGS FOR AUGUST.

The gross earnings of the under specified railroads for the month of August, in 1867 and 1868, and for the first seven months of each year are exhibited in the subjoined statement:

gross earnings for august and the first seven months of 1867 & '68.

	~A114	August		Months-
Railroads.	1867.	1868.	1867.	1868.
Atlantic and Great Western		\$407,688	\$8,835,608	\$2,986,054
Chicago and Alton	415,983	570,853	2.867 888	2,778,632
Chicago and Northwestern	1,068,286	1,265,881	6,589,+54	8,199,920
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific	404.600	478 600	2,262,201	2,700,491
Cleveland and Pittsburg	217,845	240,088	1.514,498	1,688,189
Illinois Central	709,826	764.188	4.257.401	4,265,662
Marietta and Cincinnati	114,716	1:6,5:6	788,908	807, 284
Michigan Central	348,998	892,942	2,686,702	2,799,868
Michigan South. & North, Ind	498,769	480,768	2,792,818	8,091,556
Milwaukee and St. Paul	850,564	52 2,545	2,705,221	8,457,835
Ohio and Mississippi	822,521	287,557	2,106,461	1,865,091
Pittsburg, F.t W. & Chicago	606,217	£58,287	4,528,964	4,992,021
St. I oul . Alton & Ter e Hante	920,788	204,596	1,3,2,886	1,213,891
Toledo, Wabash and Western	864,723	484,208	2,884,351	2,422,068
Western Union	78,525	84,607	894,644	467,414
Total	. \$6,166,555	\$6,963,909	\$89,923,820	\$13,641,450

MONRY AND CURRENCY.

Will you allow an "outsider" to offer some desultory suggestions which may help to modify if not to harmonize the conflicting views of Mr. Carroll and his critic Mr. Sulley.

Much of the difficulty which arises in similar controversies, appears to proceed from the fact pointed out by Malthus, that political economy is not an exact science, but depends for most of its conclusions on facts and inferences of a general character, like those of mental and moral philosophy. There is, therefore, a certain vagueness in its definitions, and often even a degree of confusion in the rise of terms.

Both the writers referred to object to bank credit as a substitute for money; but while one would rigidly limit the currency of the community to gold coin, the other would discard gold altogether, and substitute "an inconvertible government currency, always kept at par with the currencies of other countries." So long as other countries adhered to the gold standard, this would be virtually a currency at par with gold—but if all countries should depart from it how could they regulate each other? Whatever may be the imperfections of gold as a standard of value, no better substitute has yet been found, and we need not anticipate that any will. Neither need we rush to the opposite extreme, and insist on making no exchanges and measuring no values without the actual presence of an equivalent amount of coin in each case as a medium.

On the question of interest Mr. Carroll seems in the right. If interest is not the rent of capital, what is it? It is certainly rent paid for the use of something—and if that something cannot, as capital be employed in producing wealth, why does it command a rent? "That the increase of capital should lower the rate of interest or profit, is one of the fallacies of Adam Smith," says Mr. Sulley. But when understood, as it evidently must be, relatively to the demands of production, it is undoubtedly true that the increase of capital does tend to diminish and does actually diminish the rate of interest, until at length the diminution of interest even checks the accumulation of capital, as is shown in England, Holland and France. It is by no means true that there is as much real capital at the West as elsewhere; compared with the demand for its productive employment. Land is not capital unless cultivated, and only then to the extent of its exchangeable value, and after deducting the debts of its nominal owner. It is precisely capital which the West needs at present-not land, not paper credit,-but an amount of exchangeable wealth sufficient to pay the debts and develope the agricultural resources of its people.

That money, strictly defined is capital, cannot well be disputed. It is wealth, for it is a useful product of labor, its material possessing highly

useful qualities, and as a measure of value, and medium of exchange, its importance is generally mimitted. It is difficult to see how, without such a medium, the various combinations of capital and labor required for the production of wealth, could be accomplished to anything like their present extent. What element of capital then is wanting to money?

Mr. Sulley affirms that "money is neither wealth nor capital; it is only a convenience by which labor is eased or time saved." But the same might be said of the plow, the railway, the elevator—in fact of a large proportion of the many forms which capital assumes. Do they cost labor? So does money. And could the division of labor exist without some such means of anticipating and distributing its earnings?

On the other hand we cannot agree with Mr. Carroll that "capital runs away from a high rate of interest," whether in California or elsewhere. The simple fact is that in California capital has been relatively scarce, as in all countries where labor is a mere adventure in a lottery. Now that regular and remunerative industry is being established there, wealth is accumulating and rates of interest declining. But this change is simply the result of a greater production and accumulation of wealth in the country, thus increasing the relative supply of capital, and compelling lenders to submit to lower rates of interest. This process will doubtless go on rapidly, stimulated by the exceptional advantage of a sound currency, enjoyed by that lucky State. But as it still produces every year more gold than it will perhaps ever need to use as money, it must continue to export and exchange it for other forms of wealth.

It is not correct to say with Mr Sulley that a low rate of interest is always the predisposing cause of exportation. The cause of exportation is simply indebtedness, which cannot be met so well in any other way. The causes of this indebtedness may be very various. It may proceed from abundance of exchangeable wealth, manifested by a plethora of money and low rates of interest, and leading to purchases and investments abroad; or by a scarcity of money elsewhere, leading to a demand at home, or it may be (as it frequently is in this country) merely the ordinary course of trade, with an exportable commodity. That a low rate of interest indicates a comparative surplus, and a high rate a comparative scarcity of money, is evident; but these facts are not more necessarily the cause of the import or export of gold, than the rise or fall of the hermometer is of a change of clothing. Gold is exported from California, notwithstanding high rates of interest, to pay for other things which are needed still more, and the miners of California are as much enriched by producing gold as by producing wheat, only so long as they can send it abroad and exchange it for wheat or for other things which they need.

It may indeed be argued, as Mr. Sulley evidently would argue, that there is already gold enough in the world for all the purposes of currency, and that its steady increase and consequent depreciation does only harm, while it keeps a multitude of miners and others uselessly at work. But this is by no means clear. To say nothing of the constant drain still going on towards towards the East, the increase of population and extension of trade and industry over the vast regions still open to civilization may call for much larger amounts of coin than are now in use. And when we look at the state of our own currency and those of some other nations, and consider the vast amount of the national debts, the burdens of which will thus be materially lightened, we need not greatly regret the slow and gradual decline of our standard of value causing no individual suffe ing but giving a great aggregate relief to the taxpaver and stimulus to industry. And as by this process the relative value of gold must steadily decline while the cost of mining must increase, the result may ultimately be to check the production to such a degree as to stop its depreciation altogether.

"Suppose all countries should become wise, and abolish their standard of value," what would be the result? Why, they would be compelled to return to their folly by resuming that standard. We can no more do without a measure of value than of length or of capacity—and the standard must itself possess that which it professes to measure—that is, it must cost on the whole a definite amount of labor, and must possess the necessary qualities to serve as a measure, which it does in the highest degenerate and ever since Abraham weighed to Ephron the Hittite "four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant," the precious metals have been to a greater or less extent the measure and standard of value.

A word for bank currency, which, as well as "the credit system, and all other modes of unduly increasing money," "all honest people, if they were intelligent" would vote to abolish—says Mr. Sulley—to restrain within safe bounds say we. As to credit, we cannot prevent the owner of any commodity from disposing of it on any terms he pleases, nor can we prevent the owners of money from purchasing notes or from lending to merchants or depositing in banks. Neither can we prevent banks and bankers from employing the funds of their depositors, with the consent of the latter. But we can compel all banks of issue to keep their issues amply secured, and to maintain ample reserves of coin to redeem their redundant issues, and we can demand of the national government that it set the example, and enforce it on the banks, of redeeming their hitherto dishonored promises now held by the people. When this most desirable state of things is attained the present exceptional profits of banks must necessarily cease.

The great occasional fluctuations in the rate of interest no more disprove the fact that interest is the rent of capital than the much greater variations in the rent of land, buildings, and apartments under exceptional circumstances. And Mr. Sulley's argument that gold cannot be capital because "its exchangeable value depreciates in the ratio of its addition" (even if this fact could be proved) applies, in part at least, to wheat, corn, houses, ships or any other form of wealth. And if gold is not wealth, how comes it that "a greenback is much cheaper?" Cheaper than that which possesses no value?

The demand for money, says Mill, is limited only by the means of the purchaser. This is true of society in the aggregate, though not of each particular individual. The rich merchant or capitalist may be seeking for an investment for his money; but the mass of the people want money, because it commands everything else—and this demand has no limit but their means of obtaining it.

The tendency of credit to advance prices, is doubtless correctly stated by Mr. Mill; but we cannot admit that all credit "accelerates consumption, without demanding in return an equivalent production," or that it necessarily raises prices above their true level. The jobber or retailer who distributes the goods of the importer merely gains time enough, by credit to realize a portion of the proceeds from the consumer, and thus supplement his own capital (if money is capital); but he creates no fictitious demand for merchandise, and instead of increasing the supply of available currency, his notes absorb currency when they are discounted, and so tend to depreciate general prices, though the particular merchandise purchased by him may be appreciated by his purchase. In the long run, however, all these operations in the end neutralize each other, and do harm only when carried to excess.—J. S. R.

SPECIE PAYMENTS.

BY C. H. C.

In view of the discussion which occupies public attention as to the resumption of money payments, it may be instructive to consider whether any legislation or any voluntary action of the public is likely to bring it about. I may as well say in advance that I do not think it is. Not from impossibilities in the nature of the case; but the structure of the currency, the vast powers of self interest in the erection and support of it through the banking system; the overpowering debtor interest which that system creates by its needless kiting of debt against debt, and the hallucination in the public mind that price is value, so that a decline of

general prices is supposed to be a decline of general wealth, are all opposed to it. Debtors must be wronged by any contraction of currency necessary to the resumption of specie payments, as creditors were wronged by the expansion which caused the suspension, and debtors therefore resist contraction.

There are those possible modes of public policy either of which would restore the currency to the par of money, and consequently restore money payments, or the mixed system of interchangeable debt and money, to which we have been accustomed. Neither of these, in my opinion, will ever be adopted; but there is a third mode of proceeding that comes of itself, like the rejuvenation of nature in this latitude after a rugged winter, to which we must look for relief, and in which it will be found. When however, is not quite so certain as the return of spring after a hard winter.

Of the three possible and voluntary methods, the first is to stop the currency at its present volume, and accumulate capital to bring the promise to the par of the gold dollar. I believe I have heretofore given my reasons in this magazine for fixing upon \$20 per capita as the normal sum of money demanded by the population and capital of this country.

Population and wealth advance together, in the same ratio, because of the natural law which peopled the earth up to the annual supply of the means of maintenance, with slight and temporary exceptions in the violent proceedings of society. In the United States this conformity is probably less obstructed than anywhere else, and the ratio of increase is, approximately, 3½ per cent. per annum, simply compounding each decade.

Assuming the real money value of the property of the United States to have been \$16,000,000,000 in 1860, as stated in the census. The following tables will show its gradual accumulation, beginning with nothing in 1770. Of the wealth existing at that time nothing remains excepting the land, and some few old buildings, the natural appreciation of which from the increase of population, and the cost of cultivation, improvements, and repairs, amount to more than it was worth then. Hence it is fair to assume that the wealth of the nation has all been created since 1770.

It is remarked by John Stuart Mill that, "The greater part, in value, of the wealth now existing in England has been produced by human hands within the last twelve months." The power of reproduction is not less, proportionately, in the United States. But as, with population, every one who is born dies, so, with capital, every portion produced is consumed, and accumulation results from reproduction. Of the wealth produced each year all but about seven per cent in value is consumed the same year, whether in peace or in war, leaving net gain on the whole, as shown in the tables, of about $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum.

RECKONING BY DECADES FROM 1770.

Inhabitants.	Accumulation.
8,000,000	\$422,221 ,869
8,929,527	553,085,646
5,×05,987	746,759,996
7,239,814	1.018.984.728
9,688,191	1.856.488.402
12,866,020	1.81 769.580
17,069,458	2,402,362,610
	8,264,085,218
81,448,822	4,425,817,496
	8,000,000 8,929,527 5,805,987 7,239,814 9,688,191 12,866,020 17,069,468 28,191,876

\$16,000,000,000

ANNUAL INCREASE FROM 1850 TO 1860.

Date.	Inhabitants,	Accumulation.
1851	24,250,000	\$892,765,566
1852	24,500,000	896,814,696
I858	25,000,000	404,912,955
1854	25,750,000	417,000,844
1855	26,500,000	429.207.782
1856	27,400,000	448,784,599
1857	28.500,000	461,600,769
1858	29,500,000	477,79 ,287
1859	80 885,000	492,181,206
1860	81,448,822	509,272,887
Differential fractions	• •	5

\$4,495,847,496

For the inhabitants in the latter table I adopt a formula from the Treasury Department. On this scale of increase which for easy reckoning we may call 3½ per cent per annum, we have gained 8,800,000 inhabitants since 1860, and have now, in round numbers, a population of 40,000,000, and wealth in real money value \$20,000,000, demanding money for its circulating medium to one twenty-fifth of its amount, or 800 millions of dollars. Less than this of circulating capital in gold and silver we could not have, as money, if the paper folly that we call money were removed from its path, and more we could not retain without an equivalent increase of other capital.

But the currency of this country, embracing bank demand deposits and balances that would be money under a metallic system of equal volume, amounted at this time to not less than 1,400 millions of dollars, being 600 millions more than the sum of money we can hold unless in absolute hoards.

Hence, by the rule of three, as 14:8::1: 57-100. The currency dollar of to-day, has the average power as a circulating medium of 57 cents of money; or, what comes to the same thing, our general or average prices are advanced 75 per cent above the true money value, at which they stood in the census year 1860. The problem is to raise the power of this depreciated currency 43 cents in the dollar, an increase of capital;

in other words, to reduce general prices from 175 to 100, or from 100 to 57, which is the same thing, without contracting the currency. This could be effected in about twenty-one years by an average increase of capital, yearly, of $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Thus, suppose corn to be one dollar per bushel to-day, and we make an exponent of that commodity for our reckoning:—

1868	100 bush	rele \$100 or \$1	00 per	bushel.
1869			96-6z	u
1870		100 or	98-46	46
1880	1781	4 100 or	57-64	".

In the latter part of 1889 we should have 175 bushels for \$100, the price per bushel being 57 cents; and commodities in general and services would increase in quantity and fall in prices accordingly. That is to say, we should have thirty-five thousand millions of property, in real money value, to be measured in price by fourteen hundred millions of currency, being an increase in the total wealth of the country of 75 per cent, and a fall in price of 43 per cent, when our currency would be at par with the gold dollar, and money payments would resume themselves.

It is simply ridiculous to suppose that our people would submit to any such lingering process as this, or that production and trade could proceed under it. They are always and immediately checked by a general fall of prices.

As population and capital accumulate a fraction more than $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum, and compound each decade, we should by this process reach the par of money with our currency, and money payments accordingly, in rather less than nineteen years; but this does not help the case materially. It might as well be a thousand years, as ten or five, of a lingering fall of prices. No such nonesense will be endured voluntarily by the laziest man of common sense among us.

The second plan I propose to consider is to contract the currency legally and gradually, as proposed by most of our financial writers. Suppose we try the effect of a contraction of 100 millions a year. This would cause a fall of prices, first as 14 to 13, then as 13 to 12, then as 12 to 11, and so on, exceeding by a fraction of nine per cent per annum for four years, and compounded with the usual increase of capital, which we have discussed above, it would make the fall of general prices 11 per cent per annum for four years, or 44 per cent altogether in that time. As we need but a fall of 43 per cent, this would bring us to a par currency and and money payments within the four years.

But this also is too long suffering and too much of it. Any man of good business knowledge may see this at a glance. No such business can be done in this country.

The third proposition to which I ask attention is to support two currencies, separately, for a term of years as short as may be possible, one of gold and one of paper; but the government must make the paper and control the whole debt currency rigidly and entirely. It must buy the inter at paying public debt for new greenbacks as fast and as far as the bank notes and demand deposit, uncovered by the reserves, can be suppressed, so that the paper currency may be kept full to enable the banks and individuals to discharge their paper obligations with paper at paper prices, and make subsequent contracts for gold. But this power to issue new greenbacks should be in the hands of commissioners to be exercised only to make good the sum of bank currency withdrawn, and prevent a great and sudden fall of paper prices and a financial crisis. Great firmness, integrity and discretion would be indispensable in the exercise of this power.

If five years for example were granted for the circulation of the paper, it might and should be left free as a medium of exchange for all purposes according to the desire and agreement of parties during that period. But the funding system would remain, and it is my belief that the tendency to depreciation of the paper, in the divergence of prices from the gold standard, although modified and restrained by the funding, would be such as to cause the whole to be funded voluntarily during the five years, leaving us at the close of that period a pure metallic currency. Any possible balance then eutstanding should be coercively consigned to the funding process. This would leave the banks free to borrow and lend capital, though the instrumentality of money, without limit, and judging from the operations of well conducted trust companies, they would soon carry their loans to twenty times the amount of their stock capital, since they would be unembarrassed by fictitious credit in their demand liabilities. fictitious credit in discounting debt out of itself into so-called "deposits," and not out of the pre-existing currency cripples their loans, on the average, to less than two-thirds over and above their capital stock under specie payments. What trifling business is this compared with what they might do for the benefit of themselves, and the public with an unadulterated currency! Legislation would be necessary in this case to protect old contracts existing prior to the suspension in 1861-2.

Objection has been made to this plan, that two currencies of unequal cost and value will not circulate together; the less will drive out the more valuable one; which is true if the two are interchangable, but not otherwise.

We have the two currencies now, unsupported by law, but supported by public opinion and integrity in spite of the law, that is, in spite of the paper tender a:t. California ignores that act entirely, employs meney,

not debt, for her currency, and buys and sells the greenbacks as she buys and sells other public securities, for their marketable price in money. And our merchants continually traffic for gold in exchange for their merchandise, especially for imported invoices, relying upon the integrity of the debtors. I am not aware that any one has been base enough to tender greenbacks for gold in discharge of a gold contract. He could do it with impunity in law, but not in public opinion. But we want to get rid of this legal inequity, which so far as it has any real power, supports rogues against honest men, encourages debt, and the absence of capital, the thing upon which all business depends, by driving capital in money out of the country, through an abnormal depreciation of its value in the high prices we pay for imports. It is opposed to all true progress in commerce and national finance.

The great obstacle to this plan of a double currency, or of two currencies, is the huge power of fictitious credit in the banking system, which, as I have said, oripples the loans of the banks and their usefulness, and, in my opinion, ultimately, their profits also. But they believe in it, the people believe in it, and it seems useless to argue that we cannot have the value or the use of money at home and send it abroad at the same time, or have our cake and eat it too, which is what the so called credit system attempts to do through the circulation of bank debt in the place of money, and pretends to accomplish.

While this dilusion continues; although we might, by the use of two currencies for a time, slide easily from the paper currency with its false prices, to a metallic currency with its true prices, and avoid financial crisis, we shall not do it. Moreover we are likely to have a decision of the Supreme Court adverse to the constitutionality of the paper tender act, which may embarrass the greenback circulation, or remove it altogether-

I imagine that circulation might be continued without the legal tender attribute, for the purpose of withdrawing the bank currency, with a saving to the public of the interest paid to the banks on their circulation, and on their fictitious deposits also; but Congress and the people are not up to this idea and, therefore, any third plan of restoring specie payments, and without a crash of bankruptcy the only one must also be set aside, for the present as impracticable.

The fourth and last plan is the old one that comes like the Ghost in Hamlet, as the consequence of evil-doing. We have become familiar with, if not fond of it. "Art thou there true-penny?" Sponge the slate with bankruptcy. This is the old remedy, and the only practicable one, since our people will not tolerate any other, nor take warning from their repeated sufferings to prevent the evil which renders the remedy necessary and inevitable.

Undoubtedly this event will be exhibited in due time by the failure in legal tender reserves of some of the large National Banks, or of some other expanded financial institution bearing the same relation to the banks as did the Ohio Life and Trust Company in 1857, the lesson of which may be read in a child's row of blocks, when one tumbler knocks down the whole line. There is nothing in the system to prevent the failure of the banks in greenbacks, as they have already failed in gold. They have the same temptation to expand and depreciate the currency for the gain of their stockholders, and they are proceeding, as before, in discounting debt out of itself into new "deposits," and not out of pre-existing deposits or currency of any sort. Of course the end is certain, but how near no one can tell.

Of all possible blunders in public economy, that of expanding currency as such, in relation to capital, is the most inexcusable and wrong-headed, because of the self-evident truth of the proposition that the nation or the community having the least currency in proportion to capital has the most valuable money, and thereby, to the extent and power of its capital, the control of the commerce of all others. And without the expansion there can be no contraction. Mining gold is producing capital, and gold is money, or currency, to which there can be no objection, as any excess of gold is exportable; but there is no exporting an excess of paper "money."

While money is the common instrument of the world's commerce, by simply letting it alone we can maintain its value at its highest power, and take the lead of the European nations in commercial enterprise, because they do not let it alone. Every one of them, with the unimportant exception, I think, of Switzerland, tamper with money by adulterating its currency with paper. But we have outdone them all in the folly until we are steeped in debt for money and money value that have no existence, under the strange delusion that the medium of exchange is the only attribute of money, and that capital wealth and the power of payment are not indispensable elements of nature. We lend our capital on a mass of public and corporate debt as a medium of exchange, shut our eyes to the fact of the absence of so much capital, and so much means of doing business, and call ourselves paid.

With this degraded currency in hand, if the mission of the Chinese Embassy, and the aims of the Pacific Railroad Company have any significance, we are about to suffer ourselves to be plucked, in our central position, by a vastly extended commerce on both sides of the Continent. China and Japan, especially, will sell us their luxuries and knick-knacks in enormous quantities at our high gold prices, that is to say, at the low artificial value we put upon gold, and carry away solid money as the cheapest thing we can sell them in return. At the present writing our

general prices are as 175 of currency to 100 of money value, whereas, because of its non-usage as the common circulating medium, we are selling 100 of gold for 144 of currency. There is nothing, I think, that we are selling so cheap.

Having in prospect a vast increase of our commerce with the Eastern nations, who maintain by their industry and their exclusively metallic system the highest value of money, there never was an hour when a prophet in political economy was so needed in this country as now.

Except by and through general bankruptcy we shall not bring about specie payments, unless we can by law or sufferance circulate two currencies long enough to cure the disease of depreciation, as "like is cured by like" in homopathy. On this principle we must offset the debt currency against the needless public and private debt which is its counterpoise, and extinguish them both together. This we can do without a crisis; but woe unto debtors including the Government, and especially the administration of the time, if the government ever undertakes to experiment in any other way upon the financial system of the nation.

THE SPANISH REVOLUTION.

It results from what we may call the "geographical distribution" of the existing outbreak in Spain, that the rest of the world is even more than commonly unlikely to get at the truth about the progress of events in that country.

The insurrection in northeastern Spain, for instance, appears to have broken out along a line extending from Santona on the Bay of Biscay, a little east of the well-known port of Santander, to Saragossa on the Ebro. By its control of this line the revolution succeeded not only in cutting off the queen, who was at San Sebastian near the French frontier, in the northeast from her capital, but also in putting itself into a position which enabled it to cut the most important telegraphic communications of the kingdom with France and the rest of Europe. Madrid remaining loyal to the queen, couriers from that city could only reach the queen at San Sebastian by making their way through a region occupied by the insurrectionists, and whatever intelligence, therefore, of a kind favorable to the cause of Queen Isabella Paris receives from San Sebastian, must necessarily be taken with large deductions.

In southwestern Spain the capture of the great and important city of Cadiz, through the defection to the revolutionary cause of a part of the royal Spanish navy, while it enabled General Prim and his coadjuators to organize a movement against the capital by way of Cordova,

also gave them facilities for throwing out flying connections with the insurgents in the northeast around Saragossa, and for cutting the telegraphic communications of Madrid with Alicante, Valencia, Barcelona and other points on the Mediterranean coast which do not seem at first to have been favorably disposed to the new movement. We are therefore, as little likely to get at positively trustworthy intelligence by way of the Mediterranean and of Marseilles, either in the interest of the queen or of the insurgents, as by way of the Bay of Biscay, the Pyrences and Bayonne.

Out of the chaos of contradictions and exciting stories which have reached us up to this time this much, at least, however, would appear to be certain, and to be depended upon, that the intollerable system of political repression set on foot in Spain two years ago by Marshal Narvaez, and persevered in since his death by Queen Isabella and her new Moderado, Premier Gonzalez Bravo, has revived throughout the kingdom all the elements of hostility to the Bourbon dynasty. This dynasty, which was originally given to Spain by France in the last century, and which after acquiring a spurious sort of evanescent popularity by its identification during the Peninsular war with the cause of Spanish neutrality against Bonaparte, made haste to throw this popularity away again after the victory of the Holy Alliance, by accepting the military aid of Louis XVIII to put down Riego and the Spanish liberals. Ever since the French invasion of 1823 it has been certain that nothing but the adoption by the Spanish Bourbons of such a political system as should identify them with the moderate liberal development of Spanish institutions, could possibly give them a permanent hold upon the Spanish sceptre. Had Ferdinand VII, or his daughter, Isabella II, possessed anything of the qualities which enabled the Sardinian monarchs of the House of Savoy, to perceive and to put themselves into sympathy with the main drift of ideas and of events in Europe, the Bourbon dynasty in Spain might have become what the House of Savoy has ecome in Italy the symbol around which the great mass of intelligent men, anxious for the progress, but not less anxious also for the peace of their country, have rallied themselves to secure a reign of liberty protected at once and controled by law.

For, although it be true, that the bulk of the Spanish people are greatly in the rear of the populations of France or Germany in what we call the "modern march of mind," it is also true, that there exists in Spain a large but steadily increasing class of citizens who have kept a live or brought to life again, (it matters little which) the ancient Spanish ideas of commercial independence and personal rights. These men are mostly to be found in the cities and towns engaged in the pur-

suits of trade and commerce, or in the practice of the learned professions. They are naturally conservative, cautious rather than extreme, and wisely fearful of the effect upon the mind of the masses just beneath them of a sudden and violent change from their passionate faith in Church and Queen to an equally passionate contempt of Church and Queen.

This class of citizens it is, all-important as they have been for years to the very existence of such a thing as a Bourbon dynasty in Spain, that the Moderados and the queen have of late bent all their energies to alienate and to exasperate. What we now hear from the Peninsula would seem to show that this ill-omened policy is at last triumphant. The ultra-radical revolutionists of Spain, those who make up the strength of such inveterate conspirators as General Prim, have long been kept back from the fruition of their fiery hopes by the patience, forbearance and willingness to avoid a decisive and desperate crash of the reformatory but anti-revolutionary party. When it was announced some weeks ago that Gonzalez Bravo was about to retire from the ministry in favor Marshal Concha, Marquis of Havana, a trusted leader of the conservative constitutionalists, the extreme radicals seem to have telt that this was a thing to be prevented at all hazards by striking a blow before it could be consummated, and its pacifying influence on the public sentiment be telt. In this feature of the situation resides, we think, the only hope for the Bourbon dynasty. Such a rising as we now see in Spain, had it been made a month ago, against the government of Gonzalez Bravo must in all probability have carried everything before it. It is made now against the government of a man, the Marquis of Havana, who has the confidence of the conservative constitutionalists in a much greater degree certainly than General Prim. This fact may check the disposition of the intelligent classes to lend their support to the movement. This however, can only be the case if the Marquis of Havana succeeds in compelling the Queen to give real and substantial guarantees to the country of a radical and enduring change in the system of her government. Can such guarantees be given by Isabella II? That is a question partly of family tradition and partly of personal character, and it must be confessed that a Spanish reformer who should now put faith in the promises of the daughter of Ferdinand VII would deserve either to be canonized for his spirit of forgiveness, or to be ducked to death for a dunce.

The repeated offer of the Queen to resign in favor of her son, on condition of her being appointed Regent of Spain is of course too absurd to be entertained. It would amount practically to a prolongation of her own reign for seven years, as the Prince of the Asturias, Don

Alfonso, having been born in 1857, and being now consequently eleven years of age, would attain his princely maturity of eighteen in the year 1875.

Should the armed revolution succeed in driving the Marquis of Havana to the wall, the attention of the world will be promptly trans. ferred from Spain to France. It would be impossible for Napoleon III, even were he not the husband of a Spanish Empress who dotes upon meddling with Spanish affairs, to refrain from exercising a very clear and decisive influence upon so grave a matter as a change of dynasty, and perhaps of governmental forms in Spain. The compromise which in other circumstances might have been the most natural result of French counsels or French pressure, the substitution remedy of the Queen's sister and of her husband, the Duke of Montpensier, for Isabella and Don Francisco de Asis, is made impracticable now by the fact that the Duke of Montpensier is a Prince of the House of Orleans. Napoleon III cannot rationally be expected to aid in putting such a personage upon the throne of a country like Spain, though there is good reason to believe that he was at one time quite willing to see him transplanted to an imperial throne in Mexico.

This complication of the dynastic interests of the Bonapartes with the necessities and opportunities of the Spanish people is, perhaps, from a world-wide point of view, the most interesting feature of the present situation in Spain. Unhappily it is also one of the most alarming features of that situation. And it is by no means impossible, though as yet in nowise probable, that the outbreak may prove the means of plunging Europe in that warlike confusion and chaos which all men have been, for months past, vaguely and feverishly anticipating.

PROSPECTS OF THE GRAIN TRADE.

There appears to be a very general feeling of hesitation in all the great grain markets of the world. This is certainly the case with our own merchants, and for very obvious reasons. The condition of the supply has been materially changed by the harvest, while the stocks left over at the close of the crop year are generally larger than a year ago; hence there is naturally a disposition to postpone extensive transactions until the probabilities of the new supply from the principal sources are more definitely understood. Dealers are gradually becoming settled in their estimates of the prospect, and we may consequently anticipate increased activity at an early day. The Western merchants have shown considerable confidence in their purchases, and the accumulation of grain at

the trade centres of that section is, therefore, unusually large. The receipts of flour and grain at the five lake ports, from August 1 to September 12, compare as follows with those for the same period of last year:

	1868.	1867.		
Flour, bbls	674.996	575,945	Inc.	98,268
Alli kinds of grain, bush		16,618,689	Inc.	8,529,614

The recent arrivals of grain at the Western ports are thus about 25 per cent above those of last year. Below we give a comparison of the receipts of wheat and flour at the same ports from August 1 to September 19, for four years:

	1869.	1867.	1866.	1865.
Flourbbls,	839,518	733,055	518,098	580,909
Wheatbush.	9,122,908	8,501,945	4,854,478	4,886,202

This shows an increase over last year of about 600,000 bushels of wheat and 100,000 barrels of flour, and is confirmatory of the increased estimates made of the crop. The receipts during the same period at St. Louis have also been largely in excess of last season. The shipments eastward, however, have not kept pace with the arrivals, and hence stocks have accumulated, the wheat in store at Chicago and Milwaukee combined being, at latest reports, 732,000 bushels, against 507,000 bushels at the same time of 1867 and 430,000 bushels in 1866. The exports of flour at the five principal lake ports from Aug. 1 to Sept. 12 have been 406,600 bbls. against 378,700 bbls. in 1867; but the exports of all kinds of grain, for the same period, are 5,092,700 bushels less than last year. The following statement shows the details of the export movement.

EXPORTS OF FLOUR AND GRAIN FROM THE FIVE PRINCIPAL LAKE PORTS FROM AUG. 1 TO SEPT. 12.

Flourbbls.	1868. 406,600	1967 878,700	1868. Oatsbush. 8,663,400 Barley	1867. 2,794,706
Wheatbush.	4,683,900 7 006,800	4,760,600	Barley	18,879,500

A considerable amount of grain has reached Buffalo; but a material portion of the arrivals rest there, the result being that the stock of wheat on the 14th inst. was 265,000 bushels against 70,000 bushels at the same date of 1867, and the stock of all kinds of grain was 1,546,000 bushels, against 954,000 bushels at the same period last year. At New York, the receipts of flour and wheat, from the beginning of August to the 18th of September, fall materially below those for the same period of last year, as will appear from the following comparison:

	967. 1868.		1867.	18 63.
Flourbbls, 50	1,990 546,590	Ryebush.	64,910	78,860
Wheat bush. 1,97	5,885 1,664,875	Barley, &c " .	279,485	60.965
Corn " . 5,13	3, 28 0 4,839,980		2,281,595	1,167,775

But, although the arrivals are thus deficient, the stock in store at New York is nearly double that at the same time last year, due principally, however, to the large increase of corn in store, as will appear from the following comparison:

STOCKS OF GRAIN AT NEW YORK.

	Sept 21,	Sept. 16	1	Sept. 21,	Bept. 16,
	1868,	1807.		1868.	1867.
Wheatbush.	265,997	248,020	Maltbush.	100.555	10,720
	2,148,507	1,165,196	Peas " .	87,499	55,477
Oats	489,595	346,294			
Rye " .	20,808	18,961	Total " . 8,	,047,752	1,748,898
Barley	92,487	9,705	·		

Thus far, then, we have every indication of an abundant surplus for export. How far the forwarding of supplies to the seaboard may be delayed by a disagreement between New York and Chicago, is a matter to be determined by the event; and yet one which may have a certain influence upon the course of prices. The amount of grain to be shipped will be very largely in excess of last year. During the year ending August 31, 1868, the total exports of wheat and flour from the country was equivalent to about 23,000,000 bushels; while, this year, the exportable surplus is estimated at about 40,000,000 bushels. As to corn, our exportable sur plus must also be unusually large, as we have a very considerable stock of last years growth left over, and the crop now beign harvested will, we believe, be largely in excess of any previous year.

What prices we may realise for our surplus of grain depends principally upon the course of the foreign markets and supply, conditions upon which it is very difficult to form a definite opinion. It is now a settled question that Great Britain has an unusually large wheat crop; but it is equally certain that her other grain crops are deficient, and that her root and herbage crops have so suffered from drouth as to set off in great part the gain upon the wheat crop. Stocks of grain in that country at the out-ports do not appear to have materially increased during the past year, while, owing to the early harvest, a considerable portion of the new crop has been already marketed. These considerations are inducing a somewhat general opinion abroad that prices of wheat in England have touched their lowest point. Lately there appears to have been a decrease of shipments to the ports of Great Britain, based upon the supposition in European wheat growing countries that the decline of 20s. per quarter was extreme, and would be succeeded by a reaction, which it would be well to encourage by temporarily checking supplies. There seems to be no reason for doubting that the surplus supply of the European grain countries will be at least equal to that of last year. Late accounts take it for granted that France has all the grain she will require, and a surplus for export, in lieu of her

being a large importer last year. As to the supply likely to be sent from Germany, Russia and Turkey, advices are not yet very definite; there is nothing, however, to suggest an expectation that there will be any falling off from last year. The London Shipping Gasette, of the 9th inst., remarks: "The growth of wheat in Germany is fully equal to last season, and we believe that the yield in Russia, especially in the South, is a good average. The Baltie and Black Sea shipments are likely to be large, but they will be required for consumption."

Upon the whole, then, it would appear likely that the world's supply of wheat from the past harvest will be fully adequate to its consumption, and may leave a fair surplus for addition to stocks, which, in the event of abundant harvests in 1869, would lay the basis for a return next year to about average prices; that the corn market is likely to experience an earlier approach to the old level, unless the wants of Great Britain prove more pressing than now appears probable.

LOUISVILLE. CINCINNATI AND LEXINGTON BAILBOADS.

The Louisville, Ciucinnati and Lexington Railroads, as now existing and being operated, comprise the two railroads, which together extend from Louisville to Lexington, Ky., as follows:—Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, Louisville, Ky., to Frankfort, Ky., 65 miles; Lexington and Frankfort Railroad, Frankfort, Ky., to Lexington, Ky., 29 miles, making a total length of 94 miles, on which there are 8.8 miles sideings.

So long ago as 1859 (March 30) the two companies owning these properties entered into an agreement whereby it was provided that the whole road between Louisville and Lexington should be run as one line under the control of an Executive Committee of six persons, four of whom should be chosen by the Directors of the Louisville Company, and two by the Directors of the Lexington Company; and it was further provided that the receipts and expenditures should be apportioned between the two companies in the ratio of the length of their several roads.

An Act of the Kentucky Legislature, approved February 2, 1866, authorized the united company "to construct a branch railroad from some point on the line of their railroads above Lagrange to the Ohio River at or near Covington or Newport." In order to raise money to build this branch the two companies were authorized to issue and sell their joint bonds to an extent not exceeding \$3,000,000, and to secure payment of the same, principal and interest, by a deed of trust upon their railroads and branch railroads. The same Act also authorized the Louisville company to increase their capital by \$700,000, and the Lexington company their capital by \$300,000; and the two companies to be

the joint owners of the Cincinnati Branch Railroad (so called) in the proportion fixed by their operating agreement, the entire manage ment and control of the branch being vested in the Executive Committee.

On the 19th January, 1867, a supplemental Act was passed providing that the two companies in their united capacity should be known as the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroads, and by that name be as one in all matters touching their joint business and undertakings. This Act also provided that the additional stock authorized by the Act of 1866, instead of being issued as the stock of the separate companies, might be issued as the joint stock of the two companies, upon which dividends might be guaranteed to an extent not exceeding 10 per centum per annum.

It thus appears that while each company retains its separate organization, the two companies under the firm of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroads, are partners in operating the railroad between Louisville and Lexington, and joint owners of the Cincinnati Branch to be built with moneys raised on their joint credit. It is easy to see that this organization is cumbrous, and would be greatly simplified by a consolidation of stocks. As yet this has not been practicable, from the fact that there has always been a material difference in the market value of the stocks respectively. The difficulty will most likely disappear with the extinguishment of these parate debts of the companies, and the two interests will then probably give place to one of simpler form.

On the 1st of January, 1867, a deed of trust was executed conveying all the property and franchises then held or thereafter to be acquired by the joint companies or either of them, in trust, to secure the payment of the principal and interest of 3,000 bonds of \$1,000 each. These bonds have thirty years to run from date, and will be due in 1897. On the 11th of January, same year, the Branch was finally located, and on the 19th of February the grading and masonry were put under contract. The work has since then been steadily prosecuted, and is now approaching completion. In August last about 20 miles of track had been laid, and the chief engineer is confident that the whole road (81 miles) will be ready for operations by January 1, 1869, or shortly thereafter. The estimated cost of the work is about \$3,500,000. The completion of this road will place Louisville in direct connection with Cincinnati on a line of 107 miles. The present distance by railroad is 137 miles.

The reports of the Executive Committee for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1867 and 1868, furnish full statements of the condition and operations of the Louisville-Lexington line of road for those years. From these we have compiled the following abstracts, exhibiting accounts of the amount of rolling and carrying power in use, the results of operations in each year, and the financial condition of the joint interest at the close of each year.

The stock of engines and cars was the same in amount for both years. There were 14 locomotives on the line, and 238 cars. Of the latter, 13 were passenger cars, 5 baggage cars and 149 freight and stock cars; also 38 ballast, 32 hand and 1 boarding cars. Twelve locomotives are being built for the brauch line. The performance of the engines and cars was as follows:

	1866-67.	1867-68.
Miles run by locomotives	948,821	244,084
Miles run by passenger c rs	494,907	547,212
Miles run by freight cars	941,954	978,173
Cost per mile run by locomotives	49:28c.	88:15c.
Coet per mi e run by passanger cars	4:79c.	8:05c.
Cost per mile run by freight cars	1:96c.	1:88c.

The passenger and freight traffic over the line in the same years was as follows:

	1966-67.	1867-68.
Number of passengers carried	279,466	898,806
Equivalent passengers carried one mile	7,157,728	7,078,999
Average distances traveled by passengers	2 5.61 m.	21.58 m.
Miles run by passenger trains	186,529	187,889
Earnings per passenger carried one mile	8:96c.	8:92c.
Earnings per mile run by passenger trains	224:2 0c.	219:49c.
Tons of freight hauled	64,489	68,510
Equivalent tons hauled one mile	8,852,833	8,181,880
Average distance hauled	50.78 m.	46.44 m.
Miles run by freight trains	67,968	68,604
Barnings per ton hauled one mile	5:25c.	5:88c.
Earnings per mile run by freight trains	997:49c.	294:40c.

The gross earnings in the two years as above are shown in the following statement:

Passenger earnings	91 187,947 79 65 15,487 14 00 9,400 00 74 1,111 27
Total gross earnings \$570,819 (09 \$498,918 98
The cost of operating was—	
Transportation \$68,922 in Motive power 98,565 ft Maintenance of way 122,901 ft Maintenance of cars 41,415 ft General expenses 10,976 ft	59 77,641 95 88 189,566 41 58 88,977 50
Total operating expenses	8385,971 87
Net earnings. \$158.217 1	12 \$157,247 06

The following table, compiled from the annual reports, shows the results of operations for a series of ten years:

		-Gross es	rnings.		Cur-	Net	-Earn	ings	Ex-
Fiscal	Passen-		_		rent ex-	earn-	per z	tile →ı	редвев
years. 1838-59	gers	Freight.	Other.	Total.	penses.	ings.	Gross.	Net.	p. c.
1838-59	\$191,771	\$186,884	\$10,078	\$788,788	\$3:0,143	\$175,691	\$4,180	\$1,894	54.12
1000-00	M13,104	100'90%	19,961	890,877	311,304	1437,140	4,158	1,906	54.1 l
1860-61		181,804	19,654	354,855	212,938	141,947	8,775	1,510	59.99
1861-63	97,776	141,489	19,022	258,237	189,023	89,215	2,747	949	63.45
1869-63		201,139	19,198	821,239	183,272	188,957	8,428	1,495	55.48
1868-64		277,242	19,170	489,840	234,609	204,781	4,674	2,178	58.40
186 4-65	874,985	904,746	29,791	609,535	411,186	198,339	6,484	2,110	67 46
1865-66	874,499	165,808	2 .003	562,802	408,696	159,106	5.987	1,698	71.78
1866-67	283,813	909,188	94,863	510.819	857,109	153,217	5,429	1,980	70.00
1807 68	277,708	187,948	28,268	498,919	885,979	157,247	5,216	1,678	68.13
Average	. 231,110	191,292	20,431	489,914	278,414	159,500	4,605	1,697	68.11

The income account for the years ending Jun	e 80, 186	3 and 1867,
compare as follows:		
Balance on hand July 1, viz.:	1867.	1868.
Stock of supplies. Paid to Cin innati Branch Fund		\$54,929 18 96,094 59 15,446 48
Gross e rn ngs.,	510,819 02	498,218 98
(Total		\$589,689 15
Per contra: disbursed as follows:		
Operating expenses	\$857,101 90	\$885,971 87
Louisv. & FaR. on account of net earnings	118,0 8 84	108,888 78 46,789 00
Operating expenses Louisv. & F nR. on account of net earnings Lex. & RR. Two 4½ p. c. dividends on preferred stock. Batance to credit side of general account, vis.:	••••	8,900 00
Cash on haud	15,446 48	85.8:2 88
Stock of supplies on hand Jule 30	2+,094 59 54,929 15	59,456 (8
Total		\$589,689 15
The following is the general statement of re		expenses on
all accounts for the years ending June 30, 1867		
,		
Stock of supplies July 1, 1866	1867. @114.61) 93	1868.
Transportation receip s	510,319 03	498,218 98
Discount on 1 ans and interest on investments	883.000 00	40,858 58 1,983,000 00
Sal s of first morig ge 6 per cent bonds due 1897. Sa es of prefer e 19 per cent stock Re eiven from wundry persons on amounts due	000,000 00	163,4-8 76
Re eiver from sundry persons on amounts due Decrease of carh on hand	••••	18,455 95 208,838 75
Due rundry individuals	16,680 78	107,449 58
Bills payable	••••	119,814 03
Total	1,474,640 68	\$2,752,900 42
Per contra, the following charges:		
Operating expenses	#957 101 00	\$885,971 87
Operating expenses.	148,648 83	1,968,547 69
Intere t on 1st mortgage bonds	17,576 17 124,930 00	94,474 11
Intere tou 1st mortgage bonds. Disc unt Due from undry individu is.	40,153 62	192,450 00
	19,750 00	8,500 00
Stock of supplier on hand. Inc ca-e in supplies on hand.	54,929 15	4,516 93
		8,900 00
Louisvil e & Frankfort RR. Co., cash paid them. Lex. & Frankfort RR. Co., cash paid them	84,580 04 87,869 56	108,983 78 45,700 00
Cas. on hand June 80.	598,781 86	20,100 00
Total	1,474,640 68	\$2,754,9.9 43
The financial condition of the company, at the	close of	the last two
years ending June 30, 1867 and 1868, is shown in		
from the general account.		9

•	1857.		1868	_
Preferred stock, oper cent	\$48,633	18	2211.121	91
1st mortga e bonos, 6 per cent, due 1897	688,000	00	2,116,000	
Reservati 118 On contracts	11.000		109,369	
line other c. mnsule.	998		949	44
Wills payable for rails, &c., due in 1, 2 and 8 y'rs	1.425		449,814	
Unpai coupons	4.305	00	19,110	
Unpaid d viden 's			7.578	ÕÕ
Due sundry individuals	1.148		1,480	
Balance to credit of income account	96,470		95, 978	
Total	2996,214	81	\$3,593,845	28

Per contra, the following charges:

Cincinnati Branch Discount on bouds	124,950	00	\$3,107,196 57 817,4(0 00 71,691 75
Total construction account Due from other companies Due from sundry individuals. Real estate Stock of supplies for current operations Cash on hand	600 40,978 19.780	78 47 00 15	\$2,496,288 32 26,893 87 23,250 00 59,456 05 389,952 61
Total	\$996,214	81	\$2,995,845 38

The financial condition of the separate companies, jointly owners of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroads, as exhibited in their balance sheet of the 30th June, 1868, is shown in the following abstract:

Capital stock. Funded debt Dividends due and unpaid Renewal and contingent fund. tock profits Sinking fund. Profit and loss. Total. Per contra, charges as follows:	282,519 50 4,588 21 185,179 59	Lexington & Frankfort, \$514,646 42 44,000 00 8,209 36 35,296 72 65,312 94 10,000 00 8,366 97 \$681,662 41	Total of both Companies. \$1,623,24' 82 236,519 80 7,747 57 35,296 72 66,342 94 10,000 00 198,446 56 \$2,268,491 11
Construction	88,285 10 1,989 88 8,500 00	\$644,965 87 9,255 30 1,166 44 7,283 14 9,748 16	\$3,186,910 86 42,490 40 3,098 77 15,782 14 15,262 44
Total	\$1 KS1 881 70	\$681 669 41	29 968 404 11

THE COMMERCIAL RECUPERATION OF THE SOUTH.

Rarely has war left a country in a condition more utterly disorganised and devastated than that in which the South was found in the spring of 1865. The most vigorous of its white male population had been slain or maimed; its labor system was disorganised; its plantations a barren waste, through the lack of cultivation, or from the blighting march of armies; its cities were desolate, and its ports destitute of shipping; its canals and its railroads were in a state of comparative ruin; its capitalists were bankrupt, and there was neither confidence nor credit to command the use of outside capital; stocks not only of merchandise but even of the commodities essential to subsistence had become well nigh exhausted; in short a condition of more abject ruin has rarely been witnessed in any country, and the case appeared all the more hopeless from the fact of one-third of the whole population having but just passed from a condition of slavery to that of almost helpless self-dependence.

To compare this condition of things with the present position of the South affords a striking evidence of the inherent vitality of that section.

The recuperation effected within three years, in the face of political derangement, and many other formidable obstacles, must be surprising to those who have noted in history the tardiness with which nations usually recover from the effects of great wars. Poverty, desolation and bereavement appear to have roused that energy in the Anglo-Saxon blood which gives the race under all conditions a superiority over circumstances, and an ability to rise above discouragements. The promptness with which the South ignored the past, and gave itself to the work of recovering its lost fortunes, augues well for its future prosperity. The new status of the negro has been accepted as an accomplished fact, and a spirit of fairness and consideration has been shown toward the freedmen beyond what might have been expected, the planter having admitted them to a virtual copartnership in the results of their joint enterprise. Within three years after the actual emancipation of the slaves, we find negro labor systematically organized, the colored population earning a comfortable subsistence, and their labor yielding a remunerative return to employers.

The labor system of the South under its new conditions, indeed, promises to become a source of progress which in a few years will compensate the South for all the material disasters of the war. Negro labor is already proving to be cheaper under freedom than it was under slavery; and this fact foreshadows an early development of industries in that section which hitherto have barely existed. The peculiar physical qualifications of the negro for labor in hot climates, together with his limited wants as compared with the white laborer, enable him to render a given amount of work for a lower compensation than will be accepted by the white workman; nor does there appear to be any good reason for supposing that the competition for colored labor will early modify its cheapness.

It is easy to see how this fact is likely to conduce to the development of those industries which require muscle rather than skill in the laborer. There is, for instance, a broad basis for a profitable iron trade, which is already in course of successful development. Iron ore of excellent quality exists in the South in abundance, and is easily obtainable on prominent thoroughfares; while the requisites to its manufacture are available at a very low cost. Charcoal can be produced there at 5 cents per bushel, while Northern manufacturers are at an expense of about 15 cents for the same material. Negro labor for mining and reducing the ore can be procured at the rate of 75 cents per day, or about one third the wages paid in the North. Considering that charcoal and labor are the main elements of the cost of producing iron, it is evident that there is here an ample basis for successful competition with

the iron trade of other sections. Nor has the South been slow to discover the strength of its position in this respect, for even now they have a number of furnaces in full blast producing profitably a superior quality of iron, which is readily sold in our markets. Their coal deposits also afford similar inducements to that branch of mining. The large forests afford a foundation for the production of lumber at a cost much below that produced by white labor at the North. So long as the negro population were under the absolute control of a class devoted almost wholly to planting and disinclined to manufacturing, colored labor was practically unavailable for developing the resources of the mine and the forest; now, however, the negro is free to use his labor wherever it may be most wanted; and there can be little doubt that capitalists will be found ready to employ it largely in the development of these hitherto neglected resources.

The severe economy practiced by all classes of the South, since the close of the war, has already effected much in the way of recuperation. Every form of personal and domestic expenditure has been cut down to a point consistent with the lowest endurable degree of comfort. This curtailment has been necessary to provide the means of cultivation and production; and already so much has been effected through such economy that, in spite of the heavy losses on the cotton crop of 1867, the planters have been able to raise the crop of this year almost entirely upon their own means instead of depending, as formerly, upon the advances of the factors. This achievement is important, not only for the evidence it affords of the vitality of the planting interest and the enlarged share of profits it retains on the planters hands, but also as establishing a condition of things which will render the cotton grower much less dependent than formerly upon outside capital, and as foreshadowing the ultimate abolition of the system of credit upon which the whole production and trade of the South has usually been conducted. It may, we think, be regarded as a fact already demonstrated by experience that free labor will be cheaper to the planter than that of the slave. The negroes, as a rule, even now work with much regularity, and as the country becomes more settled politically, and the reward of industry will, without doubt, stimulate them to render an amount of effort greatly in excess of all former experience.

The recuperation in the transportation facilities of the South has also been far more rapid than might have been expected. This recovery is due, to a considerable extent, to the assistance rendered by the government in furnishing rolling stock at the close of the war, but mainly, however, to the very necessities of the country which the rapid development of wealth are making apparent. At the close of the war the rail-

roads were in a state of utter dilapidation. The owners had no resources for repairing them or supplying the required rolling stock. With a certain promise of an ultimate recovery of traffic, the roads have been bought up or leased in this condition on favorable terms, and placed in fair running condition. The result has been a large improvement in the traffic, and in many cases the resumption, of stock dividends. It appears from a return in our issue of September 12, that 1,333 miles of road in Georgia earned, last year, \$5,287 per mile gross, or \$2,160 net, which is over 10 per cent net on the cost of theroads, and that dividends were paid to the stockholders ranging from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 per cent per annum. This fact illustrates the rapid recovery of the railroad interest.

Much, however, remains to be effected before the South can be considered in a sound and healthy condition. While a large amount of formerly cultivated land remains waste and plantations can be bought at one-third or one-half their value before the war, there is clearly a sad lack of resource for bringing up production to its former dimensions. The dearness of real estate, however, is steadily attracting enterprising, active men of the North to settle there; and this impression of new population will contribute much toward the ultimate development of the country.

We have deemed it proper to direct attention to these features in the condition of the South because of their favorable bearing upon the commercial prospects of the country at large.

LABOR CONGRESSES AT HOME AND ABROAD.

During the past month two important assemblages of the so-called "working-classes" have been held, the one in Europe, the other in America. We describe these as assemblages of the "so-called" working classes, because the title is not only a misnomer in itself, but a misnomer which at once results from and leads to a profound misunderstanding of the relations between the classes who assume it and the rest of the community.

A "Congress of workingmen," for example, which excludes all the farm laborers of the country, is obviously no real congress of "workingmen" at all. Not less absurd is it to bestow such a title upon a congress in which neither the lawyers, doctors and writers of a country are represented, nor yet its mercantile classes. In this nineteenth century the workers are not only everywhere, as they have always been, in the majority, but the non-workers constitute, even in the most retrograde countries of Christendom, an almost infinitesimal proportion of

the population, and exercise a scarcely perceptible influence alike upon the social and upon the political world. It is difficult, indeed, to extract even from the muster-rolls of the "Third Congress of the International Association of Workingmen" at Brussels, or the "National Labor Union" at New York, an exact and exhaustive definition of the words "labor" and "workingman" as used and understood by these bodies. But in a loose and unscientific, though intelligible way, it may be said that these bodies represent that portion of the population which brings into the general social economy no other capital than its skilled industry in some mechanical trade. Two main motives conspire to bring this portion of the population into such associations, the one desirable and creditable, the other, we think, neither intelligent in itself nor likely to be of lasting potency. We may call these motives the instinct of co operation, and the passion of combination.

By the instinct of co-operation we mean the disposition of workmen whose intelligence enables them to forecast the future, but whose resources do not permit them easily to assure themselves against its chances, to form alliances among themselves with the object of providing mutual guarantees against those chances. This disposition gave birth in the middle ages to the famous "guilds" and "brotherhoods," the influence of which, both for good and for evil, is still felt in many of the more important mechanical trades. One of the most striking forms in which this disposition has ever developed itself exists and flourishes now in full vigor in the Russian Aittelschiks. In these communaled corporations each individual makes himself responsible not only for the well being but for the well doing of the rest of the body corporate. How high a standard of probity and of capacity was gradually set up by the great trade corporations of mediæ-Europe we know; and it is to this day a notable fact in France that the "carpenters," who of all the mechanics of France have preserved their corporate organization in the fullest vigor, are also of all the mechanics of France those who furnish from their ranks the s mallest contribution to the annual quots of crime. "It is almost unheard of," says an able French writer on these subjects, "that a carpenter should be found in the criminal dock of one of our courts."

A new and modern form taken by this instinct of co-operation results from the modern development of machinery. We mean the co operation of mechanics to establish, by contributions of capital, workshops and factories, which they carry on by contributions of skill and industry. This form of co-operation is one of the salient facts of recent social history. It has assumed much more important proportions in Europe, and particularly in Germany and the North of England, than in this

country. But it was shown at the Congress of the "National Labor Union," in this city, that in one single branch of industry, that of ironfounding, no fewer than eleven co-operative workshops have, within a few years past, been successfully established in different parts of the country.

So far as the "Congresses of Workingmen," rightly or wrongly so styled by way of exclusion, may bring to light the advantages of the spirit of co-operation, help to point out the perils and abuses to which it is liable, and generally instruct both the workingmen themselves and the rest of the world in regard to subjects connected with this spirit, it must be conceded that they will do good, great good, and only good.

Is it otherwise with the other, which, in some cases, also is the stronger motive to the assemblage of such Congresses, the "passion," namely, as we have called it, "of combination?" By this we mean the desire of a body of workmen whose intelligence exceeds their command of material resources, to compel the rest of the community into forming with them relations which it appears to them would be more profitable and more equitable. This desire found its supreme expression in our times in the action taken by the so-called "workingmen" of France during Its ordinary formula is a protest the French revolution of 1848. against the "tyranny of capital over labor," its ordinary outcome in political matters, the demand for such legislation as the "Eight Hour Bill," now a law in this country by act of Congress. We need not go back over all the terrible and all the preposterous incidents of the French revolutionary outbreak of 1848 to set clearly before our readers the excesses to which this "passion of combination" then led the classes subjected to its sway. These excesses were cruelly expiated in the severity with which French society chastised their culminating extravagance, the "insurrection of June." The recollection of them has been perpetuated in the sort of vague terror with which the capitalist classes of the Continent of Europe have ever since regarded everything approaching to a political demonstration made by the intelligent mechanic classes. That the excesses of 1848, however, were not without their salutary uses is shown, we think, by the tone of such Labor Congresses as these which have just been held in Belgium and United States.

It is true that in both a certain amount of wild talk was uttered as to the basis of the social order, and that in both the "workingmen" exhibited a disposition to expect impossible things from governments and from political machinery. But this is true of other classes in the community, as well as of the workingmen. It would be hard, we presume, to find a more complete contrast between the conditions of any two classes of men than exists between that of the "workingmen" and

that of the brokers in Wall street. Yet the days are not very far gone into the past, in which Congress was seriously entreated by brokers and bankers to keep the "gold market" quiet and regular by acts in such case made and provided. And the safety of the "workingmen" and of society is furthered, we believe, rather by the utterance of the incorrect theories fermenting in the heads of the former class, than by their suppression in speech leading to their dissemination in desire. No possible number of "Congresses" held by statisticians and economists, would have so good an effect in impressing the truths of political economy upon the "workingmen" as their own progressive wrestling with those truths. The failures of the "socialistic" politicians of France in 1848, undoubtedly did more than all the lectures ever delivered before the "Societie d'Economie Politique" to disenchant the intelligent "workingmen" of France, in regard to the existence of any royal or republican roads to a satisfactory adjustment of social burdens and advantages. And it is noteworthy that the one political purpose which was most clearly and most earnestly urged by the delegates at Brussels upon their constituent classes, was the eminently sound, conservative and co-operative policy of a reduction of the European armaments. The delegates to the American Labor Congress were hardly so wise or so enlightened, we think, in their development of a political plan. The project of forming a "workingman's party" involves, we think, more damage to the intellectual health than benefit to the economical interests of the "workingmen." But it is one thing to plan a political party, and another thing to create it. There being in reality no such antagonism between capital and labor, either in this country or elsewhere, as there is assumed to be by the planners of a "labor party," there can be little doubt, we think, that the native good sense and character of American "workingmen" will rapidly detect this fact, and so suffer the "Labor Party" to die before it is well brought into the world.

DEBT AND FINANCES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Previous to the breaking out of the late war New Hampshire was free from debt and had small liabilities. The successive calls for men to fill the national army and recruit the naval and marine forces necessitated large expenditures, which could only in part be met by current revenue and hence other large sums were raised on bonds and notes. Probably the total expended in bounties and relief exceeded \$5,000,000, of which \$3,490,204 was outstanding at the close of the last fiscal year, June 1, 1868. The following table exhibits the character and amount of this

debt in considerable detail for the three last years at that date comparatively, and shows that in two years it has been reduced from \$3,909,918 to \$3,490,204, or by \$419,714:

				Outstanding June 1,— 1866. 1887. 18		
Six per cents, is	sued under act of	June 1861 : date	đ July	1000	1001.	1868.
1, 1861; inter	est Jan. and July;	payable July 1,	as fol-			
lows			1866	\$100,000	8	8
фo	фo	ďο	1867	94,900	94,900	100
фо	₫ο	фo	1868	100,000	10 ,000	100,000
ģο	ďο	ďο	1869	100,000	100,000	100,000
do	φo	₫ο	1870	97,900	97,200	97,200
do	do	фo	1871	92,00	92 0° 0 100,000	92,000 100,000
đo do	do do	do do	1879	100,000 100,000	100.000	100,000
do	do	do	1878	100,000	100,000	100,000
do	do	CO	1875	100,000	100,000	100,000
do	do	do	1876	100,000	100,000	100,000
do	go	do	1877	100,000	100,000	100,000
do	go	do	1878	110,000	110,000	110,000
	ssued under act			220,000	220,000	220,000
tent 1, 1864; i	nterest March and	Sent : payable	ent. 1.			
as fullows			1384	278,000	450,000	450,000
do	do	đo	1889	150,000	150,000	150,000
Eight per cents,	issued under act of	f June, 1865; date	ed Jan.			
1, 1865; intere	est Jan. and July;	payable Jan. 1	1869	500,000	500,000	500,000
Six per cents, i	ssued under act of	July, 1866; date	ed Oot.	•	•	•
	st April and Oct.;					
lows		do	1267	••••	300,000	••••
₫ο				••••	2:0,000	250,000
do	ďο	ďο	1870	••••	234,100	250,000
do	φo	ďο	1871		116,000	162,500
do	ďο	ĝο	1872	•••	80,000	185,000
do	do	ģo	1878	••••	157,500	210,000
do	· do	do	1874	••••	9,000	25 0,0 00
Bonds of July, 1	86i			R1 994 100	\$1,194,100	£1 099 R00
	1864			428,000	600,000	600,000
Bonds of Jan. 1.	1866			500,000	500,000	500,000
Bonds of Oct. 1,	1866	••••••	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	••••	1,387,600	1,257,500
Total bonds out	standing			82,222,100	\$3,681,700	\$8,456,80C
Notes payable			•••••••	1,687,818	109,687	83,104
Total funded	l and floating debt			\$3,909,918	\$8,791,837	\$8,490,204

With the exception of \$500,000 in 8 per cents, which become due January, 1869, none of these liabilities bear over six per cent. All interest is payable in currency. There were paid to creditors for coupons and interest last year the following amounts: for coupons \$224,361, and interest on notes \$17,163—total \$241,524. The payments on these accounts will be about \$20,000 less in the year 1868-69. The amount of debt due at the close of the fiscal year 1867-68, and that will mature during the year 1868-69, is as follows:

Bond overdue and uvcalled for Bonds to become due Ju'y 1, 1888	100,000	\$850,100 83.404
Total due and to become due		
The Treasurer has in bonds of 1866	\$242,500 291,177—	538,677
Balance		\$349,827

⁻to be provided from surplus revenue and by new loans.

ANNUAL RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

The revenue of New Hampshire is derived chiefly from taxes on property, railroads and savings' banks. The following shows the receipts and disbursements of the last fiscal year:

	•			
RECKIPTS.		Ordinary expenses		
State taxes	\$694.816 81	Ordinary expenses	\$135,481	21
Railroad taxes	203,284 64	Extraordinary expenses	97,707	04
Pavings' bank taxes	77,227 65	Dividends to towns	156,945	28
8 les of public lands	25,000 00	Literary fund	37,019	
Interest on deposits, &c	2,485 80	Interest on bonds, &c	242,388	19
Miscellaneous	1,102 00	Principal debt	828,589	50
Loans	597,404 00	Cash June 1, 1868	18,684	72
Cash June 1, 1867		1		_
•		Total	1.516.745	88
Total	1 516 745 98	1	_,,	

TOWN DEBTS AND ASSETS.

The report of the State Treasurer for 1867-68 contains a statement of the debt, assets, rates of taxation, etc., in each town as of May 1, 1868. This exhibit is too voluminous for our columns; and in its stead we give the following aggregates in each county. The debts here spoken of are not military, each town having had its advances returned by the State, nor have we any description of their character or purpose:

		_	Taxp\$	100 val-	-Tax	p p⁻ll
Countles.	Debts.	Assets.	Lowest.	Highest.	Low.	High.
Rockingham	\$1,852,156 57	\$218,008 59	\$1 88	\$ 5 00	28 29	89 33
Strafford	688,878 09	101,675 99	1 83	2 95	8 19	5 84
Belknap	490,010 59	52,997 87	1 55	2 36	8 72	5 67
Carroll	447,609 68	58,050 11	1 86	8 96	4 08	9 50
Merrimac		153,211 99	1 20	2 61	2 88	6 26
Hillsborough	1,287,129 26	842,684 88	1 25	2 95	8 00	7 08
Cheshire	554,685 22	15.275 62	1 20	2 70	2 88	6 48
Su livan	447,251 45	58,264 85	1 32	2 8934	8 17	5 60
Grafton	1,058,228 04	170.4°4 19	0 87	6 (0	2 10	14 40
Coos		52.854 41	1 53	8 85	2 52	10 97
Total	97 998 987 71	£1 958 407 QK	20 87	96.00	82 10	214 40

The lowest and highest rates of taxation are found in Grafton County—the town of Grafton exhibiting the lowest, and the town of Thornton the highest rate. In relation to the above returns the Treasurer remarks that "the assets are not reliable. Some selectmen giving only such as are available, while others include every species of property and claims. Some include the highway tax in their rates of taxation, and others give only the money tax." This explanation may, in some degree, explain the wide difference in the rates given in the table.

SAVINGS' BANKS.

The following are the names of all the Savings' banks in the State and the amount of deposits therein June 1, 1868:

•		,	
Banks	Deposits.	Banks.	Dep^si's.
Amoskear	.\$1,463,637 57	Milfo d Five Cents	\$144,681 69
Ashue ot		Nachua	
Carroll County		New H mpshire	
Cheshire P.o. Inst	858,780 54	New Ipearch,	90,200 00
City Manchester		Newmarket	25,486 86
City Na-hua	448,647 22	Norway Plains	811,880 26
Connecticut River	1 25.028 39		
Dartmouth	110,271 12	Fittsfie d	
Dover Five Cents		Portsmouth	
Exeter			
Gome Five Cents		County of Strafford	
Manche ter		Somersworth	206,978 88
Meredith Bridge	2 8 367 09	Snilivan	
Merrimac River	885 678 18	Wilton	
Total, 28 institutions, and 21	0.207.035 58 de	nosits	20,020 00

It speaks well for New Hampshire to have it recorded that the entire default in the receipt of taxes in 1865 amounted only to \$5 61; in 1866 to \$11 88, and in 1867 to \$1,046 56.

COTTON MOVEMENT AND CROP FOR 1867-68.

[From the Conmercial and Financial Chronicle.]

We are now able to give our figures showing the crop and movement of cotton in the United States for the year ending September 1, 1868. Our returns are unusually complete this year, and the light we are able to throw on the subject of consumption in the United States will be especially useful. It appears that the total crop reaches 2,498,895 bales, while the exports have been 1,657,015 bales, and the home consumption 885,015 bales, leaving a stock on hand at the close of the year of 38,130 bales. The stock of cotton at the interior towns, September 1, 1868, not included in the receipts, is 3,897 bales, against 5,703 bales last season. We now bring forward our tables showing the whole movement for the year. The first table indicates the stock at each port September 1, 1868, the total exports, and the receipts at the ports for each of the last two years:

Ports.	Receip	ts, year ling	Expor	Steel			
	Sept. 1, 1863.	Sept. 1, 1867.	Great Britain.	France.	Other Foreign.	Total.	Sep.1 1568.
New Orleans	866,198 240,481 495,959	702,131 289,516 152,247 255,965	827,689 211,154 89,651 240,565	147,120 10,432 2,936 9,904	106,668 14,925 13,226 9,195	581,477 236,511 103,818 259,604	1,955 2,16 1,945 694
Texas Florida North Carolina Virginia	88,598 88,643	185,922 57,791 88,628 127,967	8,288	1,625	26,188	68,595 8,283	1.00
New York" Boston" Philadelphia"	106,978* 84,862* 24,221*	119,601° 42,712° 22,678°	291,983 1,208 1,440	26,878	56,378 288	374,734 1,411 1,440	23,444 2,50 1,76
Baltimore* Portland, Me.* Ban Francisco	2.304	10,721	13,388 2,807		2,92t 1	16,809 2,807 1	2,50
Total	2,210,282	1,965,774	1,228,890	198,395	229,730	1,657,015	38,13

By the above it will be seen that the total receipts at the Atlantic and Gulf shipping ports this year have been 2,240,282 bales against 1,965,774 bales last year. If, low we add the shipments from Tennessee and elsewhere direct to manufacturers, we have the following as the crop statement for the two years:

Receipts at the shipping ports Add shipments from Tennessee, &c., direct	to	m	anı	Mac		2,240,282	1867. 1,905,774
urers						198 613	†54,000 No return.
Total cotton crop for the year, bales					2	2,498,895	2,019,774

^{*} These figures are only the portion of the receipts at these torts which arrived overland from T-nuessee, &c. The total receipts at New York, Baltimore, Boston and Philadelphia for the year ending August 31, 1863, have been as follows: New York, 632,326 bales; Boston, 229,635 bales; Baltimore, 97,388 bales; Philadelphia, 65,831 bales.
† Returns incomplete_for 1867.

The result of these figures is a total of 2,498,895 bales as the crop of the United States for the year ending August 31, 1868. We are aware that with some it has been customary in past years to call the aggregate of the receipts at the Atlantic and Gulf shipping ports (which is 2,240,282 bales this year) the total crop, and therefore in making up the product of "Tennessee, &c.," the shipments from those points direct to manufacturers were deducted. Our custom has always been different, never being able to see any good reason for the continuance of so defective a plan. It may be very convenient for the purpose of deciding bets, but it is a misstatement to call a total, which omits a third of the product of one section of the country, the crop of cotton in the United States. Below we give the details of the production of each State, which may be epitomized as follows;

	Tota	d crop.—		-To	tal crop.—
States.	186 3.	1867.	States.	1868.	18 i7.
Louisianabales.	584,240	702,181	N. Carolinabales.	38,648	88,628
Alabama	866,198	289,516	Virginia	166,587	127.867
South Carolina	240,481	162,247	Tennessee, etc	398,588	249,712
Georgia		255,965	Manufact. South*	60,000	No return.
Texas		185,922	_		
Florida	88.598	67,791	Total crop 2	498.895	2.019.774

The details of the crop for the two years are as under:

Louislana	•			•
Exported from New Orleans:	1867-8	3	1866	3-7
To foreign ports	581,477		618,940	
Stock at close of year	1.959	683,651	248,376 15,256—	892,573
Deduct:	•	000,002		Composa
Received from Mobile	67,048		86,676	
Received from Montgomery	8,650 5,770		10,79 2 11,810	
Received from Texas.	7,692		19.0-1	
Stock beginning of year	15, 56—	99,411	102,082-	180,441
Total product for the year		584,940		702,181
Alabama.				
Exported from Mobile:				
To foreign ports	286,511 127,248		168,424	
To coastwise orts	8,650		98,158 10,792	
Burnt at Mobile	842		2,437	
Block at close of year	2,161	869,907	8,714-	268,525
Deduct stock at beginning of year		8,714		29,516
Total product for the year		866,198		289,516
Texas.				•
Exported from Galveston, &c.:				
To to reign ports	68,595 49,138		76,918 118,986	
To coa twis ports	166—	117,899	2.557—	193,411
Deduct stock at beginning of year		8,288	.,	7,589
Total product for year		114,666		185,922
Total product for year		114,000		100,822
Florida.				
Exported from Apalachacola, St. Marks, &c.:			8,019	
To Foreign ports	88,598		54,396	
Burnt at Apalachicola	*****		1,089	
Stock at close of year		88,598;	5-	58,509
Deduct— Stock at begining of year	8		162	
Recovered of burnt cotton		5	656	¹ 818
Material and Just & Control		38,598		47 701
Total product for year		90,090		57,791

^{*} Taken from different States.

Georgia.				
Exported:	1867-	•—	-1866	-7
To foreign ports—Uplands	358,556 6,048		106,44 9 ዲ058	
To coastwise ports—Uplands	235,708		142,143	
	5,945		7,058	
Burnt at Favannah Exported from Darien to north'n ports	•••••		51 K	
Stock at Savannah close of year	696	501,955	633	264,891
Dednet		,	*	,
Received from Florida—Uplands	4,997		199	
Stock at beginning of year	666 683—	6,296	4,996 8,940—	8,496
DANCE AS DOZIMINE OF JOHN			0,020	
Total product for year		495,959		355,965
South Carelli	na.			
Exported from Charleston:	00.04		FR 000	
To foreign ports—t plands	99,847 5 966		72,909 7,987	
To coartwise ports—Upland	5,966 185,081		80,943	
" Sea Island	8,838		8,766	
Exported from Georget'n, Port Royal &c.:				
To Northern ports—Upland	148		915	
Burnt at Beaufort and Hilton H. ad	191		687 45	
Stock at Charleston end of year	1,345	246,456	1,228—	178,429
Deduct-	-	•	•	•
Received from Florida—Upland	180 4,617		258 5.359	
Stock at Charleston beg'nning of ye.r	1,228—	6,025	5,585	11,183
	_,		5,555	
Total product for year		210,481		162,247
North Careli	na.			
Exported:			***	
To foreign ports	88.648-	88,643	584 88,089	38,628
10 Coasta 180 botto	00,020—		00,000	
Total product for the year		88,643		88,623
Virginia.				
Exported:				
To fo eign ports	8,268		18,011 99,238	
Manuf'd (taken from Petersburg, &c)	158,893		15,000	
Burn at Norfolk	****		2, 500	
To domestic ports Manurd (taken from Petersburg, &c) Burn at Norfolk Stock end of year at Petersburg and Norfolk Deduct stock based or year.	1,000-	168,176	1,589	181,833
Deduct stock beginning of year		1,589		8,466
Total product for year		166,587		127,867
Tonnessoo, d				-
Shipments:	LC.			
From Memphis	251,240		227,877	
From Na-hville.	79,193		****	
From Na hville			S2,079	
Kentucky, &c. Crop of Illinois, &c. Stock in Mem, his & Nashvi le end of year	116,000		0.010	
Stock in Mem. his & Nashvi le end of vear	15,000	464,540	1,602-	311,038
Deduct—		201,010	2,002	022,000
Shipped to New Orleans	69,355		49,615	
Stock in Memphis and Nashville beginning of year.	198,61 3 1,60 2	269,570	54,000 11,731—	115,346
neon m momban and respective as Finning or Jour.	2,000		11,101	210,010
Total shipments to New York, Boston, Philadelphia				
and Postland		194,970 198,613		195,719 54,000
And surpper so manufactur s as access		190,010		04,000
I otal product for year of Tenn., &c.*		893,583		249,713
Matal meadman datailed above her States for the		.a: a		
Total product detailed above by States for the	e year ei	oing S		100 00=
tember 1, 1868			. 2,	438.895
Consumed in the South not included		• • •		60 ,0 00
Total grow of the United States for	Cant 1	1000	-	400 00E
Total crop of the United States for year ending	R pebr. r	, 1908	. 2	498,895

^{*} Except the shipments to New Orleans, which are included in the New Orleans receipts.

825,015

1808]	COTTON	MOVEMENT	AND OR	OP FOR	1807-8.		301
Below we give 1865-6	e the tota	l crop each	year sinc	e 1820 :			Reles
1867-8	2,498,8	1849-50		2,096,706	1884 5	1	,254,3 28
1866-7	2,019,7	4 1848-9	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	2,728,596 2,847,684	1838-4	1	,200,814 .970 483
1861 5	(no recor	l) 1846-7	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1,77~,651	1881-2	••••••	987,477
1860-1	8,656,0 4,669.7	36 1845-6		2.100,537	1830-1	1	.038,848 976 845
1858-9	8,851,4	81 1848-4	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2,030,409	1828 9	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	870.415
1857-8 1958-7	3,113,9 2,939.5	9 1849-8		2,878,875 1,683,574	1827-8		727,593 957,281
1855-6	8,527,8	15 1840-1		1,634,945	1825-6		720,0 7
1858-4	2,847,8 2,980.0	9 1889-40 27 1838-9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1.860.532	1824-0	• • • • • • • • •	509,158
1869-8	3,262,8	32 1837-8	••••	1,801,497	1829	•••	495,000
1851-2	2.855.9	57 1885-6		1,360,725	1820-2	• • • • • • • • •	430,000
The crop of S	Sea 1sland	the past yea	r has beer	as follo	ws : Florid	a, 10,314	bales;
Georgia, 6,234	bales; So	outh Carolin	a, 4,727 i	oalesto	tal, 21,275	bales, th	e par-
ticulars of which							
Florida —Bales Georgia —Expo Dom Stoc Deduct receiv	,					••••	10,814
Georgia — Expo	orted foreign	n	• • • • • • • • •	••••••	6,048		
Stoc	k end of year	ir	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	••••••	60-	11,858	
Stock beginni	ng of year.	rida	••••••		4,997	5,119	
Total Sea Is	land and G	eorgia		•••••			6,284
South Caroli Deduct receiv Stock beginni	na—Expor	ted foreign		· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	5,966		
	-Stock	end of year .	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	·• · · · · · · · · · ·	96-	9,588	
Deduct receiv	ed from Flo	orida	•• •••••	••••••	4,617	4,811	
Dioon Dog.min	B 01 , 0m.	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	••••	•••••			4,727
Total (rop of S	a Islands				3	1,270
The crop of	Sea Islan	ds during fo	rmer vear	a haa hee	n as follow	8:	-
1854-5 1855-6 1856-7	bales 40,8	41 1857-8 18 1858-9	b	ales 40,566 47,59	8 1860-66 8 1866-7 2 1867-8	bal	record. es 82,228
1000 111111 11111	20,0		sumptio		0 2001 07111		
Doubtless so	me will b		_		e cotton p	roduction	of the
country for th							
be, we think, a							
year has prepa							
see in our fig							
received tables							
ing then to thi							
statements con							
usual table sh	owing th	e result for	the year	both in	the Northe	rn and S	outhern
States.							
Total crop of the Stock on hand co	United Sta	tes as above s	tated			••••••	2,498,895
At Northern	ports	•••••••	po. 1, 100.,	• •••••••••••		. 56,497 . 26,658—	83,155
Total supply th	ere has bee	u enging sel	, i, 1000 .	••••••	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		A,00A,000
Exported to 10 Rurnt at New	reign ports York	during the ye	ar	• • • • • • • • • •		1,657,015 1,?47	
Burnt at the S	onth less re	covered	·····	• • • • • • • • • •	••••••	648	
Now on hand (So At Nor hero	eptember 1,	1968)—				80,208	
At Southern	ports	•••••		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•••••••	7,927—	1,697,085
Total consumpti Consumpti n in	on in Unite	d States year	ending Se	nt 1 1868	helos		885,015
			Ower PP 20	P 1, 1000,	Danos		60,000

Leaving consumption in Northern States, bales

Ac ording to this formula, the consumption the past year appears to have reached 825.015 bales in the North and 60,000 bales in the South, or a total in the whole country of 885,015 bales. That our readers might see how this result tallys with the actual facts, we were making arrangements to obtain the returns from our different manufacturing establishments when we learned that the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers were pursuing the same inquiries; and we have now received from their Secretary the result of their labors. The returns are not complete (that is, they are from only 475 mills), but with the help of the census of 1860 we shall be able to reach satisfactory results. It appears, then, that the number of mills and consumption in the Un ted States in 1860 and the consumption of 475 mills in 1863 were as follows:

	(census of 1	860.	Retur	ns from m	lla, 19 6 8.
STATES.	No. of Mills.	No. of Spindles.	Con- sump- tion, Bales.	No. of Mills.	No. of Spindles.	Con- sump- tion, Bales.
Total Northern and Western	772 148	4,870,968 164,840	703,950 87,650	428 52	5,004,220 185,882	656,964 88,990
Total United States	915	5,035,798	791,600	475	5,139,602	695,954

In this table are exhibit d many interesting facts which we have not the space to refer to. It is important, however to notice that the consumption in the Southern States was only 87,650 bales (460 lbs. eac.) in 1860, according to the census, and that this year the mills which have made returns have consumed only 38,990 bales. Further, it appears that the Northern States (as also given in the census) consumed 703,950 bales in 1860, and the returns of 423 mills in the same States this year show a consumption of 656,964 bales. Now if we estimate the mills which have not reported this year as having 1,200,000 spindles (making the total spindles for 1868 6,339,602, against 5,035,798 in 1860), and as producing the average size yarn of those reporting, we shall find that the whole consumption of the country the past year has been about 881,000 bales, about the same total we have reached above. This result is certainly very gratifying evidence of the accuracy of our crop report.

Exports.

In the first table given in this report, will be found the foreign exports the past year from each port to Great Britain, France, and other ports, stated seperately, as well as the total to all the ports. Below we give the total foreign exports for five years for comparison:

Total Exports of Cotton to Foreign Ports for Five Years.

	-Export	s to forely n	ports for ve	ar ending A	ng. 81
From-	1860.	1861.	1866.	1867.	1868.
New O leans, bales		1,788,678	516,188	618,940	581,477
Mobile		456,421	270,934	153,434	286,511
South Carolina	846,770	214,838	53,824	80,896	105,818
Georgia		802,187	92,905	114,101	259,604
Texas		68,209	64,838	76,918	63,595
Flori a		28,078	87,977	8,0 9	
North Carolina		195	21	5 34	
Virgin a	8,259	810		18.5:1	8,233
New York	208,028	248,049	495,462	469,668	874 784
Hoston	9 694	23, 295	12,014	17 014	1,441
Philadelphia	293	8,798	2,035	8,155	1,440
Balt more	257	8,545	6,709	7,97 i	16,809
Portland, Maine				108	3,907
San Francisco			•••	33	1
Total from the U.S	8,774,178	8,197,568	1,552,457	1.558,787	1,657,015

Unjer the head Southern States we include Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee.

To complete our record, we give below a table showing the price of midding uplands at New York and Liverpool on Friday of each week during the last two years:

Prices of Cotton at New York and Liverpool two years.

	77-8186			
	Liver- N: w		New Liver- New 1 iver-	
York.	pool York.	pool.	York, pool, York, pool.	
CI.	d. cts.	~ d	cts. d. cts d.	
Sep'. 6	10 89	18	Mar. 6 25 9% 20% 18%	
⁴ 13 25	9% 32%	181	1 " 13 24% 10% 81% 13%	
" 20 ···· 24½	914 8534	183	" 20 24% 10% 80% 18%	
" 27 23	8% 88	18%	" 27 26 10½ 80 18½	
Oct. 4 20	834 3934	14%	April 8 29 12½ 27½ 12½	
" 11 18	8% 40	15	1 10 30 27 19	
" 18 19	8 42	15%	4 17 80% 19% 25 11%	
" 25 20	8% 89	15	" 24 82½ 12½ 26¾ 10½	
Nov. 1 19	834 39	15	May 1 8 12% 27 11%	
" 8 ····· 19	8% 87	14%	8 89 1:34 27 11	
" 15 18	8 ¾ 88	14	" 15 89 12½ 28½ 11¾	
" 29 17½	814 84	14	i 29 81 11½ 17 11	
" 29 16	7% 83%	14	" 29 81 11½ 27½ 11½	
Dec. 6 17	7% 88%	14	June 5 80 11 2 27 11 26	
" 18 15½	7% 84	141	" 12 29 11 27 1136	
" 20 15 ₃	73: 8434	1436	" 19	
4 27 15%	716 8116	1434	1 4 26 8134 1134 26 11	
Jan. 8 15%	7% 85%	151	July 8 89 111 26 101/2	
" 10 16°	7% 84%	14%	" 10 89% 11% 26% 10%	
" 17 171	7% 85	14%	" 17 89 11½ 26½ 10½	
" 24 19	79∡ 83	14%	" 24 81 16% 27 10%	
" 81 1936	7% 88%	14%	" 81 80 9% 28 10%	
Feb. 7 20	8 88	14%	Ang. 7 29 9% 28 10%	
" 14 201 ₄	8% 33	14	" 14 29½ 10 2×½ 10½	
" 21 28%	10% 32	18%	" \$1 80 10% \$~% 10%	
" 28 22	9% 83	18%	" 28 80% 11 27 10%	

WHEAT AND COTTON RETURNS FOR GREAT BRITAIN.

With the 81st of August the wheat season may be said to have been brought to a close. We have, therefore, just entered on the new season, with a price for wheat much more sa isfactory to the consumer, and with a crop, which, if realised at present rates, will yield a large return of profit to the grower. The average price of English wheat in England and Wales in 1867-8 was 68s. 42d., again t 60s. 82d. in 1866-7; 46s. 5d. in 1865-6; 40s. 12d. in 1864-5, and 40s. 102d. in 1863-4. The following statement shows the average price in each week since the 1st of September, 1868:

Weok	186	7.	186	6.	136	5.	18	34.	18	68.	ı	We	ek			18	68.	180	57.	180	86.	186	85.	18	84.
ending	e.	d.	8.	đ.	8.	d.	8.	d.	8.	ð.	1	end	ing				đ.	R.	d.	P.	d.	M.	đ	В.	а
Bept. 7							42		44	2		Feb.	90			79				45					6
14			47		44		13		44	ĩ		Mar.			• • • • • • • •					45		88		40	ğ
											ı														
" <u>91</u>					42		49	0	44	9	1							59		45		88			1
" 28			51						48	9	1							59	9	45		88		: 9	9
Oct. 8	68	5	53	3	41	1	89	8	48	2	1	**	28.			.71	10	60	11	44	11	×۶	11	39	11
-4 19	64	10	52	7	41	11	88	9	41	0	ı	April	4.			. 72	6	61	9	41	9	39	8	40	*
" 19			52	ě	48		88	ĭ	40	4	L								ã	14	5	40	ĭ	40	1
" 26			52		43				4Ŏ	ō	1				. • • • •			61		44				40	ī
								ğ														40			â
Nov. 2			54		48		88		81	10								64		45					
··· V			57		45			11	40	0		May							10						2
" 16			58	7	46	11	88	9	89	10	1		9.			.74	7	64	9	46	9	40	11	38	9
" 23	.68	11	57	6	46	10	83	9	89	11	ł	4.	16			.74	8	64	11	46	1	41	8	39	8
" 80	68	5	60		46		89		40	8	П	46					10	65	- 8	.7	4	41	9	89	8
Dec. 7			61		46		88		40									65		47	5	41	11	89	5
14			68		4Ŏ	8			41	7		June								47					
										4		a n'ii											ĭ	39	
21			59		46	.8			41	2					• • • •					47			Ť		
" 28	.67	4	60	0	46	11	87	10	40	5	1							65		48					
											1	**	27.			.67	5	64	10	51	0	41	6		
	18	68.	:86	37.	18	66.	18	65.	18	184	1	Ju!y	4.			.67	7	64	11	54	6	43	ō	40	y
Jan. 4	.67	10	60	9	46	3	88	2	19	10								64	7	55	10	43	1	41	6
11			61		46		88		40			66						65		54		4 1	ō	49	Ō
" 18			62		45	ż						**						65		52	ŏ				
																						42			ĭ
			62		45	_6			41			Aug.	. <u>i</u> .	• • • •	• • • •	.61		67		51					
Feb. 1			62		45				40											50		42			
" 8	.73		61	4	45	5			40			**								50				48	
· " 15	.78	0	59	10	45	0	88	4	40	8 (3	**	22			57	' 1	68	2	60	10	45	4	42	5
" 92			59	11	45	Ď	38	3	41	. 1	ı	44						66	7	49	7	46	7	42	8
,,,,,,,,	• •		-			•	•		-		٠,				••••			•	•		•		•		_

The imports of wheat in 1867-8 amounted to 86,215,905 cwt., against 28,783,939 cwt. in 1866-7, being an increase of 7,481,966 cwt. The exports of wheat show an increase of only 327,107 cwt. The imports of flour have declined to the extent of nearly 500,000 cwt. The following are the particulars of the imports and exports of wheat and flour into and from the United Kingdom for each of the two last seasons:

WHEAT AND FLOUR.

		WHEAT	YED LT	JUE.						
		WHEA				FLOU	R.—			
	Imp	orts.	-Exp	orts	Im	orts.—	_Expe	rte.		
Week	1866-7.	1867–8.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1866-7.	1867-8.	1866-7	'67-8.		
end ng—	cwt.	cwt.	cw t.	cwt.	cwt.	cwt.	cwt.	CWL.		
⊁ep. 7	282,064	757,270	5,792	8,136	27,297	46,8 %3	1,088	144		
" 14	814,855	764 138	11,676	29,405	22,088	83,879	184	141		
21	229,450	737,175	8,546	92,088	98,847	29,184	6	1,862		
" 28		646,705	29,424	78,160	22,747	44,684	\$85	588		
Oct. 5		£89,980	28,789	88,989	24,499	19,246	4	596		
" 18		515,179	20,503	16,704	55,292	38,126	655	603		
" 19		542,856	20,659	11,614	57,673	48,469	410	1,122		
" 26		805,708	43,849	5,859	75,881	65,471	817	573		
Nov. 2	602,871	989,177	20,586	7.6.9	68,186	68,330	118	176		
9	254,025	942,284	22,254	6,548	77,150	51,399	1,823	229		
" 16	273,215	684,455	4,760	7,226	42,412	90,744	206	880		
** 28	586,259	681,522	5,629	15,178	127,401	100,118	222	498		
" 80		1,081,292	2,669	17,271	150,419	124,908	27	1,948		
Dec. 7	548,601	735,945	185	12,536	126,654	121,805	4	806		
" 14	668,679	1,018,945	••••	21,615	181,907	153,519	195	299		
" 21	716,775	1,082,597	1	19,038	111,119	138,668	352	878		
" 28	593,941	889,486	2,750	6,514	186,148	129,774	249	208		
Jan. 4	468,985	871,159	880	9.118	86,121	80,958	186	811		
" 11	567,256	684,485	2,34 1	2,838	74 801	50,771	716	727		
" 18	455,886	825,951	17,716	1,485	44.756	60,689	9:4	185		
" 95	419,816	887,451	7,858	4,997	94,929	51,964	815	152		
Feb. 1	618,083	381,546	12,740	7 464	108,566	80,828	819	284		
8	827,709	462 561	¥,111	6.024	79,601	29,144	188	831		
" 15		674,685	215	8,747	64,699	82,0:0	155	139		
. 22		4.5,122	4.850	6 792	57,697	86,854	897	957		
" 29	466,949	591,763	2,403	2,612	53,617	54.688	655	184		
Mar. 7	590.147	570,276	2,520	11,016	55,564	63,043	258	805		
* 14	419,658	716,845	838	14,601	47,173	00,010	843	-		
" 21	847,886	620,268	244	26,956	89,968	66,016	282	237		
" 28		1,160,844	77	16,485	104,989	68,870	418	1,179		
Apr. 4		601,724	2,162	6,063	54 581	40,300	408	1,276		
· 11	818 480	828,656	45	18,261	42,176	98,798	456	114		
18	642.4 1	714,712	8,596	8,776	51.6.5	60.491	580	1,336		
" 25	608,228	707,591	160	20,752	75,470	52,689	704	928		
May 2	887 401	668,044	27,184	8,218	89,717	86.142	858	2,103		
9	777,118	770,657	21,461	6,545	80,690	58,640	£58	654		
" 16	746 814	657,738		5,493	68,854		619	1,270		
" 23	512,164	723,622	1,560 15,218		88,774	55,809	418	514		
" 80		108,558		16,558		25,831	150	24		
June 6	6.7 900	755,817	12,261 17,767	9,251 4,678	92,688	47,706		1.831		
* 18	459 051	689,057			126,284	44,865	7,613	810		
" <u>20</u>	876 739	567,428	18,456	1,521	67,897	46,811	720	659		
11 97	409 954		2,986	6,324	88,230	47,595	439	727		
	497 68E	560,547	••••	8,868	65,937	54,546	192			
July 4	507 504	865,663	••••	4,991	54,820	60,729	679			
" 11 " 18	1007 000	772,046	••••	15,848	50,717	42,519	278	828		
1 95	744 47	647,841	••••	6,585	65,278	56,098	393	77		
	040 E00	511,288	• • •	5,456	47,184	76,619	139	569		
Aug. 1	001 40	616,8:0	••••	28,976	49,864	40,977	80	198		
	091,400	447,008	***	6,648	88,762	37,280	48	464		
	411,917	608,810	142	14,385	41,860	86,899	1,246	721		
" 22		409,768	2,026	13,831	47,817	24,919	155	8,402		
" 29	080,664	889,095	141	19,864	56,208	25,483	25	1,266		
Total28	,788,939	86,215,905	411,274	733,381	3,6 22,254	8,112,268	27,789	35,823		

According to the Board of Trade returns the imports of wheat in July were 8,010,288 cwt., of which 881,752 cwt. were from Russia, 188,946 cwt. from Prussia, 147,181 cwt. from Illyria, Croatia and Delmatia, 451,988 cwt. from Turkey, Moldavia and Wallachia, 234,200 cwt. from Egypt, 540,834 cwt. from the United States, and 880,844 cwt. from Chili. The return for the seven months ending July 31 shows a dimunition in the receipts from Russia, as compared with the corresponding period last year of 1,098,183 cwt.; from Prussia of 1,669,288 cwt.; while from Turkey, Moldavia and

Wallachia, there is an increase of 844,928 cwt., from Egypt of 2,324,088 cwt., from the United States of 2,948,880 cwt., and from British North America of 247,675 cwt. The following are the leading particulars of the imports of wheat into the United Kingdom during the seven months ending July 81, 1866, 1867 and 1868:

WHEAT.			
	1866.	1867.	1868.
Russia cwts	8,988,969	6,464,815	5,871,682
Pruseis		4,071,707	2,402,419
Mecklenburg	455,923	552,821	125,566
Hanse Towns	489,79u	451,615	402,449
Illyria, Crotia and Da'matia	1,191,6:9	249,074	762 992
Turkey, Moldavia, and Wallachia	800,978	1,523,421	2,367,644
Rgypt	8,798	204,124	2,52%,211
United States		1,468,786	4,657,616
Chili	84,241	1,271,197	772,686
British North America	8,789	87	247,763
Total, including other countries	18,784,435	17,744,178	20,706,791
FLOUR.			
	1966.	1867.	1868.
Hanse Townscwts.	160,477	258,559	313,272
France	2,974,122	1.018 5 6	241,706
United States	168,949	141,709	4 28,222
Total, including other countries.	8,452,832	2,056,521	1.689.447

The import of cotton into the United Kingdom in July was 719,793 cwt.; against 748,898 cwt. last y ar, and 1,075,244 cwt. in 1866. As regards this year's importation 270,641 cwt. were from the United States, \$5,9.8 cwt. from Br zil, 5,481 Turkey, 85,808 Ezypt, 298,909 British India, and 27.644 cwt. from other countries. The following returns show the imports and exports of cotton into an 1 from the United Kingdom, and also the exports of cotton goods during the seven months ending July 31, 1866, 1867, and 1868:

IMPORTS OF COTTO	N.		
	1866.	1867.	1868.
From-	cwt.	cwt.	cwt.
United States	8,635,202	8,672,792	4,257,437
Bahamas and Bermudas		9,916	868
Mexico		22	••••
Brazil		441.0 (8	512,177
Turkey		51,460	21,015
Egypt		781 679	783,278
British India	2.888,141	1,257 869	1,02,,892
China		4.707	
Other countries		170,561	108,189
Total	. 7,932,986	6,396,104	6,735,801
EXPORTS OF COTTO	N.		
22.01.0 (1)	1866,	1867.	1868.
То—	cwt.	cwt.	cwt.
Russia		220,185	
Pruesia		130, 16	
Hanover		3,514	
Hanse Towns	426,949	403, 1:4	
Holland		290,071	282,111
Other countries		672,684	522,781
	4 004 000	4	1 000 00 00
Total	1,884,398	1,729,559	1,832,20 🕏
EXPORTS OF COTTON MANI	TPACTITE PO		
ELPURIS UP CUITOR MARK		404=	40.00
N #	1866.	1867.	1898.
Yarnlbs.	18,820,886	90,852,541	99,708,175
Piece goods	8,840,258 1,6	29,053.577	1,6:4,967,867
Threadlbs.	3,514,787	3,707,766	3 744,292

Annexed is a statement showing the extent of our trade with the U ited States and France in the principal descriptions of cotton, silk and woolen goods during the first seven months of the present and last two years. As regards the Unite: States

there is a falling off this year of 6,748,842 yards and lbs. as compared with 1867, and of 59,697,869 yards and lbs. as compared with 1886 To France the shipments show a reduction of 11,591,574 yards and lbs. as compared with 1867, and of 8,114,605 yards and lbs. as compared with 1866:

TO THE UNITED STATES,

Cotton piece goods. .yds. Cotton thread. lbs. Linen piece goods. .yds. Linen thread. .lbs. Silk piece goods. .y*s. Woolen cloth .yds. Carpets and druggets. .yds. Worsted stuffs. .yds.	898,864 69,107,879 1,271,705 460,992 8,626,941 2,616,799 48,931,833	1867. 62,922,165 854,902 51,683,397 832,738 239,674 2,619,873 2,822,281 28,2:9,715	1888 51,674 258 1,006,752 45,317,509 696,088 244,063 1,913,896 1,883,721 40,553,146
TO FRANCE.			
Cotton yarn lbs. Cotton piece goods yds. Cotton thread lbs. Linen yarn lbs. Linen piece goods yds. Silk pi ce goods yds. Woolen yarn lbs. Woolen cloth yds. Carpets and druggets yds. Worsted stuffs yds.	2,000,445 25,879,684 85,459 1,235,067 1,981,891 18,029 1,170,139 1,964,513 149,561 14,565,114	2,839,709 26,164,940 88,485 2,433,160 3,000,314 1,7,194 1,886,520 4,129,877 224,176 12,884,778	2,315,496 18,556,232 81,220 1,502,905 2,123,489 11,606 5,417,983 1,125,154 523,260 9,368,680
Total	49,139,882	52,616,851	41,025,277

INFLUENCE OF COLONIES ON ENGLISH TRADE.

Considerable light is thrown upon the disputed question of the value of the English colonies to the mother country, and their influence upon commerce and business, by the publication of recent statistics. From these returns it appears that any apparent expense of the colonies to the Imperial government is more than counterbalanced by the profits derived from trading with them. This may not be true of some of the smaller colonies, from which no compensating advantages are derived, except perhaps from their strategic position in time of war. But there seems to be no doubt that the larger colonies add largely to the wealth and commerce of Great Britain. It has always been the policy of the Imperial government to establish exclusive or at least most favorable trade relations with its dependencies, amounting in many cases to positive monopolies. In our earlier colonial times this subject was always a source of dispute. For instance the tobacco interests of Virginia were greatly impeded by the law which prohibited the exportation of that commodity. But its policy is still based upon the principle of strengthening the ties between the dependencies and the mother country by commercial as well as military means.

An example of the effects of this policy is seen in the late reports relative to the English colonies. In 1866 their trade including imports and exports amounted to the enormous aggregate of \$1,421,382,665. Of this sum nearly one half or \$679,166,890 was with the United Kingdom. In nearly all the colonies England has more than half the trade. The exceptions are Canada, Australia, and some of the smaller dependencies. Our advantages of geographical position give us

the largest proportion of the Canadian trade. In Australia the total exports and imports amount to \$335,823,080. Of this \$152,565,185 is with England. In India the trade was no less than \$619,065,020, of this more than half—amounting to \$341,551,385 was with Great Britain.

From these figures it is difficult to resist the conclusion that a large proportion of the immense commerce of England is derived from her colonial possessions Whether this commerce could or could not be obtained upon terms of free competition, without the advantages of sovereign jurisdiction it is foreign to our purpose to discuss. It is sufficient for us to call attention to the facts that seem to justify the colonial sys em of Great Britain. That system is now undergoing no change. It is still pushing forward its policy of colonial trade extension. For that purpose no expense or trouble is spared. In India railroads thousands of miles in extent are constructed to convey the cotton and products of the interior to the coast. In a few years the commerce of England and India will be more than doubled. Australian trade is as yet only in its infancy. It has been said that England has made more money out of the United States as an independent power than she could by holding it as a colony. This is doubtfu!. The actions of English statesmen of the present day do not support the statement. That England makes money out of her colonies appears to be indisputable. Whether the colonies make money out of the mother country is another question. which they will be called upon to decide sooner or later.

RICE CROP FOR 1868.

The Charleston Courier gives the following estimate of the yield of the coming rice crop of South Carolina and Georgia:

SOUTH CAROLINA.

Waccamaw, Pee Dee, Black, Sampit, North and South Santee Rivers	Tierces.	
Cooper River. Pon Pon. Ashepoo	1.200	
Combahee	1,000	
Savannah River	18,000	
Total for South Carolina	88,100	3 8,100
GEORGIA.		
Ogeechee	8,500	
Crop of Georgia.	10,800	10,809
Total yield of South Carolina and Georgia		48,900

Which, added to the estimated crop of Louisiana, say from 20,000 to 25,000 tierces, and the probable yield of the crop of North Carolina, say about 5,000 to 7,000 tierces, will give an aggregate yield of about 75,000 to 80,000 tierces as the growth of thi section.

\$8,298,200

DEBT AND VALUATION OF BOSTON.

Messre. Dupee, Beck & Sales, of Boston, give in their Circular the following statement of the debt and valuat on of Boston:

DEBT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON.

The amount of the consolidated debt of the city (funded, unfunded and was	er
loans), on the 1st of May, 1868, was \$14, 146,800 65, and is made up of the followi	ng
items, viz.:	

items, viz.: Funded city debt. \$9,152,639 8 Unfunded '' 133,443 7 Water loans. \$3,867,711 17 Roxbury debt. \$9,1,06 66 Total \$14,146,900 66 Funded. \$14,011,656 97 Unfunded 1385,243 7 Total. \$14,146,900 66 Classification of the consolidated debt: \$14,146,900 66 City debt proper \$3,562,393 16 War debt. \$1,915,500 06 Roxbury debt. \$99,306 06 To also above. \$14,146,900 66 To also above. \$14,146,900 66 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the treatury amounting to 487,070 13
Unfunded "
Unfunded "
Roxbury debt. 9.11, 06 for
Roxbury debt. 9.11, 06 for
Total. \$14,146,900 60 Funded. \$14,011,656 91 Unfunded. \$14,011,656 91 Unfunded. \$14,146,900 60 Classification of the consolidated debt: Water debt. 1,915,000 00 War debt. 1,915,000 00 Roxbury debt. \$1,915,000 00 To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the treatury amounting to 487,070 13
Funded. \$14,011,656 99 Unfunded. \$14,011,656 99 Total. \$14,146,900 60 Classification of the consolidated debt: Water d.bt.— 1 he Let cost of the works to May 1st, 1868 \$7,677.702 50 City d.bt proper. \$3,562,893 10 War debt. \$1,915,500 00 Roxbury debt. \$99,806 00 To alsa above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the trea.ury amounting to 487,070 13
Unfunded
Total
Classification of the consolidated debt: Water debt.—The Let cost of the works to May 1st, 1868 \$7,677.702 55 City debt proper \$5,502.392 10 War debt. \$1,915,500 00 Roxbury debt. \$91,806 00 To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on hand in the treatury amounting to. 487,070 13
Classification of the consolidated debt: Water debt.—The Let cost of the works to May 1st, 1868 \$7,677.702 55 City debt proper \$5,502.392 10 War debt. \$1,915,500 00 Roxbury debt. \$91,806 00 To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on hand in the treatury amounting to. 487,070 13
Water debt.—1 he Let cost of the works to May 1st, 1968 \$7,677.70 E8 City debt proper. \$3,562,893 10 War debt \$1,915,500 00 Roxbury debt. \$191,806 00 To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the treatury amounting to \$47,070 13
City debt proper. 3,562,893 10 War debt. 1,915,500 00 Roxbury debt. 991,806 00 To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the treatury amounting to 487,070 13
To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on hand in the treatury amounting to 427,070 13
To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on hand in the treatury amounting to 427,070 13
To all as above. \$14,146,900 60 To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the treatury amounting to 487,070 13
To all as above. \$14,146,900 & To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 & 59 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the treatury amounting to 487,070 13 \$5,199,369 73
To meet which the e was belonging to the sinking fund. \$4,762,299 59 Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the trea-ury amounting to 487,070 13 \$5,199,369 75
fund
Also bonds and mortgages on haud in the treatury amounting to
amounting to
\$5,199,369 73
Net debt May 1, 1868
• • •
Since the above date, the funded debt has been increased \$1,030,000.
The Ninth Section of the Ordinance of Finance (O. dinances of 1863) requires that "all balances of money remaining in the Treasury at the ind of any nanually ar; all receipts in money
ces of money remaining in the treasury at the and of any nan ial year; all receipts in money
on account o Le sale of real estate of any de-criptio, now b longing or which may here after belong to Lecity; all receipts on account of the principal sum of any bond or note
now owns or which may be not er be owned by the cit and also of the asympletic value
now owne for which may here after be owned by the cit; and also of the annual city t x, in every inture year a sum that shall not be less than three per centum of the amount of the
prin pal of the ty debt (and never less han fifty thousand dollars in each year) shall be
app opriated to the payment or the purchase of the capital of the city debt.
The rincipal and interest of the bove funded debt (including the Roxbury debt.) are pay-
able as follows:
\$583,205 (0, at 4½ per cent, principal and interest in gold.
5,672,500 00, at 5 44 44 44 45 45 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
5.672,500 00. at 5 4 4 currency. 2.000 00. at 54 4 4 currency.
483,115 00, at 5 " currency.
294,00 + 00, at 53/2 **
294,00 : 00, at 53 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

\$10,143,945 80

The average rate of interest is 5 36-100 per cent per annum, and the aggregate annual interest on the funded cebt s \$538,247 51.

The avenual rate of interest on the water loans is 4 93-100 per cent, vis:

On \$1,949.711 11 at 4½ per cent in gold	\$87,737 00 54,100 00 50,160 00
\$8,867,711 11 at 4 93-1(0 per cent	\$191,997 00
VALUATION OF THE CITY OF BOSTON.	
Total real estate, 1878	
Increase	\$18,784,700 \$200,937,900 202,644,700

Total real and personal, 1868	•••••	••••••	·····			499,573,700 471,497,800	
Increase	• • • • • • • • •					\$22,075,900	
Total po ls, 1868	• • • • • • • • • •	••••••			•••••	48,416 41,778	
Increase				_		6,638	
State tax						\$723,140 5,161,689	
Total warrant						\$5,384,829	
State tax	••••••				\$8 95 11 56	81 51	
					\$15 5	\$13.80	
NEW ORLEANS O	 L WOTTON	~~~~~~	 Pat cod	THE T	TEAR.		
						C-11	
The New Orleans Price Cur		_				• .	
pared review of the movements from which it appears that the			•	•	_	_	
Stock on hand 1st September, 1967 Arrived since August 21	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	••••••	659,5	bale 27 49—660,37	ee. 10,200 B	
Made from waste and damaged cott Total receipts for 12 months	ton, sampl	es, etc	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	. 	8,01	9 - 668,89 5	
Total						688,651	
Total ex ports 13 months			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	••••••••	680,54	7 - 681,692	
Stock on hand and on ship-bo	ard		*********		bales	. 1,959	
and							
The seriement in defail' mon	to by mo	nth, is as	under:				
Receipts, 8	ales. Expt	nth, is as 's	under :	Re	eceipts. Sa	es. Exp	
Receipts, 8	ales. Expt	nth, is as 's May	under:	Re	eccipts. Sa 8,800 26, 8,284 12.0	es. Exp \$\frac{1}{2}\$ 50 47,195 000 19.632	
Receipts. 8 8,042 1 October	ales, Expt' 5,970 6,87 5,750 11,58 7,000 43,47	nth, is as 's 's May 34 June 15 July	under:	Re	eccipts. Sa 8,800 26, 8,234 12, 8,817 4,	es. Exp # 500 47,195 000 19,632 00 10,846	
Receipts. 8 September 8,043 1 October 81,566 20 November 90,062 6 December 147,614 12	ales, Expt 5,330 6,87 5,750 11,58 7,000 43,47 1,000 119,30	nth, is as 75 May 34 June 75 July 30 Augus 32 Augus	under:	Re	8,800 26, 8,234 12, 8,817 4, 1,517 8	'es, Exp # 500 47,195 000 19,632 00 10,846 900 2,056	
Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 9 Rec	aler, Expt; 5,230 6,87 5,750 11,56 7,000 43,47 1,000 119,20 1,000 127,88	75 May 34 June 75 July 30 Augus 32 Aud di	t ff. in stock	R	8,800 26, 8,234 12, 8,817 4, 1,517 8,019	Ces. Exp 47,195 000 19,632 00 10,846 900 2,096	
Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 9 Rec	aler, Expt; 5,230 6,87 5,750 11,56 7,000 43,47 1,000 119,20 1,000 127,88	75 May 34 June 75 July 30 Augus 32 Aud di	t ff. in stock	Re	8,800 26, 8,234 12, 8,817 4, 1,517 8,019 854,	Ces. Exp 47,195 500 47,195 000 19,632 00 10,846 900 2,096 	
Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 8 Receipts 9 Rec	aler, Expt 5,330 6,87 5,750 11,58 7,000 43,47 1,000 119,30 1,000 127,88 1,000 19,77 1,000 122,88 2,600 61,40	May	t ff. in stock 1866-7	76	8,800 26, 8,234 12, 8,817 4, 1,517 8,019 . 8,895 657, 60,490 854,	res. Exp 47,136 000 19,632 000 20,846 900 2,096 	
Receipts Receipts Receipts Royal	aler, Expt: 5,950 6,875 5,750 11,55 7,7000 43,47 5,000 119,90 7,000 127,38 7,000 122,38 2,600 61,40 a series 6 1867-68,	May June July July July July July Total, of years :	t	76 DW8 : 1864-65.	30,490 854,5 1859-60.	250 867,816 1859-59.	
Receipts	aler, Expt; 5,250 6,87, 750 11,56 7,000 43,47,000 119,36,000 119,36,700 119,28,2,600 61,46 a series 6 1867-68, 324,555	78 May 75 May 75 May 76 July 76 Augus Aud di 14 Total, 76 years 1866-67, 408,521	t ff. in stock, 1866-7 are as folk 1835-66. 258,878	76 DWS : 1864-65. 21,826	1859-60. 1,848,163	1859-59. 953,528	
Receipts	aler. Expt: 5,250 6,87 5,250 11,56 7,000 43,47 1,000 119,26 7,000 127,88 7,000 129,32 2,600 61,40 a series 6 1867-68 324,555	75 May 75 July 76 July 77 July 78 Aud di 78 Total, 78 Total, 78 1866-67. 78 408,521	t	0W8 : 1864-65. 21,826	1859-60. 1,848,168 107 16.437	1859-59. 953,528	
Receipts	aler. Expt: 5,250 6,87 5,250 11,56 7,000 43,47 1,000 119,26 7,000 127,88 7,000 129,32 2,600 61,40 a series 6 1867-68 324,555	May	t	76 DW8 : 1864-65. 21,826	1859-60. 1,848,168 107 16.437 19,147	1859-59. 953,528	
Receipts	aler Expt; 330 6,8; 750 11,56 7,000 43,37,000 119,38 7,000 127,86 7,000 122,86 2,600 61,46 8,824,555 75 8,059	75 May	t	0 W8 : 1864-65. 21,826	1859-60. 1,848,168 107 16.437 19,147 48,112 203,157	1859-59. 959,528 9,043 14,527 19,593 247,708	
Receipts	ales Expt; 190 6,87; 1750 11,58; 1750 11,58; 1700 127,88; 1,000 119,30; 1,000 127,88; 1,000 122,38; 1,000 132,38; 1,000 132,38; 1,000 61,40; a series 1,867-68, 324,555 3,059	75 May 75 May 75 Jaly 76 Jaly 77 Jaly 78 Aug es 78 Aud di 78 Total, 70 f years 7866-67 408,521 159,298 1,554	t	76 0 W8 : 1864–65. 21,826	1859-60. 1,848,163 107 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,395	1859-59. 953,528 0,043 14,547 12,593 247,703	
Receipts	ales Expt; 190 6,87; 1750 11,58; 1750 11,58; 1700 127,88; 1,000 119,30; 1,000 127,88; 1,000 122,38; 1,000 132,38; 1,000 132,38; 1,000 61,40; a series 1,867-68, 324,555 3,059	75 May 75 May 75 Jaly 76 Jaly 77 Jaly 78 Auda ii 78 Total, 78 Tota	t	0 W8 : 1864-65. 21,826	1859-60. 1,848,168 107 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,395 3,735	1859-59. 953,528 9,043 14,527 12,593 247,708 8,074 1,193 4,477	
Receipts	ales Expt; 190 6,87; 1750 11,58; 1750 11,58; 1700 127,88; 1,000 119,30; 1,000 127,88; 1,000 122,38; 1,000 132,38; 1,000 132,38; 1,000 61,40; a series 1,867-68, 324,555 3,059	75 May 75 May 75 Jaly 76 Jaly 77 Jaly 78 Aug es 78 Aud di 78 Total, 70 f years 7866-67 408,521 159,298 1,554	1866-7 are as folk 1835-66. 258,878	780 W/8 : 1864-65. 21,826 5,953	1859-60. 1,848,163 107 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,395 3,735 4,004 2,949	185 - 59. 959,528 9,043 14,527 12,593 247,708 8,074 1.193 4.477 4.826	
Receipts	ales, Expt. 1,3 90 6,87 1,750 11,68 1,000 48,47 1,000 119,38 1,000 119,38 1,000 127,88 1,000 61,44 a series 1,867-68 324,555 75 3,059 147,993 27	18 May 15 May 15 Jaly 15 Jaly 1868-61. 1866-67. 408,321 159,286 1,554	t	780W8: 1864-65. 21,826	1,859-60. 1,818,163 107 16,437 19,147 43,112 203,157 2,395 3,735 4,104 2,949 5,205 60,999	1859-59. 953,528 953,528 0,043 14,527 12,593 247,708 8,074 1.1193 4,477 4,820 9,945 64,850	
Receipts	aler, Expt., 390 6.87, 370 11,65, 200 43,47, 1,750 11,60 11,93 11,000 11,97,82,000 61,44 a series 1867-68, 324,555 3,059 147,003 27	15 May 15 May 15 Jaly 16 Jaly 17 Jaly 18 Aud di 18 Total, 18 1866-67. 408,521 159,298 1,554 6,735	ff. in stock. 1866-7 are as folk. 1835-66. 263,578 188,744 766	76 OWB : 1864-65. 21,326	3,0490 854,3 1859-60, 1,848,163 107 16,437 19,147 43,112 203,157 2,395 3,735 4,104 2,949 6,205 60,199 16 862	1859-59. 959,528 9,043 14,527 19,593 247,708 8,074 1,1193 4,477 4,820 9,945 64,850 17,182	
Receipts	aler, Expt., 390 6.87, 370 11,65, 200 43,47, 1,750 11,60 11,93 11,000 11,97,82,000 61,44 a series 1867-68, 324,555 3,059 147,003 27	18 May 15 May 15 Jaly 10 August 11 Total. 11 Total. 12 1866-67. 408,521 159,286 1,554	1866-7 are as folk 1835-66. 258,878	70 W8 : 1864-65. 21,326	3,925 951, 1859-60, 1,848,163 107 16,437 19,147 48,112 203,157 2,395 4,104 2,949 6,205 60,999 16,863 9,079 18,552	1859-59. 959,528 9,043 14,527 12,593 247,703 8,074 1,193 4,477 4,826 9,945 64,850 17,132 9,440	
Receipts	aler, Expt., 390 6.87, 370 11,65, 200 43,47, 1,750 11,60 11,93 11,000 11,97,82,000 61,44 a series 1867-68, 324,555 3,059 147,003 27	75 May 75 Jaly 76 Jaly 77 Jaly 78 Auda ii 78 Total, 78 Total	t	5,953 5,964	3,925 951, 1859-60, 1,848,163 107 16,437 19,147 48,112 203,157 2,395 4,104 2,949 6,205 60,999 16,863 9,079 18,552	1854-59. 959,528 959,528 9,043 14,527 12,598 247,708 8,074 1.1193 4.477 4,820 9,945 64,850 17,132 9,440 12,334	
Receipts. 8 September 8,043 8 October 81,566 9 November 90,082 6 November 107,875 12 Febr. ary 122,598 13 April 22,588 13 April 41,773 55 The details of the exports for Whither exported. Liverpool. biles. Lonus B. Glasgow, Gr'n'k, &c. Cowes, Falm'th, &c. Queen t'n, Cork, &c. Havrs. Bordeaux Marseil es Manix, Cette, and Rouen Amsterdam Rotterdam & Ghent Remen. Antwerp, &c. Hambu g. Gotte. b'g & Stockholm Spain, Ghraltar, &c. Mexico, &	aler, Expt; 3,30 6,87 3,750 11,68 7,000 143,47 1,000 119,70 1,000 119,78 1,000 129,88 1,000 129,	15 May 15 May 15 Jaly 16 Jaly 17 Jaly 18 August 18 Total, 18 Total, 18 Jaly 18	1866-7 are as folk 1835-66. 268,878 188,744 766 3,721	5,953	1,859-60. 1,849, 854, 1659-60. 1,848, 163 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,395 4,104 2,949 2,949 2,949 15,862 60,199 15,562 60,177 17,725 61,323	1859-59. 959,528 9,043 14,527 19,593 247,708 8,074 14,119 4,477 4,820 9,945 64,850 17,132 9,440 12,334 75,889 16,578	
Receipts. 8 September 8,043 1 October 81,566 2 November 90,083 6 November 90,083 6 November 147,614 12 January 109,275 12 Febr ary 122,598 13 April 41,773 55 The details of the exports for Whither exported. Liverpool biles. Longon Grink, &c. Queen t'n, Cork, &c. Havro. Rangow, Grink, &c. Cowes, Falm'th, &c. Queen t'n, Cork, &c. Havro. Rants, Cette, and Rouen Amsterdam Exordeaux Marseil es Manis, Cette, and Rouen Amsterdam & Ghent Exemen Antwerp, &c. Hambu g Gotte. b'g & Stockholm Spain, Gibraitar, &c. Mexico. &c. Genos, Trieste, &c.	aler, Expt; 390 6.87, 376 11,65 (1,001 14,001 11,00	15, 143	t. 1866-7	5,963 5,963 6,963	1859-60. 1,349, 854, 1859-60. 1,349, 163 16,437 19,147 43,112 203,157 2,395 4,104 2,949 5,059 15,362 6,079 13,522 50,317 17,725 51,323 2,4,09	1859-59. 959,528 959,528 9,043 14,527 19,599 247,703 8,074 1,193 4,477 4,820 9,945 64,850 17,132 9,440 12,334 75,899 16,578 54,446 61,948	
Receipts. 8 September 8,043 t October 81,566 2 November 90,083 6 November 90,083 6 December 147,614 12 January 10%,375 12 Febr. ary 192,598 12 April 41,773 5 The details of the exports for Whither exported. Liverpool biles. Lonu n Glasgow, Gr'n'k, &c. Cowes, Falm'th, &c. Queen t'n, Cork,&c. Havre. Bordeaux Marseil es Nants, Cette, and Rouen Amsterdam Rotterdam & Ghent Bremen Antwerp, &c. Hambu'g Gotte. b'g & Stockholm Spain, Grbraltar,&c. Mexico, &c Genos, Trieste, &c. Et, Fetersburg, &c. New York	aler, Expt, 390 6,87,376 11,817 6,828,4555 11,817 7,725 11,817 7,725 84,735 11,817 7,725 84,735 11,817 7,725 84,735 11,817 7,725 84,735 11,735	18 May 15 May 15 July 16 July 17 July 18 August 18 Total, 18 Total, 18 Total, 19 July 18 J	t	50 W8 : 1864-65. 21,828	1,859-60. 1,849, 854, 1659-60. 1,848, 163 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,959 5,205 60,999 15,862,964 17,725 561,322 24,0.9	1859-59. 959,528 9,043 14,527 19,593 247,708 8,074 1,118 4,477 4,826 9,945 66,850 17,132 9,440 12,334 12,334 15,899 16,578 51,446 61,918 51,856	
Receipts. 8 September 8,043 t October 81,566 2 November 90,082 6 November 90,082 6 November 104.761 4 January 104.875 1: Febr ary 192,598 1: Febr ary 192,598 1: April 41,773 5: The details of the exports for Whither exported. Liverpool biles. Lone n Glasgow, Gr'n'k, &c. Queen t'n, Cork, &c. Havre. Rordeaux Marseil es Nants, Cette, and Rouen Amsterdam Rotterdam & Ghent. Remen. Antwerp, &c. Hambu g Gotte. b'g & Stockholm Spain, G-braltar, &c. Mexico, &c. Genoa, Trieste, &c. St. Petersburg, &c. New York Boston Providence, R. I	alee, Expt, 390 6,87,390 6,87,376 11,600 119,27,600 129,28,4,600 61,44 a. series 1867-68, 324,555 27,283 3,659 147,093 27,27,293 38,673 11,981 5,677 7,795 54,779 81,651 1,061 1,065	15 May 15 May 15 Jaly 16 Jaly 17 Jaly 18 Aud et al. 18 Total, 18 Total, 18 Correct 408,521 15,534 1,554 24,803 4,833 4	1866-7 are as folk 1835-66. 258,878 183,744 766 3,721 16,454 688 1,701 154,697 81,457 9,083	50 W8 : 1864-65. 21,828	1,859-60. 1,849, 854, 1659-60. 1,848, 163 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,959 5,205 60,999 15,862,964 17,725 561,322 24,0.9	1859-59. 959,528 9,043 14,527 19,593 247,708 8,074 1,118 4,477 4,826 9,945 66,850 17,132 9,440 12,334 12,334 15,899 16,578 51,446 61,918 51,856	
Receipts. 8 September 8,043 t October 81,566 2 November 90,082 6 November 90,082 6 November 104.566 2 November 102.578 12 Sannary 102.578 12 Sanri 102.	alee, Expt., 330 6,873, 370 11,681 1807-8,3824,555 4,779 31,651 1,661 1,	18 May 15 May 15 Jaly 16 Jaly 17 Jaly 18 August 1886-67. 408,521 159,288 1,554 24,808 4,335 3,212 15,432 145,046 84,244 9,711 8,249	1866-7 are as folka 1835-66. 268,878 188,744 766 3,721 16,454 688 286 1,701 154,697 81,457 9,083 5,005	5,963 5,963 6,765	1,859-60. 1,848,163 16,437 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,355 4,104 2,949 5,205 60,999 15,505 61,322 24,0.9 61,337 11,148 5,717	1854-59. 953,528 953,528 14,527 12,598 247,708 8,074 1,193 4,477 4,820 9,945 68,850 17,132 9,440 12,334 16,578 51,496 61,948 61,948 61,948 61,948 61,586 61,573	
Receipts. 8 September 8,043 t October 81,566 2 November 90,082 6 November 90,082 6 November 104.761 4 January 104.875 1: Febr ary 192,598 1: Febr ary 192,598 1: April 41,773 5: The details of the exports for Whither exported. Liverpool biles. Lone n Glasgow, Gr'n'k, &c. Queen t'n, Cork, &c. Havre. Rordeaux Marseil es Nants, Cette, and Rouen Amsterdam Rotterdam & Ghent. Remen. Antwerp, &c. Hambu g Gotte. b'g & Stockholm Spain, G-braltar, &c. Mexico, &c. Genoa, Trieste, &c. St. Petersburg, &c. New York Boston Providence, R. I	alee, Expt., 330 6,873, 370 11,681 1807-8,3824,555 4,779 31,651 1,661 1,	15 May 15 May 15 Jaly 16 Jaly 17 Jaly 18 Aud et al. 18 Total, 18 Total, 18 Correct 408,521 15,534 1,554 24,803 4,833 4	1866-7 are as folk 1835-66. 258,878 183,744 766 3,721 16,454 688 1,701 154,697 81,457 9,083	50 W8 : 1864-65. 21,828	1,859-60. 1,849, 854, 1659-60. 1,848, 163 16,437 19,147 48,113 203,157 2,959 5,205 60,999 15,862,964 17,725 561,322 24,0.9	1859-59. 953,528 953,528 953,528 14,527 12,598 247,708 8,074 1.193 4,477 4,820 9,945 64,850 17,152 9,440 12,334 75,449 16,573 54,466 61,918 6,573 54,466 61,918 61,918 61,918 61,918 61,918 61,918 61,918 61,918 61,918 61,117 61,573	

RECAPITULATION.

Great Britain	147,120 50,285 50,488	403,521 160,852 22,217 83,350 248,376	358,878 184,510 5,422 17,378 259,355	21.826 5,952 402 167 164,504	1,496,966 818,291 188,125 129,270 908,684	994,696 256,447 182,475 146,963 196,590
Total	681,692	867,316	768,548	192,851	2,914,996	1,777,171

RECEIPTS OF COTTON EACH WEEK FOR TWO YEARS AT SOUTHERN PORTS.

The course of receipts at the different ports have been as follows for each week of the last two years:

TT 1-					_					
Week	_N. Or	leans.	Moi)11e.—	-SAVA	n'h.—	-Char	"t'n.¬		188.
ending	1867-8.	1866-7.							'67-8.	66-7.
bept. 7	1,085	1,547	988	640	485	1,440	889	480	126	145
" 14	818	2,018	1,392	479	1,660	494	578	1,089	214	46
41		2,648	2.145	773	2,288	1.237	848	950	106	120
		4,163	4,618	1,607	4,9 0	1,479	1.111	1,481	55	179
	8,262	7,566	4,864	8,096	7,187	2 847	2,908	2,096	.78	690
*************	4,428	12,662	4,623	2,847	9,019	5,989	5,090	2,663	115	759
10	6,504	16,56)	6,418	7,566	10,417	4,991	6,181	2,985	104	1,419
40	7,878	21,500	6,689	8,680	12,405	8,858	5,869	5,895	766	1,668 2,119
	9,884	22,019	7,334	7,898	14,955	8,169	8,598	4,667	1,141 769	4,419
0	11 1.0	19,639	11,226	9,100 10,198	19,258		11,634	5,086		4,064
" 15 " 22	31,170	24,963 27,708	10,638 15,188	10,198	8,112 21,081	7.047	11,789 9,896	6,883 5,888	1,149	8 572
" 29		28,886	16,650	9,640	19,678		7,859	4,069	1,994	5,405
Dec. 6		25,299	18,721	10,447	14,171	6,088 6,285	6,796	5,221	2,269	4,463
18	• 4 97Q	81.979	20.888	12,719	18,445	5,159	9,701	5,397	2.569	5,043
** 20		87,764	23,860	18,899	22,072		9,122	6,268	2,692	4.546
" 27	98 491	29,461	28,101	14,746	20,031	9,114	9,985	6,028	8,344	6,189
Jan. 8	31,160	24,844	16,587	6,905	24,278		9,882		2,260	8.894
" 10		25,019	17,058	9.508	17.081	6,609	6,509	3,961	2,481	6.151
" 17	90 988	29,664	15,575	8,303		11,154	7.808	6,288	2,930	4,182
" 24	20.858	80,755	15,922	12,097		10,466	9,789	5,868	2,839	4,789
" 81		41,656	16,868	6,568	28,200		10,910	6,899	2,217	6, 67
Feb. 7		26,030	12,098	10,072	18,602		11,716	4,647	8,295	6.467
• 14	38 878	19,488	12,460	6,581	21,886	6,743	8,729	4,801	4 100	6.473
" 21	95 497	28,786	12,774	6,900	21,164		10,828	5,231	2,911	6.248
_ " 28	23 271	20,576	15,420	5.037	22,684			2.895	8,671	7,772
Mar. 6	98 104	17,312	8,954	8,187	14,208		9,011	4.104	3.018	5,274
" 18	22,809	18,859	5,112	3,857	11,550	4,780	5,854	2,505	4,699	7,375
" 20		14.587	8,663	8,176	11.804	4,523	5,848	2,377	4.441	5,102
. 27	18,275	10.874	2,927	2,611	7,481	4,201	8,690	2,964	2.284	4.733
April 8	11.667	9,751	4,069	2,741	2,848	2,248	5,262	8,525	3,633	8,927
" 10	10.~78	8,405	8,838	1,925	9,967	8,737	5,494	2,575	8,194	8,389
" 17	9,501	9,141	8,293	2,470	5,626	2,628	8,606	2,712	8,551	8,073
24	6,882	6,041	2,804	1,255	651	2,478	1,210	1,459	4,134	8.437
May 1	8,844	5,127	2,757	1,848	1,519	2,205	2,275	1,549	5,140	1,950
·· 8	2,985	4,592	996	1,927	2,971	3,042	1.338	1,433	4,021	1,891
" 15	. 2,224	4,800	429	1,557	2,278	1,825	921	1,582	3,723	1,888
" 23	1,052	4,256	630	1,264	2,500	8.010	810	2,495	1,737	2,110
_ " 29	. 972	8,458	220	937	1,484	1,646	1,834	1,885	849	2,098
J. no 5	. 1,027	4,038	2.0	1,117	865	8,139	830	1,753	636	1,656
12	. 569	2,038	121	715	597	2,418	264	1,689	611	1,258
4 19	. 873	2,895	76	549	1,500	1,828	860	. 748	373	1,121
_ '' 26		2,208	108	418	813	2,407	27)	1,145	263	1,184
July 8	. 259	2,156	58	445	1,160	1,234	278	1,787	149	1,171
10	. 277	1,148	23	291	980	1,155	170	957	199	966
Al.z.r	. 479	870	20	889	1,400	:,851	290	760	104	586
#1	. 361	1,201	75	841	880	1,378	190	1,881	158	598
01	. 123	1,039	86	259	407	1,189	200	. 89	60	968
Ang. 7	. 184	1,116	26	848	15	1,928	20	1,50 &	60	503
43		1,008	. 9	444	100	1,279	574	1,080	55	445
21	. 149	887	43	207	853	1,153	170	1,440	117	228
" 31	. 817	1,025	270	230	811	789	70	1,605	237	255

DEBT OF MISSOURI.

We have received the following letter from the Treasurer of Missouri in regard to the debt of that State:

CITY OF JEFFERSON, Aug. 28, 1868.
WM. B. Dana & Co., Publishers, &c., New York;

Gentlemen-Your circular I tter of the 24th instant is at hand. Herewith I hand you a state nent of our State bonds as requested.

1868] DEBT OF	TENNESSEE. 311							
Old debt proper-All bonds exchanged for a	new-maturing in 1889 and 1883—6 per							
cent								
Total								
Actual bonded debt								
Very	respectfully,							
	Wи. Візнор, State Treasurer.							
	······································							
UNION PAC	IFIC RAILROAD.							
The following are the earnings and	expenses of the Union Pacific Railroad for							
the year ending June 30, 1868:								
TARNINGS \$883,885 From freight \$,223,971 From express 30,454 From mile 66,800 From miscellaneous 26,579 5	EXPENSES For conducting transportation \$517.802 86 For motive power 977.010 62 977.0							
Total	73 Total							
Total (on average of 472 miles)	\$4,246,040 73							
The amount of First Mortgage Bonds the Company can issue on this 472 rolles is								
\$7,520,000.								
Gold interest for one year, at the rate of 6 per cent, is. \$471,260 Add 40 per cent premium for gold 180,480								
Total								
We will now add to the account the interest on the United States second mort- gage bonds, and it will stand as follows:								
	\$1,561,288 59							
Interest on first m rigage bonds reduced to c Interest on second " " "	\$1,561,238 59 surrency. \$631,680							
Surplus, after paying all interests	\$478,403 59							
It is stated by the officers of the Board that the earnings for the first half of the financial year were so large that the Company reduce i their charges twenty-five per cent.								
DEBT OF TENNESSEE.								
The following is the statement, recently reported to the legislature of Tennessee, of the boaded debt of that State:								
BONDED DEET OF THE STATE.								
C	<u> </u>							

BONDED DEBT OF THE STATE,	
State debt proper to Jan. 1, 1866. Interest on same funded 10 Jan. 1, 1868.	. ,
Total. \$21,465,00' 00 Interest Funded to Jan. 1, 1866. \$2,732,343 10 State bonds loaned railroads since Jan. 1, 1861. 4,483,000 00	
	\$29,685,848 10

	,	[
State bonds loaned to turnpike co.'s to Jan 1, '61	490,000 00 102,060 00	599,080 00
State bonds loaned to Agricultural Bureau to Jan. 1, 1861	30,000 00 7,200 00	87,900 00
Total	•••••••	\$24,842,772 76 71,006 00
Aggregate state debt		\$34,271,762 76
BONDS ENDORSED BY THE STATE.		• • •
Nashville and Chattanooga Rast Tennessee and Virginia East Tennessee and G. orgia Memphis and Little Rock		200,000
TotalOf this amount there has been cancelled by sinking fund	••••••••••	\$3,815,000 148,000
Balance	·- ·····	\$2,172,000

ASSISTANT TREASURER'S STATEMENT FOR SEPTEMBER.

The following is the official statement of the business of the office of the Assistant Treasurer of the United States, in New York, for the month of September, 1868:

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS.			
Balance, August 81, 1869		287,555,452 17	Z
Receipts during the month:		V-1,111,-11	-
On account of customs	\$13,279,450 03	}	
ido Gold notes	1,963,300 00		
do Internal revenue	177 858 87	,	
do Three per cent. Certificates	5,030,000 00		
do Post-office Department	807.125 53		
do Transfers	10,056,000 00		
do Patent fees	8,870 80		
ado Miscellaneous	6,671,968 88		
do Disbursing accounts	10,85 \ 499 91		
do Assay office	74,728 97		
		- 54,298,708 69	a
Zdo Interest accounts	0,010,410 %	02,680,100 08	,
Total		0141 OF4 100 OF	
Total	•••••••	\$141'99a'100 90	,
Payments during the month:	A00 000 450 00	1	
Treasury drafts	\$80,808,410 89		
Post-office drafts	219,440 58		
Disbursing accounts	18,282,722 82		
Assay-Office	197,459 88		
Interest accounts, viz.:			
In coin	8,833,188 75		
In currency	17,908 00-	- 47,854,170 75	•
Relance		\$94,499,990 11	
Balance	279,289,118 95	40-4-00,000 22	
Balance to Cr. disbursing accounts	12,684,378 69		
Balance to Cr. Assay office	2,205,969 57		
Balance to Cr. Interest accounts			
Receip's for Customs in the month of Sept., 1868		\$18,979,450 09	
Receipts for Customs in the month of Sept., 1867	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	11,967,894 64	
receibts for offerome in me mount of pehet root	•••••	11,501,002 01	•
Increase for Sept., 1863		\$1,811,625 49	i
The men we maked vancours	•••••	A-lor 1/040 An	

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Abstract statement, as appears from the books and Treasurer's returns in the Treasury Department, on the 1st of September and 1st of October, 1868:

		DEBT	BEARING COIN	INTEREST.		
			September 1.		Increase.	Decrease.
5	per cont	. bonds	. \$221,588,400 00	\$221,588,400 00	\$	8
•	- 44	1881	283,677,800 00	283,677,800 00		
6	66	(5-20's)	1,591,226,050 00	1,591,8:8,600 00	8,669 550 00	••••
	Total		2,096,491,750 00	2,100,154,800 00	8,662,550 00	

DEST BE	ARING CURREN	CY INTEREST.		
6 per ct. (RR) bonds	\$35,814,000 00		3 \$4,820,000 00	\$
8-y'ars com. int. n'tes	10,595,410 00	5,251,990 00		5,848,480 00
8 p. cent. certificates Navy Pen. F'd 8 p.c	62,205,000 00	65 230,000 00		•••••
Mavy Pen. F d o p.c	18,000,000 00	18,0(0,000 00		
Total	191,114,410 00	128,115,980 00	\$2,001.520 00	•••••
MATURED DEB	T NOT PRESENT	ED FOR PATHE		
7-30 n. due Aug. 1, '67, J'e & J'y 15, '63	\$4,650,000 00	\$8,587,000 00	\$	1,113,000 00
6 p. c. comp. int. n'es	5,088,490 00	6,8:9,070 00	1,288,580 00	•••
B'ds of Texas ind'ty Treasury notes (old)	956,0.0 00 154,111 64	956,000 00 154,111 64		*******
B'ds of Apr. 15, 1842, Jan 28, 1847 &	202,122 02	202,122 01	•••••	*******
Mar 81, 1848	1,259,200 00	967,650 00		290,550 00
Treas. n s of Ma. 8,68	555,499 00	44 ,4 12 00	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	110,000 00
Temporary loan	744,920 00 18,000 00	744,920 00 18,000 00		******
Cerum. Or indept ess	10,000 00	10,000 00	•••••	
Total	12,665,218 64	12,440,243 6	\$	\$294,970 00
DEBT	BEARING NO I	STEREST.		
United States notes		\$856,021,078 00		\$
Fractional currency	81, 02,218 87	82,988,614 17	1,181,895 80	
Gold certi. of deposit	25,161,620 00	25,286,400 00	••••••	4,925,220 00
Total	412,984,911 87	409,191,087 17		8,798,821 10
	RECAPITULATI	ON.		
				8
Bearing coin interest	2,0%,491,750 00	2,100,154,*00 00	8,662,550 00	•••••
Bearing cur'y interest		128,115,980 00 12,4 0,243 64		224,970 00
Bearing no interest!	412,984,911 87	409,191,087 17		8,793,824 20
Ammonato	9 649 986 995 01	9 844 001 KBD 91	1 04k 07K 90	970,594 68
AggregateCoin & cur. in Treas	107,641,971 98	110,257,841 86	2,615,869 88	\$10,091 00
Debt less coin and cur	2,585,614,318 03	2,584,648,718 98		970,594 08
The following statement show				
the dates in the foregoing table:	b the amount	or cond and	Julicuty sch	arawiy as
_ _	CURRENCY IN	THEATTH		
			64 990 045 90	•
Coin	15,071,070 77	18,865,994 76	© 1,020,313 03	1,705,076 01
Total coin & curre'y	107,641,971 8	110,967,841 86	2,615,869 89	
The annual interest payable	on the debt.	as existing b	September 1	1868 and
October 1, exclusive of interest				
follows:	OH THE COM	podud interes	i notaj, coi	mpares as
=	EST PAYABLE	ON PUBLIC DES	ST.	
	September 1.		Increase.	Decrease.
Coin-5 per cents	\$11,079,420 00	\$11.079,420 00	8	\$
" 6 " 1881	17,020,688 00	17,020,648 00	010 770 00	••••
" 6 " (5-20°в)	95,478,563 00	95,693,816 00	219,758 00	
Total com interest	\$128,578,621 00 t	128,793,874 00	\$219,759 00	\$
Unrency—6 per cents	\$2, !18,840 00	\$2,878,040 00	259,200 00	******
" 8 "	2,256,150 00	2,846,900 00	90,750 00	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Total currency inter't	\$4,874,980 00	\$4,794,940 00	\$849,950 00	8

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

The Course of Trada—Loans and Discounts—Rates of Loans and Discounts—The Stock Market—Unit d Stat a Securities—Bonds sold at the New York Exchange Board—Prices of Government Se urities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at London—Miscillaneous Securities at New York—Stock Exchange—General Movement of Coin and Bollion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

The course of trade and finances during September, though not in some respects what has been expected, yet affords some cause for gratulation. The merchandise murket; have exhibited a very fair degree of activity. These has been the hesitation among buyers which cannot but show itself so long as the abnormal

condition of values exists, and in some branches of trade holders have had to meet this feeling by a partial concession in prices; but upon the whole, the month's business has been satisfactory. The West has taken a very large amount of goods, and the South has been more fully represented than at any period since 1861. It may perhaps be safely assumed that domestic manufacturers have realized very fair profits upon their products recently marketed. The trade in foreign goods however, has been somewhat irregular as to its results. There appears to have been an over supply of some classes of dry goods, owing to heavy consignments from Europe; and, at the auction sales, large lines of fabrics have realised but little over the gold cost, leaving a heavy loss to the consignors. The crop movement has varied somewhat from that of the same month of last year. While the receipts of grain at the lake ports have been almost unprecedented, the quantity sent Fast has been much less than in September of 1867, the grain merchants here being cautious at making heavy purchases at the late current prices. Western holders, however, somewhat moderated their views; and as the New York Central and Erie railroads have much reduced their freights during the month it is to be expected that the next few weeks there will be a material gain in the Eastward movement of produce.

This delay in the forwarding of grain to the seaboard has had a somewhat direct bearing upon the course of the money market. The lightness of the supply of grain bills made at New York and Buffalo has tended to keep down the loans of the banks, the result being that, for the greater part of the month, demand loans have ranged at 3@5 per cent, a much easier condition of things than prevailed in September of 1867. Discounts of prime paper have been generally done at 6½@7 per cent. Wall street firms engaged largely in stock operations, as a precaution against a repetition of the stringency experienced a year agr, have borrowed large amounts on stock and bond, during the month, at 6@7 per cent, for from 60 to 90 days, and these loans having materially reduced the demand for call loans, have partially contributed to the ease in the rates upon demand transactions. At the date of the last bank statement, the banks were, in some respects, in an easier position than at the corresponding period of last year, as will appear from the following comparison:

	pt. 26, 1868.	Sept. 28, 1867.
Loans and discounts	\$271,200,000	\$251,900,000
Specie	12,600,000	9,500,000
Circulation	84,000.0 0	81,100,000
µеровітв		181,4/0,000
Legal tenders		55,900,000

At the close of the month, however, there was a sudden increase in the demand for money, apparently due, to some extent, to artificial efforts to tighten the market, under which the rate on call loans advanced on the 30th to 7 per cent, and in exceptional cases even 7 per cent in gold.

The following comparison shows the totals of the statements of the New York banks at the close of each week in September and at the close of September, 1867:

	Bept b.	Sept. 12.	bent 19.	5ept. 20. i	Bept. xo, 'o'
Loans and discounts	\$271,530,696	\$272,055,690	\$271.2:2,096	\$271,273,544	\$251,91,751
Sp.cie	16,815,771	16,150,942	14,665,742	12,603,483	9,496,163
Circulation	84,170 419	84, 139, 926	84,044,693	84,050,771	34,147,269
Depos ts	2 7,854,888	205,489,070	204,824,583	202,068,334	181,439,410
Legal Tenders	65,988,067	68,429,038	68,772,700	68,587,576	55,991, 526

Tre following are the rates of Loans and Discounts for the month of September:

RATES OF LOANS AND DISCOUNTS.

	Sept. 4.	Sept. 11.	Sept. 13.	August 28.
Call loans	8 @ 4	8 @ 5	8 @ 5	4 @ 5
Loans on Bonds and Mortgage	-@ 7	−@ 7	−@ 7	—ĕ 7
A 1, endorsed bills, 2 mos	6 @	6 @—	6 @	6 @—
Good endorsed bills, 8 & 4 mos	−@ 7	−@ 7	−@ 7	−@ 7
" single names	7 @ 71	7 @ 71	7 @ 71	7 @ 71
Lower grades	8 @10	8 @10 °	8 @10 T	8 @10 ¯

The stock market has been on the whole active. The increasing earnings of the roads have encouraged outside operators to buy, and a considerable amount of stocks has probably passed from the hands of the cliques into the hands of temporary operators. The prevailing tendency of speculation has been toward higher prices and to secure this the cliques appear to have borrowed freely on 2 to 3 months' time. The transactions for the month have been slight y in excess of the same month of 1867, as will appear from the following statement of sales at both boards:

Classes. Bank shares	1867. 1.819	1868. 2.188	Increase. 869	
Railroad "	1,446,068	1,461,464 8,578	15,401	878
Mining "	4,151 10,564	88,817	27,758	••••
Telegraph "	11,659 76,759	18,700 19,615	2,041	57,144
Expr'ss&c"	40,646 45,46 8	81,498 110,074	40,852 64,606	• • • • •
Total—September 1		1,780,629 14,544,018	98,500	1,806,789

United States securities have been quiet, so far as respects the operations of investors. There has, however, been much speculative activity, growing out of an expectation that the market would react from the late unusual y high quotations. Large "short" sales have been made under this idea; but the supply of bonds being in the hands of one or two leading firms the seliers have been at the mercy of holders, and prices have been maintained until ear the close of the month, when there was a decline of \$\frac{1}{4}\$ to \$1\frac{1}{4}\$ per cent. The following are the comparative prices of bon's on Sept. 30, 1868, and Sept. 30, 1867;

					Bept. 80.	Sept. 30
					1868	≥867.
United States Si	xes 1881 c	oupon			11814	110%
United States V	ve-twent	les 1862 c	מחרים	18	1124	1181
		1864	- A	*** *******************		109
44	46	1863	**		1094	16934
**	**	1863	64	(new)	10772	1074
66	• 6	1867	66	(404)		107%

The transactions in bonds during the month have largely exceeded those for the corresponding period of 1867, as will be seen from the following statement:

BONDS SOLD AT THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes. U.S. bonds		1868. \$23 ,892,150	Inc. \$6,552,150	Dec.
U. S. notes St'e & city b'ds Company b'ds	2,297,800	10,058,000 1,658,300	7,760 200 817,800	1,692,750
Total—September	\$22,171,550 1:2.041,630	\$85,608,450 158,865,440	\$18,436,900 6,830,810	•••••

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of September as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of	-6'e, 1	881		-6's, (5	-20 yrs.) Coup	on	5'e	,10 -40
	Coup.	Reg.	1862.	1864.	1865.		1867. 18	368. yrs.	
1		118%	1131	109%	1111%	108	107%	1081	1051
2	1141	114	114	1093	111%	108%	103%		105%
8		113%	113%	109%	111%	108%	10s 🔏	108%	105%
4	114	••••	1133	10.7%	111%	108%	108%	108%	105
5	••••		113%		1111	108%	108%	10 %	105%
7	114		118%	109X	1111	109	109	101%	105
8			118%	109%	111%	108%	168%	108%	105
9	118%	••••	1133	1091	111	1033	1081	105%	104%
10			118%		110%	108%	108%	2083≰	105
11	11434	118%	118%	109%	1111	109	109		103
19	114%		110X	109%		109%	109	109⅓	105
14	114		1134	109%	1111	109%	108%	109	105
15	*****		1:3%	109%	111	109	109	109%	105
16	114	• • • • •	118%	109%		109	109		104%
17	114		113%		111	108%	104	100	104%
18	••••		114%	110	111%	109	109	109%	
19	*****	1133	114	210	111%	109	109%	109%	104%
21	114%	118)	114%	110%	1111%	109 🗸	10 🔏	109%	103
23	11436		115%	110%	1111	109%	109 🔏	ور 109	104%
28		• • • • •	115	110%	1111%	109	109	:::::	104%
94	114	••••	114%	109%	110%	108%	103%	1091	• • • • •
25			114	1∪91∕	110%	108%	108%	1091	
26	114	••••	114	*****	110%	108%	105%	109%	• • • • •
28	114		113%	109%	• • • • •	108%	108%	1093	:::
29	118%	• • • • •	118	109%	109%	103%	1.8	108%	104%
8)	112%		112%	109%	109%	107%	108	• • • • •	
-									
First		113%	1187	109%	111%	108	107%	1081	1051
Lowest	1127	113%	112%	101%	109	107%	107%	1081	10436
Highest	11436	114	115%	110	111%	109%	1.91	109%	105%
Range	2	%	2.4	%	1%	11/	1%	1%	*
Last	1127	118%	112%	109%	109%	107%	108	108%	1043

The closing prices of Five-Twenties at Frankfort in each week ending with Thursday, were as follows:

Sept 3. Fept. 10. Sept. 17. Sept. 24. Month. 75%@75% 75% 75% 75% 75%@75%

The closing prices of Consols for money and certain American, securities (viz U. S. 6's 5-20's 1862, Illinois Central and Erie shares) at London, on each day of the month of September are shown in the following statement:

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	for		Ili.C. sh's.		Date.	Cons for mon.	U.S.	secur Ill.C. sh's.	Erie
Tuesd y 1 Wedn'y 2 Thursday 8 Friday 4 Sat'day 5 Monday 7 Tu'sday 8 Wednesday 9 Thursday 10 Friday 11 Saturday 12 Monday 12 Monday 14	94 94% 94 94 94 94 94 94	71% 72 72 71% 72 (Holi 72	91% 91% 91% 91 day.) 91 91% 91 90% day.) 90%	30% 31% 31 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%	Tuosday 22 Wednesday 93 Thursday 24 Priday 25 Saturday 26 Monday 28 Tuesday 29 Wednesday 30 Lowest Highest Range	91% 91% 91% 94% 94% 94%	72% 73% 73 73 73 72% 73% 73% 73% 71% 73% 13%	91% 90% 93 93 93% 94 95% 95% 95% 5	31 美元 32 专元 32 专元
Tuesday 15 Wedney 16 Thurs 17 Friday 18 Saturday 19 Monday 21	94% 94% 94% 94%		90½ 91 90¾ 91 90¾ 90¾	30% 30% 30% 31 30% 30%		9636	70% 73% 8% 78%	171	20% 50% 31%

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of August and September, 1868:

	,	. 4	-4			G4		
	Open.	—Augu High.		Clos.	Open.	-Sopten High.	aber.— Low.	Clos.
Railroad Stocks—						6-	,	0.02,
Alton & Terre Hautdo do pref	• • • • • • •	••••	••••	••••	48	46%	48	48
do do pref Boston, Hartf rd & Erie	1936	24	18)	2134	64 2234	66 X 23	6336 2236	68¥ 23
Chicago & Alton	1981	144	186	148	149	15836	141	150
do do pref Chicago, Burl. & Quincy do & Gt Esstern	. 1883	145 178	13814 170	145 171	144	158%	144	151
do & Gt Eastern	40	40	40	40	40	40	38	40
uo & Norinwest'ii	8214	83 14	80	8314	84	90% 91%	84	86
do do orefdo & Rock Island	11014	88% 112%	79% 97%	8814 10114	84 1021⁄4	104%	83% 100%	88 % 109 %
Cleve., Col., Cin & Ind	. 88	88	8i ~	82	813	82	7936	793
do Painesv. & Ashtado & Pittsburg	100	100	9736	98	981	101	963≰	₽63€
do & Pittsburgdo & Toledo	. 89½ . 102¾	89⅓ 10≀ %	85 98%	86% 101%	87 108	89 1031	81% 100%	84% 102
Del. Lack & Western	. 118	120	118	119	114%	122	1181	1:2
Dabuque & Sioux citydo to pref	72%	$n_{\mathcal{H}}$	72%	7236	80% 80%	101 97	80¾ 92	101 98
.SEP10	88%/	68%	4536	48	47%	5236	46	46%
do pref	. 78¾∢	781	68	69	70	703	63	7034
Harlem do pref		••••	••••	••••	194 1 22	124 123	124 122	124 122
do pref. Hannibal & St. Joseph	85%	85%	84	84	87	90	87	90
do do pref Hudson River	. 86	86 140	88 183	83 140	97 140	90 143	87 188	.89¥ 1401€
Illinois Central	151	151%	1423	14434	145	146	148%	14036 146
Ind. & Cin innati					51	51%	51	5136
Mar. & Cincin., 1st prefdo 2d pref	28	28	88	28	••••	••••	•••	••••
Michigan Centrul	1193	121	118	119	119	119	113	118%
Michigan Central	883	881	82	84%	86%	8614	83	83
Mil. & P. du Ch'n, 1stprde do _ d pr		107	106	107	••••	••••	••••	• • • •
Milwankee & St Panl	76	77	69	76	77%	97%	771	94
Morris & Rose T	84	8414 64	79 <i>%</i> 63	88% 64	84 64	96 653a	84 63	94% 65%
Morris & Ess x New Haven & Ha tford. New Jersey	218	225	218	225				
New Jersey	3211		222.	:::•	1333	184	1837	1823
do Contral	181	191 1823	118 122%	119 125%	190 126	124 130%	120 128	123 126%
do & N. Haven	145	145%	148	148	140	141	140	1:1
Norwich & worcester	91	91	91	91	92 29	93	92 28	93
Ohio & Mississippido do pref	80% 75%	80% 79	28% 77%	28 % 78	89	29% 89	78	28⅓ 78
Panama	840	3 68	84 0	368	864	869	860	810
Panama Pitreb., Ft. W. & Chica Reading	110%	110% 95	105 88⅓	1081 90%	10-36 91	1111 <u>%</u> 95 <u>%</u>	107 891⁄4	169 98¥
Rome & Watertown	. 0174	••••	0079		114	1:4	114	114
Bionington	80	60	80	80	.80	83	80	.88
Third avenue . Toledo, Wab. & Western	51	583	49	5814	180 58⅓	190 64	180 58⅓	180 593
do do do piet	78	78	78	78	787	78	78%	78
Miscellaneous—								
American Coal	45	45	45	45	2223		4444	
Cumberland Coal Del. & Hud. Canal Coal	80	81 181	29 11934	29 127	29% 128	85 131	29% 127	88 127
Pennsylvania ('os)	. 200	200	200	200				
Pacific Mail	. 10134	1041	983	1013	101 %	1183	101%	107
Auantic do	. 10	19% 27%	15 ¥7	19% 27%	20	21	20	21
Union Navigation	171	1734	157	153 453	15%	15%	15	15
Canton	40	48 11%	153 453 103	45% 11	46	49%	46	46
Cary Improvement	814		83	834	7%	7%	7%	73
Mariposa		• • • •			3,46	536	83%	536
do prefQuicksilver.	7 21⅓	7 2214	10	2134	8 21	12% 23%	8° 201⁄	12% 22%
Manhattan Gas	417			••••	2:25	2:15	225	325
Manhattan Gas	85	85	88	8434			84	88%
Bankers & Brokers Ass	99	105	AA	105	106	106	1043	105)

Express— American Adams	52%	45¾ 58	40 46	41 48	44% 48%	51 52%	4136 48	49¾ 52¾ 50
United States	24%	4634 2434 2734	41 181 241	91 24%	21 1/4 25 1/4	25 1/ 81 1/	21 1/2 25 1/2	2436 80

The gold premium has steadily declined from 145‡, at the opening of the month, to 141‡ at the close, the change being apparently due mainly to the low rates of exchange following the large exports of bonds in July and August, and to the prospect of the grain and cotton exports realizing a larger amount than those of last year. The receipts of treasure from California have slightly exceeded those of September last year, while the exports of specie have been about \$200,000 less than then.

The following formula will show the movement of coin and bullion during the month of September, 1867 and 1868, comparatively:

GENERAL MOVEMENT OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK.

In banks, near first	2,611,440 842,160	1868. \$16,815,778 2,844,944 896,9 9 8,383,139 549,400	Increase, \$9,544,188 233,504 554,799 616,180 549,400	Decrease \$
Total reported supply	\$2,976,801	\$24,440,220 \$1,974,272 18,279,450	\$11,498,096 1,811,6.6	\$ \$302,259
Total withdrawn			\$1,009,097	\$
Excess of reported supply	\$ 1,802,471 9,496,168	\$9,186,498 12,603,483	\$9.186,498 8,107,820	\$ 1,302.471
Derived from unreported sources	\$10,798,634	\$8,417,085	8	\$7,381,549

The following exhibits the fluctuations of the New York gold market in the month of September, 1868.

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Date. Closing. Date.		Openi'g	Lowest	High'st.	Closing			
Tuesday 1 Wednesday 2 Thursday 3 Friday 4 Saturday 5 Monday 7 Tuesday 8 Wednesday 9	145 144% 143% 144% 144% 144% 144%	144% 143% 144% 144% 144% 144% 144%	145% 144% 144% 144% 145 144% 144%	144 141 144% 144% 144%	Tuesday 22 Wednesday 23 Thursday 24 Friday 25 Saturday 26 Monday 28 Tuesday 29 Wednesday 30	148 142% 149 142% 142% 141%	142% 141% 141% 142% 141% 141%	142% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142%	142% 141% 142% 142% 141% 141%
Thursday 10 Friday 11 Saturday 12 Monday 2 Theesday 15 Wednesday 16 Thursday 17 Friday 18 Saturday 19	143% 141% 144% 143% 144% 144% 144%	143% 144 143% 148% 144% 144% 144%	141% 144% 144% 144% 144% 144% 144%	144% 144% 143% 144% 144% 144%	Sept. 1868	141 % 147 % 144 % 245 127	141 143½ 142½ 191 126¾	146% 147% 145 254% 148%	143)6 146% 144 198
Monday	1441	14434	14436	14834	S'ce Jan 1, 1868	13336	18834	150	1413

The following exhibits the quotations at New York for bankers 60 days bills on the principal European markets daily in the month of September, 1868:

course of foreign exchange (60 days) at new york.								
	London.	Paris.	Amsterdam.	Bremen.	Hamburg.	Berlin.		
	cents for	centimes	cents for	cents for	cents for	cents for		
Days.	54 pence.	for dollar.	florin.	rix daler.	M. banco.	thaler.		
1	108% @ 09%	518%@517%	40%@40%	794@79%	85% (0.55%)	71%@71%		
2	108% @109%	518% 517%	40%@40%	791/007934	85% @85%	71%@71%		
8	108%@109%	518% @517%	40% @4 %	79% @79%	35% @35%	71%@71%		
4	1011/0109%	516 2 6515	40%@40%	791/0193/	8 %@35%	71%@71%		
5	109 6 6 109 %	516 2 6515	40% @40%	794@79%	35% (0.35%	71%@71%		
7	1091 @10034	5164 @515	40% @40%	794 @793	35% @35%			
8	1091 @1091	516% @515	40%@40%	7916079%	85%@35%	7150715		
9	1091/01391	516 2 @515	40% @40%	794@79%	85 1 (0.85 %	71%@71%		
10	109%@109%	518% (651%)	40% @40%	794@79%	35% @353%	71%@71%		
	1095@1095	518%@516%	40% @40%	791 @79%	8514 @3574	71%@71%		
11	109%@109%	518% @516%	40%@40%	79% @79%	35% @35%	71%@71%		
19	109%@109%	518% @516%	40% @40%	794 @79%	951/20959	71岁@71%		
14	109 @109%	5185 @5175	40% @40%	791(@793	35 14 @ 35 1/4	71%@71%		
15	109 @1095	518% @517%		794 @ 79%	8 %@35%	71%@71%		
16			40%@40%		811/03574	71为@71%		
17	108%@109	518% @517%	40%@40%	794@79%	35%@35%	71%@71%		
18	108%@1 9	518以@517米	40% @4 %	79%@79%	85% @85%	71%@71%		
19	108%@109	518%@517%	405 @4034	791/0793	85%@85%	71%@71%		
21	103%@103	520 @518%	40% @40%	79 @7936	85% @35%	71%@71%		
23	108%@108%	520 @518%	40%@40%	79 @794	85% @85%	71%@71%		
23	108%@108%	5 0 @518%	40% @40%	79 @7914	35%@35%	711607136		
24	108%@108%	520 @518%		79 @7934	85%@85%	71%@71%		
25	1084 @108%	520 @518%	40%@403	79 @791	35%@35%	711, @711		
26	108%@108%	520 @518%	40%@40%	79 @7914	85%@35%	71%@71%		
28	108%@108%	520 @518%		79 @791	35%@35%	71% @71%		
29	108%@108%	5.0 @518%	40%@40%	79 @791	35% @35%	71%@71%		
30	108%@108%	520 @518%	40% @40%	79 @7914	35%@35%	71%@71%		
Sept., 1868 Sept., 1867	108 % @ 109 % 109 @ 110	520 @515 521 1/2 @515	40%@40% 40%@41%	79 @79% 78%@78%	85 % @85 % 85 % @36 %	71 % @ 71 % 71 % @ 71 %		

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1:

Returns of the New York, Philadelaphia and Boston Banks.

21014.125 01		CITY BANK	RETURNS	u Dunko.	
Date. Loan«.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'ge.
January 4. \$249,741,297	\$12,724,614	\$34,134,391	\$187,070,786	\$62,111,201	\$483,266,304
January 11. , 251,170,728	19,222,856	34,094,187	194,835,525	64,758,116	558,884,525
January 18 256,083,938	23,191.867	84,071,006	205,883 148	66,155,241	619,797,369
January 25 258,392,101	25,106,800	84,0-2,762	210,093,084	67,154,161	528,503,223
February 1 206,415 613	23,955,320	44,062,521	213.330,524	65,197,158	637,449,923
February 8 \$70,555,856	22,823,372	81,096,831	217,844,518	55,846,959	597,242,595
February 15 271,015,970	24,192,955	84,043,296	216,759,828	63,471,762	550,521,185
February 21 267,768,648	22,518,987	84,100,023	209,095,351	69,868,930	452,421,592
February 29 267,240,678	22,091,642	84,0 6,228	208,651,578	58,553,607	705,100 784
March 7 269,156,636	20,714,243	34,153 957	207,787,080	57,017,044	619,219,598
March 14 266,816,034	19,744,70!	84,218,891	201,188,470	54,788,866	691,277,641
March 21 261,416,900	17.944,808	84,212,571	191,191,526	52,261,086	649,482,341
March 28 257,378,247	17,823,867	84,190,808	180,525,138	52,123,178	557,843,908
April 4 254,287,891	17,077,299	84,227,108	2 80,956,8 46	51,709,706	567,783,138
April 11 252,936,725	16,343,150	84,194,272	179,851,880	51,982,609	493,871,451
April 18 254,817,986	16,773,549	84,218,581	181,832,523	50,583,660	623,713,923
April 25 252,314,617	14,943,547	84,227,621	180,807,489	53,866,757	6(2,784,154
May 2 257,628,672	16,166,878	84,114,848	191.206,185	57,863,599	588,717,922
May 9 265,755,888	21 286,910	84,205,409	199,276,568	57,541,827	507,028,567
May 16 267,724,783	20,939,142	84,193,249	201,313,305	57,618,095	480,186,908
May 23 267,881,279	20,479,947	84,183,039	202,507,550	62,283,003	488,735,142
May 30 268,117,490	17,861,088	84,145,606	204,746,961	65,633,964	602,118,248
June 6 273,792,867	14,828,531	84,188,159	209,089,655	68,822,028	640,663,329
June 18 275,142,024	11,193,631	34,166,846	210,670,765	69,202,840	580,828,197
June 20 274, 117,608	9,124,830	84,119,120	211,484,887	72,567,582	553,983,817
June 27 276,504, 86	7,753,800	84,048,721	214,302,207	73,853,803	516,726,075
July 8 281,945,931	11,954,730	84,032,466	221,050,808	72,125,989	525,646,693
July 11 281,147,708	19,235,848	81,068,202	224,320,141	68,531,542	591,756,395
July 18 282,912,490 July 25 280,345,255	20,399,031 20,804,101	84,004,111 88,963,373	228,180,749 226,761,662	71,847,545 72,235,585	505,462,464
	20,502,737	83,951,805	223,101,867	78,688, 61	497,169,897
August 8 279,811,657 August 8 279,705,786	24,781,427	81,074,874		74.051,548	409,131,169
August 8 279,705,786 August 15 277,808,620	27,913,55)	84,114,087	223,561,087	72.9-5,481	587 004,881 482,518,952
August 22 275,345,781	19,768,631	81,187,627	216,485,405	69,757,645	610,308,551
August 21 27:,780.726	16,949,103	74,112,139		67,757,376	
September 5 271,831,696	16,815,778			65,988,778	
Feptember 12, 272, 55,691	16,150,942			63,429,837	
September 18. 271,25,186				63,773,700	518,471,552
September 26. 271,278,544	12,503,483			63,587,576	
population so, surjetojots	,,100	0-,000,112	,,001	00,001,010	040,100,002

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.								
Date. L	egal Tenders.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.			
January 4	8.6,782,482	\$52,002,804	\$235,913	\$10,689,000	\$86,621,274			
January 11	16,087,995	52,593,707	400,615	10,639,098	87,181,8 80			
January 18	16,827,428	53,018,196	820,978	10,641,752	87, 157,089			
January 25	16,886,987	52,825,599	279,898	10,645,226	37,312,540			
February 1		52,604,916	248,678	10,688,927	57,922,287			
February 8	17.068.716	52,672,448	287,878	10,685 926	87 896,658			
February 15		52,532,946	248,157	10,668,828	87.010.520			
February 22	17,578,149	52,423,166	204,929	10.632,495	86,458,464			
February 29		52,459,757	211,365	10.634.484	85,798,814			
March 7	17,157,954	58, 181,665	232,180	10.633.713	81,826,861			
March 14	16,662,299	53,867,611	251,051	10,681,899	94,528,550			
March 21	15,664,946	58,677,887	229,518	10,6+3,613	83,836,996			
March 28	14,348,391	53,450,878	192 858	10,643,606	82,428,890			
April 4	18,2:8,625	52,209,284	215,835	10.642.670	31,278,119			
April 11	14,194,885	52,256,949	250,240	10 640,932	82,255 671			
April 20	14,498,287	52,989,780	222, 29	10,640,479	88,9 0,952			
April 27	14.951.106	52,812,628	204,699	10,640,812	84,767,590			
May 4	14,990,833	58,888,740	814,866	10.631,(4)	85,109,987			
May 11	15,166,017	53,771,794	897,778	10.629.0 5	85,017,596			
May 18	15,881,545	53,491,588	8 8,525	10,632,665	86,080,063			
Мау 25	15,828,099	58, 63,225	290,302	10.66 ,276	86,000,197			
June 1	16,184,865	53,562,449	289,371	10,626,987	88,574,457			
June 8	16,073,808	58,491.864	2:6,581	10,630 945	42,910,499			
June 15	15,837,117	58,122,521	175,308	10,430,979	48,016,968			
June 22	15,998,145	53,381,820	182,711	10.631, 2.0	43,243,562			
June 29	16,414,877	53,072,878	198,568	10,630,807	43,936,629			
July 6	16,44%,153	53,653,471	233,996	10,625,426	44,824,898			
July 18	16,664,232	53,791,596	182,524	10,626,214	45, 156, 620			
July 20	16,747,440	58,994,618	188,252	10.647 85#	45,637,975			
Ju v 27	16,555,894	54,024,355	195,896	10,622 247	45.5 3.220			
August 8	17,402,177	54,341,163	187,291	10,623 646	47 215,867			
August 10	17,792,508	51,592,015	184.007	10,62,751	45,04-,718			
August 17	17,819,300	54.674,758	196,530	10.624.7 2	46,636,377			
Au ust 24	17, 14,195	55,151,724	185,156	10,628 360	45,985,616			
August 81	17, 16, 325	55,255,474	181,248	10,622,581	46,068,150			
September 7	16.875,409	55,694,068	222,900	10,622,316	45, 79,109			
Sept 11 ber 14	16,810,565	55 646,740	2019,058	10.613,974	44 730,828			
September 21	15,857,082	55,620,710	197,207	10,620,531	43,955,581			
September 28	16,088,854	55,468,296	284,552	10,607,940	44,227,127			
	,,	,,		,				

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.									
(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)									
_	•	=	Legal		Circulation-				
Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Tenders.	Deposits.	National.	State.			
Janu ry 8 \$	34.960,249	\$1,466,946	\$15,548,169	\$40,856,022	\$24,636,559	\$228,780			
January 18	97,800,289	1,276,987	15,560,965	41,496,320	24,75:,965	227,958			
January 20	97,488,468	926,942	15,882,769	41,904,161	24,70 ,001	217,872			
January 27	97,488,485	841,196	16,849,637	43,991,170	14,564, 06	226,258			
February 8	96,845,260	777,627	16,738,229	42,891,128	24,628,103	221,160			
February 10	97,973,916	652,989	16,497,648	42,752,067	24 850,926	221,700			
February 17	98,218,828	605,740	16.561 4 1	41 502,550	24,850, 055	220,452			
February 24	97,469,436	616,953	16,809,501	40,887,614	24,686,212	216,490			
March 2 1	100,249,692	683,532	16,804,846	40,954,986	21,876,089	2 5,214			
March 9 1	101, 59 861	867,174	15,556,696	89,770,418	24,957,700	210,162			
March 16 1	101,499,611	918,485	14,582,342	39,276,514	25.062,415	197,720			
March 28 1	100,109,595	798,606	13,712,560	87,022,546	25,094,258	197,239			
Ma:ch 80	99,132,268	685,034	18,786,082	86, 184, 640	24,983,417	197,079			
April 6	97,020.925	781,510	18,004,924	86,008,157	25,175,194	168,028			
April 18	97,850,280	878,487	12,522,035	86,422,929	24,213,014	167,013			
Ap il 20	98,906,805	805,486	11,905,608	86,417,890	24,231,053	166,9 62			
	98,302,848	577, 63	12,248.545	36,259,946	24,231,978	164,831			
	97,624,197	815,469	12,656,190	87,635,406	25,208,284	160,885			
	97,882,288	1,183,668	11,962,868	87,358,71 6	25,225.173	145,948			
May 18	96,938,524	1,186,881	12,199,492	87,844,742	25, 234 465	160,241			
May 25	97,041,720	1,018,809	12,848,141	28,898,14:	25,210,660	150,151			
June 1	97,458,997	766,553	14,188,806	40,811,569	25.204,939	159,560			
	98 116,682	681,149	14,868,900	41,470,876	25,194,1'4	159,818			
	99,513,988	561,990	14,373,575	41,738,706	25,190,565	159,150			
	99,889.683	476,438	14,561,614	42,5SJ,871	25, 197, 3 7	158,908			
	99,477,074	486,699	15,195,550	42,506,316	25,182,920	158,812			
July 6 1	00,110,830	1,617,638	15,107,807	48,458,654	25,214 104	:44,629			
July 13 1	01.498,516	1,198,529	15,743,211	48,116,765	25,916, 81	141,589			
July 20 1		1,521,893	15,469,406	43,876,800	25,21~,747	13,799			
July 27 1	02,408,771	785,641	15,837,748	48,580,894	25,254,906	142,450			
August 8 1	02, 80.659	7:6,254	15,796,059	43,389,523	25,016,492	•••••			
August 10 1	08,860,686	684,968	15,758,958	44,962,263	25 197,164	••••			
August 17 1	08,956,603	664,698	15,554,590	43,702,501	25,182.658				
August 24 10	08,6 4,691	779,11-2	16,810,828	42,360,049	25.214,5 6	• • • • • •			
Augus 81 1	08,660,020	767,819	15,843,796	41,214,607	25,190,091	••••			
Se cmber 7 1	08,858,110	833,063	14,975,841	40,891,745	25,196,084	****			
September 14 1	02,921,733	748,714	18,774,880	40,640,820	23,183,876	•• ••			
September 21 1	(2,472,986	642,793	13,466,258	39,712,168	25,184,048	••••			
September 28 1	01,621,744	642,829	14,082,447	89,127,650	25,150,081				

MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE

AND

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

NOVEMBER, 186.8.

MISAPPREHENSIONS IN BEGARD TO CURBENCY.

Many serious mistakes were made by business meu and money operators at the close of the late war, owing to their confident belief that a general monetary revulsion must attend the return of peace. That there would be a terriffic explosion as a matter of course, attended with an immense fall in prices they felt to be certain, and therefore hastened to make large sales of merchandise at such low rates that they were, in many cases, glad to repurchase the very articles they had parted with at a considerable advance, when they found the expected catastrophe did not take place. The same feeling of apprehension in regard to a monetary panic has existed from that time to the present, though it is evidently becoming less influential.

Much of this fear has arisen from not distinguishing between our present currency and our former mixed convertable currency. Our present currency consists wholly of credit. The national Treasury has issued some 400 millions, and the banks 300 millions more, in all 700 millions, and with this the domestic trade of the country is carried on. The government wishes to keep out its full issues and the banks desire to maintain their circulation, and consequently there is no cause whatever, for any contraction. Unlike a mixed currency which from its very nature is liable to

continual fluctuation, an irredeemable credit currency, unless the law making power interferes to expand or contract it, remains stationary. Under our present system when money is paid into a bank, it is immediately loaned out again to its customers. The banks have no fears of being called upon to redeem their notes in specie, and there is no necessity or wish on their part to contract their operations, and therefore they put out their notes as fast as they are paid in. This being the case, why should any one who understood the matter have had any fears of a panic at the close of the war? Panics can only come from a loss of confidence in the currency or a forced or sudden withdrawal of that currency, and as confidence was increased by the closing of the war and no sudden withdrawal to be expected, all fears of such a disaster were groundless.

So at the present time, all apprehensions of a great scarcity of money owing to an expected demand from the West have proved false. The currency is now a fixed quantity, the whole is at the disposal of the commercial public. Besides the 700 millions of circulation we have over 600 millions of bank deposits, in all 1,300 millions, against 450 millions before the war. How little chance then is there for any panic or even a general and severe pressure unless we can make a demand which shall suddenly draw off a large amount of this currency from the centres of trade? No such demand is under the circumstances at all probable. There is at present very limited opportunity for speculation. Breadstuffs and provisions are so abundant that there is little disposition to operate in them for a rise; so of cotton; so of manufactures. The day for general speculative movements on the present currency basis has passed by. The national industry disturbed by the war, is now restored; production in every department is equalized; consumption is reduced from its national dimensions by the high prices of commodities as compared with wages; and as a consequence although there must be a large trade to meet the necessities of the people, there cannot be so extensive and brisk demand for merchandize, as there would be in a normal condition of the currency when all values were measured by the true standard, and each class in the community received its due share of the general product.

Our depreciated currency has produced a partial paralysis of business which must continue until the specie standard has been restored. Hence no expectations can be reasonably entertained of any excessive demand for money, or any great rise in the rate of interest. The most marked features of trade and industry will be dulness and inactivity, until the currency has been brought to par with gold. When a movement for that purpose has been fairly inaugerated, and a gradual withdrawal of a given quantity of circulation each month has been commenced, prices will begin to descend to their natural level in the commerce of the world. But

no panie need attend this contraction, because, although the currency will be reduced from time to time, the process will be well understood beforehand, and the indebtedness of the country will be contracted in a corresponding ratio, so that all obligations to pay money will be met as readily as before; while the prices of commodities being lessened by the very process of contraction, less currency will be needed to transact the same amount of business. When the true point has been attained, which will be indicated by the currency being at par with specie, the rate of interest will be no higher than it has usually been when trade was in a sound and healthy condition.

There is no danger then of any essential disturbance in the monetary affairs of the country except from political causes. How imminent that danger may be, each one must determine for himself in view of the circumstances which affect the condition of the nation.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COTTON MANUFACTURERS AND PLANTERS.

At a meeting of the government of this association, held in New York on the 6th October, 1868, the following reports were adopted. We give them in full, on account of the general interest felt in the subject, and the importance of the facts presented:

REPORT OF THE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE.

The committee have expected, until within the last four days, to obtain reports from the cotton mills of the country so nearly full and complete, that they would serve as a safe basis for a report exhibiting the actual consumption of cotton, and other interesting and valuable information.

The secretary sent out circulars addressed to some person connected with every cotton factory of which he had knowledge in the United States, asking from each the few items of information which any practical manufacturer or his clerk could easily give.

In behalf of the association the committee acknowledge, with thanks, its obligation to the great body of manufacturers who shave supplied the desired facts, a summary of which will be herewith presented. To those who have not yet made the returns we once more appeal, and invite their examination of the statistics so far gathered, and the deductions from them, as an indication of the value of trade statements to be compiled from complete returns. We believe the default has been, in most cases, not one of refusal, nor even of reluctance, but rather of postponement or indifference.

If any withold through fear that the details given will be subject to

inspection, we repeat to them the assurance given by the secretary, that these returns are seen only by him, and are regarded by him as confidential. Even this committee consider only the aggregates and averages which the secretary prepares from them.

The United States census of 1860 embraced returns from 1,091 cotton mills, having 5,235,727 spindles, and using 422,704,975 pounds of cotton, equal to about 920,000 bales per annum (80 pounds per spindle).

So far the association has received the reports of 548 mills or corporations. They have 5,968,000 spindles, produce yarn of sizes that average No. 27‡, and use annually 371,688,716 pounds of cotton, equal to 808,000 bales of 460 pounds each (62‡ pounds per spindle).

SUMMARY OF RETURNS FROM COTTON MILLS RECEIVED TO COT. 1, 1868.

State.	Mills.	Spindles.	No. Yarn.	Consumption.	Consumption per Spindle,
Maine	20	448,692	221	28,824,618	64.96
New Hampshire	23	718,604	261	47,251,489	65 75
Vermont	8	21,146	28 1	1,097, 25	51 88
Mas: achusetts	182	2,205,007	261	128,78 2.576	18.40
Rhode Island	95	9 5,402	84	41,246,628	44.10
Connecticut	67	504,620	804	26,555,120	52.63
New York	88	410,980	8 21	29,408,044	49.65
New Jersey	18	181,704	4: 1	6,780,000	51.48
Pennsylvania	46	264,644	18 1	25,160,069	95.07
Delaware	8	46,052	16 4	3,478,280	75.58
Maryland	10	89,848	12 1	6,929,000	188.68
Ohio	4	21,884	12 1	8,170,000	188.82
Indiana	1	10,800	14	1,498,061	188.26
Missouri	4	18,4 6	10 1	2,475,000	184.28
Virginia		86,060	15≩	4,010,000	111.18
North Carolina	10	16,284	1(4	2,464,000	151.16
South Carolina	6	81, 588	18∯	4,174,100	182.14
Georgia	19	65,814	12#	10,226 850	158.57
Alabama	7	22,196	144	2,629,916	113.49
Mississippi	5	6,924	8∰	1,18 ,0 0	170 42
Texas	8	6, 00	10 <u>1</u>	1,125,0(0	178.58
Arkansas	1	528	8	158,400	800
Tennessee	6	8,864	6₩	1,150,000	121.74
Kentucky	2	5,264	10	925,000	175.72
		RECAPITUI	ATION.		
Northern States	479	5,768,299	27 🖁	848,645,960	59.57
Southern States	69	199,772	12]	28,042,766	140.87
Total	518	5,968,001	278	871,688,716	62.23
The total returns re	occived u	p to October	6 show the fo	llowing results	:
	556	6,048,249	278	876,008,890	62.17

If there are in the country as many cotton mills as were reported in 1860, and no more, there are yet 543 mills to be reported to the association.

The 548 mills already reported have an average of nearly 11,000 spindles to each mill. The mills not reported must necessarily be of much smaller average.

It has been the purpose of this committee to take nothing by conjecture or estimation, and to deal only with ascertained facts, so presenting them that they shall convey truthful impressions.

In the absence of the returns of a portion of the spindles, there is a temptation to estimate this smaller portion, and then proceed to make deductions from the premises so obtained. It would, however, be a step in the wrong direction, leading perhaps to self deception.

The returns from nearly six millions spindles show the annual use of about 808,000 bales of cotton in the production of yarms averaging in size No 27%. The States north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers, and the States south of those rivers, returns respectively, so far:

		Av. No.	Using lbs.	Lbs per
Mills.	Spindles.	Yarn.	Cotton.	Spindle.
Morth 479	5,708,229	27 🖁	84 3,645,950	59.57
South 69	199,771	124	28,042,766	140.87

These aggregates and averages bear intrinsic evidence of accuracy in their consistent relations and proportions. They show a use of 747,000 bales of cotton north, and 61,000 bales south of the Ohio and Poto nac Rivers; also the wide difference in the size* or weight of the yarn produced in the two sections. Complete returns from both sections would probably modify both and reduce the difference.

From these data, compared with the census of 1860, any person so disposed can readily compute, to his own satisfaction, the total number of spindles, and thereupon the total consumption of cotton.

The committee regret that they have been unable to get the full returns in time for this report.

The committee present in compact form, some facts afforded by the complete and accurate statistics of British cotton trade and manufacture, annually compiled in that country. They will be found interesting to American manufacturers and planters, as throwing some light upon the supply of cotton goods and yarns during the last nine years, compared with the supply during the ten years preceding; also upon the extension of markets for those products, and the comparative stocks or surplus existing in 1860 and now.

British statistics give the requisite information of about one-half the cotton business of the commercial world.

^{*} Norm.—To pers us not tamiliar with mar unacturing, it should be explained that the number givent o express the size or weight of yarn, indicates the number of skeins or hanks, of 849 yards each, required to weigh one pound avoirdupois.

They exhibit the following aggregates for the period named:

,	Ŭ		Pounds of	Lbs. of goods &
10 yrs, 1850–59	Pounds cotton consumed. 8,285,896,000	Waste lbe. 865,896,000	goods and yarns produced. 7,870 000,000	yarns expo'd & cons'd in G. Bt. 7,064,762,620
. .				

Showing an accumulation of 805,287,880 pounds in the nine years.

9 years, 1860-68. 7,286,149,000 901,842,000 6,834,807,000 6,420,889,000

Showing a deficit in production of 85,582,000 pounds in the ten years.

Totals.......15,472,045,000 1,767,2 8,'00 13,701,807,000 13,485,151,620

Av per yr. first 10 823,589,600 86,589,600 737,000,006 706,476,262

" l.st 9 804,016,555 100,149,111 708,867,444 712,376,555

The waste is stated very nearly as in the English tables; that for the last nine years being much heavier than for the previous ten years, because of the poorer qualities of cotton necessarily used through the years of scarcity, 1862-6. The quantities for 1868 are, of course, not assumed to be actual. Enough, however, is known of the proportions they bear to those of former years to demand approximation to those of 1860, the largest ever known, and they have been so computed.

The remarkable feature here developed is that the consumption in Great Britain, and the export of cotton goods and yarns have exceeded their production in the aggregate of the last nine years to the extent of 85,582,000 pounds. It is obvious that this deficiency occurred in the years 1862-4, when the supply of cotton was so much reduced, and was made good from the accumulations of previous years. It does not appear that all the surplus productions, which had piled up before 1861, and which threatened great disaster to the manufacturing interest at that time, have yet been distributed to consumers. Here, as in England, attention has been called frequently during the last two years to the extracrdinary shipments of British cloths and yarns to India, each half-year increasing upon the pre-Explanation is given by the statement that the raw cotton formerly used in India has been attracted to Europe by the high prices; that the home manufacture formerly supplying that people with good and durable cotton cloth has been materially diminished, thus opening a demand for the English fabric; and that the enhanced prices for cotton and other Indian products have more than doubled the wages of laborers, and greatly enlarged the ability of the ryots and other poorer consumers to buy the British goods. (See note †.)

[†] Note.—From the circular of George 7 ra er, Son & Co., of Manchester, England, dated 5 ept. 1, 1668, we take the following comp rative quantities of plain and solored cotton cl the exp. ried from London, Liverpool, and the Clyde to Madras and Calcutta, to Bombay and to China.

During the whole year 1866.
 825 431,905 yards.

 " 1867.
 1,066,814,613

 Fr.m Jan. 1 to Aug. 26, 1868.
 832,521,700

It will be a berred that in these items only of British trade, the increase of 1867 was nearly 30 per cent upon the export of 1868, and that for nearly 8 mo the of 1868 the rate is 17 per cent above that it f1867, while the aggregate for the 8 months is more than for the whole year 166. The business for a ugust though only to the 26th day, was larger in amount than the average per moth of the first six months of 1868, the lower prices of July having induced renewed activity.

During the last nine years the population of the world known to British commerce has increased; new markets have been opened or extended; and if the enormous trade with India is to be considered permanent on the scale of the last twelve months, it is not easy to see anything but excessive prices that can check the expansion of British cotton trade while peace continues its protecting and encouraging influence.

In the absence of the necessary statistics, no satisfactory exhibit of th cotton trade and manufacture in Continental Europe can be given. There are, however, some significant facts to show that the continent stands in relation to the supply of, and demand for, cotton fabrics, in a position similar to that of Great Britain. After a larger importation of raw cotton than during the year preceding, they stand now (Oct. 1) with stocks of cotton much less than they held Oct. 1, 1867, and so low indeed that their drain upon Liverpool is seriously felt. This tells of the increase of consumption.

In regard to our own country, the following suggestive comparison is presented. While regarding what is to follow, with much confidence in its truth and value, the Committee adhering to its rule, request that it be taken as hypothetical until verified.

The consumption of cotton North and South, in the United States, as stated in the New York Shipping List, for the eight years 1853 to 1860 inclusive, amounted in its aggregate to 6,339,300 bales, an average of 792,412 bales, say for convenience 800,000 bales per annum.

Cotton statistics were not regularly kept and published during the late war, and for the few data accessible to us the committee are indebted to some careful and practical manufacturers who kept private memoranda, and two of whom, in 1862 and 1863, prepared careful reports upon the cotton manufacture, for the annual publication of the Boston Board of Trade. At certain points between the Spring of 1861 and the close of the year of 1865, the number of spindles at work was approximately ascertained. Starting with these points fixed, the Committee have obtained also estimates by several manufacturers, all of whom were running mills throughout the war, of the proportion that each year from 1861 to 1868 bears to the average of the eight years preceding, in the supply of cotton goods produced, taking the latter average at 100.

These estimates, independently made, stand thus:

		No. 1.	· 2.	8.	4.	5.	Sum of them.	Average.
1861.	per cent.	75	60	62.5	f 0	75	882 1	661
186 3.	- 16	85	85	87.5	40	881	180 5-8	86 1-6
1868.	44	40	85	87.5	40	881	185 5-6	87 1-6
1864.	46	45	85	87.5	80	884	200 5-6	40 1-6
1865.	€	60	75	69	60	75	880	66
1866.	4	75	80	80	75	80	890	78
1867 .	4	110	100	100	90	115	5 5	108
1868.	"	115	115	110	100	120	160	112
								:
	•	555	585	525	515	565	2.695	589

The resulting average is 539 for these eight years, as compared with 800 for the eight years, 1853-60. The consumption of those years was stated at 800,000 per annum. Owing to the poorer quality of cotton obtainable during the war, many more pounds were required to get an equal production. Allowing five per cent for the extra waste, the proportion above found, 539-800, would require an average consumption of 565,750 bales of 480 pounds each per year, from 1861 to 1868, or, stated year by year in due proportion, thus:

1861bales	588,600	1865bales	554,400
1862	808,800	1866	655 200
1863	812,200	1867 1868	865,200
1864	887.400	1868	949,800

Let it be noted here that while the average weight of American bales consumed at home in the years 1859 and 1860 was nearly or quite 480 pounds, the weight since 1865 averages rather under 460 pounds. This difference, if allowed, would raise the above figures of consumption, 1861 to 1868, nearly 4½ per cent. The figures thus derived from data wholly different from those used in compiling the annual statements, are interesting as nearly confirming the estimates by the latter of the home consumption.

But the more important fact developed by the comparison of the production of the two periods, is this; according to the calculations thus obtained, the production of cotton goods for the last eight years compared with the production during the eight years preceding, has been as 539 to 800, or only 67° per cent; an actual diminution of nearly 33 per cent during a period when there was an increase of population more than 30 per cent, requiring a corresponding increase of supply. The sum of these represents the deficiency now, compared with 1860. True, the foreign export of cotton goods ceased and the Southern markets were cut off, but the aggregate of both would not make good a moiety of the deficiency. That h s been in part supplied from the old reserves in families and with traders, eked out by the economies enforced at first by war prices, and since continued under an expectation of a return to the ante-war scale of prices.

The conclusion seems irresistible, that the old stores of cotton cloth and other fabrics throughout our country are now exhausted; and this explains the fact that a demand from consumers, imperative and sustained by necessity, has already begun.

The position of the cotton trade and manufacture in Great Britain and Continental Europe, from the operation of like causes, is the same as with us, differing however in degree, and modified by the influence of price and the substitution more or less of other textiles for cotton.

The depression in the cotton-goods trade, now subjecting many manufacturers on both sides of the Atlantic to an average loss, is under the circumstances anomalous, sustained by an erroneous estimate of the capacity for supply, and by the expectation of the trade that the extreme decline at the close of 1867 may be repeated this season.

The report of the Committee on Raw Material will show an apparent loss in the stocks of cotton in the world during the year ending Oct. 1, 1868, to the extent of more than 300,000 bales, the consumption of raw cotton having so far exceeded its supply, yet apparently failing to fill up the gap in the supply of cotton fabrics, caused by the short production of the years of the war.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RAW MATERIAL.

Cotton is the only raw material properly under the consideration of this Committee for the purposes of the Association, and the question of supply in relation to demand is the chief point of interest alike to planters and manufacturers.

Sure of ample supply, the American manufacturer looks at the cotton of other countries only in its bearing upon price. The manufacturer in Europe has to consider both the questions, of supply and price, and cannot overlook the influence that price has upon supply from distant sources as well as the constant bearing of supply upon price.

The stocks of cotton in Europe Oct. 1, 1867, amounted to 1,092,000 bales. On the first of the present month there were only about 600,000 bales, or about 500,000 less than last year. There were at sea, for England, 282,000 bales more than last year, and the import since January 1 is 220,000 bales less. On the other hand, an increased import direct to the continent compensates in part, and then the fact remains that a loss of over 300,000 bales, compared with the position a year ago, has been incurred, showing that the consumption has to that extent exceeded the supply.

The time has not yet arrived when a useful estimate can be made of the incoming crops of our own or other countries. Of the American crop our factories, if at full work, will want at least 1,000,000 bales for the year's consumption: and as the experience of this season has shown, the the inconvenience and hazard of allowing the stocks in mills and markets to run nearly out, (quite out in some mills) it is supposed that the position for the close of the cotton year (August 31), will be strengthened by the addition out of this crop of 100,000 bales or more, to the surplus in mill and market.

This appropriates 1,100,000 bales of the crop to be retained for home use, and probably to be retained whatever may be the price.

In Great Britain the supply for the year ending Dec. 31, stand approximately as follows:

Stock, Dec. 81, 1867	bales, 447,460 2,584,495
ted Office (now)	850,000
Total supply	3,881,955
Deliveries to Sept 17, Liverpeol and London, to trade 2,025,082 For export	
2,468,928	
Estimate for 14 weeks (to Dec. 81) trade and export, at 70,000 per week	8,448,828
Leaving stock Dec. 81, 1868, about	883,182

The excess of consumption (in the world) over the supply of 1868, seems to say that consumption must be reduced, or supply increased, because it is in the nature of things quite impossible that the surplus stocks, now so low, shall ever be much more reduced without stopping part of the consumption.

The evidences of the extent of supply for 1869 are not at all clear, and the extremely unfavorable weather since Sept. 1st has increased the obscurity about the result of our own crop. In the midst of these uncertainties, the Committee defer any calculation of the supply, as of the demand upon it, until the probabilities shall be better developed.

RAILROAD EARNINGS.

It is satisfactory to note a steady gain in the earnings of our railroads; satisfactory not only as an evidence of the prosperity of the roads but also as indicating an improvement in the internal commerce of the country. While there is no advance in the rates of transportation, and yet an increase in the earnings, it is clear that a large amount of freight is pass ing over the roads; and this we take to be an incontestable evidence that, despite the current complaints and croaking, there is yet a steady gain in the general trade of the country, Within the last three or four years, there has been in progress a great deal of pioneer development which has been little noted in the Eastern cities. The pressure of taxation and high prices have forced population toward the outskirts of our newly settled sections, where cheap and fertile lands bestow a better return for labor than almost any other branch of industry; and the quiet of

trade in the cities has also induced an unusual proportion of emigrants to seek their fortunes in the same direction. We have thus had an important settlement of population along the routes of the Western roads who have raised a large amount of heavy freight to be transported. At the same time, the Western companies have stretched out their lines into the sparsely settled regions, carrying population with them. The expansion in the agricultural sections has naturally increased the traffic of the roads and of the lines connecting the West with the seaboard. From the returns of fourteen roads it appears that there has been an increase in the gross earnings of the first nine months, from \$45,598,356 in 1867 to \$49,-879,064 in 1868; or nearly ten per cent. The earnings on the same roads for the month of September were \$7,829,797 against \$7,189,034 in 1867; which shows a ratio of increase about the same as that for the previous eight months. The following are the gross earnings of these companies for the mouth of September and the first nine months of the year, in 1867 and 1868:

.			Nine M	Ionths
Railroads.	1867.	18 6 8.	1867.	18 8.
Atlantic and Great Western	\$483.857	\$477,795	\$3,819,460	\$8,463,849
Chicago and Alton		488,155	2,776 837	8,266,787
Chicago and Northwestern	1,451,284	1,518,488	7,991,138	9,717,403
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific	517,703	544 900	2,774,903	8,245,891
Illinois Central	738,180	878,500	4,995,981	5,189,168
Marietta and Cincinnati	. 121,217	121,519	960,120	928,808
Michigan Central	. 464,778	456,974	8,15:,480	8,256,327
Michigan South. & North. Ind	. 487,8 67	512,528	8,280,210	8,607,079
Milwaukee and St. Paul	. 751,789	1,023,520	8,457,910	4,481,355
Ohio and Mississippi	. 855,372	807,122	2,471.488	2,172,218
Pittsburg, F.t W & Chicago	669,087	761,829	5,198,001	5,758,850
St. Loui , Alton & Ter e Haute		196,486	1,581,996	1,410,327
Toledo, Wabash and Western	8 - 2,996	450,208	2,7:7,347	2,872,266
Western Union		97 388	521,140	. 561,758
Total	7,189,034	\$7,829,797	\$45,598,856	\$49,879,064

It will be observed that the principal increase is upon the roads running through newly settled country. The increase, for the nine months, on the Chicago and Northwestern road is \$1,726,265, or about 27 per cent; this gain, however is largely due to the transportation of materials for the construction of the Pacific Railroad, and to the flow of population and trade along the route of that road, with which the Northwestern connects. On the Milwaukee and St. Paul road there has been an increase, for the nine months, of about \$923,395, or about 27 per cent. On this road, there has been an extension of mileage from 735 miles to 820 miles; which, however, only partially accounts for the increase of earnings, the company having pre-eminently profited from the development of new country opened by it. About three-fifths of the continued increase on the fourteen roads has occurred on these two lines, the balance being unevenly distributed among the remaining twelve companies, nine showing a moderate increase and three a decrease.

In the earnings for September there has been a decrease on five roads, viz., Atlantic & Great Western, Michigan Central, Ohio & Mississippi,

St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute, and Western Union. On the others, the largest ratio of increase has been on Chicago & Alton, Illinois Central, Milwaukee & St. Paul, Fort Wayne, and Toledo Wabash & Western The large amounts of produce pressed forward to the grain centres, immediately after the harvest, is the principal cause of the gain in the earnings during the last month. For the last two or three weeks, kowever, there has been a falling off in the receipts of many roads, owing to the wet weather and also to the fact that the fallen price of grain has checked the transportation of produce; for this reason, it is quite likely that the exhibit of earnings for October may not be so favorable as that for September. There is, however an unusually large stock of grain in the hands of the farmers, the forwarding of which, and especially of the unprecedented corn crop, must give active employment to the roads for the next few months and keep the earnings on a liberal scale.

DETENTION OF BREADSTUFFS AT THE WEST.

It is somewhat anomalous that, with unusually abundant crops of cereals, the arrivals of grain at the seaboard since the harvest have been upon a comparatively limited scale, while of the large exportable surplus very little has yet been shipped. Stocks of grain at present are accumulating at the lake ports, the dealers professing a purpose to carry their load until the East is prepared to take it at much higher prices. On the 20th inst. there was 1,518,400 bushels of wheat in store at Chicago, against 754,100 bushels at the same period of 1867, and at Milwaukee 618,000 bushels this year, against 455,000 bushels at the corresponding date of last year; while, on the 10th inst., there was affoat on the canals only 8,154,000 bushels of all grains against 4,852,000 bushels in 1867; which clearly shows the disposition of the Western dealers to hold back supplies.

This detention of produce is, perhaps, no more than might have been expected as the natural result of a decline of 35 cents in wheat, and a material fall in other grains since September 1st, following close upon a still larger decline during the summer. Much of the grain held in lake storehouses cost the holders considerably above the now current values; and it is natural, even if not prudent, that the owners should try to avert losses by holding for higher prices. It may at least be urged in favor of the Western dealers that they are but following the rule frequently adopted by factors circumstanced as they now are. Whether they are acting wisely is questionable; especially considering that the English markets, according to the latest accounts, are likely

to be better supplied than has been expected. It is less our purpose, however, to discuss the prudence of the present hoarding of grain than to survey the common policy of the West in holding back its grain from shipment during the last few weeks of navigation. The present action of the dealers is but an illustration of what almost invariably occurs at this period of the year. In October or November, there is generally a difference of views between Eastern buyers and Western sellers, which results in a curtailment of shipments and in a limitation of supplies at the seaboard during the winter, of no benefit to the trade of either section. For the purpose of indicating and illustrating what proportion of the supplies sent East comes to hand during the period of navigation, the suspension of navigation, and from the opening of navigation to the marketing of the new crop, we have compiled the following statement, showing the arrivals of flour, wheat, corn and oats at New York within each of these respective periods.

RECRIPTS OF FLOUR, WHEAT, COAN AND OATS AT NEW YORK, 1866-67.

	Sept. 1 to	Dec. 1 '66.	May 1, '67, I	ec. 1, '66, to
	Dec 1, '66.		to B 11. 1, '67.	Sept. 1, '67.
Flourbbls.	974.000	747 000	687,000	1,884,009
Whe tbush.	2,678,000	2,148,000	1,842,000	8,450,000
Cornhush.		2,404,000	8,881,000	10,785,000
Oats bush.		1,887,000	1,724,600	8,561,000
				
Total bush, incl. flour	17,908,000	10,134,000	14,582,000	24,706,000

It thus appears that of the total arrivals of 42,614,000 bushels of wheat, corn and oats within the crop year 1866-7, 17,908,000 bushels were received between September 1 and December 1, and that the balance of 24,706,000 bushels came between the close of navigation and the termination of the crop year, a period of nine months, 10,124,000 bushels arriving during the six months suspension of navigation, and 14,582,000 bushels during the three months subsequent to the opening of navigation. About 42 per cent of the supply sent here is thus seen to have been forwarded within the first three months of the crop year: 24 per cent within the succeeding six months, and 34 per cent within the three last months. There is a manifest inequality in this movement. It is not easy to explain satisfactorily why such a heavy proportion should be kept back until the closing quarter; nor can it well be shown that the arrival of only 10,124,000 bushels, during the six months from December to May, is conducive to an even movement of the trade or to regularity of prices. It is easy to explain why, if 58 per cent of the Eastern supply is held back at the close of navigation, such a small proportion of that reserve should arrive here while the canals are frozen; for the limited capacity of the roads, their blockade by snow, and their high rates of freight as compared with water carriage, naturally cause grain to be held back until the opening of navigation. But the

question arises, is there any real advantage to the Western dealers and to the West at large, in so small a portion of the crop being forwarded East before the closing of the canals? The dealers suppose that by holding back in October and November they can induce a scarcity at the East which will enable them, for the time being, to get higher prices. They succeed in producing the comparative scarcity, and not unfrequently a temporary advance in prices; but, so long, as it is known that the supplies are stored in the West, the New York merchants operate cautiously, satisfied to work upon light stocks, and refuse to pay a price which they think inconsistent with the supply to come ultimately upon the market. The result is that the Chicago merchant fails to get the price he demands and finds, when it is too late, that he has to carry his stock for some months.

This detention of supplies, of course, tends to keep the Eastern markets lightly fed with grain during the ssupension of navigation; which, at first sight, would seem to be in favor of the West getting higher prices upon its shipments during that period. But against this apparent advantage must be set off the high freights paid during that period. The roads hold the shippers at their mercy, having no competition from the canals to keep down freights; and the result is that high charges have to be paid for transportation, which react upon the price of grain at the West. After February the New York dealers begin to anticipate the large supply to come upon the market on the opening of the canals, and regulate their bids accordingly, the anticipation of the near arrival of supplies being almost as influential on prices as the actual receipts. When navigation opens, a large amount of grain is of necessity crowded upon our markets. The Western banks are no longer willing to help the dealers in carrying their stocks, for the mercantile interest then comes in with large claims for accommodation; so that there is no course for the holders of grain but to realise precipitately upon their hoards; and, considering the large amount of grain to be sold within the three months before the marketing of the new crop, it is clear that then the Western seller is very much at the mercy of the Eastern buyer.

It must be further taken into account that the carrying of such large stocks involves heavy interest payments, heavy charges for storage and insurance, and a certain amount of risk of deterioration or damage to the grain; which act as another drawback against any extra price that may be supposed to be obtainable by holding back supplies. At New York, the grain could be carried through the winter months at little over one-half the discount charges paid at Chicago, money being then abundant here, and good produce paper negotiable at 6 per cent; or it would be

ready for shipment to foreign ports whenever prices might warrant such a movement. As evidence of the little benefit resulting to the West from holding the grain back during the season of 1866-7, we give below the actual price of Chicago Spring at New York the last Friday of each month during the autumn, winter and spring of that season:

Chicago Spring	Sep. 28, '66.	Oct. 26, '66.	Nov. 80, '66.	Dec. 27. 66.	Jan. 25,'67.
	\$1 90@\$ 60	\$2 00@2 55	\$1 90@2 85	\$1 90@2 45	\$1 90@2 40
Chicago Spring	Feb. 88, '67. \$1 90@2 85	Mar. 29,'67. \$2 10@2 65	Apr. 26, '67.	M-y 81, '67. 82 2. @3 50	June 48. '67 81 75@2 85

These figures give little encouragement to the present secumulation of stocks in the West. Beside, it clearly is not conducive to the interests of Western industry and trade that the means of the banks should be unnecessarily absorbed in the carrying of immense stocks of grain. Were a larger proportion of the Eastern supplies held through the winter in New York, the Western money markets would be easier, a lower rate of interest would prevail there, and the banks, instead of carrying a dead weight for several months, would be the better enabled to foster the thousand profitable enterprises in that section which so much need and so much deserve support; while our own banks would find more legitimate employment for their ample balances, than in lending them to Wall street operators to be used in demoralizing stock speculations.

TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN THE SEABOARD AND THE WEST.

The extension of the means of transportation between the West and the Atlantic seaboard is the supreme commercial necessity of the times. Beyond the Alleghanies lies the finest trace of agricultural and mineral country on the face of the globe, occupied by a people unsurpassed for practical intelligence, industry and enterprise. Every year, the population of this section is fast increasing its numbers and enlarging its products; and this rapid expansion of Western industry demands a corresponding increase in the facilities for commercial intercourse with other sections and other countries. At present, New York is the grand depot for marketing the surplus products of the West; and thus far our railroads and canals have proved an adequate means of outlet for them. It is not to be imagined, however, that a region with such immense resources is to be always, nor even much longer, dependent upon one market and one port. Nor is it desirable, for the interests of this city, that such dependence should be unduly prolonged. The prosperity of the West is conducive to the welfare of the whole country; and what benefits the country at large is advantageous especially to this port.

But, be this as it may, New York can control no trade which cannot

be done through its agency more advantageously than through others; and if new routes should be opened, establishing cheaper and quicker communication between the Atlantic and the great grain section, we must cheapen and quicken ours, or it must inevitably result that a portion of the heavy freight trade of the Western interior would take the new direction. A shorter and cheaper connection between the European markets and the West would, indeed, create its own traffic, in addition to that already existing. Whatever reduction is effected in the cost of transporting grain is so much gained in our ability to compete with European producers; and cheaper transportation would therefore insure an extended demand for Western food products abroad. Western expansion is now crippled by the cost of carrying commodities immense distances at high prices. Remove this obstacle, and we should witness an extension of agriculture unprecedented in that rapidly developing section. The growth of the West constantly keeps ahead of the progress of the railroads; and the result is that the transportation companies control absolutely the rates of freight and, by their high charges and frequently inadequate accommodation, act as a restriction upon the sources whence their traffic is derived. Each railroad having as much freight as it can carry, there is no motive for competition between the several companies, but rather for collusion to secure the highest possible rates; which is clearly a condition of things unfavorable to the commercial interests of the country at large.

Upon the foregoing considerations, we welcome any feasible effort to introduce competition in transportation between the East and West, and especially when the new route promises to effect a saving in time and distance. The convention held last week at Norfolk, Va., made a gratifying show of strength in favor of a railroad enterprise by which it is proposed to connect that port with the valley of the Ohio and the vast and fertile lands of the Mississippi valley. Judging from the earnestness shown at that gathering of Western capitalists, it may be regarded as a settled matter that a connection will soon be established between the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and Louisville. The supplying of such a link would connect the ports of Virginia with the most thriving sections of the West, Northwest and Southwest by a shorter route than now connects them with New York. The distance, by the proposed route, from Louisville to Norfolk would be 714 miles, or 351 miles less than from Louisville to New York; from Cairo the distance would be 400 miles less than to New York, and from Cincinnati 237 miles less. There is here a very broad basis for a material saving on the transportation of the heavy freights of the West, the distance of these sections from the Atlantic being reduced about one-third. The route, it is also

claimed, would have very important advantages over the existing routes in respect to grades, the maximum grade being 68 feet to the mile. while that of the Pennsylvania Central is 100 feet and that of the Baltimore and Ohio 116 feet. Running through a mild climate, the road would be subject to none of the interruptions arising from ice and snow which embarrass the New York and Pennsylvania roads. The West, and Cincinnati especially, needs facilities that will enable it to forward its produce as freely in the winter, when navigation is suspended, as at any other time; while it equally requires the means of sending to market its crops in the fall without glutting both the roads and the canals; and that desideratum would be met by supplying the lacking link between the Virginia roads and those of Kentucky. The road would be available for the transportation of Western produce destined to New York at a season when the existing roads are overcrowded or when the canals are frozen, which would be of great importance to the grain trade of this city.

It is contemplated to establish a line of steamships to run between Norfolk and Liverpool, designed to carry the heavy class of freight brought over the new route, and supplying the facilities for through shipments from the West to Great Britain. Here, perhaps, is the weak point in this scheme for making Norfolk a great port for Western products. For although it is easily conceivable how the vessels may get ample outward cargoes, yet it is by no means apparent where the return cargoes are to come from, seeing that the Atlantic imports are naturally attracted to the New York market. The projectors evidently aim to divert emigration to that point as a basis of return traffic, and propose, as an inducement for emigrants to come by their vessels, to give them free transportation from Norfolk to their destination. The representatives of the connecting railroads promised in the convention to grant this advantage to settlers coming in the Norfolk steamers. They cannot, however, make such a gratuity without some considerable cost. If the sacrifice should induce emigrants to sail for Norfolk in preference to New York, there would be some compensation to the roads; for the profits of the steamers upon the emigrant trade would place them in the better position for carrying freight cheap; but if it should fail to attract emigrants, the vessels would have to charge proportionately higher rates of freight, which would make against the economy of the route to Western torwarders. The great earnestness shown by the West in forwarding this enterprise, as a new outlet for its products and a source of competition with the Eastern routes, warrants the expectation that much will be done by the merchants of that section to estab ish trade on the route; and, with such aid at the beginning, its natural

advantages may be relied upon to secure it ultimately an important position as a line of communication between the grain States and Liverpool.

Contemporaneously with these efforts, steps are being taken for connecting the Chesapeake Bay with the West by an unbroken line of navigation. The shortest natural water line between the Atlantic and the West undoubtedly lies between the mouth of the James River and the commence ment of the Ohio. This reute it is proposed to open by completing the unfinished portion of the Virginia canal, over the 80 miles between its present terminus at Buchanan and the Greenbrier River: which would connect steam navigation at Richmond with steam navigation in the Kanawha, by a canal 277 miles in length. In this way a connection would be opened between the Chesapeake Bay and the river system of the West, with its immense flat-boat traffic, a system which admits of unlimited ramification by the building of canals connecting the great water lines.

. These movements for opening, at the same time, railroad and water communication between the West and the Chesapeake Bay indicate a public sense of the pressing necessity for ampler transportation accommodation for the rapidly expanding interests of the interior; and, considering the comparatively light outlay of capital required for the completion of the enterprises, there can be no doubt of their ultimate realization, and as little question that a new era of commercial development will be the result.

FRANCE AND SPAIN.

Now that the Spanish revolution is an accomplished fact, and now that it is hardly less certain that Napoleon III. will in no direct way interfere with its progress than it is that the Pope can do no more for her most Catholic majesty than offer her the Quirinal for a palace and Rome for a place of sojourn, it begins to be hoped that the mighty change which has occured in Spain may have some good effect upon the uncertain and therefore perilous condition of affairs in France. This hope is by no means unreasonable. In the first place, the downfall of the government of Queen Isabella II. must weaken the clerical party in France, and the necessity of keeping well with the clerical party in France has been one of the Emperor's most perplexing political obligations. Under the inspiration of a fanatical nun known as Sister Patrocinio and of a scheming priest, Father Clariet, advanced by the Queen to the dignity of Archbishop of Tarragona, the government of Queen Isabella II. had probably become the model clerical government of Europe.

The priesthood in Spain were all-powerful over matters relating to the social life and training of the Spanish people. Their order had gradually recovered all and more than all the power which it had lost by the liberal decrees which several years ago broke up the monastic institutions. What Von Beust has forbidden Austria any more to be, what Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, and his coadjutors would gladly see France become, that Spain was. It will be difficult now even for the ingenious Bishop of Orleans himself to disprove the evidence offered by the Spanish revolution of the impotence of a strictly clerical support to sustain a temporal dynasty. Paith in the church undoubtedly is still a power in France, and particularly in rural France. But it is much less of a power in France than it was and is in Spain. If the Bourbons, nevertheless, found it a broken reed at Madrid, why should the Benapartes be asked to lean very heavily upon it at Paris!

The Emperor Napoleon III., then, may find himself to a certain extent set free by the triumph of Prim and Serrano from the bondage of that organization in France which has done more than any other single force, so far, to foil the attempts which he himself has repeatedly made to expand and liberalize the imperial system. The French clergy themselves, if they be not utterly blind to the condition of the world they live in, must recognize the fact that the success of the church in Spain has been its ruin. The Spanish church finds itself to-day imperilled by the downfall of the mon archy which it had made too much and too openly its own tool. The French church will hardly now be kept with a very firm hand upon the same fatal course by the experienced ecclesiastics who control its helm.

Again, the Spanish revolution, so long as it prospers as it has up to this time prospered without damaging social order in Spain, or endangering the foreign relations of the country, must relieve the French government to a certain extent from its complications in that most complicated and perilous question of France and Rome. The overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons deals a death-blow to the intrigues of the Neepolitan Bourbons with the Roman court, while at the same time it throws the Roman court more helplessly than ever into the arms of the French government. Were the project mentioned in some quarters as under consideration at Florence and Paris to be carried out, and the Spanish throne to be offered to and accepted by the Prince Amadeus, of Savoy, the second son of King Victor Emmanuel, it would become absolutely necessary for the Papal court to make its peace with Italy, and to relax its tormenting hold upon France And finally, without wandering too far into speculations upon the possible bearing of a series of events which are still working out, it is clear that the emancipation of Spain, and the revival of her energies under a capable and feasible government must strengthen the Emperor Napoleon against the extreme war party in France which for two years past has been urging him madly on, in season and out of season, to a war with Prussia, for the purpose of preventing the consolidation of Germany.

The tact that Italy is to-day a power of importance, and that the force of Italy might be turned against France in certain contingencies, has already had its influence in fortifying the Emperor's policy of resistance against the impetuosity of the clamorers for the "natural boundaries of France." The rise beyond the Pyrenees of a new Spain not incapable of becoming what the Spain of old so often was, a decisive make weight in the balance of European power, will reinforce this tempering and modifying influence of the Italian resurrection upon the pride and the passions of the French people. Of course nothing of all this good could be looked for, were the Spanish revolution to degenerate, as so many friends of Spain have feared, and as all the foes of Spain have hoped it might, into a chaotic and anarchical conflict between the theories of philosophers and fanatics on the one hand, and the ambition of unscrupulous adventurers on the other.

The disposition manifested at the outset by a few members of the Madrid Junta to dabble in political experiments, after the manner of the French revolutionists of 1848, seems however, to have been effectually arrested. M. de Girardin, in La Liberte, concedes the establishment of a Spanish republic to be now impracticable, and congratulates Europe that the future of Spain just now rests upon one man, Marshal Serrano, Duke of La Torre, who is at once sensible and honest. We may not unreasonably anticipate, therefore, at no distant day, the formal settlement of the Spanish crown, under a well-ordered constitutional system, upon some prince of alien blood, but of mature years, and of respectable political capacity. The advent of such a prince as the ex-king Ferdinand of Portugal, for instance, to the Spanish throne, would be hailed by Europe as the presage of a real restoration of Spain to the place which of right is here in the family of nations.

How greatly France now needs what we may call the moral and political tonic of such an issue of the Spanish revolution, may be measured by the fact that capital in France is flowing as freely as water into the coffers of the French government. It is but the other day that, in response to a call for a new loan, the French Minister of Finance received, in twenty-four hours time, offers to the amount of thirty-four times the sum required. And the short loans of the French government, corresponding to what are known in English finance as "Exchequer Bills," have just been renewed at the unprecedented rate of one half per cent a year.

These facts, usually cited in proof of the popularity of the imperial government, really show, as the London *Economist* wisely suggests, only its actual ill-effect upon French interests and French public opinion. The credit of

the French government is independent upon the credit of any particular dynasty in France. It reposes upon the intelligent confidence of Frenchmen in the unbounded resources of France, and upon the moral certainty that "whatever king may reign" the Rentes will surely be paid. But France within a few years past has made enormous progress in the development of her industry and her resources. She has prospered exceedingly, and accumulated a vast store of readily available capital. Were the policy of the French government clearly known and satisfactory, these accumulations would naturally find their way into the vortex of industry and trade, and the government, though it might still borrow at an advantage as compared with other governments would still be obliged to pay something more than nominal rates of interest. Now, on the contrary, the anxiety of men as to a future of war or of peace chills private enterprise, and capital locks itself up for safety, not for profit, in the public funds.

A practical and prosperous government in Spain by its influence in deciding the positive triumph of a peace policy in France, may therefore, perhaps, accomplish for France, Europe and the world happy results not less important than those whih it will schieve for Spain herself.

THE PROSPECTIVE PREMIUM ON GOLD.

The decline in the price of gold from 150 in July to 137½ within the present week, however influenced by speculation, has been the result of well defined movements. The rise in the premium, three months ago, was mainly due to what then appeared to be a reasonable prospect of a serious adverse balance in our foreign trade. During the first six months of the year, we had exported from New York alone \$60,000,000 of specie, an unprecedented amount for that period, and yet our imports were increasing, while our exports were falling below the value of those last year, and we had to provide for the payment of \$7,200,000 on account of the purchase of Alaska. Few or none considered it safe to rely upon the continuance of the exportation of bonds upon any considerable scale, and it was therefore deemed inevitable that we must make further he vy drafts upon our already reduced stock of gold, in order to balance our trade indebtedness to Europe.

It was principally upon these considerations that gold advanced to 150. Relief, however, came from the quarter least expected. It proved that notwithstanding the immense amount of United States bonds held in Europe, the market there was open to take still more at the easier prices induced by the rise in gold; and contrary to all expectation, Government securities were sent out steadily, during July and August, to an aggregate

amount variously estimated from \$25,000,000 to \$40,000,000, besides several million shares of the Erie Railway Company. This very large contribution toward the adjustment of our foreign trade account, virtually averting a heavy drain of specie, completely changed the condition of the gold market and produced a steady decline in the premium, as the magnitude of the movement came to be generally appreciated.

The downward tendency has also been accelerated by the result of the harvest affording promise of an abundant surplus of food products for export. It is difficult, however, to estimate with even approximate accuracy the course of the foreign trade movement for the next few weeks, upon which the price of gold must be in a large degree dependent. During the months of July, August and September, the imports at this port have varied but little from those of the same period of last year, the total being \$72,800,000, against \$65,400,000 in 1867. The produce exports at New York, for the same period, have been \$39,800,000, against \$42,000,000 last year. Perhaps it may be safely assumed that, for the next three months, the imports will not vary materially from those of the same quarter of 1867. There would seem to be good reason, however, for anticipating that the course of the exports will be more favorable than last year. Our exports of field products may certainly be relied upon to yield us a larger return; the only question being, whether the improvement will come at once, or be delayed through a temporary holding back for better prices. Thus far, our shipments of breadstuffs have not been so large as might have been expected from the abundance of the crops. At the West, grain is held above the views of Eastern shippers; and it is very possible that the Western dealers may keen back their produce antil the close of navigation, in which event the exportation of our surplus of breadstuffs would be in a considerable measure delayed until the Spring of next year. The arrivals of grain at New York from August 1 to October 13, compared with those of last year, have been as follows:

	Oct. 18, 1868	Aug. 18, 1867.
Flour, bbls	7 1.680	908.545
Corn meal, bbls	25 245	17.045
Wheat, bush	2,716,865	8.44(1.900)
Corn, bush	7.091.870	6.085,445
Ryc. bush	105,995	963,745
Barley, &c., bush	616.935	708,930
Oats, bush	2.797.210	9.665.086
•		-,,,

The stock of grain in New York warehouses on the 12th instant was as follows, compared with the same period of last year:

Oct 12, 1988.	Oct. 14, 1867.
Wheat, bush	167,608
Corn. bush	967,664
Oate, bush	89 1,897
Barley, bush	89,798
Malt, burh	57.977
Peas, bueh 83,890	
Rye, bush 81,825	19,945 7,800
Market Care Care	20.100.404



It is apparent from these figures that our grain shippers have not been in a position to make shipments this fall at all proportionate to the large increase in our surplus; it is therefore to be expected that sooner or later we shall have a large amount of exchange made against this class of exports. Our exports of breadstuffs for the fiscal year 1867-8, are stated in the official returns at \$69,000,000. The exportable surplus of wheat alone, this year, is estimated at about 40,000,000 bushels, which, at current and probable prices, would realize much more than our whole shipments of flour and grain last year. The corn crop is also abundant and likely to yield us a liberal exportable snrplus; when it is considered that the whole quantity of corn exported last fiscal year was only 11,500,-000 bushels, it is apparent that here also there must be some gain in the value of our shipments. These facts show that, allowing for the late decline in prices, our exports of breadstuffs, for the current fiscal year, may easily realize from \$25,000,000 to \$30,000,000 more than those of 1867-8, The cotton crop is being held back from the same cause which checks the shipments of breadstuffs. The planters are this year absolute owners of their cotton, and the stocks being small, they hold their cotton with considerable firmness. It is quite possible that there may be a temporary check in the exports of this staple from this cause; but there is every reason to expect that the result for the whole year will exceed in value that of last year. From all thus far ascertained as to the prospect of the yield, it would apparently be safe to estimate that we shall have a surplus of 1,700,000 bales for export. Estimating the average price for the year at the low figure of 20 cents per pound (with gold averaging, say 185), the total value of our exports of this staple would be about \$150,000,000, which, though about the same in currency value as the cotton exports of 1867-8, would yet yield a higher value in gold, the premium having then averaged above the foregoing estimate.

The course of supply and demand upon the gold market for the last quarter of the year is not likely to affect materially the premium. A large amount of coin interest becomes payable at the Treasury on the 1st of November, and although probably some \$14,000,000 of the total may be due to foreign bondholders, yet it is anticipated among foreign bankers that fully one half that amount will be set off by remittances of bonds. From this date, to the close of the year, the supply of commercial bills is generally such as to require comparatively small exports of specie. The probable course of market supply and demand for the whole country, for the months of October, November and December, may be thus estimated:

<u></u>	PROBABLE SUPPLY.	
From California		\$7,500,000
From imports	 .	1 500 000
From November coin interest.	**********	86,000,000
From Treasury sales	**************************	12,000,000

PROBABLE WITHDRAWALS.	
por ('ustoms duties	\$87,500,000
For export (same as in 1867)	18,000,000
Total withdrawals	C00.002.83
Probable avoses of withdrawals	66 200 000

It would thus appear probable that the movement of specie is likely to result in a slight loss from the market within the three months. On the 1st of October, however, there was \$20,200,000 of private gold on deposit in the Treasury, against \$14,800,000 at the same date of 1867; so that the market will, on the whole, probably be better supplied for the current quarter than during the same period of last year.

PACTITIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE MONRY MARKET.

The sudden advance of 2 to 3 per cent in the rate of interest, at the close of September, was not wholly unexpected with those familiar with the sinuosities of Wall street. In September and October, the cropmovements usually take a considerable amount of currency from the New York banks to the interior, and call for an increase of discounts; and as the banks are required to make up their quarterly statement on the first Monday in October, there are always ordinary causes at work about the close of September which expose the loan market to extraneous and artificial interference. This year, owing to well known causes, less currency was sent West in September than usual, and the re discounting of grain bills was also on a limited scale; the result being that money was loaned on call at 4 per cent up to near the close of the month, against full 7 per cent at the same period of last year. So little was this ease expected that Wall street dealers borrowed largely late in August and early in September at 6 and 7 per cent on three months time; and these anticipatory transactions so far reduced the demand for call loans that there can be little doubt the low rates would have been continued into October had the market been allowed to take its natural course.

During the last week of the month, however, certain operations were undertaken designed specifically to tighten the market, and money suddenly became so scarce that, upon a large proportion of the call loans made outside the banks, rates of interest were paid above the legal limit. These transactions were conducted by wealthy combinations of stock speculators, the object being to break down the prices of securities; a purpose, however, which was not realized, the larger holders of stocks having fortified themselves by time loans. Both gold and securities appear to have been used for borrowing greenbacks, the currency thus obtained being either locked up in the borrower's safe, or sealed up and used as

collateral for new loans and the operation repeated to any extent consistent with the secresy necessary to such a transaction. It is estimated that, in this way, several millions of legal tender notes were temporarily held out of circulation until Saturday last; when, the banks having completed their preparations for the quarterly statement, the money was returned into circulation. These operations imply a collusion between bank managers and the speculators conducting them, to which it is difficult to conceive how any conservative bank official could lend himself. There is some reason for supposing, however, that bank officers may have been overborne through the parties to the "tying-up operations" securing temporarily a large amount of the stock of the bank.

These operations are not a violation of any existing law; nor is it perhaps desirable that any effort should be made to restrain them by legal enactment: for means would always be found to evade any such restric-The remedy must rather be found in the moral opprobrium which ever falls upon those who adopt dishonorable expedients in business, and in the measures of self protection which are early learnt by those who suffer from these transactions. Last fall, the expedient of locking up greenbacks was successful; holders of stocks were compelled to realise, panic seized upon the stock market, securities declined heavily, brokers first failed and then merchants; and out of this ruin the authors made rich gains. The lesson, however, was too costly to be soon forgotten; and the result was that although the locking-up process was tried previous to the spring quarterly bank statement, parties carrying secuties were found to have protected themselves by long loans, as they have done in this last instance; so that after one successful experiment, there have been two unsuccessful. It is reasonable to hope that the participators in these disreputable raids upon the loan market, after finding that they only gratuitously degrade themselves before the community by their efforts, will adopt more honorable means for conducting their speculations. It is nevertheless a reflection upon the business morality of the financial metropolis of the country that prominent capitalists, controlling large corporate interests, should be found willing to stoop to such degrading and mischievous expedients. Such proceedings have a direct tendency to encourage laxity of honor in Wall street operations generally, and to lower the standing of that practical integrity which has made the brokers' word as good as his bond; they strike at the foundation of all confidence and good faith.

An attempt has been made in some quarters to throw the blame for the late stringency upon the Treasury Department, as if to conceal the real authors of the derang-ments. A fair examination of the facts, however, will we think exonerate the Government officials from all responsibility. On the 1st of September, the Treasury held in its vaults but \$15,000,000

of currency. There was good reason for expecting that the receipts from internal revenue in September would fall below the disbursements of the month; while it was necessary to keep in view the possibility of the banks. in preparing for their quarterly statement, having to present a portion of their Three Per Cent Certificates for redemption. Under these circumstances, it was clear that the Secretary must report to the sale of bonds or gold, or both, in order to realize currency; although the extent to which it was necessary to carry these sales could be ascertained only by the gradual discovery of the amount of the disbursements; so that a certain portion of the sales was of necessity thrown toward the latter part of the month. The Assistant Treasurer commenced with the sale of bonds; and from the last debt statement it would appear that \$3,600,000 of Five-Twenties were sold, realizing about \$4,000,000. After the third week of September, the sales of bonds were suspended, and on the 22d the Assistant Treasurer began to realize on gold, continuing his sales until the 30th, and selling in all \$2,300,000. During the sales of bonds, and of nearly one-half of the sales of gold, money was extremely easy, call loans being 3@5 per cent; and, upon the stringency setting in, the sales of gold were suspended, and the checks received against the sales of the last two or three days of the month were held back from presentation at the banks, out of voluntary consideration for their convenience. There was certainly nothing in these transactions calculated to interfere with the convenience of the banks; on the contrary, the Department showed a commendable readiness to accommodate them, as far as possible, when they had been subjected to pressure from speculative combinations. It is true that the Treasury realised, in September, about \$7,250,000 in bonds and gold taking temporarily that amount out of the banks; but these receipts were immediately disbursed; indeed, from the fact of the currency balance being on the 1st of October only \$13,300,000. It appears that the Treasury paid to the banks in September \$1,700,000 more than it received—a fact which again shows the pressing necessity of the Secretary realising upon gold and bonds. In view of these facts, we cannot but regard the late animadversions upon the action of the Treasury in these matters as very inconsiderate, not to say uncandid and unjust.

The frequent recurrence of extraneous tampering with the money market has led many to doubt the wisdom of the provision in the National Bank Act requiring the banks to make a statement of their condition on the first Monday of each quarter. The knowledge that on a certain day of April and October, periods when money is always most active, the banks are apt to call in loans in order to place their affairs in a conservative condition, holds out a temptation to seize the occasion for producing an artificial stringency; and so strong is the inducement that the experi-

ment has been made repeatedly upon an extended scale, and the recurrence of the April and October statements has thus become a source of much uneasiness in the money market and of regular periodical disturbance to business. It has been proposed, therefore, that Congress should remedy the evil by requiring the statements to be made, not upon any fixed and invariable date, but at periods to be determined from time to time by the Comptroller, and always antecedent to the date of notification and of the required return. In this way, it is urged, the dangers and the inconveniences, as well as the deceptions, attendant upon the present system of statements would be effectually obviated. There are, however, obvious objections to this proposed change, but we forego for the present the discussion of the subject.

CHICAGO, BUBLINGTON AND QUINCY BAILBOAD.

(ORGANIZED UNDER THE CONSOLIDATION OF JULY 9, 1856, AND SUBSEQUENT PURCHASES.)

The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad is a consoli ation of the Chicago and Aurora and the Central Military Tract Railroads. The company acquired the Peoria and Oquawka and the Quincy and Chicago (form rly the Northern Cross) railroads by purchase. The Lewiston branch was a donation. Previous to May 2, 1864, when the new line between Aurora and Chicago was spened to traffic, the cars of the company passed to and from Chicago over the Galena and Chicago Union Railroad, from the Junction to Chicago, a distince of 30 miles, for the use of which a stipulated percentage of carnings was paid.

The lines of the company, as now constructed, have a total length of 400 miles, accounted for as follows:

Awrers and Chicago Railroad—Junction 80 miles west of Chicago to A. Tors. Central Military / ract Railroad—Aurers to Galesburg Peor. a and Oquawka Bailroad—Peoria, via Galesburg, to Burlington Quincy and Chicago Railroad—Galesburg to Quincy Levision Branch Bailroad—Yates City to Lewiston. Chicago Extension Railroad (new)—Aurora to Chicago	700	
These several lines constitute by combination—		
A line from Chicago to Burlington	204 263 95	miles.

—and two branches, viz.: one from Aurora to the Chicago Junction 13 miles, and the other from Yates City to Lewiston, the latter to be extended north to Buda and Dixon, by the Dixon, Peoria and Hannibal Railroad Company, and south to Hannibal. The American Central Railroad, now on the eve of completion, will leave Galva on the main line, 142 miles from Chicago, and extend to New Boston, on the Mississippi, affording an aditional feeder of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad. At Burlington the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy road connects with the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad, which will next year be completed to a junction with the Union Pacific Railroad at or beyond

Omaha. At Quincy connection is made with eq. Hannibal and St. Joseph Builroad, which, with its extensions, already connects with the Central and Eastern Divisions of the Union Pacific Railroad. The eastern connections are ample, including all the railroads leaving Chicago, and the more direct line leaving Peoria and forming part of the Columbus, Chicago and Indianapolis Central Bailroad Line.

The oper-ting accounts of the company for the years ending April 30, 1867 and 1868, compare as allows in the statement which follows:

Pa-senger earnings Fr. ight	4.194.692.99	1967-68. \$1 489,506 93- 4,214,911 86 465,238 97	Increase. \$ 92,318 87 40,498 06	Decrease, \$61,307 28
Total gross earnings Operating expenses	\$6,068,189 05 8,098 574 07	\$6,154,647 25 8,067,165 55	\$71,509 20	\$ 36,408 58
Net earnings	\$2,969,568 98	\$8, 67,481 70	\$97,917 72	

The company owned at the close of the two last years, respectively, the following amount of rolling stock: Locomotives, 119-122; passenger cars, 55-55; baggage, mail and express cars, 27-30; pay car, 0-1; house, freight and cattle cars, 1,659-1,817; Blue Line cars 40-00: platform and coal cars, 493-555; drovers' and conductors' cars, 43-49; gravel cars, 40-40; tool cars, 2-2; pile driving car, 1-1; rubble cars, 86-99; hand cars, 123-123; and wrecking cars, 2-2-total cars, 2,571-2,774, being an increase of 203 in the last year.

The number of miles run by locomotives, a d the number of passengers and tons of freight carried, with the mileage thereof, is shown in the following account:

Miles run by passenger trains	1.194,759 584,934	7 0,560	Increase 66,000 24,848 198,440 226,988	Do rease
Passe: gers carried esst	466,909 917,390	449,060 458,978 908,0 \s 89,781,629	•••••	1 858 7,994 9,789 2,558,154
Tons carried east	¥78,56\$	508,588 424,906 987,469 18 3,48 5,097	44,168	41,074 2,561,978

The earnings, expenses and profits per mile of road operated in the two years, as above, was as follows:

Gross carni: gs per mile	\$15,207 84	215,886 62	2178 78	\$
Ope ating expenses per mile	7,788 98		•	66 QB
Profits (net cernis ge) per ml e	7,478 91	7,718 71	944 80	
l xpenses, per cent		49.83	••••	1.09
Taxes to gross earnings	8.07 p. c.	8.24 p. c.	0.17 p. c.	*****

The income account for the years 1866-67 and 1867-68 shows the following results:

Balance to credit May 1	2,989,563 98 68,728 70	8,087,481 70 44,081 89		Decrease. \$ 20,641 21
Trustees Quin & C. KR	••••	24,571 74	24, 571 74	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Total revenue	\$8,641,979 28	\$ 5,060,6 \$ 0 83	\$1,418,651 60	8

Dishursed as berewith stated:						
Rent of tricks & depots	\$14,288	14	\$10,970 0	10	\$	\$8,188 14
Interest on bond	406,758	81	868,554 9	18	*********	48,198 88
Taxes, t to & County	111,885	74	128,805 9	Ю	14,970 16	
U. S. tax on earn'gs, &c	72,278	94	71,931 9	Ю	*** ***	1,047 74
Tran-fer office expenses	1,000		1,000 (******	******
Divi'nd, May 15, '66 & '67	809,650		519,950 G		10,800 00	*******
" Nov. 1, '66, andSept. 5, '67	509,650		519,950 0	Ò	10,300 00	*******
Dividend, March 16, '68	,		697,195 (627,195 00	*******
U. S tax on dividends	63,933	10	197,905 1		114,982 9	*******
Distribution of stock Sept 15, 1967	••••		2,079 800 0		2,079,810 00	
Bonds purchased for sinking fund	50,600		49,500 (õ		1,100 00
				_		-,
Total disbursements	\$1,786,488	28	\$4.568,662 ()8	\$2,883,178 HO	*****
Bal. to credit Apr. 30	\$1,905,496	00	\$491.968 8	30	•••••	\$1,418,627 20

A further divid nd of 5 per cent was payable Sept. 15, 1868. The distribution of stock, Sept. 15, 1867, was equal to 20 per cent on the capital, then amounting to \$10,399,010. The total cash dividends during the last five years have been equal to 52 per cent, and the stock detributed equal to 50 per cent. The profits represented by stock distributions have been used in the road and equipment, the co: struction of the Burlington bridge and other improvements The bridge at Quincy does not involve the rnances of the Company, being built by a separate organization, under arrangements with all the companies whose railroads terminate at that point. These bridges are about ready for use. The bridge at Quincy is about 4,000 eet, and that at Burlington about 2,237 feet long. Both rest upon stone piers, and the superstructure is entirely of iron, with draws for the passage of r ver craft. When completed they will be structures of great beauty as well as of very great importance to the business of the country as well as of the railroad companies. Of the total gross earnings of this Company in 1867-68 (\$6,154,647 25), the amount contributed by business passing over it to and from the Hannibal & St Joseph Railroad was \$607,597 90, and that to and from the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad \$391,069 50, or together \$998,667 40, nearly a sixth of the aggregate busine s of the Company.

The financial condition of the Company, as exhibited on the balance-sheets of April 30, 1867 and 1868, is shown in the following statement, with the increase and occrease in the last-named year.

	1867.		8		8	\$
Capital s ock	10,899,010	ထ	12,544,080	00	2.145.020 00	
Fun ed debt	5.45S.25J	00	5,918,750	00	********	289,500 00
Due N Cross HR bondholders			270,000		270,000 00	
Unclaimed dividends	2,016	00	2,853		887 00	*********
Unpaid acc unts & pay-rolls	299,498	81	296,850			2,612 79
Due agents and roads	64,038					.,
Sinking fund	828,796					
Sinking fund	1,900,496					1,418,597 20
2222200 01 1100210 11000111111111111111	210001220					-,
Total	18,957,094	01	19,785,777	68	828,758 63	•••••
Against which amounts are charged						
Construction (400 m)	18,246,710	70	14.507.814	47	1,960,683 77	*******
Equ pment	2,956,327	52	8,905,407			*********
Due on Northern Cross R.R	270,000	00	270,000			
Maier ais on and		69	440,151	05		*******
Pullman Palace ar o, stock \$73,800			48,900		48,900 00	
Steam ferry and other boats	41,888				4,073 50	*********
Builington depot grounds & accretions	*****		126,187		196,187 55	••••
Chicago t ams for transferring freight	4,500					*********
Account and bills	208,878					
Burl & Mo. Riv RR off. et's	180,028				119,695 79	*********
Due from agents and ro-ds	61,728					298 09
Div No. 14 and tax hereon						
Deposit it New York, Boston and Treasury						498,562 59
Dep. with litestees say fund						
Pah. Mitt II frasons ave sendices	200,000	- 34		-30		n1,000 00
Total	18,957,024	01	19,785,777	68	896,758 63	

The following table shows the highest and lowest sale prices of this company's stock at New York, in e ch month of the five years, 1863-68:

Months.	1868-64.	1964-65.	1865-66.	1866-67.	1867-68.
	103 @120	126 @142	101 2110	114 @117	180 (2)183
М.у					
June		126 % (c. 183	104 @168	116 @121	183 @148
July	114 @116%	126 6188	100 /4 (20 11%	194 @195	144 @150
August	115 @ 263	127 @ 181	111 @118	129 (2):30	196 (2)153
Bept	120 @123	117 6127	112 6 126	128 6 138¥	194 @1961
Octof er		111 @115	184 @1 0	1834@187	12646137
Novombr		115 @120	110%@115	181 @1881	1×8 @185
Dec m > r	115 @11736	116k@118	118 @115	180 6184	186 6 3187
Ja: ua y	118 @129	114 (2)120	109%@114	129 @188	188 @14834
February		115 @190	119 6112	129 @130%	144 615836
March		100 @118	119 2115	12934 @ 132	149 % (2:50
April	132 @149	108 @117	115 @117%	180 @185	150 6150

Year	108 @149	100 @143	102 @130	114 @186%	1 34 @153 %
Dividends	9 p. c.	18 p. c.	10 p. c.	10 p. c.	10 % p. c.
Distrio'ns		y 26, 10 "Oc		Re Se	ກ 15. 20 ້ີພິ
Districts		,, 20 00	o., ~o	D1	p 10, 20

Additional for 1868-09: May 140@180%; June 181@184; July 184@165; August 170@178; September ...@...; range 142@178.

MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON BAILROAD.

Articles relating to the Memphis and Charlest n Railroad were published in the Magazins of November, 1866, and November, 1867. We now add another year's record to our previous reviews, comparing the results of the two fisca years ending respectively June 30, 1867 and 1868. The gross earnings from transportation compare as shown in the following summary:

Passer ger earnings	686,886 85 27,199 62	1877-68. \$589,834 41 465,845 79 41,700 89	Increase. \$ 18,900 77	Decrease. \$390,674 63 171,041 06
Express Reuts and pr vileges	76,7±0 00 9,406 98	59,700 00 17,848 54	8,436 61	17,020 00
Total	1,661,612 48	1,174,914 18	•••••	486,698 30
Less, t e tollowing amounts expen	ded:			
Transportation Mot ve power Maintenance of way. Maintenance of cars.	888,848 59 829,4%7 00	\$282,685 67 \$58,278 28 206,610 07 82,538 89	8	\$51,409 47 80,570 94 121,856 98 29,450 47
Total		890,107 86		284,817 11
Net earnings		\$344,806 27	\$	\$902,881 19

The extraordinary falling off in revenue in 1867-68, as compared with the previous year, is attributable in a great measure to the thort crop of cotton and the impoverished condition of the country through which the line presses, as well as to a large reduction made in local rates, both freight and passenger. Besides, the epidemic which prevailed at Memphis last fall and summer almost suspended business for four months, while the inability of the Virginia rai roads to move cotton promptly, and the derangements at Charleston were also great hindrances, preventing large shipments to Eastern cities for several months during the quainess selson.

The road is now in fair running order, and the stock of cars and locomotives ample for any ordinary requirements of business. During the year there was added to the equipment 102 box freight, 43 platform and 10 stock cars, and one baggage car, and a further gradual increase is provided for. The present equip-

ment consists of 55 locomotives, 38 passenger and mail cars, 7 baggage cars, 1 hay and 1 street car, 3 6 box and 156 platform cars, 14 stock cars 1 wrecking car and 79 road and hand cars. The mi eage and operations in 1866-7 and 1867-68, compare as follows:

Train, miles	294.818	1867-68. 751,942 197,016 95,289	Increase.	Dec. 84,889 96,883 6,587
The des ination of the cotton was as follo	ws:			
Memphis Corinih and Tuscumbia. Decatur Hunt-villa Steve son	2,962 6:0 881	78,764 278 4,859 646 578	8,818 157 1,897 86 243	***** **** **** ****

The total fiscal operations of the company for the years as above, as exhibited on the profit and loss account are shown in the following abstract:

Balance, July 1	5 Balance, July 1	1867-8. 880,107 95,781 111,960 20,675 15W,881 490,964 20,990
Total	9 Total	1,728,912

Since the completion of the road and branches (Jan. 1, 1860) there has been declared and paid nine dividend—two stock and seven cash. The following is a list thereof with the date of declaration, rate and in what paid.

No. 1 December i, 1859	0 per cent	k stock	21,851,125
2February 29, 1860		cash	
8 A gue , 1869	4 "	**	152,50
4 February, 1861	4 "	41	152,501
5 N. ptemb-r 30, 1861	4 "	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	159,501
6January 9, 1869		stock	1,830 843
7 February 2, 1862	4 "	cash	219,389
8 . March 8 , 1863	4 "	conf. cur	
9 March xl. 1868		cash	169.881

The sto k dividends represented earnings u ed in construction, and were charged to that account. The balance sheets of the 30th June, 1867 and 1868, respectively, compare as follows:

	1867.		1868.		Increase.	Decrease.
Capita' stock	\$5,819,725	00	\$5.812,725	00	\$	8
Tennessee State loan	1,595,530	00	1,695,530	00	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	*
1st Mort 7 per cent bonds (conv.), 1880	1,294,000	00	1,298 000	00		1,000 00
2d Mor . 7 p. c to .ds, 1866	237,000	00	1,+00,000	00	768,000 00	
Bil spy ble	y 48, 119	41	1 1,228	55		184,890 86
U. pald coupon.	156,973	00	89,445	0:1		117,580 00
Unp id di sidends	81,218	98	84,348	68	184 70	
Due U 1trd States	271,408	61				272,403 02
Su pense acrount			8,733	09	8,733 09	
"urrent accounts		71	141,585	49		70,695 23
Transportation receipts	1,685,477	81	1,174,914	18		510,568 68
Total	\$11.046,669	98	\$10,706,454	94		2840,214 99

Per c ntra: charges on the following accounts-

RoadBquipment	\$5,959,003 69 1,602,601 93 891,581 76	\$6,900,688 16 \$341,634 54 1,184,558 50 181,967 28 896,411 46 1,-29 70	\$
Construction	\$7,986,186 60	\$7,661,608 13 \$875,421 53	8

Materials, etc				55,618 06
Stock of ot er com; anies	. 199,690 (1,114,494 (
Interest and exchange	194,418			
Profit and loss	78,464 (18,517 56
Discount on bonds	179,845 (1,178,700 (
Bils receivable	105.104			
Current accounts. &c	890,846	9 49 871 4	8 88,094 79	14,554 95
Cash on hand	82,033 1	9 67,508 0		
Total	\$11,046,669	8 \$10,706,454 9		\$840,214 99

This balance sheet shows that large progress has been made during the year in the liquidation of the floating liabilities of the company, and notwithstanding the diminished earnings of 1867-68, a marked improvement in the financial condition is recognizable. The earnings for 1868-69 are expected to reach a dividend paying point. This expectation is based on the fair condition of the road and the sufficiency of reling stock, and also on the increased crops of cotton and cereals to be moved. The amount required to pay interest on all the bonds and 6 per cent on the stock is \$575,007 30—viz., interest on Tennessee loan, \$95,731 80; on first mortgage bonds, \$90,510, and on second mortgage bonds, \$70,000, and six per cent on the stock, \$318,765 50.

CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY.

[Consolidation (June, 1864) of Chicago and Northwestern, Galena and Chicago and Peninsula Railroads, and including railroads constructed, purchased and leased].

The lines of railroad owned, leased and operated by the Chicago and Northrestern Bailway Company are as follows:

MCZICIII Isanway Combany aic as lonows.			
Wisc prin Divis on		214.6 m	niles.
Chicago, Ill., o Fort Howard, Wis	42.3		
Kenosha, Wis. to Rockford, Ill.	73.4		
GALENA DIVISION		261.0	64
GALENA DIVISION. Chicago, III., 10 B. bank of Misslesippi (opp Clinton, Ia)	87 0		
unction (30 m. W. Chicago) to Freeport. Ill	91.0		
Elgin (42 m. N. W. Chicago) to Richmond, Ill	88.0		
IOWA DIVISION (leased tines).		854.0	**
Bridge, E. bank of Mississippi, Ill. to Clinton, Ia	1.1		
Chicago, Iowa a d N. braska RRClinton to edar Rapida, Ja	81.8		
Cedar R pids and Missouri River Ru Cedar Rapids to Missouri River 2	71.6		
MADISON DIV SION		67.6	44
Belvidere, Il, (78 m. W. Chicage) to Madison, Wis	67.6		
PRIVALITA DIVINOR		71.9	**
Escanaba, Mich., to Cleveland Mines, Mich.	65.8		
Rranches an : Kytensions to mines	* *		
MILWAUKEE DIVESION-Chlcago, Ill., to Milwinkee, Wis	••••	86.0	"

Total length of railway owned, leased and operated, 1,153.4 miles, second track 30 miles, and sidings (in Chicago 27.7, and on lines 138.7) 166.4 miles; gauge, 4 feet 64 inches.

The following shows the distribution of the 2d track and sidings on the several lines, and the total length of track in use at the close of 1867-68:

		tiles of Tra	ıck
Lines of Ro d	Main.	Sidings.	Total.
Chicago t Fort Howard	242.2	86 7	278.9
Kenosha in Rockford	79 A	8.1	75.5
Chicago to Clinton (ncl. 30 m. 2d track)	188.1	78.6	216.7
Chicago Junction to Freeport	91 0	18.8	104.8
Kigin to kichmond	88.0	2.8	85.8
Clinton to Cedar Rapids	81.8	14.5	95.8
Cedar : apids to is our Eiver	271.G	21.8	296.4
Belvidere to Madison	67.6	4.0	71 6
Escanab to mines	71.2	9.9	8C.4
Chicago to Milwaukee	85.0	9 4	14.4
Total line, 2d track and sidings	1.151.4	196.4	1.849.8

The bridge across the Mississippi at Clinton was completed January 7, 1865; the Peninsula Railroad (Escanaba to Negaunee, 62 m.) was opened June 1, 1865; the Chicago and Milwaukee Railway (85 m.), was leased May 8, 1866, and the Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad was opened from Boone to the Missouri River (151 miles), April 1, 1867. Since these dates these several lines have been operated by the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, and their operations included in the general accounts. In October, 1867, the Chicago and Northwestern Company purchased certain interests in the Winena, and St. Peter, and La Crosse, Trempealeau and Prescott Railroads, and have guaranteed bonds to the amount of \$800,000, issued by the latter. These companies, however, retain their separate organization, and in no manner form part of the lines operated by this company.

The stock of locomotives and cars on hand at the date of consolidation, and at the termination (May 31) of each subsequent year has been as follows:

Locomotives	ine 1, 94 26 121	81	1865-6. 189 88 173	1866-7. 908 44 947	'67-R. 204 44 248
Description and number of cars:					
Passenger	1,89: 306 1,89: 53 2,430	3 94 94 98 9 75 8 2,000 6 611 109 8 2,778 2,778	108 91 114 99 88 2 2,280 787 207 53 3,227 822 3,857	112 21 183 117 101 4 8,554 901 807 53 4,815 5,689	118 21 139 137 107 4 8,56 901 307 58 4,894 532 5,788

PASSENGER AND FREIGHT BUSINESS.

The number of passengers carried, and the tons of freight transported in each of the four years ending May 31, 1865-68, are shown in the following statement:

of the four years ending May 31, 1860-68, a:	e edomad 1	n the ioii	owing sta	tement:
	1864 5.	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.
Average length operated	(846 2 m.)	(924.5 m.	(1027.6m)	(1,158m.)
Prom Chlosen	`959,034	424,192	418,440	445,850
Fastongers) To Chicago	234,129	889,164	845,169	871,673
carried. To & from all stations.	1,096,697	1,511,992	1,533,028	1,711,567
Tonnage From Chicago	214,243		405,510	485,225
carried To Chicago	530, 37	• • • •	760,177	783,293
(To & from all stations	956,484	1,870,116	1,726,919	1,982,429
The freight is classified as follows:				
Merchandizetons	145,751	179,189	206,078	288,588
Coal "	28,294	80,167	49,208	86,926
Lumber	131,298	168,287	207,830	286,780
Floarbbls	859,024	897,461	1,908,899	1,061,617
Wheat bush	4,877,977	9,788,488	10,218,288	9,458,416
Corn	1,950,480	4,027,202	4,074,948	2,754,850
Oats	5,901,698	5,650 278	4,492,691	5,868,492
nye and carrey	531,069	950,140	1,611,868	1,665,113
Dressed hogstons	11,512	17,274	16,478	8,603
Hides	1,868	*****		*:::
TION	• • • • •	21,369	47,814	88,796
EIR TEMPERSON	• • • • •	231	1,956	5,673
Aron (ro	*****	88,987	141,428	286.185
Froduce of Country	84,144	48,586	84,615	41,846
Saithbls	OF OF	84,173	90,681 84,615	112,048
Heavy 4th class articlestons	85,864	81,884		41,846
Horses	18,115	7,444 107,698	7,696 77,814	6,6 9 8 58,199
Live stock Cattle	126,526 285,885	279,049	249,896	816,991
Hogs	113,058	64,940	51,092	40,121
(Sheep	110,000		01,042	20,121
Totals in net tons	956,484	1,870,516	1,726,919	1,983,429

REVENUE, BARNINGS, EXPENSES, &c.

The following statement exhibits the sources and amounts of revenue, and the objects of disbursement in the same four years ending May 31, 1868:

	1864-5.	1865-6.	1866-7.	1867-8.
Passenger earnings	\$2,167,901 77	\$2,510,727 52	\$2,945,016 19	\$8,593,081 47
Fre ght "		5,893,191 81	6.649,539 81	8,266,809 40
Express "	90,045 87			464,405 57
Mad "			124,485 27	172,605 90
Miscellan's "	46,817 58		96,637 81	137,994 12
Total gross earn's	\$6,830,749 75	\$8,948,840 28	\$10,161,785 45	\$12,614,846 16
Operating expenses	\$4,295,472 86	\$5,079,959 84	86,724,265 45	\$7,483,484 04
U. S. taxes on earn's	157,769 07	200,169 43	107,611 96	
U. S. rev. tax stamps		4,514 64	5,68+ 22	
State & county taxes		249,489 99	266,436 59	259,764 79
Total of erating expenses and taxes	\$4,621,861 84	\$5,527,083 45	\$7,103,993 20	\$1,873,646 60
Earn's les expenses	\$2,199,887 91	\$2,716,756 83	\$8,057,712 25	\$4,741,199 86
Expenses to earnings (exci've of taxes		61.54 p.c.	66.17 p.c.	
Taxes to earnin.s	4.77	5.50	8.74	8.00
Exp uses to earnings (inclusive of	87.75	67 04	60 Q1	A9 49

The following is a statement of the gross earnings monthly for the same years:

Jure. July Au ust September. Octuber. November January February. March April. May	1664-5. \$565,145 4 480,709 1 519,306 5 659,604 7 739,759 1 716,878 2 518,400 5 41,004 7 483,164 9 493,357 6 565,623 8	10 \$747,943 90 22 702,691 51 27 767,508 17 75 946,707 12 8 932,682 78 30 754,671 04 10 5.7,343 40 10 5.7,343 40 10 8 8 9,917 24 44 528,545 95 16 8 8 9,917 24 16 527,518 96	1866-7. \$92.,932.87 797,474.96 1,000,121.95 1,010.893.87 712,358.68 696,146.61 574,646.384 765,896.13 77.379.53 896,711.84	1967-9, 1888,658 440 1,068.286 47 1,448,942 36 1,541,56 90 1,211,56 90 39 734,889 83 817,477 84 850 198 67 1,094,097 56 1,211,149 81
Yearly earn'gs	\$6,820,749 5 568,895 8	75 \$8,943,540 28 686,986 69	\$10,161.785 45 846,977 85	\$12.614,846 46 1,051,287 20
Yearly carnings per mile operated. Year y expenses per mile oper ted Year y profits per mile operated Expenses to earnings per cent	8,060 4 5,461 8 2,599 1 67.75	31 5,978 45 4 2,983 68	9,888 80 6,918 19 2,975 61 69.91	10,937 00 6,826 47 4,110 63 62.42

The earnings and expenses by divisions for the year 1867-68, was as follows:

Divisions.	Gross earnings.	-Operating ex		Nett earnings.
Wiscons n	\$8,156,069 79	\$2.0 9.178 98		\$1,146,885 81
Galena		2,482,706 93	67 89	1,8 0,951 88
Iowa		2,860,96 73	69.12	1,054,784 09
Madison		158, 175 12	67.63	78 423 79
Peninsula	44 ,0:8 48	278,837 90	62.65	166, 86 48
Milwaukee		538,599 29	54.63	489,025 81
Total	\$12,614,846 46	\$7,878,646 60	63.43	\$4,741,199 68

INCOME ACCOUNT-DISPOSITION OF REVENUE.

The following statement exhibits the nett receipts from earnings, and the mode of their disbursement for the four liscal years, as above:

	1864-65.	1865-66.	1866-67.	1867–68.
	8	ŧ	8	8
Balance from previous year		157.608 59	488,983 22	468,221 46
Nett earnings in year	2,199,887 91	2,716,7 6 83	8,057,743 25	4,741,199 86
•				
Total resources	2,199,387 91	2,574,360 43	8,541,78) 47	5,209,421 83

Disbursed on the following accounts:

Inter et an i exchange (including interest and ivide daon the Chic, and Milw R i way			
and the Beloit & wad. RK bonds and stocks	750,470 00	(948,795 85	1,275,824 09 1,342,878 86
Sin upg funds	יטט טוצאטטו ק	65,120 00	59,120 00 58,120 00
Chic, lows & Nebr. RR. rent	897,115 98	∫ 36 °,881 59	
C dar R & M. Riv. RR rent	L 09.4710 80.	152 28	265,*19 41 419,548 84
Dircoun on secur ties sold.	5 1,826 19	415,799 :0	117,88 05
Divid nds on prefer ed stock	872,573 15	447,185 88	983,600 0:0*1,828,180 00
Dividends on common stock		•••••	*1,486,930 00
Tota: disbursements	2.04 .784 82	2,890,871 20	8,078,506 01 5,188 947 15
Balance to next year	\$157,603 59	\$488,989 23	\$463,294 46 \$20,476 97

GENERAL BALANCE SHRET.

The financial condition of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, May 31, 1865-68, four years, is shown in the following abstract;

	1865.	1866. \$	1867.	1868.
Capital stock—common	18,16' ,921 18	18,147,901 18	18,232,495 61	14,555,675 61
Funded debt	19.090.482.87	14,061, 00 00	14,789.125 42 18.28 : 000 00	16,850,287 43
Bonds of e sed roads guar				2, 97,400 00
Netr firsting debt	525,598 44 157,6x 8 59	277,150 85 483,988 22	1,128 476 55 468 224 46	226,264 47 24, 76 97
lotal	89,159,195 87	41,006,096 04	45,864,322 64	49,282,104 47
Per contra : the charges which for	ollow—			•
Old construction	84,849,605 79			39.811,092 62
Old construction New construction	84,849,605 79 1,850,835 18	1,26",240 09	1,770,856 9	¥,777,208 97
Old construction New construction New eq 1pm nt Securities on hand	84,849,605 79 1,850,835 18 1,102,034 40 1,340,778 44	1,26",240 09 1,539,935 02 1,908,709 77	1,770,856 9 4,828,899 50 2,629,59 10	4,777,908 97 4,968,899 50 629,179 76
Old construction New construction	84,849,605 79 1,850,835 18 1,102,034 40	1,26",240 09 1,539,935 02 1,908,709 77	1,770,856 9 4,828,899 50	4,777,908 97 4,968,899 50 629,179 76

LIABILITIES AND ASSETS-FLOATING DEBT.

The following is a statement of the liabilities and assets, the difference between the amounts of which constitutes the "net floating debt" as given in the annual balance sheets of May 31, 1865-68:

	1865.	1886.	1867.	1869.
Bills payable	\$852,779 57	£330 972 59	\$1,380,755 61	\$80,579 84
Galena - tock premium (\$8 a share)	5,931 (4)	********	••••••••	
Ticket & freignt balances	184,787 56	140,544 92	118,881 78	123,562 23
Leased roa or rental	102,101 00	175,072 91	110,201 42	
Const. A dir n cultivated				
Coup' & div. u collect'd		87,114 91	1(5,8 0 69	71,914 00
Bills & accounts, including May pay-rolls	785,755 84	772,703 49	925,500 85	721,016 47
La Cro-se, Trem calcau & Prescott R.R.				
Co		•••••		511,823 74
Matal Imbilition	1 700 089 07	1 100 407 10	0 60F 660 VF	1 002 980 00
Total habilities	1,729,258 97	1,506,407 12	2,685,660 35	1,725,856 86
T 41 - 6 M - 1				_
Less the following assets:				•
Ticket & frei ht balances	\$181,088 88	\$139,929 63	\$213,565 69	\$268,799 06
Uncol ected earnings	199,819 96	286,826 60	576,805 28	
h war a comparing	•	•	19,246 86	
Express companies	40.040.04	23,710 48		
U. S Government	49.646 04		18 ,935 87	
Corporat's & individuals	109,196 85	248,698 79	25068 11	
Cash on band	414,658 85	550,790 92	891,566 99	409,140 51
Total assets	9000 -AK AR	91 990 958 97	\$1,519,183 80	61 500 000 90
AVIAL BESULF	\$500,000 00	P1,440,200 Z(⊕1,014,100 OU	₱1,000.083 88
Nett floating debt	\$825,898 44	\$277,150 85	\$1,128.476 55	\$226,264 69

^{* 10} per cent, payable in stock.

STOCKS, BONDS, &C., OWNED BY COMPANY.

The "securities on hand" given as an aggregate in the balance abstracts as above, are enumerated at large in the following summary:

	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
A LAATIN A ARAL BANKS TISSE BRILLS		~~ ~	8	
1st & 2d Mort. (Gal. & Chic. Union RR) bds	7,000	958,000	298,000	284,000
1st Mort. (Ced. Rpds. & Mo. Riv. RR) bds	27,500	27,500	• • • •	••••
1et Mort (Bel & Mad RR) bds	4,000			••••
Sterling B idge Co's. stock	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Dub, & Sioux City RR Co's, pref. stock	8,828	8.804	8,804	
Dub. & Sioux City RR Co's, 1st Mort, bds	2,000	6,000	6,000	
Waupaca and Weyauwega town bonds	5,100	2,100	2,100	2,100
Propeller "Favorite" stock	10,455	10,455		-,
Chicago & Mil. RR Co's stock				••••
Flagg Trust bonds, C. & N. W. Co		45,000		
Figg Trust bonus, C. as M. W. Co	• • • •		••••	••••
Consol. skg. f'd bonds " "	••••	60,000	••••	•••
Peninsula RR 1st mort. bonds	••••	143,000	••••	•••
Rqu pment bonds, C. & N. W. Co		83,000	.*:::	.*:::
Dubuque Southwestern RR Co.'s bonds	••••	4,000	4,000	4,000
Green Bay Transit Co.'s stock and loans			274,200	
Northern Pacific RR subscription	• • • •		11,888	20,000
St. Paul & Chicago RR 1st mo: t. bondsloans	••••			17,000
loans	••••	••••	••••	69,579
Chicago and Milwaukee RR bonds				1,500
Winona & St. Peter RB stock and bonds.				230,000
AA TUODE OR DE' LOIGI TEP PROCE EDG DOUGE	••••	••••	••••	#90,000
Total securities.	840.798	1,908,709	2,629,593	629,179

The stock of the Chicago and Milwaukee Railroad Company, which figures largely in t'e returns for 1865, '66 and '67, has been carried to construction and so charged off. There is still a fraction in other hands amounting to \$153,400; the total amount was \$2,250,000. Of the Beloit and Madison Railroad Company's stock but \$10,200 remains in foreign hands. With these trifling excep-

and Northwestern Railroad Company.

FUNDED AND GUARANTEED DEBT.

tions the whole property of these companies has been absorbed by the Chicago

The funded debt at the close of the years 1865-66, both inclusive, stood as follews:

	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
	8	8	\$	8
Flagg Trust 8 p.c. bonds	245,000	245,000	200,000	*****
Pref. skg. fund 7 p. c bonds (C. & N. W., 198 m.) 1865	1,250,000	1,250,000	1,250,000	1,949,000
Funded coupon 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N.W., 198 m.) 188	756,000	756,000	756,000	755,000
Gen. 1st mort. 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 198 m.) 1885	8,600,000	8,600,000	8,600,000	8,595,000
Appleton exten. 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 23 m.) 1885		184,000	184,000	184,000
Green B. exten. 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 26 m.) 1835	800,000	8:0,000	800,000	800,000
Equipment 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W.) 1874	270,489	820,000	165,000	133,000
1st most. 7 p. c. bonds (Gal. & Chic. U. RR, 249 m.)				
1882	1,963,000	1,948,000	1,919,000	1,919,000
2d mort. 7 p. c. bonds (al. & Chic. U. RR, 249 m.)				
1675	1,085,000	1,932,000	1,178,000	1,029,000
Mississippi River Bridge 7p. c. bonds (Gal. & Chic. U.				
RR. 249 m.) 1884	200,000	200,600	900,000	200,000
Elgin & State Line RR purchase 6 p. c. (Gal. & Chic.				
U. RR, 249 m.) 1878	189,000	189,000	189,060	199,000
Peninsula RR 1st mort. 7p. c. bonds (712 m.) 1896	1,029,000	1,200,000	1,075,000	1,075,000
Consol. skg fund 7 p. c. bonds (C. & N. W., 800 m.)				
1915	948,000	2,627,100		8,429,000
Equipment 10 per cent bonds, 1868-71	•••••	•••••	2,200,000	1,925,000
Total funded debt	9 090 459	14 051 000	16 951 000	13 078 000
TART INNERA MONETHING	1 m, Usel, %C2	74'00T'(400	10,201,000	T0/219/000
The ' hands guaranteed" by the company of	e as foll	0074 •		

1.t m	ortgage	e 7 per cer	it bonds	Chic. & Mil. RR, 45 m.) 1874	\$397,000
8d		- ••	• 4	(" ") 1870	57,90 0
94	**	••	**	Mil. & Chic. RR, 40 m.) 1874	182,000
ãã	**	44	46	1838	10,500
1st	66	44		(C. & M. Railway 85 m.) 1898	1,095,000
18 t	46	**	**	(Beloit & Mad. RR,46 m.) 1888	872,000
				• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	

MARKET PRICES OF COMPANY'S STOCK .

Statement of the lowest and highest prices of the stocks of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company at New York in each month from January 1, 1863, to the close of the fiscal year ending May 31, 1868, being for one year before and four years after consolidation.

COMMON STOCK.								
June July Angust September October November December January Feoruary March April May	1868-64. 2814-02514 2814-02614 281-02614 281-02614 281-02614 4814-049 4814-049 4814-049 4814-049 4814-04514 4814-04514	1864-65. 50 @50 48%@58 52%@57% 44%@54 34 @46 40%@47% 85 @40% 83 @40% 83 @40% 83 % @47 80 @34 21 % @85% 21 % @88	1865-66. 28 @77 26 @30 % 26 @31 27 % @29 % 28 % @34 % 28 % @37 % 26 % @37 % 25 % @37 % 25 % @37 % 25 % @49 % 25 % @49 % 27 @49 % 28 % @40 % 28 % 28 % @40 % 28	1866-67. 28 4 @ 31 4 30	1867-68. 81 % @44 48 @ 11 % 41 % @47 41 % @47 41 % @48 47 @55 % 55 @ 55 % 58 % @61 % 60 @61 63 @70			
Year		20 @60	28 @89%	281/0631	8416070			

June, 1868, 65%@73; July, 73@84%; August, 80@88%; September, 84@90%; and October, to 18th, 86%@97%.

	PRI	FERED 1700	Œ.		
June	61 @67 65 @65	1884-85. 86 @94% 84 @93 85%@91% 77 @83% 67%@85% 67%@85% 61%@67% 61%@67% 48 @64	1865-86. 58 @57 56%@66 56%@64 60%@64 60%@69 61 @75% 53%@51% 53%@51% 53%@55%	1866-67. 59 @61% 59 @66% 56 @66% 55%@73% 72%@81 69%@93 65%@65% 56%@65%	1867-68. 55%-64% 65%-67% 67%-67% 65%-667% 66%-67% 70%-66% 72%-66% 72%-66%
April	79 694%	52%@68% 48 @94%	56 Ø61% 52%Ø69	66×@684×	88 @16% 75 @50% 808@888

Forner notices of this company will be found in the Magazines of December, 1865, and September, 1867.

RETURN TO SPECIE PAYMENTS.

BY C. H. DERBY.

At the close of the war, there were serious impediments in the way of a return to specie:—First, a floating debt of at least fifteen hundred millions, with large arrears due to army, navy and contractors. A vast paper currency in the shape of greenbacks, fractional notes and compound notes and seven-thirties with options in favor of creditor. Interest of all the debt was funded, bidding fair to exceed one hundred and eighty millions. A large army in the field to a large navy at sea, daily incurring great expense and contracts for ships, rifles, cannon, cloth and military stores for a million or more of men in course of execution.

At this time our exports were below our imports and the South

exhausted by a long war, required large supplies from abroad. To meet pressing wants it was necessary to raise a thousand millions in the fiscal year between June 1865 and June 1866, and this was effected by the Northern and Western States, with little or no aid from the Southern balf of the Republic.

It was found too that the war had swept away more than a third of the live stock of the South, and made some inroads upon the of the North, and that it had nearly arrested the growth of our great crops of cotton, rice and sugar.

The greenbacks were issued as a war measure, but at the close of the war, it was not easy to resume in the face of all these difficulties. More than three years have now elapsed since the war ended, and these difficulties have been gradually surmounted. By the continuance for three years of the most productive taxes, by the growth of customs, by the sale of surplus ships and stores and conversion of gold into currency, we have extinguished the compound notes, reduced the greenbacks and brought our debt down below twenty-five hundred millions to the surprise of the nation, which feared it would equal that of England. We were wiser than she was. She issued her bonds at three per cent in consols, below sixty per cent upon their face. She floated them in depreciated currency, and thus made her debt forty-two hundred millions of dollars. We sent our bonds out at par in a similar currency and floated them at higher, but temporary interest and now we reap the advantage. We have reduced interest to \$120 million in November and shall soon bring it down to \$100 millions, and probably soon meet it with our taxes on foreign and domestic liquors and tobacco alone.

Our other expenses since we paid the amount due for bounties one of the war expenses and for Alaska, are down to \$120 millions and may be further reduced.

Our exports of last year \$355 millions on gold values exceed our imports and with an increased shipment of cotton at an advance of twenty-five per cent on last years prices, we shall probably carry up our exports to \$400 millions in gold values and our revenue from customs above \$180 millions.

Since October our revenue has been running at four hundred millions, and our expenses at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, bearing a large surplus for absorption of debt and future reductions. Mr. Delmar is evidently at sea, when he ceases to collect the returns of merchandize and goes into finance. He has failed to see that our revenue checked by the fail of cotton in January and February has been increasing ever since while our outgoes have been diminishing, and we are encouraged to reduce our foreign spirits, wines, tobacco, tea, wool, carpets, seed, steel

spices and print cloths on which our duties now range from one hundred to three hundred per cent both by the state of our revenue and the beneficial effect of prior reductions. Intelligent manufacturers ask for no duties on manufactures above thirty-five per cent, and our present duties on groceries alone are yielding us more revenue than all our customs before the war.

Doubtless the freedman is using more coffee, tea and sugar and foreign fabrics than the slave, where he lived on his pittance of meal and fish, and wore one suit of fustian.

We have too made important changes in the debt. The floating debt, if we except \$360 millions of currency, and a few receipts for specie and three per cent bonds required by the banks, has nearly disappeared. For twenty years from the date of our five-twenties we have after the first five years the option to pay the principal at our pleasure. We have made good use of the premium on gold by sales, and still better by tempting the holders of the Seven-thirties to take six per cent in gold drawing a premium of 40 per cent and equivalent to eight and 4 10ths per cent in paper, and now our policy is to provide the same money for the people that we give to the creditor of the nation.

While there were strong, and, as it seems to us, conclusive reasons for the issue of greenbacks to float our debt, there is good reason to believe we should have issued less. Less would have sufficed, and we could have filled any vacuum with compound interest notes at low interest, which would as the interest accumulated, have gradually retired from circulation and been self-funding. If we compare our issue of Seventhirties with that of compound notes for the same term of three years, it is obvious that the last saved ten per cent or more to the nation.

They quietly withdrew from circulation and were funded at par. The Seven-thirties called for nearly four per cent more interest, nearly one per cent interest on interest, and under our option called also for Five-twenties, worth a premium of five to ten per cent. They have read us an important lesson on finance, and point out a very easy and simple mode of disposing of our greenbacks. Our Sub-Treasury received monthly in greenbacks about fifteen millions of dollars. Let us cancel them, as they come in, and replace them as we pay out, with an equal amount of compound notes at three per cent for three years convertible at any time with their running interest into long four per cent consols, and whenever and wherever the nation shall require new banks, let us make these bonds the basis of circulation, and meanwhile transfer to these compounds, the property of legal tenders at their par value. In twenty-four months the whole greenback currency would disappear.

But who, it will be asked will pay the interest on the compounds,

which for three years, will average about seven million yearly. This can easily be met by a tax of one per cent on bank circulation and half per cent on bank deposits, And after that, the four per cents will become a part of our funded debt at a very low rate of interest, while our surplus revenue may be applied to the payment of bonds, drawing six per cent. With the greenbacks, which are but broken promises of the nation to pay gold, which have no intrinsic value, the last impediment to a return to specie will vanish, and long before they are gone we, by an almost imperceptible process and guided by an elastic cable shall be drawn to specie payments.

The greenback now commands seventy-six cents in specie—an advance of one per cent only a month, a change to which our traders are habituated, carries it to gold in two years, and a movement accelerated to two per cent a month achieves the same result in a year.

It has been urged, in a recent article in this MAGAZINE, that we have now a population of forty millions, and property worth twenty thousand millions, and require a circulation of twenty dollars per head, or of four per cent on our property, and the writer seemed inclined to treat our bank deposits as a part of the currency, and thus to almost double our real circulation.

As respects our population, our coming census fifteen months hence, will doubtless give us forty millions. As respects our wealth we probably consumed during the war, nearly a fifth of our northern cattle, horses and swine, and more than two-fifths of this description of property in the South. But we have shown great recuperative power, since the war, and in the last three years of peace have, in the North, already more than made good our share of these losses, and at the South are fast retrieving them.

The rice of the South at nine cents produces nearly as much as the rice crop of 1859 at three cents. The cotton and rice together at eighteen cents in gold for the one, and seven in gold for the other, yield more this year than all the cotton, sugar and rice of the South yielded in 1860. Our sheep have increased seventy per cent, and there can be little doubt that the census of 1870 will show a growth of at least twenty-five per cent on the value of our farms, stocks railways and other property. And our debt, large as at first glance it may seem, when compared with the affluence of our resources, or when we compare our interest and expenses with the growing income of our people, at least thirty times larger, becomes insignificant.

As respects our currency, it seems to us that bank deposits cannot be treated as circulation, but should be regarded as hoarded wealth. If they do constitute circulation one might triple them and then return to gold,

if the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is any criterion for this country—

The British and Irish Bank Deposits are	\$1,500,000,000 225,000,000
The gold circulation	875,001,000
Total	\$2,100,000,000

And there the bank deposits exert no deliterious influence, and gold is displacing paper and accumulating in the Bank of England, as it is also in the Bank of France. The two institutions having idle in their vaults more than three hundred and fifty millions. If the United Kingdom can maintain specie payments with such deposits, and a circulation of two hundred and twenty-five millions, and keep afloat many public exchequer bills and private sixty day bills that pass as currency, we with a third more population can easily float more than three hundred millions in bills, and a large amount in long compounds. The above amount of deposits is reliable, as it is taken from the recent valuable treatise of Patterson on British Banking and Commerce.

The measure proposed would not be onerous to commerce, because the compounds laid aside as a reserve will always be ready to perform the office of legal tenders just as the greenback now is, and might fulfil the requirements of the law, and be used either as a legal tender, or the means of borrowing them in any emergency.

It is true that the Internal Revenue might not all be paid in greenbacks, but bank notes and compounds could be easily exchanged for them as they would be even more available to the public. Let us assume that we require eight hundred millions of currency next year, and have three hundred millions in bank notes and two hundred in compound notes and greenbacks, how shall we command three hundred millions in gold. We find at once an hundred and twenty millions in the banks and Sub-Treasury. There is at least an hundred millions hoarded, or two dollars and a half for each inhabitant, and we may easily reserve one hundred millions more in the next two years from the products of our mines, from our imports, and from specie introduced by emigrants and travellers.

Total.....\$117,000,000

While returning by easy steps to specie we shall not require more than sixty millions a year from exports, and can easily reserve fifty-seven millions annually.

But if these supplies do not suffice, it would be very easy for our Secretary of the Treasury to borrow, in France or England, a hundred millions in gold, at 3 per cent, for six and twelve months, on the pledge of \$150 of our long four per cent bonds, and this would give us all that would be required, and as our bonds appreciated by our return towards specie a large profit, greatly exceeding interest, might be realized from their sale. The French Government have recently borrowed for five months at one-half of one per cent a year, and for a year at one per cent. The present time is propitious for a return to specie—the nation is stronger than it thinks itself. All our statesmen who study its resources are surprised by its recuperative powers and the affluence of its resources. It should no longer compel its people to measure their property by broken promises and fluctuating standards, but return at once to gold and adopt with the European standard uniform coins, weights and measures, and thus resume its proud position among the nations.

SECRET ISSUES OF STOCKS.

The equanimity of Wall street has been disturbed by the discovery that the Eric Railroad Company has made further issues of stock, secretly and without authorization from the stockholders. It is now somewhat over two years since this Company placed over \$5,000,000 of its stock in the hands of one of its directors, as collateral for a loan, upon conditions which enabled him to put the stock in circulation; that issue has become permanent. Last spring, a further issue of \$10,000,000 of convertible bonds was made, which were promptly exchanged for stock; and now we have an official admission that, within the last few weeks, \$10,000,000 more of these bonds have been sold, of which \$5,000,000 has been already converted into stock, while the remaining \$5,000,000 is to be exchanged for shares at an early day. We have thus an increase of \$20,000,000 in the stock of one company within one year, without a word of previous intimation to the stockholders.

It is foreign to our purpose to inquire particularly into the purposes of these new issues; although it may serve to point the moral of our remarks to state incidentally that the New York Stock Exchange, feeling that current rumors affected seriously the security of dealings in the stock, appointed a deputation to wait upon the President of the company for explanations, the result of which may be thus stated. The President after admitting the issue of \$10,000,000 of new bonds, as before stated intimated that the negotiation had been made for the purpose of providing funds to retire \$4,000,000 of acceptances given to the Boston.

Hartford and Erie Railroad Company, against \$5,000,000 of bonds taken at 80 from that corporation, and further to provide means for the purchase of steel rails, to lay an additional rail, adapting the line for either broad or narrow guage traffic. Of the \$7,200,000 of money obtained on the sale of bonds in the spring, \$3,000,000, according to the same authority, was used upon construction purposes; while, as to the disposal of the remaining \$4,200,000, nothing was elicited beyond the fact that a large amount was spent in "settling" with parties who lately surrendered controlling positions in the affairs of the company to the present incumbents. So that, for the issue of \$20,000,000 of stock, there is nothing to show beyond \$5,000,000 of the bonds of another corporation, the interest of which is guaranteed by the Erie Company, the laying of a new line of rails, some minor improvements of no great consequence, and ordinary repairs, which should have been covered by the current earnings.

These facts sufficiently illustrate the grave abuses incident to directors possessing unchecked power to make issues of stock; and illustrations might easily be multiplied ad libitum, by reference to other companies, the action of whose directors differs from this case only in the extent of their issues. It is not surprising that these developments should have produced in Wall street a feeling bordering on consternation, nor that a more or less general distrust of stocks should have followed. If directors are to be allowed to issue new shares when they please and upon any pretence they may set up, there is no longer any security either to stockholders or to parties advancing money upon stock collaterals. There is, in fact, an end to confidence in these securities; and stock enterprises must henceforth stand at a discount. Nearly all our large undertakings are accomplished through a combination of subscribers, whose proprietory interest is represented by the scrip or stock they severally hold. If the number of shares may be increased at the will of the directors, and the new stock may be sold at any price the managers may choose to accept, it is very clear that the stockholders are constantly liable to have their interest in the property ranged; and if, moreover, these issues may be made secretly, so that the shareholder knows nothing of them until the shares are marketed, he has no chance whatever to protect himself against the consequent depreciation in the value of his stock and is doubly The effect of such uncertainties, if continued, must be to discourage corporate undertakings, and to limit our progress to what may be accomplished by individual enterprise, a result which would be an unmitigated misfortune.

This license to directors further tends to depreciate the value of share investments by rendering stocks unreliable as collaterals. Lenders are

liable at any moment to find that stocks upon which they have advanced money have become suddenly depreciated by new issues. To say that they can protect themselves by calling for an increased margin from the borrower in cases of depreciation, is to assume that the borrower would be able or disposed to keep up his margin under the uncertainty or the panic attending the revelation of the new issue, an assumption which cannot be allowed. A succession of such developments as we have witnessed now in the case of the Eric Company, and recently in connection with other companies, can have no other result than to make lenders less disposed to advance money upon this class of securities, and to induce them to demand larger margins generally upon such loans. Perhaps, as far as respects Wall street speculations, this might be regarded as a result not without obvious compensations; but there are others who have to borrow upon stocks besides speculators, and to such the consequence would be a serious injury.

The possession of this power of secret issue acts as a demoralizing temptation to directors. Issues of new stock always produce more or less fluctuation in the value of the shares; and the fluctuations afford an opportunity for highly profitable speculation to those in the secret. For illustration, let a suppositious case be taken in connection with the new issues by the Eric Company. The directors issued \$10,000,000 of bonds say at 50, with the understanding that the bonds should be early converted into stock and placed secretly on the market. They were aware that the probable result, when the operation became known, would be to put down the price 10 to 15 per cent. In anticipation of this decline they sell, say, 100,000 shares for future delivery, and then, announcing the fact of the new issue, buy up the stock at the decline to make their deliveries. The whole operation would make them a profit of \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000-so much taken out of the pockets of the deluded public by official secresy. Let it be further supposed that, say, \$5,000,000 o new stock were issued for some purely fictitious purpose, and that the directors should subsequently profess to find that the company less needed the funds than was expected, and that consequently the the stock could be bought in and cancelled. Let it further be supposed that the stock thus sold were quietly marketed at 50, and that the announcement of the new issue, concurrently with depreciatory representations and street manipula. tion of the stock, were to put down the price to 40. In this case, there is a margin of 10 per cent profit on "short" sales in anticipation of the decline, and an equal profit upon purchases of \$5,000,000 of stock to be made at the decline, with a view to its ultimate return to the company at the price at which it was issued; making a profit on the combined elling and buying accounts of \$1,000,000. Indeed, the directors of this company can at any time throw any amount of new stock upon the market for their own speculative purposes, buying it back again at the consequent decline, and then cancelling an equal amount of shares. We express no opinion as to whether operations similar to these are now being carried on by the Company in question; certain, however, it is that these things can be done; and the recent history of the Erie management affords no guarantee that those who usually control its affairs are above such expedients. To say the least, the fact of the administrators of the affairs of a company representing \$75,000,000 of capital possessing such sweeping powers has a demoralizing tendency which can hardly fail sooner or later to corrupt the direction. Such facilities for speculation tend to make the management a mere means to the most reckless operations, and should not be allowed longer to remain undisturbed by the Legislature.

The evil is by no means one hopeless of remedy. All scandals upon the reputation of our corporations can be removed by the State Legislatures enacting: 1. That directors shall make no new issues of stock except by and with the consent of two-thirds of the stockholders in interest. 2. That no new shares shall be issued without first offering them to the existing shareholders, and that all issues shall be made openly and after due notice. 3. That all stock companies shall keep a record of the amount of their stock outstanding, in the office of some well-known financial institution, at all times open to the inspection of the shareholders, or of parties holding the shares as collateral for loans. 4. That these requirements shall apply to stock issued in the way of dividends as well as for other purposes; and, 5. Any violation of these provisions should be constituted a criminal offense, subject to punishment and fine.

THE PACIFIC BAILBOADS AND BAILBOAD PROGRESS.

The great Continental line of railroad which is to connect our Atlantic and Pacific borders, and develope the interior in an ever increasing ratio, is now approaching completion. The latest official reports inform us that the Union Pacific has reached 880 miles from Omaha, the initial point on the Missouri River; and that the Central Pacific has reached a point 350 miles from Sacramento on the river of the same name, the western terminus in California. The total length of the two roads thus approaching union will be 1,657 miles and hence only 427 miles remain to be constructed to finish the work contemplated.

The mission of this highway is by no means of a purely domestic character. It is to become the transit line of the commerce between the opposite sides of the old world. But the benefits to the territory through which it passes are already apparent. A few years ago the country

traversed was scarcely a home for civilized man. It is now far on the road to prosperity, and settlements have been made and new States and territories marked out with unprecedented rapidity. It is true that special natural inducements have operated largely to effect this result. But how much more rapid has the development been since these railroads were commenced. The miners of Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, &c., were virtually isolated from the world of commerce, and dependent for intermittent communication on laborious travel over mountain and plain. Now their labor is made doubly remunerative by the facilities given to travel and transportation.

When these enterprises were commenced no railroad from the East had reached the banks of the Missouri River, and the only means the Union Company possessed of getting forward material and supplies was by way of that river. This was a slow and toilsome process, but it showed the necessity for the immediate construction of connecting lines, and the Chicago Division of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad was extemporized, and since then a line of railroad from St. Louis to Omaha has been completed. Several other railroads in Iowa and Missouri, pointing to Omaha, are also in progress, so that the former deficiency will soon be fully supplied.

Nor was it alone in the States between the Mississippi and Missour! that the construction of the Pacific railroads made further improvements necessary. From the Mississippi to the Atlantic coast there was not a single line on the shortest route. To remedy this defect was a necessity; while to secure a share in the commerce that is to be developed by the Pacific railroads has been the aim of all the railroad companies whose lines transverse this section, and the great cities of the Atlantic seaboard have been preparing for the commercial advantages to result from this interior enterprise.

That the greatest improvement should have been made in the new States west of New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland is not surprising. To these population has been directed in the greatest measure, and in them the defects in system were most notable. In the older States, east of that line, the system was more complete, but even in these extensive improvements have been made and are being made.

The result of much of this effort may be stated as follows: In 1865. the first 40 miles of the Union Pacific Railroad was laid; in 1866 there were constructed 265 miles; in 1867 a further length of 245 miles, and to date in 1868 there has been constructed 330 miles, or, in four years, 880 miles. The Central Pacific, notwithstanding the intervention of the Sierra Nevada, has progressed with equal rapidity; and the Union Pacific (E. D.) is now in operation from Kansas City to Sheridan, 405

miles. Railroad construction in the States east of the Mississippi and west of Pennsylvania has been during this period as follows:

	_Miles of Road			Cost of Poads			
_	1864.	1868.	Incr.		1868.	Inc ease.	
Iowa		1.680	890	\$26,000,U^O	\$37,560,000	\$81.5 0.000	
Missouri	920	1,20K)	250	47, 00,000	86.000,000	9,000,000	
Minnesots	160	560	400	5.400,000	16.840 000	11,80 ,000	
Wisconsin		1,200	150	40 000,000	48 000,000	8,000,000	
Illinois	8, 00	8,400	80	117,:00,:00	151,500,000	40.010.000	
Michigan	870	1,260	890	83.00: (00	45,000,000	18,000,000	
Indiana	2.900	2,600	400	71.8(0.000	104,500,100	88,900,000	
Ohio		8,810	110	191 000,000	167,500,100	46,500,000	
Total	13,800	18,110	2,890	\$459.600,000	\$652,8 0,000	\$198,000,000	

Thus in these eight States in four years nearly 5,000 miles of new railroad have been laid and millions of dollars expended, not only on these, but also in improving previously existing lines. The total increase in cost has been nearly \$200,000,000, or about \$15 per head of the population.

Among the principal railroads in progress or constructed in the four years referred to the following are the most important:

In Iowa: the Iowa division of the Chicago and North Western, the Iowa division of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific, the Burlington and Missouri River, the Sioux City and Pacific, and the St. Joseph and Council Bluffs. By the time that the Pacific railroad is completed, the Rock Island and Burlington lines will have reached the Missouri.

In Missouri: the Pacific of Missouri, and the extensions of the North Missouri towards Iowa and the Missouri River. The Southern Pacific is also being extended southwest, and the St. Louis and Iron Mountain south, the latter to a connection with the Southern railroads at Columbus, Ky. The St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railroad has also been completed to a connection with the Iowa railroad of the same name, giving St. Louis an indirect route to Omaha. Several other roads are projected to connect with the Union Pacific Railroads.

In Minnesota: the Milwaukee and St. Paul, the Winona and St. Peter, and the Minnesota Valley. Considerable progress has also been made in the first division of the Pacific Railroad and its branch north to Watab has been opened through.

In Illinois: the St. Louis, Jacksonville and Chicago, which gives another connection to the Illinois Central. The Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis is now in course of construction, chiefly as a mineral road, and designed to supply coal to railroads, &c. The St. Louis, Vandalia and Terre Haute, and the Cairo, Mound City and Vincennes are also in progress, with a view to their early completion.

In Michigan: the Jackson, Lansing and Saginaw, and the Flint and Pere Marquette are the principal new constructions. There is also being constructed a more direct line between Port Huron and Chicago, known as the Air-line. The Grand River Valley Railroad is approaching com-

pletion.

In Indiana: the Columbus, Chicago and Indiana Central Railroad has completed a line from Union City to Loganport and consolidated into itself the Chicago and Great Eastern, the Indiana Central and the Logansport and Burlington. There is also being built a line from Indianapolis to Vincennes to connect with the road to Mound City and Cairo; and several other lines are projected.

And in Ohio: several short lines, chiefly auxiliaries of existing lines. In this State several important consolidations have been effected.

Further east the principal developments have been rather improvements than new works. In New York the Erie is having a third rail laid to accommodate the narrow cars. The Hudson River has completed its second track, &c. The lines in progress from the Hudson have chiefly a northwestern direction, and will connect with the Central, the Midland being the most important. In a few years the Boston, Hartford and Erie will continue the Erie Railway to Boston. In the city of New York the depot and warehouse accommodation has been largely extended. In Pennsylvania, especially in the eastern portion, the extension of roads is being rapidly carried on, the objective points being Easton, on the Delaware, and New York city. In the southwest of the State the construction of the Pittsburg and Connellsville railroad to a connection with the Baltimore and Ohio is being carried on actively. New Jersey has also made extensive improvements in its railroads and accommodations for an increasing traffic. The works at Hoboken, Jersey City, Communipaw and Elizabeth port are among the most extensive in the United States. In the Delaware peninsula railroad building is very active; and Maryland is connecting Baltimore more firmly with both East and West.

This activity in railroad construction and improvement is not local, but is everywhere apparent. It will bring many parts of the country, as yet isolated from markets, into connection with the centres of commerce, and tend largely to the development of national industry. It is the precursor of a vast revolution in the relations of distant parts of the country one with the other, and will result in a harmony of interests to which we have hitherto been strangers. In the South the same spirit of enterprise which has prompted the Northern States to action is fully roused, and in several instances where private capital has been wanting, the States have come to the rescue and supplied the means required Tennessee, South Carolina and Alabama are conspicuous for the aid they have voted to great enterprises. In a few weeks the Selma, Rome and Dalton Railroad will be completed, and give us a more direct route to Mobile and New Orleans. So in every direction the maps are now networked with lines of road which the future is to realize.

THE PRESIDENTIAL RECTION.

When the king of France died, under the old regime, it was customary for the chief chamberlain of the palace in which the event took place to signify it to the assembled courtiers, in the ante-room of the state chamber, by throwing open a door and crying out: "The king is dead! Long live the king!" This quaint ceremony symbolized, tersely enough, the fiction, which, after all, was no fiction, of the undying nature of the chief executive office. The monarch was mortal. The monarchy was immortal.

Something of the feeling expressed in this antique royal rite pervades the people of all countries in which the people have some recognized connexion with their system of government more deep and vital than that of mere obedience to a superior force handled by superior cunning. It certainly pervades the people of the United States, and pervading them. it ballasts with a substratum of rational composure the ship of state, in the height of every political tempest. No matter how hot and fierce may le the contest of parties for power, the great masses of the people feel that. end their contest as it may, the substantial framework of the Republic will endure. One President may disappear into private life. Another may emerge into the trying and dazzling daylight of power; and the country may suffer something or gain something, in the matter of the direction of its public affairs, by the change, but the people never believe that the suffering will be fatal or the gain vital. The politicians, of course, assert the contrary, during the heat of the canvass; the people, for the time of the canvass, act as if they felt the assertions of the politicians to be true, for there is a kind of moral fever engendered by the excitement of a political contest. But the canvass once over, the peeple relapse into their normal confidence in their institutions. There is a side of danger, of course, as well as a side of safety in this relation of the people to their politics. It is certainly possible that the institutions of a republic as well as the institutions of a monarchy may be imperiled by the over weening confidence of the nation in their stability. It is certainly possible that the change from one President to another may at some given time, and under some particular condition of circumstances, lead to profound and permanent modifications in the national constitution.

But, on the whole, and taking the average of what we may call a nation's chance, especially in the case of a nation so made up and so situated as our own, it is probably true that we gain in respect to impulse and elasticity more than we lose in respect to prudence and caution from this temperament of the people and of the times. Such, at least, is the general conviction of thinking men among us, as shown in the turn which pri-

vate affairs commonly take after the termination of a great public contest This is commonly a favorable turn, and that it is so is universally admitted to flow from the general feeling that a political decision, simply because it is a decision, remits the nation to a course of probable safety The election of General Grant has not yet, it is true, been followed by the usual indications at the great financial centres of the country which mark the recognition by the popular sense of a decision as an advantage. This may be accounted for, however, mainly by the peculiar and unusual condition of our money market the past two weeks, and partly, no doubt, by the singular and abnormal condition into which the business interests. not only of the United States but of Europe, have been brought during the last three years; on this side of the Atlantic by the unsettled relations of the lately rebellious States to the rest of the country, and, on the other side of the Atlantic, by the vexatious and incomprehensible relations of the two great military powers, Germany and France, with each other and with the rest of Europe. It is at least certain that the election of General Grant, if it has failed to work the usual miracle of reviving commercial confidence, has not still further depressed it. On the contrary, it may be assumed from the antecedents of this election, and from the peculiar political situation of the newly chosen Chief Magistrate, that so far as the fact of his election influences commercial confidence at all, the influence will be beneficial.

For nothing is more clear to the impartial observer than this: that General Grant's election, no matter what may have been the motive of some of his supporters in urging it, is a triumph of the conservatism and honesty of our people. His nomination was made in response to the desire so widely expressed for peace and rest from strife. He became the chosen leader of a great party, not because he was a politician, but because he was not a politician; and he is trusted now because it is believed he will not seek mere party ends but the country's highest good. What the nation most needs now is repose. It needs to be assured that peace is a reality, and that peace will be as permanent as it is real. It needs to be satisfied that passion will hereafter play a smaller, and reason a greater part in the influence of parties upon public policy. It needs to see a harmony based on mutual respect, existing and efficient between the executive and the legislative branches of the general government. All of these things which the country so greatly needed are made not unreasonable expectations by the conditions under which General Grant has been chosen, and by the popular understanding of General Grant's own character and purposes.

In the light of such anticipations the country will look forward to the selection by General Grant, of advisers who will represent not any sectional feelings, passions or theories, but the broad and national and patriotic spirit of the substantial people of the republic. From an administration constituted, as it would certainly seem to be more practicable for General Grant than it would have have for any other man now before the country to constitute an administration, the country will expect a policy of financial retrenchment and prudence, a conciliatory and yet a resolute control of all internal questions justly appertaining to the domain of the federal authority, and a judicious remission of many of the matters which have of late most perplexed our public policy, and most embittered the passions of party, to the unobtrusive and smoothly working system of local independence, combined with general responsibility, which was originally the most distinctive feature, and is still the strongest anchor of American institutions.

PROSPECTS OF THE COTTON :TRADE.

Cotton has well nigh gained its former importance as the great commercial crop of the country. The exportable surplus of the staple may now be estimated as worth \$125,000,000 in gold; which is near its average value between 1855 and 1860. The growing magnitude of this branch of the export trade renders it especially important to ascertain as nearly as possible what are the prospects as to the value and the movements of this particular staple. The premium on gold is very directly influenced by the supply of cotton bills; and the exports of other products are materially affected by the premium on gold; so that, in an important sense, the cotton movement may be said to control our whole export trade. The supply and demand, however, have during the late war been subject to so many fluctuations, that it is difficult to form satisfactory estimates of the cause of things a few months ahead; each successive year, however, the movements are assuming more regularity, while they afford an accumulation of new data for our guidance.

The general tenor of reports has, during late weeks, become more favorable, so that now the prevailing anticipation in this market is that the Southern crop will exceed that of last year. The injury by rains and the worm has proved less serious than was at one time expected, while the picking season has been very favorable; so that if the election and after-election excitement does not interfere with the work of the freedmen, it is now believed among the better informed that an increase of about 200,000 bales upon the last crop may be relied upon with considerable confidence, which would give us a total of say 2,700,000 bales. The fact of the arrivals of cotton at the ports, since September 1, having been over 90 per cent in excess of those of last year is an indication of this improve-

ment in the supply; and yet only partially so, for the crop this year is about three weeks earlier than last year, while in the fall of 1867 trade at the Southern ports was checked by the prevalence of yellow fever. The prospects of the supply in other cotton growing countries appear to be on the whole satisfactory. There were some reports earlier in the season of injury from the rains to the plant in India, but the later advices are all favorable; and it is inferred from the fact that the bulk of the last crop was marketed when prices were high that the area planted will be large, though we do not look for any material increase from that quarter. From Egypt, however, the supply is estimated at about 400,000 bales, as against 250,000 bales last year, while the reports from Brazil are all favorable. the high prices obtained for the last crop having induced, it is believed, some increase of planting. It would seem, then, that the combined supply in America, Brazil, and Egypt may exceed that of last year by say 350,000 bales of 450 lbs. each, which is equal to an addition to the world's consumption of about 7,000 bales per week. It is not to be assumed, however, that the whole of this additional supply will reach Europe. Our own manufacturers had reduced their stocks to an unprecedentedly low point before the crop began to arrive, and not only will they have to compensate for this deficiency in supply on hand, but they are likely to require an increased amount for actual consumption, to meet the extra demand naturally growing out of an improved condition of trade throughout the country generally, and especially in the Southern States. For this reason, Liverpool is not likely to be much benefited by the enlarged Southern crop.

The present condition of stocks in Europe and of the supply affoat combined does not in the total differ very materially from the same period of last year, as will be seen from the following comparison:

IN STOCKS AND APLOAT.

Liverpool, November 6th. 8 Ock	1868, bales. 496,000	1867 bales. 571,000
AfiontLondon, October 22d.	284,000	226,000
Stock	89,088 184,914	118,843 74,179
HAVRE, October 9th. Stock	60,439	80,149
Affoat, in excess of 1867	29,885	
Total visible supply	1,014,916 58,155	1,069,871

There is, however, as affecting prices in this country, a material difference in the nature of the stock, the total amount of American on hand at Liverpool, at the date given above, being only 48,000 bales, against 138,000 bales at this time last year. But, aside from this circumstance, it will be seen that the visible supply of Europe is 55,155 bales less than

at the same period of last year; which requires to be set off against the probable increased supply from the new crops, if we suppose it is necessary for the present stocks to be maintained. Making this allowance, then, and supposing that the major portion of the increase in the crop of American will be required at home, it appears that Europe may anticipate results exceeding those of last year by about 200,000 bales, which would allow an increase in the weekly consumption of 3,840 bales over last year-We find that the amount taken by the trade at Liverpool last year, from October 3 to December 31, averaged 57,870 bales per week; while, for the first four weeks of the corresponding period of this year, the purchases of the trade have averaged 58,360 bales, or about 500 bales per week more. For evident reasons, however, the purchases of the trade for the last few weeks are not perhaps a fair indication of the consumption. The following is a statement of the average weekly consumption for the nine months ending October 1 of the two years;

A	mericen.	Reagil	W. Indian.	Reat Ind	Mediter'n	Total
		Tri marre	11 0 TO FEMALE	TRUMP C TOTAL		
toes below	84 414	411 700	0.048	10 404	8.480 .	54.078
1868 balos.	279.919	10,786	2,043	18,406	0.400 .	D4.U10
	00 000		0 4 40		0.044	40.00=
1867	241.972	5,887	2,149	14,853	2,844	46,205

This statement shows a weekly increase of 7,873 bales. The present price of cotton at Liverpool, however, is one-third higher than the average price during the last quarter of 1867; which does not favor the supposition that the rate of consumption during the balance of the year will keep up to the high rate indicated above, assuming that the price remains near the present quotations.

The home trade of Great Britain appears to be steadily recovering, and the demand from the agricultural districts, stimulated by the large wheat crop, is expected to prove larger than in late years. On the Continent, there is a more assured political feeling; the grain and wine crops are abundant; and enlarged orders for yarns and goods are expected from that source. Perhaps the wants of eastern countries may prove moderate. The India and China markets were glutted with goods at the beginning of this year, when prices were low; and, stocks being larger than usual, there will naturally be some freluctance to buy largely at the advance in prices required by the present value of cotton. The South American markets being affected adversely by the continuance of war and by the late earthquakes, are not likely to require their average amount of manufactures. The probabilities would thus appear to favor a fair, steady demand for goods, not below that of last year, possibly above it.

There are some other considerations which are not unlikely to have a certain degree of influence upon the price during the next few weeks. It is usually the policy of the Liverpool dealers to encourage a free export from the United States early in the season, with a view to getting a large

amount affoat and centered at the southern ports; and when a considerable proportion of the crop is in process of movement towards Liverpool, the price is allowed to drop, and the cotton falls into the hands of English buyers at low prices. It remains to be seen whether the fact of the crop being this year held to an unusually large extent by the planters may not partially thwart this trade trick. The planters well enough understand the game of the Liverpool buyers; and if their financial condition is such as to enable them to hold on for the best market, they will doubtless keep back their cotton in the event of any extreme decline abroad. It is not, however, certain as yet that they have adequate resources for thus protecting themselves. The present extreme stringency of money at New York is not favorable to the holding of cotton at the ports. The banks have urgent applications for money from the South, to which they cannot respond; and, unless it should prove that the monetary pressure is largely due to artificial meddling, it is quite possible that cotton may have to be shipped more freely than is consistent with the interests of holders.

MONEY AND CURRENCY.

There is another article under this head in the October number of the MAGAZINE, in which the writer criticises both myself and Mr. Carroll; and also raises certain objections to political economy as a science.

Now political economy may or may not be entitled to be called an exact science, that perhaps is a matter of opinion only, but J. S. R. has quoted Mathews, let us hear what Dr. McCulloch has to say upon the subject. In alluding to the condition and progress of the sciences in general he says: "None of them has been instantaneously carried to perfection; more or less error has always insinuated itself into the speculations of their earliest cultivators. But the errors with which this science (political economy) was formerly infected, are now fast disappearing, and a fow observations will suffice to show that it really admits of as much certainty in its conclusion as any science founded on fact and experiment can possibly do." And we think with Dr. McCulloch, that its principles are now getting to be pretty well understood, though it may suit the interest or prejudices of some parties to disparage them.

With respect to the confusion of terms; that is, perhaps, also a necessity of the incipiency of the science; but no doubt it has partly arisen from the opposing schools of philosophy, as well as from the wilful misapplication of terms by non-professors of the science. But this is a matter of very small moment, as by a little attention we may very easily under-

etand the meaning of the author upon any part of the subject. And what does it matter whether we call the fertility of the soil, and the vegetable and mineral productions of the earth, capital or natural agents? They all become capital when they become property, and their relative quentity and convenience for consumption must always limit the power of labor; and, therefore, the profit on all other capital. But I must now attend more especially to the objections raised by J. S. R. to some of the propositions of my former article.

He seems to admit that under certain circumstances, an inconvertible government currency might be practicable, even without the standard of value; that is, "so long as other countries adhered to the gold standard." "This would be virtually a currency at par with gold, being at par with the currencies of other countries." This is no doubt quite correct, and in that case we should not only get rid of the expense of the getting of the gold we at present export, but should obtain the gold we imported from other countries for nothing; while some of them would have to pay for it at the present fixed price; and others more fortunate might receive a portion of it upon the same terms as ourselves. But the difficulty with J. S. R. is expressed in the following words: "But if all other countries should depart from it (the standard of value), how could they regulate each other?" Now this is a point upon which no difficulty could possibly Gold would be then in the same position as all other commodities; its production being regulated by its natural or exchangeable value, which would be accurately measured by the money of account, the nominal dollar.

It is a fact which nobody denies that the value of the precious metals varies less than that of any other commodity; and experience seems to demonstrate that the supply is inexhaustible. Therefore we need not fear any variation in value nor amount; as it would not be for the interest of the miner to lower their relative price; nor to produce them at less than the average profit. We might, therefore, supposing the currency at par, with the greatest confidence, establish it at the present rate of gold as per dollar; say about eighteen and a half dollars per ounce; and make this prices of gold the par value of the currency. There would, of course, be a price for gold in all countries, and, therefore, no difficulty in calculating the relative values of the different currencies, whatever their denomination or relative amount. There would be no commercial balances to pay, as the exports would always balance the imports. We should have no panics, nor monetary disorders of any kind; and what would be better still, we should have no fluctuations in the demand for labor arising from those causes. We should also have the advantage of getting rid of "the imperfections of gold as a standard of value," without being forced to find either a better or a worse substitute. Having disposed of this difficulty we pass now to the next proposition.

Mr. J. S. R. proceeds to say, "On the question of interest, Mr. Carroll seems in the right. If interest is not the rent of capital what is it? It is certainly rent paid for the use of something; and if that something cannot as capital be employed in producing wealth why does it command a rent."

From this it would appear as though I had denied that interest was the rent of capital; whereas I have held no such language, nor do I hold any such opinion. What I did say was to the following effect: "That i nterest is the rent of capital permanently invested upon undoubted security none will deny; but under the present system and practice of banking, gold-getting, stock-jobbing, &c., and the very extensive financial operations of almost all the governments of the world, that principle can have but the least possible effect at present in regulating the interest or discount on money." I therefore did not deny that interest was the rent of capital-I merely intimated, what any candid person will admit, that the rate of profit upon capital had at present very little influence upon the rate of interest on bank discounts.

Mr. Mill, speaking upon this point (book 3d, chap. 23), says: "This is evidently a question of demand and supply. Nor have demand and supply any different meaning or effect in this case from what they have in all others. The rate of interest will be such as to equalize the demand for loans with the supply of them. It will be such, that exactly as much as some people are desirous to borrow at that rate, others will be willing to lend. If there is more offered than demanded, interest will fall; if more is demanded than offered, interest will rise; and in both cases to the point at which the point of equation of supply and demand is re-established."

Both the demand and supply of loans fluctuate more incessantly than any other demand and supply whatsoever. The fluctuations in other things depend on a limited number of influencing circumstances; but the desire to borrow, and the willingness to lend are more or less influenced by every circumstance which affects the state or progress of industry or commerce, either generally or in any of their branches.

No doubt this is correct, but if Mr. Carroll or J. S. R. are not satisfied with the dictum, they can, if they choose, like the celebrated Don Quixote, take a tilt at the Mill, and with probably as much chance of success. Both of them assume that it is the increase of capital which lowers the rate of interest or profit. J. S. R., with reference to this point, asys: "But when understood, as it evidently must be, relatively to the demand of production, it is undoubtedly true that the increase of capital does tend to

diminish, and does actually diminish the rate of interest, until at length the diminution of interest even checks the accumulation of capital, as shown in England, Holland and France."

That the rate of profit diminishes, and therefore that of interest upon permanent investments with good security, as before stated, as population increases no one will deny; but the cause is not to be found in the superior increase of capital. On the contrary, this diminution of the rate of profit is caused by a tendency to a relative decrease of capital. Or, in other words, as population increases the capital required for their maintenance is more difficult of attainment. It is spread over a wider surface, and is found in more difficult positions. Capital is divided into fixed and circulating.

The first, according to my opinion, previously expressed, includes the land, its minerals and natural productions; the second, all kinds of skill, machinery and other necessaries.

It must be acknowledged by all who take the trouble to think, and it is conceded by Mill and others that the profit on circulating capital is necessarily limited by the power of production on the worst soil in cultivation, or on that at the greatest distance from the consumer. In other words, the rate of profit on circulating capital depends upon the amount of labor required for the production of a given amount of food and other necessaries.

Mill, in reference to the subject, says: (chapter on profits) "It thus appears that the two elements on which, and which alone, the gains of the capitalists depend are, first, the magnitude of the produce, in other words, the productive power of labor; and secondly, the proportion of that produce obtained by the laborers themselves; the ratio which the remuneration of the laborers bears to the amount they produce. These two things form the data for determining the gross amount divided as profit among all the capitalists of the country; but the rate of profit, the per centage on the capital, depends only on the second of the two elements, the laborers' proportional share, and not on the amount to be shared.

Thus it appears that there can be no such thing as a competition of capital. There may be a competition of money, as no one denies; but it is a misnomer to say there is a competition of capital.

When the increase of population forces an increase in the prices of food and raw material, the nominal wages of labor have to be increased also; so that the laborers may obtain the requisite quantity of the necessaries of life. This increase of wages necessarily takes place in all employments, and being taken out of a less proportionate amount of production, it must decrease the rate of profit. Rents rise also, as a consequence of the

increased price of food, and the excess of former profit goes into the pucket of the land owner in the shape of rent. These circumstances decreace the the rate of profit, and therefore the rate of interest.

With respect to the low rate of interest in England, Holland and France, that can be satisfactorily accounted for without assuming it to arise from the accumulation of capital.

England imports from foreign countries probably half her consumption of necessaries, and that is, according to the principles laid down, quite sufficient to account for a very low rate of profit. Yet about eighteen months since the rate of interest on discounts at the bank was ten per cent.

The rate of interest generally rules higher in France than in England; but that can also be accounted for without assuming that there is a less proportionate amount of capital in that country than in England. In France a large proportion of the taxes are raised from the land; perhaps fifty per cent; while in England, exclusive of the poors rate, one and a half or two per cent is all which the land contributes. This state of things in France must be favorable to the rate of profit on circulating capital. As, although taxes on land, according to valuation, night to some extent retard cultivation, yet it would prevent the decrease in the rate of profit upon circulating capital. The case of Holland is different.

Hitherto we have said little or nothing upon the effects of taxation, though it is obvious when laid upon the necessaries of life that it must reduce the rate of profit, exactly in the same manner as a decrease of fertility in the soil forced into cultivation by the increase of prices. With respect to Holland, McCulloch observes:

"The oppressive weight of taxation has been the principal cause of the lowness of profits in the United Provinces during the last two centuries, and the decline of their manufacturing and commercial prosperity. Not withstanding the severe and laudable economy of her rulers, the vast expense incurred by the Republic in her revolutionary struggle with Spain, and her subsequent contests with France and England, led to the contraction of an immense public debt, the interest and other necessary charges on which obliged her to lay heavy taxes on the most indispensable necessaries. Among others, high duties were laid upon foreign corn when imported, on flour and meal when ground at the mill, and on bread when it came from the oven. Taxation affected all the sources of national wealth; and so oppressive did it ultimately become, that it was a common saying at Amsterdam, that every dish of fish brought to table had been once paid to the fisherman and six times to the state. Wages being necessarily raised, so as to enable the laborer to subsist, the weight of these enormous taxes fell almost wholly upon the capitalist."

This state of things in Holland, as shown by McCulloch, is quite suffi-

cient to account for the low rate of profit. It was the expense of subsisting the laborer, and not the competition or accumulation of capital the same cause that everywhere else depresses the rate of profit.

The mistake of those who think that money is capital, and that land is not, arises from a superficial view of the subject; they seem to think that profit arises out of the process of buying and selling; whereas, it is solely the product of land and labor.

J. S. R. says: "Land is not capital unless cultivated, and then only to the extent of its exchangeable value, after deducting the debts of is nominal owner."

All I have to say to this proposition is, that there seems to be very little difference between land and other kinds of wealth in this particular, as Mill lays it down, that the difference between capital and wealth is merely in the mode of consumption. The one is consumed in reproduction, while the other is consumed unproductively. Thus there is not much difference between land entirely unused and uncultivated, and any other kind of wealth, uselessly consumed.

With respect to land being capital only to the extent of its exchangeable value, it is exactly in the same position as other things; it is presumed that under ordinary circumstances its exchangeable value is its true value; but what the debts of its nominal owner can have to do with the extent, or the degree of its being capital, verily I do not understand.

"But," says J. S. R., "it is precisely capital which the West needs at present, not land, not paper, not credit." No doubt this is true; it is not paper, nor credit, which the West needs; they have both been tried and found wanting. What the West needs, as well as the East, is to make every man earn his own capital before he expends it or trades with it. There are too many merchants and jobbers who ought to be producers; and too many consumers who do not compensate the community for what they eat, think and wear. And notwithstanding the assumption of Mr. Carroll and J. S. R. that the West needs capital, there is more capital around the city of Chicago, and within reach of her water privileges, than almost any other city of the Union, or she would not have sprung up, like Jonah's gourd, as it were, in a night. But unfortunately extreme prosperity begets extravagance, and a mania to get rich at once, instead of in the old patient, plodding manner. This is the evil, but there is no help for it, except work, economy and patience.

J. S. R. objects to the proposition that "money is neither wealth nor captal, but merely a convenience, &c. And says the same might be "said of the plow, the railway, the elevator." Yet there is a difference between money and these other conveniences. The one saves time only, and the other makes labor more productive. The difference is one of principle;

but the effect is, to some extent, the same; that is up to a certain point. But the redundancy of plows, railways, &c., would affect nobody's interest but that of the owners; while a redundancy of money would affect the interest of the whole community; but instead of assisting production the expense of the addition would have to be paid for out of the proceeds of labor and capital; therefore, we might as well assume that a tax would make an addition to our wealth.

Individuals no doubt are right in regarding money as wealth, because it can be exchanged for any other commodity, but it is not wealth, nor capital to the community. Mill holds such a proposition to be preposterous.

He says: "It often happens that the universal belief of one age of mankind, a belief from which no one was, nor without an extraordinary effort of genius and courage could at that time be free, becomes to a subsequent age so palpable an absurdity, that the only difficulty then, is how such a thing can ever have appeared credible. It has so happened with the doctrine that money is synonymous with wealth. The conceit seems too preposterous to be thought of as a serious opinion," &c.

I have no more to say upon this part of the subject, as Mr. Mill's testimony is conclusive, though I may say that I held the same opinion long before I had read his "Principles of Political Economy," and I believe before his book was either printed or published. We pass now to the next proposition.

J. S. R. is of opinion "that it is not correct to say with Mr. Sully that a low rate of interest is always the predisposing cause of exportation." Now let me remind J. S. R. that this was not a general proposition, but had reference to Europe only. It was written in answer to Mr. Carroll's assumption "that money runs away from a high rate of interest all the world over." The words are, with the contest, as follows: "In Europe, under such circumstances, we see exactly the same phenomenon of the exportation of the metals from the countries where the rate of interest is comparatively low, to countries where the rate is comparatively high, and it is always this comparatively low rate of interest, which is the predisposing cause, &c." Now this is quite a different proposition, and bears quite a different meaning to that which J. S. R. has put upon it. to say: "the cause of exportation is simply indebtedness." evidently putting the effect for the cause. The cause of the indebtedness was the cheapness of money in one country. There was no more goods imported than would have been balanced by the exports; but the prices being higher in one country than another, money must be exported to pay the balance.

Says J. S. R., "It is by no means clear that this steady increase and

constant depreciation of the currency does only harm;" and speaks of the "constant drain going on towards the East," as a necessity of the trade and industry of "the vast regions still open to civilization," and supposes, that "much larger amounts may be called for than are at present in use." Of course, as long as the West is willing to give, there will be no cessation to this demand. Money is exported through its depreciation; but why should the West find currency gratuitously for the East through the unnecessary regulation of the standard of value. And as a plea for the continuance of this state of things we are asked to "consider the vast amount of the national debts, the burdens of which will thus be materially lightened, and for this reason J. S. R. thinks we need not greatly regret the slow and gradual decline of our standard of value," causing as he says, "no individual suffering, but giving great aggregate relief to the taxpayer and a stimulus to industry."

Now, all this seems very plausible, and even philanthropic on the part of J. S. R. if it were only true; but, unfortunately, it is neither true nor honest, and we have still to learn that honesty is not the best policy for nations, as well as individuals.

Had we not better honestly pay our debts than to be giving our money or labor away, which is the same thing. And does J.S.R. really believe that no individual suffering is caused, by constantly diminishing fixed incomes, which are chiefly derived from permanent investments in the debts of various nations.

With respect to the stimulation of industry, that idea is utterly exploded. A constant increase of currency, even of gold and silver, can do nothing more than cause fluctuations in the demand for labor. Sometimes there may be a little feverish excitement, through the increase of price, but as consumption is thereby retarded, it always ends in an accumulation of stocks, and a lack in the demand for labor, causing trade to become a lottery, and producing all kinds of fraud and bankruptcy. But our opponent seems to think that this production of gold may ultimately stop without any change or interference with the standard of value, and no doubt it may; but it may also be a long time first, perhaps another century. In the mean time, is there any good reason why the United States should bear the tax of the export of gold?

But we are told that if we should abolish the standard of value we should be compelled to resume it; "that we could no more do without it than without a measure of length or capacity." But this is certainly a mistake, as a measure of value and a standard of value are two distinct things. If the standard only was abolished the measure would remain. The standard might be abolished to-morrow, and if the newspapers did not publish the fact, very few people would know anything about it; per-

haps the gold miners, bankers, brokers, and merchants, values would remain exactly as they were before, bearing the same relation to each other. Suppose two commodities to be offered for sale, the one being produced at half the cost of labor, or difficulty of attainment as the other, say, at present, one would be charged half a dollar and the other a dollar. Well, the nominal dollar with its hundred parts, or cents, would measure it just the same as before; they would bear the same relation to each other, and the same price. The only difference in the case would be, that gold and silver would have a price, and as I have said before, have to be paid according to price and weight. Therefore the measure of value would be as accurate and as stable as before; but in future, all countries that imported gold and silver would have to pay for it by their own labor, and not get it gratuitously as many of them do at present.

It is very easy to assume, with our opponent, that, "ever since Abraham weighed to Ephron, the Hittite, four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant, that the precious metals have been to a greater or less extent the measure and standard of value;" but not quite so easy to prove it.

There was no doubt some criterion by which values were computed; but there could be no standard, according to difficulty of production, for probably two thousand years after that; sheep and oxen were the criterions by which values were at that time estimated. There were no coins in the world, the shekel was only a weight, representing, no doubt, as much silver as by the arbitrary dictum of the times was considered equal to the utility of a lamb; as pieces of silver and lambs of silver were synonymous terms, as before stated.*

In our last, we assumed that: "All honest people, if they were intelligent, would vote for the abolition of bank currency, as well as the credit system; and all other modes of unduly increasing money." But J. S. R. objects to this, and assumes that the evils arising from the system might be restrained within safe bounds." This, however, seems to me to be impossible. The system is so general, so extensive, that it viciates the whole volume of trade and commerce; and however prudent, no individual can thoroughly protect himself from its costly and evil influence.

When we take into consideration the greater expense of doing business, the immense amount of interest money paid to the banks, and their immense profits; the frauds, the bankruptcies, the vice, the crime, the general imprudence and demoralization which the system engenders among the people, the monetary panics, the losses from the involuntary idleness of the people, at intervals, of longer or shorter duration, according

^{*}For further explanation upon this point, see Article, "History and Principles of Money," vol. 49 of this Magazine.

to the extent of the derangement of commerce, &c., and when we remember that those who pay, pay for the whole of this waste and loss, verily we cannot help repeating, that, were the people honest and intelligent, they would vote to abolish the whole system. Of course we could not, nor do we wish to prevent private individuals from disposing of their property on any terms they choose; but we could prevent, if the people understood the matter, banks from issuing their promises to pay as money, and discounting their deposits on demand; and we could tax them, so that the whole business would be less profitable—"the public good is the supreme law."

We pass now to a very ingenious paragraph, apparently constructed, rather in the hope of throwing dust into the eyes of the reader, than with any expectation of successfully combatting the argument it is intended to oppose.

Mr. J. S. R. says: "Mr. Sully's argument, that gold cannot be capit; 1 because its exchangeable value depreciates in the ratio of its addition (even if this fact could be proved), applies at least in part to wheat, corn, houses, ships, or any other form of wealth." Now this is not true as a principle; J. S. R. has not allowed for the exceptional circumstances under which our system of commerce operates upon production and consumption. As a general thing, what may be termed capital, never depreciates: much less in the ratio of its addition. There may be exceptional cases, however, under our present fluctuating monetary and banking systems; but the articles or commodities in question never do depreciate, under ordinary circumstances. First, because they are all either articles of necessity or consumption; and secondly, because the cost of raw material, and therefore labor, has a tendency to rise constantly. Some kinds of wealth may depreciate, in exchangeable value, but wheat, corn, houses and ships, do not belong to that category. These things would never be in excess, unless consumption were retarded by an increase of price, or a sudden failure of demand through a monetary crisis. The case of gold and silver is quite different, as they are not articles of daily or necessarily consumption, their indefinite increase makes no addition to wealth or capital. But says our opponent: "If gold is not wealth, how comes it that a greenback is much cheaper? Cheaper than that which possesses no value?" Now this is merely a quibble, and is taking up time and space to no purpose. Although gold is not wealth to the community, seeing that it makes no addition to meat, drink, clothing or shelter, it is wealth to the individual, as before intimated. But as it is the fixed standard of value, and legal tender for debts, society is forced to purchase any amount which may be presented to it, and even at a price beyond the cost of production. It thus receives a conventional and

fictitious value, which J. S. R. will admit, upon second consideration, considerably exceeds that of a *greenback*. Ergo, it would be much cheaper for society to furnish a currency of *greenbacks*, than to maintain one of gold.

J. S. R. objects to the assumption of Mill, "that the demand for money is limited only by the means of the purchaser," because capitalists may be seeking for investments, and may be willing to loan their money instead of demanding some other commodity immediately in return for it. And he further says: "the mass of the people want money because it commands everything else, and this demand has no limit." J. S. R. seems to have mistaken what constitutes a demand for money. A desire for money, and a demand for money, are entirely separate matters. Mr. Mill says upon this point: "The demand for money again consists of all the goods offered for sale. Every seller of goods is a buyer of money, and the goods he brings with him constitutes his demand."

A person having no goods to sell, may have a desire for money, because, "it would command all other things;" but to assume that such a person had any demand upon the market for money would be ridiculous. If people choose to loan money, that is an affair between the borrower and the lender. If the money have been previously obtained by production, society is neither injured nor benefitted.

For one thing Mr. J. S. R. gives Mr. Mill credit, that is, for having stated correctly the tendency of *credit* to advance prices; but he says, "we cannot admit that all credit accelerates consumption without demanding in return an equivalent production, or that it necessarily raises prices above their true level."

Now, we cannot help what J. S. R. chooses to admit, and what he chooses not to admit, but we hope to be excused for saying that we do not know of any one who has made such an assertion, "that all credit accelerates consumption without demanding in return an equivalent production." The language used is, Whatever accelerates consumption, &c., which certainly bears quite a different meaning, and, I think, cannot easily be controverted. I must now beg leave to quote Mr. Mill once more, against the conclusion "that credit does not necessarily raise prices above their true level."

Mr. Mill says: "In a state of commerce in which much credit is habitually given general prices at any moment depend much more upon the state of credit than upon the quantity of money. For credit, though it is not a producing power, is a purchasing power, and a person who having credit avails himself of it in the purchase of goods, creates just as much demand for the goods, and tends quite as much to raise their price as if he made an equal amount of purchases with ready money."

Now we have endeavored to answer, either by our own reasoning, or quotation from others, all the objections raised against our former article by J. S. R., and hope we have succeeded; but if unfortunately we have not satisfied him, and he should again favor us with his notice, we have only to ask of him, that he will condescend to quote us fairly, and not transpose our sentences to make them mean what they were not intended to mean; and then perhaps he may discover that they are not so very much opposed to truth after all.

RIGHARD SULLEY.

TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH THE UNITED STATES.

We take the following from a late little to the Commercial and Financial Chronicle from its London Correspondent:

It is satisfactory, to observe that in some branches our trade with the United States for the month of August, exhibits an improvement as compared with last year. In that month, for instance, the shipments of linen piece goods amounted to 9,194,496 yards, against 8,574,910 yards; of linen thread to 142,116 lb., against 185,527 lb.; of carpets and druggets to 375,126 yards, against 355,782 yards; and of worsted stuffs.to 10,455,810 yards, against 9,840,867 yards in August last year. The following statement shows the exports of the principal des riptions of cotton, silk, and woo'en goods to the United States and to France during the first eight months of the present and last two years:

TO THE UNITED STA

Cotton piece goods	77,995,681 1,450,429 4°5,367 4,199,305 8,145,630 57,977,586	1867. 70,000,205 980,274 90,283,307 983,265 277,257 2,861,158 2,979 063 37,080,082	1968
TO FRANCE.			
Cotton yarn. lbs. Cotton piece goods yds. Cotton thread lbe. Lunen yarn lbs. Linen piece goods yds. Woolen yarn lbs. Woolen cloth yds. Carpets and druggets yds. Worsted stuffs yds.	1,522,055 2,573,791 1,259,950 2,686,606 509,410 17,672,812	8,208,864 20,719,980 46,467 2,566,660 8,385,643 2,002,415 5,082,898 304,747 14,036,743	2,402,506 21,725,813 84,999 1,799,518 2,852,51 6,668 9 1 1,229, 57 599,6 3 10,674,678
Total	61,978,284	51,418,910	46,539,176

According to the official returns, the imports of wheat into the United Kingdom in August amounted to 2,012,874 cwt., being 1,125,095 cwt. less than in August last year, in which month they reached a total of 3,887,469 cwt. From Reasia, there is a reduction of about 735,000 cwt.; from Prussia, of 292,000 cwt.; from Egypt, of 20,000 cwt.; from the United States, of 158,500 cwt., and from Chili, of 27,250 cwt. In the eight months ending with August 31, the imports were 22,710,165 cwt., against 21,031,647 cwt. in the corresponding period in 1867, and 15,529,299 cwt. in 1866. From the United States and Egypt, the receipts were as much as 5,000,000 cwt. greater than in 1867, while those from the Danubian provinces show an augmentation of 1,578,971 cwt. On the other hand, bowever, Russia and Prussia exhibit a considerable decline, the diminution in the importation from those two countries being 3,792,759 cwt. The following statement shows the quantities of wheat and flour

received from each principal wheat growing country in the first eight months of the present and last two years:

WHEAT.

Russia	2,898,506 8,805,024 1,250,828 829,788 11,769 845,750 44,253 8,789	1867. 8,045,857 4,474,388 581,976 297,916 1,694,506 422,203 1,738,945 1,615,904	1868. 6,214,781 9,512,905 14,424 799,906 2,676,491 2,776,873 4,529,906 990,116 272,386
Total, including other countries	15,529,299	21,031,647	22, 719,165
Prance	1966. 8,078,740 198,051 15,818	1867. 1,071,394 208,704 28,838	1868. 256,778 469,508 101,111
Total, including other countries	8,687,648	2,267,582	1,894,878

The Board of Trade returns for August, and the eight months ending August 31, have been issued to-day. They show unfavorable results as regards our trade, the declared value of our exports being considerably less than in 1867 and in 1866. In August, the declared value of our principal exports of British and Irish produce and manufactures was £16,427,597, being a diminution of £1,453,402 as compared with the corresponding month last year. As compared with each of the seven previous months of the year, a decided improvement is shown, but, at the same time, the increase in the exports in August over July in the current year is by no means in an equal ratio with 1867 and 1866. This year, the increase amounts to only £379,328, but in 1867, was £2.318,569, and in 1866 £2,492,322. In the eight months en ling with August 31, the shipments of British and Irish produce and m nufactures were valued at £116,777,023 against £121,056,913 in 1867, and £125,265,820 in 1866. The computed real value of our principal imports in July was £21,487,6 2 against £19,215,843 last year, and £10,641,564 in 1866. In the seven months ending with July 31, it amounted to £132,288,806 against £128,935,000 in 1867, and £143,544,759 in 1866.

As regards the imports of cotton, the principal feature in the monthly statement is the heavy falling cff in the receipts from the United States, the total in August Inst year being as much as 267,291 cwt., while in the current year it amounts to only 87,751 cwt. In the eight months, however, the imports direct of American cotton have been 4,345,188 cwt., being an increase of 40,,105 cwt., as compared with last year. The imports of Brazilian cotton have increased from 25,509 cwt. in August 1867 to 85,422 cwt. in August this year, but the imports of Egyptian cutton have declined from 66,996 cwt. to 37,374 cwt., and of East India from 611,882 cwt. to 509,851 cwt. The following were the imports of cotton into the United Kingdom in the eight months ending with August 81:

IMPORTS OF COTTON.

•	1866.	1867.	1868.
From—	cwt.	cwt.	cwt.
United States	8,884,000	8,910,083	4,345,189
Bahamas and Bermudas	6.418	10.349	868
Mexico	8,145	22	
Brazil	493,883	467.007	627,599
Turkey	83,980	55,88\$	30,462
Egypt	785,460	8 1 675	820,647
British India	8.489.087	1.869.451	1.589.743
China	17.949	4,707	
Other countries	198,734	195,054	148,214
Total	8,809,601	7,391,690	7,508,921

The exports of cotton in August were 294,389 cwt. against 288,629 cwt. last year, and 408,214 cwt. in 1866. In the eight months they were as follows:

and 408,214 cwt. in 1866. In the eight month	s they w	ere as folk	DWS:	
EXPORTS OF CO	PTON.			
		1866,	1867,	1868,
_ To-		cwt.	cwt.	cwt.
Russia	•••••	248,285	298,785	188,017
Prussia. Hanover.	•••••	42,089 5,618	145,786	77,018
Hanse Towns		516,477	3,514 459,179 345,865	1,671 887,758
Holland		516,477 847,865	345,865	887,758 857,799 614,288
Other countries	1	,127,828	770,656	614,288
Total	-	287,607	2,018,188	1,626,544
			• • •	
The following were the exports of cotton good	la in Aus	rost, and is	the eight	months
		•		:
IN AUGUST.	1866.		1000	
Yarnlbs.	19 080 4	40 151	1867. 865,614 122,829	1868. 14,494,888
Piece goodsyds.	12,969,9 254,199,7	98 260.	123,819	275,483,888
Piece goodsyds. Threadlbs.	578,4	.06	596,078	478 634
				•
IN EIGHT MON	THO.	•		
Yarnlbs.	86,290,0	76 105.1	718,155	114,202,518
Yarn	1,666,584,9	84 1,789,	176,406 1.	900, 260, 705
Threadbs.	4,088,1	98 4,	808,841	4,222,926
A 1 to a statement of section the Andrews	11	-641		
Annexed is a statement showing the declared	1 ASIDE	or me con	ton goods	exported
in August, and in the eight months ending with	August	31:		
IN AUGUST.				
	1866.	186	7.	1868.
Yarn	E1,167,827	£1.8	75,178	£1,178,292
Piece goods	5,812,601 90,5 2 7	4,9	04,987	4,705,809 79,284
Thread	80,02		02,881	79,254
IN EIGHT MON	THE.			
Yarn	8,744,919	9,7	89,049	9,846,087
Piece goods	38,828,0ut	9,7 35,8	89,04 9 1 9 ,184 51,840	9,846,087 82,968,728
Plece goods	88,828,006 683,547	85,8	12,184 51,840	707,460
Piece goods	88,828,006 688,547 , the dec	85,8 Tared valu	12,184 51,840 e of our (707,460
Plece goods	88,828,006 688,547 , the dec the rever	85,8 7 lared value months	12,184 51,840 e of our o were:	av7,460
Piece goods	88,828,006 683,547 , the dec the rever	lared value months	12,184 51,840 se of our o were: 867.	707,460 Exports of 1868.
Piece goods	88,828,006 683,547 , the dec the rever	lared value months	12,184 51,840 se of our o were: 867.	707,460 Exports of 1868.
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern Southern	88,628,006 653,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,6	85,8 70 lared value months value 127 £12,	12,184 51,840 60 of our (Were: 867. 462,678 774,225	1868. £11,512,924 607,257
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific	88,528,006 653,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,6 643,6 426,1	85,8 70 lared value 1 months v 1277 £12, 120 43	12,184 51,840 se of our over sees. 867. 462,678 774,285 490,816	1868. £11,512,924 607,257 864,467
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern Southern	88,528,006 653,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,6 643,6 426,1	85,8 70 lared value 1 months v 1277 £12, 120 43	12,184 51,840 60 of our (Were: 867. 462,678 774,225	1868. £11,512,924 607,257
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned. British and Irish produce and manufactures in the Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total	88,828,006 683,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 643,6 426,7	85,8 7 lared value months value £12, 20 43 18,	12,134 51,840 60 of our of were: 567. 462,678 774,285 490,816 727,779	107,460 exports of 1868. £11,512,924 607,257 864,467 12,424,648
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B	88,828,006 683,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 643,6 426,1 17,838,5	85,8 7 lared value months value £12, 20 42 189 18,	12,184 51,840 10 of our of were: 667. 662,678 774,225 490,816 727,779 oduce and	1868. £11,512,924 607,257 364,467 12,484,648 manufac-
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned. British and Irish produce and manufactures in the Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total	88,828,006 683,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 643,6 426,1 17,838,5	85,8 7 lared value months v 777 £12, 120 43 43 189 18, dd Irish pr	12,184 51,840 se of our sewers: 567. 462,678 774,925 480,616 727,779 oduce and	1868. £11,512,924 607,257 364,467 12,484,648 manufac-
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight more	88,828,006 658,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 643,6 426,1 17,838,1 ritish an nthis end	85,8 7 lared value months v 177 £12, 120 43 189 18, d Irish pring with A	12,124 51,840 e of our of were: 867. 462,678 774,285 490,816 727,779 oduce and 1907.	1868. £11,612,924 607,257 384,467 12,424,648 manufac- :
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mod Alkali, cwt	88,828,006 tS3,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 426,1 17,888,1 ritish an	85,8 7 1 a months v 1077 £12, 120 18, 143 189 18, d Irish pr 1966. 1,131,75	12,184 51,840 6e of our of were: 867. 462,678 774,925 490,816 727,779 oduce and 1967. 947,982	1868. £11,612,924 607,257 384,467 12,424,648 manufac- :
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo	88,828,006 £58,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 643,6 426,1 17,838,1 ritish an nthis end	85,3 7 lared value n months v 177 £12, 120 43 189 18, d Irish pr ing with 1 1866 1,181,755 9,687	12,124 51,840 were: 867, 462,678 774,225 490,816 727,779 oduce and 1967, 947,952 12,783	1868. £11,512,924 607,257 384,467 12,424,648 manufac- : 1668. 1,069,600 18,469
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo	88,828,006 £58,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 643,6 426,1 17,838,1 ritish an nthis end	85,8 7 1 a months v 1077 £12, 120 18, 143 189 18, d Irish pr 1966. 1,131,75	12,184 51,840 6e of our of were: 867. 462,678 774,925 490,816 727,779 oduce and 1967. 947,982	1868. £11,512,994 607,257 364,467 12,464,648 manufac- :
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern Southern Total Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight model of the consequence of the Coals, tons Coals, tons Cotton Manufactures:	88,622,04 658,647, the dec the rever 1866. £16,643,643,643,6426,7 17,838,4 ritish an ntis end	85,3 7 lared value n months v 177 £12, 120 43 189 18, d Irish pr ing with 1 1866 1,181,755 9,687	12,124 51,840 60 of our of were: 667. 667. 667. 649,616 727,779 oduce and 1947,932 12,783 57,496	1968. £11,512,994 607,257 384,467 12,424,648 manufac- : 1668. 1,083,600 18,469 76,879
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Cotton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread lb.	88,632,046 £58,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,263,5 426,7 17,338,1 ritish an nths end	85,3 77 1 lared value 1 months value 120 142 189 18,4 189 18,175 9,687 101,728 87,558,274 1,018,202	12,124 51,840 60 of our of were: 867,678 774,225 490,816 -727,779 oduce and august 81 19,77 947,932 12,783 57,496	1968. £11,612,994 607,257 384,467 12,424,648 manufac- : 1668. 1,069,600 18,469 76,879 58,418,888 1.128,697
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight model. Alkali, cwt. Beer & ale, bbls. Coals, tons Cotton Manufactures: Piece roods, yds. Thread, lb. Esathenware and Porcelain pkgs.	88,928,046 £58,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 426, 17,388,1 ritish an ntis end	85,3 Talent value in months v	12,124 51,840 61,840 were: 867. 867. 774,225 490,816 727,779 oduce and 12,77. 947,932 12,783 57,496 70,0 10,205 980,274 71,570	1868. £11,612,994 607,257 864,467 12,424,648 manufac- : 1668. 1,083,600 18,463 76,879 58,418,888 1.128,697 62,887
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight model Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Cotton Masuractures: Piece goods, yds Thread, lb Faathenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery	88,928,046 £58,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 426, 17,388,1 ritish an ntis end	85,3 77 1 lared value 1 months value 120 142 189 18,4 189 18,175 9,687 101,728 87,558,274 1,018,202	12,124 51,840 60 of our of were: 867,678 774,225 490,816 -727,779 oduce and august 81 19,77 947,932 12,783 57,496	1968. £11,512,924 607,257 364,467 12,424,648 manufac- : 1668. 1,062,600 18,469 76,879 58,418,888 1.128,697
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb Easthenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery.	88,628,046 £88,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,426,763,426,7 17,838,4 ritish an nths end	85,3 1 ared value in months value in valu	18,184 51,840 60 of our	1968. £11,612,924 607,257 364,467 12,424,648 manufac- : 1668. 1,062,600 18,469 76,879 58,418,888 1.128,697 62,887 579,195
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb Easthenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery.	88,628,046 £88,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,426,763,426,7 17,838,4 ritish an nths end	85,3 77 lared value 1 months value 120 43 189 18,4 189 18,1.75 9.687 101,728 87,558,274 1,018,202 79,057 929,090 £190,773 68,827	12,124 51,840 61,840 Were: 867. 867. 174,225 490,816 727,779 oduce and 1247,932 12,783 57,496 70,0 10,205 980,274 71,570 714,884	1868. £11,612,924 607,257 884,467 12,484,648 manufac-: 1668. 1,083,600 18,463 76,879 58,418,888 1,128,697 62,887 579,195
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight model Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Cotton Masuractures: Piece goods, yds Thread, lb Faathenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery	88,628,046 £88,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,426,763,426,7 17,838,4 ritish an nths end	85,3 Talent value in months v	18,184 51,840 60 of our	1968. £11,612,924 607,257 364,467 12,424,648 manufac- : 1668. 1,062,600 18,469 76,879 58,418,888 1.128,697 62,887 579,195
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mod Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Cotton Manufactures: Piece roods, yds. Thread, lb Eaathenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery HARDWARE AND CUTLERY: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, sawa, &c., value Anvils, vices, sawa, &c., value Linen Manufactures of German silver, value. Linen Manufactures	88,628,046 £58,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,5 426, 17,388,4 ritish an nths end	85,3 1 ared value 1 months value 1277 £12, 180 18, 189 18, 189 18, 1966 1,131.75v 101,728 87,558,274 1,018,202 79,057 929,090 £190,773 68,897 461,207	12,124 51,840 61,840 Were: 867. 462,678 774,225 490,816 727,779 oduce and 1947,982 12,783 57,496 70,0 10,205 980,274 71,570 714,284	1868. £11,612,994 607,257 384,467 12,484,648 manufac-: 1668. 1,083,600 18,463 76,879 58,418,888 1.183,697 62,887 579,195 £108,815 57,231 227,019
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in it Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbis Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb. Easthenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery HARDWARE AND CUTLERY: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, sawd, &c., value. Manufactures of German silver, value. Liken Manufactures: Piece goods, vds.	88,928,046 658,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,6 426,7 17,838,4 ritish annths end	85,8 1 ared value in months v	12,124 51,840 60 of our	1968. £11,512,994 607,257 364,467 19,424,648 manufac-: : 1668. 1,063,60 ₀ 18,40 ₉ 76,879 58,418,882 1.128,697 62,887 579,195 £108,315 £108,315 £77,291 287,019
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb. Fasthenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery HARDWARE AND CUTLERY: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, saws, &c., value Manufactures of German silver, value. Linen Manufactures: Piece goody, yds. Thread Thread	88,928,046 658,547 , the dec the rever 1866. £16,268,6 426,7 17,838,4 ritish annths end	85,3 1 ared value 1 months value 12,2 160 42 18,2 189 18,4 189 18,175 19,687 101,728 87,558,274 1,018,207 79,057 929,090 £190,773 68,897 461,207	12,124 51,840 60 of our	1868. £11,612,994 607,257 384,467 12,484,648 manufac-: 1668. 1,083,600 18,463 76,879 58,418,888 1.183,697 62,887 579,195 £108,815 57,231 227,019
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mod Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb Eastherware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery HARDWARE AND CUTLERY: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, sawa, &c, value Manufactures of German silver, value. Liner Manufactures: Piece goody, yds. Thread.	88,828,046	85,8 1 ared value in months v	12,124 51,840 61,840 Were: 867, 462,678 774,225 490,816 727,779 oduce and August 81 1847, 947,982 12,783 57,496 70,010,205 980,274 71,570 714,284 £ 59,281 68,070 383,087	1868. £11,612,994 607,257 384,467 12,424,648 manufac-: 1668. 1,683,500 18,469 76,879 58,418,888 1.128,697 62,887 579,195 £108,815 57,231 227,019
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mod Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb Eastherware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery HARDWARE AND CUTLERY: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, sawa, &c, value Manufactures of German silver, value. Liner Manufactures: Piece goody, yds. Thread.	88,828,046	85,8 1 ared value in months v	12,124 51,840 60 of our	1968. £11,512,994 607,257 364,467 12,424,648 manufac-: 1668. 1,069,600 18,469 76,879 58,418,883 1.123,697 62,887 579,195 £108,815 577,231 227,019
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mod Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb Eastherware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery HARDWARE AND CUTLERY: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, sawa, &c, value Manufactures of German silver, value. Liner Manufactures: Piece goody, yds. Thread.	88,828,046	85,8 1 ared value in months 1 177 £12, 180 18, 189 18, 1866. 1,131.751 9,687 101,728 87,558,274 1,018,207 19,057 929,090 £190,773 68,897 461,207 77,995,621 1,450,422 56,886 89,956	12,124 51,840 61,840 Were: 867,678 774,225 480,816 727,779 oduce and 1207,947,932 12,783 57,496 70,0 10,205 980,274 71,570 383,087 60,258,807 988,305	1968. £11,512,994 607,257 364,467 19,424,648 manufac-: : 1668. 1,063,600 18,400 76,879 55,418,388 1.123,697 62,887 579,195 £108,315 57,231 237,019 54,512,008 887,184 48,392 94,585
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mo Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds. Thread, lb. Fasthenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery HARDWARE AND CUTLERY: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, saws, &c., value Manufactures of German silver, value. Linen Manufactures: Piece goody, yds. Thread Thread	88,828,046 658,547 , the dec the rever 1866. 216,268,6 426, 17,888,1 ritiah an ntis end	85,8 1 ared value in months v	12,124 51,840 61,840 Were: 867, 678 774,225 480,816 727,779 oduce and 1907, 947,932 19,783 57,496 70,0 10,205 980,274 71,570 338,087 60,258,807 988,305	1968. £11,512,994 607,257 364,467 19,424,648 manufac-: : 1668. 1,063,600 18,400 76,879 55,418,388 1.123,697 62,887 579,195 £108,315 57,231 237,019 54,512,008 887,184 48,392 94,585
Piece goods Thread So far as the United States are concerned British and Irish produce and manufactures in a Ports on Atlantic—Northern —Southern Ports on Pacific Total The following were the chief shipments of B tures to the United States during the eight mod Alkali, cwt Beer & ale, bbls Coals, tons Corton Manufactures: Piece goods, yds Thread, lb Eaathenware and Porcelain pkgs Haberdashery and Millinery Habware And Cutlery: Knives, forks, &c., value Anvils, vices, saws, &c, value Manufactures of German silver, value. Liner Manufactures: Piece goody, yds Thread. Metals— Iron—Pig, &c., tons Bar, &c., tons Bar, &c., tons Railroad, tons	88,828,046 658,547 , the dec the rever 1866. 216,268,6 426, 17,888,1 ritiah an ntis end	85,3 Tallared value in months value 1277 £12, 120 423 ———————————————————————————————————	12,124 51,840 61,840 Were: 867,678 774,225 480,816 727,779 oduce and 1207,947,932 12,783 57,496 70,0 10,205 980,274 71,570 383,087 60,258,807 988,305	107,480 exports of 1868. £11,512,994 607,267 384,467 19,424,648 manufac-: 1668. 1,063,600 18,400 18,400 76,879 55,418,888 1.123,697 62,887 579,195 £108,815 57,291 237,019 54,512,005 887,184 48,392 94,585

Γ	November.

		-	•
Hoops, sheets and boiler plates, tons	18,766	21,761	9,960
Wrought, tons.	7,281	5.057	2.6:5
Steel Unwrought, tons	18,179	18,098	9.523
Copper, wrought, cwts	6.881	8,457	1.819
Lead, pig, &c., tons	4.591	4,564	5.060
Tin plates, cwts	771,785	728,975	896,278
Olland mile	1,983,438	1,278,418	
Oil seed, galls			159,639
Salt, tons	114,516	97,806	96,511
SILE MANUFACTURES—			
Broad piece goods, &c., yards	485,367	277,957	253,963
Handkerchiefs, dozens.	5,518	2.393	1,189
Ribbons, lbs.	21,952	13,857	9,456
Other articles of silk (value)	£84,214	84,647	96, 259
hilk manuf's mixed with other materials	£54,783	58,360	57,194
Spirits, British, galls	83,865	54,714	79,612
Wool lbs	194,640	8,904	87,172
·	-	•	-
WOOLEN AND WORSTED MANUFACTURES-			
Cloth, yards	4,119,305	2,831,158	2,096,396
Carpets and druggets, yards.	8,145,680	2,97,9,068	2,257,847
Shawls, rugs, &c., number	114,047	99,185	69,674
Worsted stuffs and waistcoatings, yards	57,277,586	37.089.088	51.0U8.956

HARTFORD AND NEW HAVEN RAILROAD.

The earnings and expenses of this road for the years ending August 31, 1867 and 1868, were as follows:

Barnings From Passengers From freight From mails From monts, &c.	1967. \$911 539 625,992 114,007	79 61	1868. \$891,091 632,454 114,709 55,627 8,452	66 50 23
Total	\$1,685,884	59	\$1,697,884	
Tetal expenses	\$982,518	90	\$1,034,935	
Net earnings	702,815 158,818	69 80	679,899 190,809	50
Balance	548,996	89	\$481,590	

Compared with the previous year the gross earnings of 1867-68, show an increase of \$11,999 80, with an increase in operating expenses of \$42,416 18, making the decrease in net earnings, \$30,416 38. The balance remaining after the payment of interest and taxes is less than that of the preceding year by \$62,406 08.

The income of the company from all sources during the year was as follows:

Cash on hand, Sept. 1, 1867	1,697,834	89
Total	\$1,870,664	89
Thus accounted for:		
Dividends	57 5.46	K1
Operating and repairing road. Tomilinson Bridge Company, for depot grounds, New Haven	1,008,829 49,832 8,445	34 30 36
Real estate in Connecticut	4,975 20,134	70 52
State and national taxes	188.281 170,578	

CALIFORNIA TREASURE MOVEMENTS FOR NINE MONTHS.

We have received from Thomas P. Kettell the following statement of the treasure movement at California for nine months:

The imports of treasure (exclusive of those from Victoria, which are included in the receipts from coastwise ports) for the nine months ending September 30, 1867, and 1868, respectively, were as follows:

Japan Mexico Panama Sandwich Islands Society Islands	1867. \$	1868. \$4,164 00 1,627,721 50 800 00 4,400 00
Totals		\$1,686,685 56 28,670 19

The receipts of treasure and bullion from coastwise ports and Victoria (V. I.) for nine months ending September 30, 1867 and 1868, respectively, were as follows:

Uncoined	\$4,150,840 \$29,216	\$1,785,654 668,762
Totals	\$4,479,556	\$2,414,416 \$2,065,149

The following is a comparative statement of the bullion and treasure received during nine months ending September 80, 1867 and 1868, respectively, from our own and Nevada State:

1867.	Uncoined.	Coined.	Totals.
Northern Mines	\$29,528,876	\$2,444,998	\$31,973,874
Southern Mines	2,828,834	959,519	8,288,353
Totals	\$81,857,710	\$8,404,517	\$85,262,227
Northern Mines	. \$27,362,928	\$8,199,111	\$10,562,684
	2,220,689	1,286,080	8,456,719
Totals	~ ,,	\$1,185,191	\$84,018,758 \$1,248,474

The following is a recapitulation of the foregoing statement:

Imports	1867. \$1,665,806 4,479,556 85,262,227	1868. \$1,636,636 2,414,416 84,018,758
Totals		\$83,069,805 \$3,887,284

The exports of treasure for the nine months ending September 30, 1868, and the same compared with a like period of 1867, were as follows:

То—	1867.		1868.
China	\$7,153,465	07	\$3,978,009 65
Chile	728,450	97	
Central American ports	581,044		588,900 00
wastand	4,420,481		4,689,459 90
France	1,453,639	76	941 553 47
Japan	53,969		862,459 46
Mexico	26,000	00	8,000 00
New York	17.311.815	77	18,460,421 30
randwich Islands	8,800	ÚΟ	50,000 00
Society Islands	500	00	
Vancouver Island	50,000	00	95,000 00
Total	\$81,788,186	61	\$29,058,103 78
Add duties			6,560,729 95
	\$87,781,840	61	\$85,618,883 73
Decrease 1868		• • • •	\$2,118,006 88

CONSUMPTION, &c., OF COTTON IN EUROPE.

M. Ott-Trum, ler, of Zurich, has issued an interesting circular respecting the cotton movements of the last season, of which the following are the chief particulars, the figures represent thousands of bales:

ENGLAND.						
	Amer	- In-	Bra-		Bun-	
	ican.	dian.	zil.	Egypt	. drv.	Total
Stock in the ports, Oct. 1, 1867	244	466	197	85	89	911
Import during the season		1,190	589	175	118	
222po. 4 caring and responsible		-,100				
Total (1 470	1,656	716	210	155	4,909
Total Export to the Continent	1,110					
Export to the Continent	162	597	81	9	25	874
	1,810	1,059	635	201	130	8,885
Total in the ports, September 80	118	260	102	19	19	518
• • •						
Consumption	1.197	799	588	189	111	2,832
	-,	,,,,				~~~
CONTINENT.						
Stock, Oct. 1, 1807, at Havre, Marsellies, Bordesux,						
Stock, Oct. 1, 1867, at Havre, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Bremen,						
Hamburg, Trieste and Genoa	58	52	21	4	51	181
Hamburg, Triesie and Genoa						
named ports	348	122	86	58	225	839
Export from England to the Continent, deduction being						
made for 11,000 bales re-exported from Continent to						
England	158	592	81	9	23	868 .
Tang margines	100	00%	- 01			
Total	559	766	188	71	299	1,883
Total						
Stock, bep. 80 at the above named ports	21	48	18	2	21	101
~						4 0.00
Consumption	588	723	175	69	277	1,782
ENGLISH CONSUMPTION	M.					
1867-68	1 197	799	533	182	111	2,522
1866-67		815	298	160	125	2414
1865–66	846	878	259	186	150	2.819
					843	1,873
1964-65	197	850	203	235		
1863-64	178	620	184	219	4:4	1,565
1862-63	99	905	111	168	54	1,313
1861–63	301	675	101	122	15	1,217
1860-61	2,170	249		193		2,612
1859-60	2,135	207		218		2,560
CONSUMPTION OF CONTI	w www					•
1867-68	588	728	4 88	-00	OFF	1,782
			175	69	277	
1969-67	532	777	152	75	217	1,783
1865-66	891	755	164	69	237	1,616
1864-65	49	637	121	89	286	1,!83
1869-64	64	548	74	106	246	1,033
1862-63	84	559	49	64	108	814
1861-62	238	415	21	48	40	776
			- -	~-		
1867-61	1,278	423		78		1,776
1859-60	1,272	885		55		1,712
		000		-		_,
CONSUMPTION OF BURG						4 804
	1,785	1,523	708	251	388	4,604
1866 67	1,548	1,592	450	215	842	4,147
1865-66		1,638	428	255	387	8 985
1864-65	236	1.487	824	874	634	8,065
1853-64	242	1.163	203	825	660	2,598
1862-69	138	1.461	160	2:7	162	2,146
1861-62	562	1.090	122	164	55	1,993
		-,000			_==	_,
1860-61	8 449	674		271		4,888
1839-60		592		278		4,273
	-,	00%		210		31010
STOCK IN ENGLAND, SEP	т. 30,	,				
186	0 1862		327	1860		954
1867 911 1865 804 1868 21	7 1861		779			
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•			- :	L -	f the
The f llowing figures show the imports and cons	տաթյ	CO ID E	urop	e m e	ECU (TING

The f llowing figures show the imports and c nsump ion in Europe in each of the last seven seasons;

,			ports		Stocks		-	
	Europe	Amer-	Other		close of	C	oncumpt	OB
	Oct. 1.	ican. c	countries.	Total.	season.	Total.	Engl'd.	Cont't.
1861-2	1.019	14	1,364	9,427	363	1,993	1,217	776
1862-3		121	1,947	2,456	250	2,146	1,332	814
1863-4	250	215	2,716	8.181	563	2.588	1.565	1,033
1861-5		250	2,602	8,415	317	3,055	1,878	1,186
1865-6	957	1,565	8,166	5,078	1,143	8,935	2,819	1,616
1866-7		1,495	2,601	5 239	1.092	1.093	2.414	1,783
1867-8	1,092	1,572	2,554	5,218	614	614	2,822	1,782

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATKS.

Abstract statement, as appears from the books and Treasurer's returns in the Treasury Department, on the 1st of October and 1st of November, 1868:

DEST	BEARING COIN	INTEREST.		_
K nement hands	October 1.	November 1.	Increase.	Decrease.
5 per cent. bonds	283,677,800 00	283,677,800 00	8	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
6 " (5-20's)	1,594,8:8,600 00	1,602,812,250 00	7,423,650 00	•••••
Total	2,100,154,800 00	2,107,577,93 0 0 0	7,423,650 00	•••••
DEBT BE	ARING OURREN	CY INTEREST.		
6 per ct. (RR.) bonds	\$89,684,000 00	\$42,194,000 00	\$2,560,000 00	5,251,930 00
8-y'ars com. int.n'tes 8 p. cent. certificates	5,251,930 00 65,230,000 00	58,325,000 00		6,905,000 00
Navy Pen. F'd 8 p.c	18,000,000 00	14,000,000 00	1,000,000 00	
Total	128,115,930 00	114,519,000 00		8,596,930 00
MATURED DES	T NOT PRESENT	ED FOR PAYME	NT.	
7-30 n. due Aug. 15, '67, J'e & J'y 15, '6 6 p. c. comp. int. n'es	83,587,000 00	\$2,956,950 00	\$	\$580,050 (0
B'ds of Texas ind'ty	6,322,070 00 256,000 00	5,128,810 00 256,000 00		1,198,760 00
Treasury notes (old)	154,111 64	151,611 64		2,500 00
B'ds of Apr. 15, 1842, Jan. 28, 1847 &	967,650 00	487,500 00		480,150 00
Mar. 81, 1848	445,492 00	445,492 00	••••	
Temporary loan	744,920 00	814,860 00		430,060 00
Certifi. of indebt'ess	18,000 00	13,000 00	•••••	******
Total	12,440,948 64	9,753,728 64	\$	\$2,686,520 00
DEB	BEARING NO I	NTEREST.		
United States notes	\$856,021,078 00	\$856,021,078 00	480,871 25	\$
Gold certi. ofdeposit	82,988,614 17 20,386,400 00	88,413,985 49 19,716,840 00	480,871 25	819,560 00
Total	409,191,087 17	409,151,898 42	•••••	\$89,188 75
	RECAPITULAT	on.		
	8	8		8
Bearing coin interest	2,100,164,500 00	\$ 2,107,577,950 00	7,428,650 00	8 0 KOR 090 00
Bearing cur'y interest	128,115,980 00	1:4,5:9,000 00		8,596,990 00 2,686,520 09
Bearing coin interest	128,115,980 00 12,4 0,243 64	1:4,5:9,000 00		8,596,990 00 2,686,520 09 89,188 75
Bearing cur'y interest	128,115,980 00 12,4 0,213 64 409,191,097 19 2,644,901,560 83	9,758,728 64 7 409,151,898 48		2,686,520 09
Bearing cur'y interest Matured debt	128,115,980 00 12,4 0,213 64 409,191,097 19 2,644,901,560 83	9,758,728 64 7 409,151,898 48 1 2,641,002,572 06		2,686,520 09 89,188 75
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt Bearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur	128,110,990 00 12,4 \ 0,243 64 409,191,087 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,841 80	114,519,000 00 9,758,728 64 7 409,151,898 43 1 2,641,002,572 06 3 118,878,019 24 5 2,527,129,552 83	8,615,177 28	2,686,520 09 89,188 75 8,698,988 75 7,514,166 18
Bearing cur'y interest Matured debt Bearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show	123,110,290 00 12,4 00,243 64 409,191,097 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,841 66 2,584,648,718 90 78 the amount	114,519,000 00 9,758,728 64 7 409,151,898 43 1 2,641,002,572 06 3 118,878,019 24 5 2,527,129,552 83	8,615,177 28	2,686,520 09 89,188 75 8,698,988 75 7,514,166 18
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt Bearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur	123,110,290 00 12,4 00,243 64 409,191,097 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,841 66 2,584,648,718 90 78 the amount	114,519,000 00 9,758,728 64 7 409,151,898 43 1 2,641,002,572 06 3 118,878,019 24 5 2,527,129,552 83	8,615,177 28	2,686,520 09 89,188 75 8,698,988 75 7,514,166 18
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt Rearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table	123,110,290 00 12,4 00,243 64 409,191,097 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,841 66 2,584,648,718 90 78 the amount	112,519,000 9,758,722 64 7 409,151,893 42 2,641,002,572 06 3 118,878,019 24 5 2,527,129,532 81 of coin and	8,615,177 28	2,686,520 09 89,188 75 8,698,988 75 7,514,166 18
Matured debt Matured debt Bearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur. The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table Coin AR	12,410,243 64 12,410,243 64 409,191,087 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,841 66 2,584,648,718 W	112,519,000 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,893 43 2,641,002,572 06 3 118,873,019 24 5 2,527,129.552 8i of coin and	8,615,177 #8 currency se	2,686,520 09 89,188 75 8,696,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at
Hearing cur'y interest	123,110,930 of 12,40,213 64 409,191,097 1' 2,644,901,560 S: 110,257,841 66 2,584,648,718 90 78 the amount : 10 CURRENCY IN \$96,891,847 10 18,865,994 76	12,619,000 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,899 42 2,641,002,572 06 113,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 81 of coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47	8,615,177 28 currency se	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,898,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,961 29
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt. Bearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas. Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table Coin Currency. Total coin & curre'y.	123,110,930 of 12,40,213 64 409,191,097 1' 2,644,901,560 S: 110,257,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 66 27,841 86 27,841 86 27,841 86	12,619,000 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,899 42 1 2,641,002,572 06 1 12,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 81 0f coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24	3,615,177 28 currency sej	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,898,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt. Hearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table coin Am Currency. Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable	12,410,213 64 19,410,213 64 409,191,097 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,841 86 2,584,648,718 90 78 the amount 10 CURRENCY IN \$96,891,847 10 18,885,994 76 110,257,841 86 on the debt,	12,519,002 0 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,899 42 2,641,002,572 06 113,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 81 0f coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O	\$6,516,123 67 8,615,177 28 \$6,516,128 67	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,896,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,601 29
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt Hearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table coin Am Currency. Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 1868, exclusive of interest.	12,410,213 64 19,410,213 64 409,191,097 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,841 86 2,584,648,718 90 78 the amount 10 CURRENCY IN \$96,891,847 10 18,885,994 76 110,257,841 86 on the debt,	12,519,002 0 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,899 42 2,641,002,572 06 113,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 81 0f coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O	\$6,516,123 67 8,615,177 28 \$6,516,128 67	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,896,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,601 29
Matured debt Matured debt Bearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur. The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table Coin Currency Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 186S, exclusive of interefollows:	12,410,213 64 19,40,213 64 409,191,097 1 2,644,901,560 8: 110,257,841 66 2,5534,648,718 90 78 the amount : D CURRENCY IN \$96,891,847 10 18,365,994 76 110,287,841 86 on the debt, est on the con	12,619,000 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,899 42 1 2,641,002,572 06 1 123,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 83 of coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing Ompound interest	\$6,516,138 67 3,615,177 88 ctober 1, an est notes), co	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,896,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,601 29
Matured debt Matured debt Bearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur. The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table Coin Currency Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 186S, exclusive of interefollows:	123,110,231 64 123,410,231 64 409,191,097 1 2,644,901,560 8 110,257,941 66 2,5534,648,718 99 78 the amount 396,991,847 10 18,365,994 76 110,287,841 86 on the debt, est on the con	113,573,023 64 7 409,151,893 43 1 2,641,002,573 06 3 113,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.653 83 of coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,465,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O mpound interest	\$6,516,133 67 3,615,177 28 \$6,516,138 67 3,615,177 88 ctober 1, an est notes), co	2,686,630 03 89,188 75 8,686,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,601 29 d Novem- ompares as
Hearing cur yinterest Matured debt. Hearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table coim and currency Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 1868, exclusive of interest follows: ANNUAL INTE	123,110,293 64 123,40,213 64 123,40,213 64 123,10,297 11 2,644,901,560 8: 110,257,841 66 2,584,648,718 96 78 the amount : D CURRENCY IN \$96,891,847 10 18,865,994 76 110,257,841 86 on the debt, est on the CO	113,513,002 64 7 409,151,893 42 1 2,641,002,573 06 3 123,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 83 0f coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O mpound interes November 1. 811,073,407,403 00	\$6,516,138 67 3,615,177 88 ctober 1, an est notes), co	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,896,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,601 29
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt Hearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table coim and currency Total coin & curre'y Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 1868, exclusive of interest follows: ANNUAL INTEREST Coin—5 per cents 6 " 1881	123,110,393 64 193,110,397 11 2,644,901,560 8: 110,257,841 86 2,584,648,718 99 78 the amount 396,891,847 10 18,365,994 76 110,287,841 86 on the debt, est on the coi	114,519,000 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,593 42 2,641,002,579 06 113,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.532 83 of coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,953 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O mpound intered November 1. \$11,079,420 00 17,029,688 00	\$6,516,137 28 \$6,516,138 67 3,615,177 88 ctober 1, an est notes), co	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 3,686,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,961 29 d Novem- pmpares as
Hearing cur yinterest Matured debt. Hearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur. in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table coim and currency Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 1868, exclusive of interest follows: ANNUAL INTE	123,110,293 64 123,40,213 64 123,40,213 64 123,10,297 11 2,644,901,560 8: 110,257,841 66 2,584,648,718 96 78 the amount : D CURRENCY IN \$96,891,847 10 18,865,994 76 110,257,841 86 on the debt, est on the CO	113,513,002 64 7 409,151,893 42 1 2,641,002,573 06 3 123,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 83 0f coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O mpound interes November 1. 811,073,407,403 00	\$6,516,137 28 \$6,516,138 67 3,615,177 88 ctober 1, an est notes), co	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,886,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,961 29 d Novem- ompares as
Hearing cur'y interest Matured debt Hearing no interest Aggregate Coin & cur in Treas Debt less coin and cur The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table coim Am Coin Currency Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 1868, exclusive of interest follows: ANNUAL INTEREST Coin 6 " 1881 6 " (6-20's) Total coin interest	123,110,393 64 123,110,397 11 2,644,901,560 8: 110,257,941 96 12,584,648,718 96 78 the amount 12,40,213 64 110,257,941 86	113,573,022 64 7 409,151,893 42 1 2,641,002,573 06 1 128,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.552 83 of coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O mpound intered November 1. \$11,079,420 00 17,020,688 00 96,183,735 00 \$124,235,793 00	\$6,516,133 67 \$,615,177 28 \$6,516,138 67 \$,615,177 38 ctober 1, an eat notes), co	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 3,686,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,961 29 d Novem- pmpares as
Hearing cur'y interest. Matured debt Hearing no interest Aggregate. Coin & cur in Treas. Debt less coin and cur. The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table COIN AN Coin. Currency. Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 1868, exclusive of interest follows: ANNUAL INTE Coin—5 per cents. " 6 " 1881 " 6 " (6-20's). Total coin interest. Currency.	123,110,293 64 193,110,297 11 2,644,901,560 8: 110,257,841 66 12,584,648,718 96 78 the amount 18,365,994 76 110,287,841 86 on the debt, 28t on the con 18,110,794,80 00 17,020,638 00 17,020,638 00 128,793,874 00 28,287,804 00	113,573,023 64 7 409,151,893 42 7 409,151,893 42 1 2,641,002,573 06 3 123,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.653 83 0f coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,578,019 24 as existing O mpound interes ON PUBLIO DEI November 1, \$11,079,420 00 17,020,438 00 96,185,735 00 96,185,735 00 \$2,531,640 00	\$6,516,128 67 \$,615,177 28 \$6,516,128 67 \$,615,177 88 ctober 1, an est notes), co	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 8,896,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,601 29 d Novem- ompares as
Hearing cur'y interest. Matured debt Hearing no interest Aggregate. Coin & cur in Treas. Debt less coin and cur. The following statement show the dates in the foregoing table coin AR Coin Currency. Total coin & curre'y The annual interest payable ber 1, 1868, exclusive of interest follows: ANNUAL INTE Coin—5 per cents. 6 " 1881. 6 " (6-20's). Total coin interest Currency—6 per cents	123,110,393 (10,213 64 409,191,087 11 2,644,901,560 8: 110,257,841 66 110,257,841 66 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25	114,519,000 9,753,722 64 7 409,151,899 42 1 2,641,002,572 06 1 123,673,019 24 5 2,527,129.652 81 0f coin and TREASURY. \$103,407,935 77 10,463,033 47 113,573,019 24 as existing O mpound intered November 1. \$11,079,420 00 17,020,638 00 96,185,735 00 \$2,531,640 00 2,169,750 60	\$6,516,128 67 \$,615,177 28 \$6,516,128 67 \$,615,177 88 ctober 1, an est notes), co Increase. \$445,419 00 \$445,419 00 153,600 00	2,686,520 03 89,188 75 3,686,988 75 7,514,166 18 parately at 2,900,901 29 d Novem- pmpares as

NEW YORK, PROVIDENCE AND BOSTON RAILROAD COMPANY.

The annual report of this company for the year ending August 31, 1868, shows the following general balance sheet of receipts and expenditures for the year:

Receipts for year	CREDITOR. 361,017 46
1,107.301 43	Due from 1rs H. Faimer, and in Ston- ington Bank
	\$1,107, <u>951</u> 48

The President remarks, in concluding his report, that the future prospects of the company are better than at any time during the past two years, and we believe that it will be in a condition to resume the payment of dividends by the first of January next.

ASSISTANT TREASURER'S STATEMENT FOR OCTOBER.

The following is the official statement of the business of the office of the Assistant Treasurer of the United States, in New York, for the month of October, 1868:

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS.		
Balance, Sertember 30, 1869		\$94,499,990 11
On account of customs	\$10,448,292 94	
do Gold notes	5,208,160 00	
do Internal revenue	244,7% 83	
do Three per cent Certificates	5,810,000 00	
do Post-office Department	412,403 04	
do Transfers	10,892,000 00	
do Patent fees	5,576 20	
do Miscellaneous	12,655,385 12	
do Disbursing accounts	11,000,187 88	
do Assay office	54,915 97	
do Interest accounts	18,C49 22-	- 56,749,298 25
Total		\$151,949,933 8 ₆
Payments during the month:		
Treasury drafts	\$44,263,163 55	
Post-office drafts	988,797 55	
Disbursing accounts	18,894,559 00	
Assay-Office	298,679 45	
Interest accounts, viz.:	044 440 44	
In coln	841,449 41	** *** ***
In currency	18,019 33-	- 59,249,668 18
Balance		\$91,999,615 18
Balance to Cr. Treasurer U. S	\$79,798,185,57	
Balance to Cr. disbursing accounts	10 284 952 69	
	1,961,507 09	
Balance to Cr. Interest accounts	91,999,615 18	
Receip's for Customs in the month of Oct., 1968		\$10,448.222 94
Receipts for Customs in the month of Oct., 1867	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	9,082,986 27
Increase for Oct., 1868		\$1,865,236 6

UNITED STATES ASSAY OFFICE FOR OCTOBER.

Statement of business at the United States Assay Office at New York, for the month ending October 31, 1868:

DEPOSITS OF GOLD.	
Foreign coin	\$55,000 00
Foreign bullion. United States bullion.	10,000 00
United States bullion	950.c00 90
	\$1,015,000 00
DEPOSITS OF SILVER, INCLUDING PURCHASES.	
Foreign coin	\$38,000 OO
Foreign bullion	20,000 00
Foreign bullion. United States bullion (contained in gold)	12,000 00
Colorado	4,000 (0
Lake uperior	8,000 00
Nevada	8,000 00
	\$85,000 00
Total deposits, parable in bars	\$330,000 00
Total deposits, payable in coins	\$80,000 CO
	\$1,100,000 03
Gold bars stamped	1,892,787 28
Gold bars stamped Transmitted to U. S. Mint, Philadelphia, for coinage	

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

Stringency in the Money Market -Activity in the Stock Market—Bonds sold at the New York Stock Exchange Bond—Prices of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at London - Miscellaneous Securities—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Exchange at New York.

October has been characterized by one of those periods of excessive stringency in money, which appear to have become regularly periodic in the fall and spring months. The preparation for the quarterly bank statement caused less disturbance than had been anticipated, owing to the demand for moving the Western crops having been checked by the refusal of the New York grain merchants to buy produce at the then current high prices. In the early part of the month, however, there was a steady drain of funds to the banks of the minor cities. causing a loss of deposits and of legal tenders, and a firm 7 per cent rate of interest. About the middle of the month the market suddenly assumed a stringent aspect, the banks having little to lend, and the large balances in the hands of private bankers, which had for some time kept money easy, finding ready employ. ment at rates much above the legal limit. With the exception of the banks and a few private bankers who, on principle refuse to accept over the legal interest, lenders obtained during the latter part of the month rates varying from 7 per cent in gold to 1 per cent per day from borrowers on stock collaterals. Discoun ing operations suffered a severe check. The mercantile banks have been unable to meet fully the wants of their customers; who, however, would have suffered more in consequence had it not been that their wants were strictly moderate. An unusual amount of paper was thrown upon the street for negotiation, and the very choicest names were sold with much difficulty at from 8@12 per cent. The inability of the banks to re-discount grain bills caused the failure of some firms West and at Buffalo, and produced in consequence a heavy decline

in breadstuffs. Otherwise, the mercantile community has not suffered materially; but there is no doubt an accumulation of paper in the hands of dealers which must cause a heavy pressure for discounts ere long. The following statement will show the changes in the condition of the associated banks during the month:

	Sept. 26.	Oct. 81.	Changes.
Loans and discounts	\$271,273,000	\$269 ,365,000	Dec. \$8,708,000
Specie	12,603,000	10,620,000	Dec. 1,983,000
Circulation	34.050.000	84,253,0 0	Inc. 203,000
Deposits	202,068 000	181,948,000	Dec. 20,120,000
Legal tenders	63,587,000	51.590.000	Dec. 11,997,000

The loss of \$20,000,000 of deposits and of \$12,000,000 of legal tenders, with a reduction of only \$9,000,000 in loans, is quite sufficient to account for the extreme stringency that has prevailed. It is not, however, so easy to account for these violent changes. There has certainly been no outflow of legal tenders, either to the banks of other cities or into the Sub-Treasury, at all proportioned to the reduction shown in this comparison; and it therefore seems impossible to evade the conclusion that a large amount of funds has been withdrawn from the banks and hoarded by speculators, for the purpose of embarrassing the market and forcing a decline in securities. The pressure has compelled the banks to take in for redemption about \$11,500,000 of 3 per cent certificates, within the month; which amounts to a contraction of the circulation to that extent; the Secretary of the Treasury having determined that the certificates are not reisenable.

The following comparison shows the totals of the statements of the New York banks at the close of each week in October and at the close of October, 1867:

	Oct. 8.	Oct 10.	Oct. 17.	Oct 24.	Oct. 81.	Oct. 26, '67.
Loans and dis	\$269,558,868	\$265,595,582	\$264,644,685	\$268,579,188	\$262,865,569	
Specie	11,757,885	9,816,097	9.1: 6,620	9,553,588	10,620,523	6,161,164
Circulation	84,154,806	84,188 108	84,218 948	34,193,938	84,258,210	88,959,080
Deposits	194,919,177	189,053,997	188,830,586	186,0 \2,847	181,948,547	178,064,123
Legal Tenders.	60.240.447	60,005,086	58.626.857	56,711,484	51,590,948	56,281,948

The following are the rates of Loans and Discounts for the month of October:

RATES OF LOANS AND DISCOUNTS.

	Oct. 2.	Oct. 9.	Oct. 16.	€ct 23.
Call loans	7 @—	6 @ 7	6 @ 7	7 @10
Loans on Bonds and Mortgage	-@ 7	-@ 7	-@ 7	<u>—@</u> 7
A 1, endorsed bills, 2 mos	6 @	61@—	61@—	7 @
Good endorsed bills, 3 & 4 mos	− @ 7	− @ 7	<u>—</u> @ 7	7 @ 8
" single names	7 @ 71	7 @ 71	7 @ 74	7 @ 8
Lower grades	8 @10	8 @10	8 @10	8 @10

The stock market has exhibited unusual activity, the combined sales at both boards having amounted to 2,362,000 shares, against 1,800,000 shares in October, 1867. The severe stringency in money has been accompanied with special efforts to break down stocks, and the attempts have been partially successful, but less than might have been expected. Cliques, who are holding very large amounts of stock, have secured their position by time loans, extending to the close of the year; which mainly accounts for the comparative firmness of the markets.

The following statement shows the sales of the several classes of stocks at both boards during October:

Classes.	1867.	1868.	Increase	. Dec
Bank shares	1,886	2,383	497	
Railroad "	1,586,579	2,018,944	477,872	
Coal "	4,080	6,209	2,1:9	
Mining "	19,800	109,189	89,389	
Improv'nt"	18,200	19.775	6.575	• • • • •
Telegraph"	129,784	44,388		85,401
Steamship"	47,337	109,838	62,496	
Expr'ss&c"	47,768	56,261	8,578	
Total—October		2,362,027 16,906,045	561,685	1.948.109

The several classes of securities have suffered less from the monetary pressure than might have been expected. Governments, indeed, have advanced steadily in the face of the growing stringency and at the close prices were 2@3 per cent above the opening quotations. The result of the October elections appears to have induced among dealers and speculators a good deal of buying, on the assumption that the election of Gen. Grant to the presidency would be accompanied with a material advance in the price of bonds. The fact that bonds have this week declined 3@4 per cent, shows that the over-discounting of future events is apt to reverse the results anticipated. The speculative transactions have been large, and the sales at the board for the month aggregate \$23,479,000 against \$17,649,000 for the same period of last year, as will appear from the following statement:

BONDS SOLD AT THE M. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE BOARD.

Classes.	1867.	1868.	Inc.	Dec.
U.S. bonds	\$17,649,500	\$28,479,150	\$5,829,650	8
U. S. notes	8.041.900			8,041,900
St'e & city b'ds	8,881,500	11,145,100	7,268,600	
Company b'ds	892,200	2,031,400	1,189,200	****
Total—October		\$86,655,650	\$11,190,550	
" -since Jan. 1	177,009,730	195,521,090	18,011,860	••••

The daily closing prices of the principal Government securities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of October, as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.

Day of	-6's, 1	881.~		-6's, (5	-20 yrs.) Cour	on	5'	s.10-40
	Coup.			1864.			1867. 18		
1		1123	1121	110	109%	1081			10436
§		••••	112%	110¥	110%	1081	108%		
8	118%	1123/	118	110,4	11036	108%	108%	108%	
5	118%		118	1103	110%	108%	108%	109	104%
6	118%	118	118		110%	108%	108%	109⅓	
7	••••		1181	110%	110%	108%	109		105
8	118%	118	118	1103	110%	108%	108%	109%	105%
9	****	1123	112%	1101	11034	103%			105
10		112%	11236	1101	110%	1081	108%		105%
19		118	1123	1103/	1103	108⅓	108%	109₹	105⅓
18		1137		110%	111	108%	109	1093	105 🔏
14		118%	113%	111	111%	1097	109 %	109%	•••
15	115%	114	1:8%	11:34		110	110	1111	105%
18		114%	1143	112	119	110%		11137	105%
17		11436	114%	111%	111%	110%		1111	1063
19		115	114%	112%	112%	111%		112	1063
20		• • • • •	118%	211X	111%	111	110%	111%	
21		••••	1183	111%	1123	1101		110)	105%
23	115%		118%	111%	111%	:10 😯	110%	111	105%
23	115%	*****	118%	111%	1113	110%	1103		105%
24		114%	113%	111%	111%	110%		111	105 💢
26		• • • •	119%	1111	11136	110	110%	110%	105₺

97	115	114 11834 114	118 118 1181	111 1111 1111	111X 111X 111X	110 110 110%	1101/ 1103/ 1103/		106%
First	118 1161/ 81/	112% 115 2%	1121 1141 214	110 112% 2%	1125	108¥ 111¥ 334	108% 108% 111% 2%	108% 112 8%	104% 104% 106% 2 106%

The closing prices of Consols for money and certain American securities (viz U. S. 6's 5-20's 1862, Illinois Central and Erie shares) at London, on each day of the month of October, are shown in the following statement:

COURSE OF CONSOLS AND AMERICAN SECURITIES AT LONDON.

Date.	for	U.S.	securi Ill.C. sh's.		Date.	Cons for mon.	U.S.	III.C.	Erle
Thursday 1 Friday 2 Sat'day 3 Monday 5 Tu'sday 6 Wednesday 7 Thursday 8 Friday 9 Saturday 9 Saturday 10	94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94%	73% 73% 74 74% 74% 74%	96% 96 96 95% 95% 95% 95%	8136 8236 8236 8236 8236 8236 8236 8236	Thursday 22 Friday 23 Saturday 24 Monday 28 Tnesday 27 Wednesday 28 Thursday 29 Friday 30 Saturday 31	91% 91% 9 % 94% 94% 94%	71% 73% 73% 73% 73% 73% 73% 73% 73%	97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97	31% 30% 28% 28% 28% 29% 29% 25 28
Monday 12 Thesday 18 Wedney 14 Thurs 15 Friday 16	94% 94% 94%	7436 7436 xc724		31 % 31 % 32 % 32 %	Lowest	94% 94% %	72% 74% 236	95½ 97½ 2½	28 32% 4%
Saturday 17 Monday 19 Tuesday 20 Wednesday 21	94% 94% 94%	72% 78% 78%	963(97 963(3236 3236 32 315	Low e T	9636	70% 74% 4% 74		28 5034 2234 28

The closing prices of Five-Twenties at Frankfort in each week ending with Thursday, were as follows:

Oct. 1, Oct. 8 Oct. 15. Oct 29. Oct. 29. Month. 761/4077 771/4 781/4 781/4071/4 781/4071/4 781/4071/4

The following table will show the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of September and October, 1868:

	September.				October			
					Open.			
Railroad Stocks—					•	-6		
Alton & Terre Haut	. 43	4616	48	43	423	45	40	40
do do pref	64	66.36	6336	63%				• • • •
Boston, Hartford & Erie	223	23	217	23	23	2734	23	2734
Chicago & Alton		15834	141	150	150	15536	150	15136
do do pref	144	1583	144	151	158	156	152	156
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy				101	170	171	168	170
do & Gt. Eastern	40	40	38	40	401	40%	40	401
do & Northwest'n	84	90%	84	86	68%	913	883%	92
do do pref		91 🛣	88%	88%	88	98	88	92%
do & Rock Island	1021	104	100%	102%	10314	1093	10%	106%
Cleve., Col., Cin. & Ind.	811	82	7936	79%	79	80	75	77
do & Dittahnea	87	89			8434	913 <u>4</u>	8434	883
do & Pittsburgdo & Toledo	108		84%	84%		1065	1011	103
	1100	1031	1001	102	1011			132
Del., Lack & Western	. 116.X	122	118%	1:2	121 1/4	182	1217	10)
Dabuque & Sioux city	. 80×	101	80¾	101	95	101	95	95
do do pref	. 92 %	97	92	98	95	95	95	
Erie	47%	527	46	44%	47	497	88 <i>)</i>	411
_do_pref	. 70	70⅓	63	70₺	70	71	65	65
Harlem		124	124	124	••••		• • • •	• • • •
_do pref	. 122	123	122	122				• • • •
Hannibal & St. Joseph	. 87	90	87	90		. •		*::
do do pref	97	UΛ	27	801	50	V409	27	89

Hudson River 140 143 138 140% 189 189 184% 1	87%
	45
	5 0
	96
	45
) ake Shore	00₺
	233
	10
Michigan Central	19
	87
Milwankee & St. Paul 77 77 97 77 94 95 111 93 1	0214
	021
	66
	121
	201∡
New York Central	26%
	142
do & N. Hav n	19.8
Ohio & Mississippi	
	31%
	79
	3.0
	11414
Reading 91 95% 89% 98% 98% 100% 98%	99%
	• • •
	• • • •
Third Avenue 180 190 180 180	
	64
do do dopiei	74
Miscellaneous	
	85
	291
	220
	40
	12634
Atlantia do 90 91 90 91	
Boston Water 1 0 Mer	18
Canton 46 49% 46 46 47 51% 47	4814
	101/
Mariposa 8% 5% 8% 5% 5 8% 5	12/6
do pref 8 19% 8 12% 18½ 24% 13½	231
Quicksilver	24
Quicksilver 21 23½ 20½ 22½ 21½ 27½ 11½ 27½ 11½ 20½ 225 225 225 225 220 230 230	280
	36 🔏
Bankers & Brokers Ass 106 106 104% 105%	••••
Express—	
American 44% 51 41% 48% 48 49 45%	4634
Adams 48% 51% 48 52% 59% 59% 49%	5034
United States 41 51 41 50 49 50 47	47
Merchant's Union	2136
Wells, Farge & Co	28%

The course of the gold premium has been steadily downward, the price hav ng opened at 140½ and steadily declined to 133½, at which figure it closed. The market has been freely supplied from sales by the Treasury, so that, at the close of the month, there was only \$1,100,000 les in the banks than at the beginning, although the payments for customs and the exports combined amounted to \$12,000,000. From a statement given below it would appear that \$9,000 000 of gold has come from unreported sources; about one-half the amount has come from the sales of the Treasury and the balance probably represents gold that has passed out of private hands into the banks.

The following formula will show the movement of coin and bullion during the month of October, 1867 and 1868, comparatively:

GENERAL MOVEMENT OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK.

In banks, near first		1868. \$11,757,835 902,788		
Imports of coin and bullion	219,666 189,857	558,963 841,449	334,297 152,092	
Redemption of loan of 1847-'48 Total reported supply.		\$8,800 \$18,598,885	89,300 \$1,849,365	8

Exports of coin and bullion	\$1,905,599 9,082,986	\$1,602,804 10,443,928	397,975 1,365,287	8
Total withdrawn	\$10,288,515	\$12,051,027	\$1,762,512	8
Excess of reported supply	\$1,958,955 6,161,164	\$1,542,808 10,620,526	\$ 4,459,862	\$411,147
Derived from unreported sources	64 907 900	90 077 718	48 870 KM	•

The following exhibits the fluctuations of the New York gold market in the month of October, 1868:

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st.	Closing.	Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st.	Closing
Thursday 1	140%	13936	14036	140%	Friday 22	135%	135	136	185
Friday 2	1391	18936	140%	139 %	Saturday 24	125	134%	135 1	18436
Saturday 8	110%	189%	140%	140	Monday 26	133%	183%	1315	184
Monday 5	1403	18934	1403	140	Tuesday2:	134%	134 %	134%	1341
Tuerday 6	140%	13934	14056	140 kg	Wednesdsy 25	1341	183%	134 1	13434
Wednesday 7	140	139%	14034	140	Thursday 29	1:4%	1345	1314	184 💥
Thursday 8	1391	13874	12936	13934	Friday	1.4%	184	134 %	134 %
Friday 9	139	1883	189%	139	Saturday 31	134	133%	134	12334
Saturday 10					_				
Monday12						140%	183%	140%	183%
Tuesday	137%	137%	138	137					
Wednerday 14	137	13 1	1373	137	1866	146	145%	154%	146%
Thursday15	137%	1875	138%	138	1865	: 44 %	1443	149	146%
Friday	137%	1373	187%	1873	1864	192	189	227%	2233
Saturday17					1868	14934	140%	156%	145 %
Monday 19	136%	136%	1371	137¥	1862				
Tuesday20	137%	136%	137%	137	1				
					S'ce Jan 1, 1868	188 🙀	1831	150	183%
Thursday	1853	135%	1:5%	185%	1			•	

The following exhibits the quotations at New York for bankers 60 days bills on the principal European markets daily in the month of October, 1868:

COURSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (60 DAYS) AT NEW YORK.

_	London. cents for	Paris.	Amsterdam cents for	cents for	Hamburg.	Berlin. cents for
Days.	54 pence.	for dollar.	florin.	rix daler.	M. banco.	thaler.
1	108%@108%	520 @51814	40% @40%	79 @794	35%(035%	71%(0)71%
2	108%@108%	520 m 518%	40%@40%	19 @7934	85% @35%	71%@71%
8	108%@108%	520 @518%	40% @4 %	79 @191	35%@35%	71%@714
b	108%@109	520 @517%	40%@40%	79 @ 91	2 % @35%	71%@71%
6	1081/@1087/	520 @518%	40% @40%	79 @794		71%@71%
7	1043/@1083/	520 @518%	40% @40%	79 @7934	35%@35%	71%@71%
я	108%@108%	520 @518%	40%@40%	79 @79%	85%@85%	71% @71%
9	109%@109%	518%@517%	40% @40%	79%@79%	35% (435%	513, @7136
10	109%@109%	518% @517%	40%@40%	79%@79%	35% @35%	71%@71%
13	10934@10934	517%@516%	40% @41	79%@79%	35%@36	71%@72
13	109%@109%	517%@516%	40%@41	79%。679%	35% @36	7136@72
14	109%@109%	516%@518%	40%@41	79%@79%	35 14 @ 36	71%@72
15	109%@109%	516%@515	41 @14%	7936 @7936	86 @3514	71%@71%
16	109%@109%	517米@516米	41 @14%	79%@79%	36 @36%	715607156
17	109160	517%回516%	41 @1436	7936@7936	26 @36%	71% @71%
19	1093600	517%@516%	403(@40%	7934@7934	35% (36	713 @7136
20	109%@109%	516% @515	40% @40%	795607936	3534@36	71%@71%
21	1093/@10034	516% @515	40% @40%	7934 @ 79%	35% @36	71%@71%
22	109% @109%	517%@516%	4034@41	79% @79%	353, @36	72% @
23	109 % @ 109 %	516% @515	40% (041	79%@79%	357, 636	724@
24	109%@109%	516 4 @515	40% 6041	7934@7934	3536 @36	72% @
26	109% @110	515 @514%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @3634	71%@71%
37	110 @110%	514%@518%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	71%@71%
28	110 @110%	514%@518%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @36%	71%@71%
29	109%@109%	515 @513%	41 @41%	79% @79%	36 @363	71%@71%
80	109% @109%	515 @513%	41 @4136	79%@79%	39 @36%	71%@71%
81		515 @513%	41 @41%	79%@79%	36 @86 %	71/0713
Oct., 1867 Oct., 1868	108%@110% 108%@109%	590 @518% 591%@515	40×@41× 40×@41×	79 @79 K 78% @78	35 * @36 * 35 * @36 *	71 % @ 72 % 71 % @ 72

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelaphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1:

NEW YORK CITY BANK RETURNS.

	ans. Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. clear'gs.
January 4 \$249,7	41,297 \$12,724,614	\$84 ,184,391	\$187,070,786	\$62,111,201	\$483,266,304
January 11 253,1	70,723 19,222,856	84,094,187	194,835,525	64,758,116	558,884,525
January 18 256,0	83,938 23,191.867	84,071,006	205,883,143	66,155,241	619,797,869
January 25 258,3	92,101 25,106,800	84,0-2,762	210,093,084	67,154,161	528,503,223
February 1 266,4	15 613 28,955,320		213,330,524	65,197,158	637,449,928
February 8 270,5	55,856 22,823,872	84,096,834	217,844,548	55,846,959	597,942,595
February 15 271.0	15,970 24,192,955	84,048,296	216,759,828	68,471,762	550,521,185
February 21 267,7	763,643 22,518,9 87	84,100,023	209,095,351	69,868,920	452,421,592
February 29 267,2	240,678 22,091,649	84,0-6,223	208,651,578	58,553,607	705,100 784
	56,636 20,714,238		207,737,080	57.017,044	619,219,598
	16,034 19,744,701	84,218,881	201,188,470	54,788,866	691,277,641
	17.944.808		191,191,526	52,261,086	649,482,341
March 28 257,		84,190,808	186,525,128	52,128,178	557,848,908
	87,891 17,077,299	84,227,108	280,956,846	51,709,706	567,788,138
April 11 252,9	36,725 16,843,150	84,194,272	179,851,880	51,982,609	493,371,451
April 18 254,8	317,936 16,776,549	84,219,581	181,832,523	50,533,660	623,713,923
April 25 252,3	314,617 14,943,547		180,307,489	58,866,757	8(2,784,154
May 2 257,6	23,672 16,166,873	84,114,843	191,206,135	57,863,599	588,717,822
May 9 265,7	755,883 21 286, 910	84.205,409	199,276,568	67,541,527	507,028,567
May 16 267,7	24,783 20,939,149	84,193,249	201,313,305	57,618,095	480,186,908
May 23 267,3	81,279 20,479,947	84,183,088	202,507,550	62,233,002	488,785,142
May 80 268,1	17,490 17,861,088	84,145,606	20',746,964	65,633,964	602,118,248
June 6 273,7	792,267 14,828,531		209,089,655	68,822,023	640,663,329
	142,024 11,198,681	84,166,846	210,670,765	69,202,840	530,328,197
June 20 274,1	17,608 9,124,830	34,119,120	211,484,887	72,567,583	553,983,817
	04,036 7,753,800	84,048,721	214,302,207	73,853,303	516,726,075
July 3 281,9	45,981 11,954,730	84,032,466	221,050,806	72,125,989	525,616,693
	47,708 19,235,848	81.068,202	224,320,141	68,531,548	591,756,325
	12,490 20,399,031	84,004,111	228,180,749	71,847,545	505,462,464
July 25 290,3	45,255 20,804,101	83,963,373	2.6,761,662	72,235,584	487,169,387
August 1 279,8	11,657 20,502,787	83,957,805	223,104,867	73,633,161	409, 131, 169
August 8 279,7	05,786 24,784,427	81,074,874	231 716,492	74.051,518	587 001,3S1
August 15 277.8	08,620 29,953,85)	84,114,087	223,561,087	72 945,481	482,533,932
	15,781 19.768,681	34,187,627	216,435,405	69,757,645	610,808,55 t
August 29 271,7	80,726 16,949,109	74,112,139	210,334,646	67,757,376	480,785,665
	30,696 16,815,778		207.854,811	65,933,778	470,036,175
Beptember 12, 272,0	55,690 16,150,94%	84,139,926	205,489,070	63,429,837	493,191,072
	57,096 14,665,748	84,044,693	202,824,583	63,772,700	518,471,5°2
September 26, 271,2		84,050,771	202,068,334	64,587,576	620,105,074
	3,868 11,757,898	84,154,606	194,919,177	60,2 0,4 7	747.618,516
	95,582 9,846,097	84,188,108	189,058,997	60,05,086	657,958,155
October 17 261.6	44,035 9,186,620		188,880,586	58,626,857	635,516,454
October 24 263 5	79,133 9,553,588	34,193,988	186,057,847	56,711,484	850,584,443
October 81 262,3	65,569 10,620,526	84,258,210	181,948,547	51,590,9 8	809, 45 4, 542

PHILADELPHIA BANK RETURNS.

					_
Date.	Legal Tenders.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.
January 4	\$ 6,782,482	\$52,002,304	\$235,912	\$10,639,000	\$ 36,621,274
January 11		52,593,707	400,615	10,639,096	87,131,830
January 18		54,018,196	820,973	10,641,752	37,457,089
January 15		52,825,599	279,398	10,645,226	37,312,540
February 1		52,604,916	248,678	10,638,927	57,922,287
February 8		52,672,448	287,878	10,635 926	37.896,658
February 15		52,532,946	2:18,157	10,668,328	87.010.520
	17,578,149	52,423,166	201,929	10,632,495	86,453,464
February 29		52,459,757	211,365	10,684,484	85,798,814
March		53,081,665	232,18)	10.633,718	34,826,861
March 14		53,367,611	251.051	10,631,399	94,523,550
March 21		53,677,837	229,518	10,648,618	83,886,996
March 28		53,450,878	192 838	10.643.606	32,428,390
April 4		52,209,234	215,835	10.642-670	31,278,119
April 11	4 4 40 - 00#	52,256,949	250,240	10.640.932	82,255,671
Auril 20		52,989,780	222,229	10,640,479	88,950,952
April 27		52,812,628	204,699	10.640.812	84,767,190
May 4		53,333,740	814,366	10.631.044	85,109,937
May 11		53,771,794	897,778	10,629,0 5	86,017,596
3 ay 18		53,491,588	8-8,525	10.632.665	86,030,063
Мчу 25		58.463.225	290,302	10.661.276	86,000,997
June 1		53,562,449	289,371	10,626,987	86,574,457
June 8		53,491.864	226,581	10.630.945	42,910,499
June 15		58,122,521	175,808	10,680,979	43,016,963

Date.	Legal Tenders.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.
June 22		58,881,820	182,711	10,681,9:0	48,948,548
June 29		53,072,878	198,568	10,680,307	48,936,629
July 6		53,653,471	238,996	10.625,426	44.834.398
July 13		53,791,516	182,524	10,626,214	45, 156, 620
July 20		58,994,618	184,252	10,647,85%	45,637,975
July 27		54,024,355	195,886	10,622,247	45.5:8,220
August 8		54,841,168	187,231	10,628 646	47 205,867
August 10		51,592,015	184.007	10,622,751	45,04~,718
August 17		54,674,758	196,530	10,624,772	46,636,377
Auxust 24	17. 14.195	55,151,724	185,196	10,623,360	45,985,616
August 81	17,616,325	5 1, 255, 474	181,2-8	10,622,581	46,063,150
September 7		55.6 4,068	222,900	10,622,316	45, 179, 109
September 14	16,810,565	55 646,740	209,058	10,618,974	44,730,328
September 21		55,620,710	197,207	10,690,531	43,955,531
September 28	16.088.854	55,468,286	234,559	10,607,940	44,727,127
October 5		55,248,519	195,689	10,608,83	43,525,479
October 13		55, 373, 834	161,282	10,607,413	42,713,623
Oct. ber 19		55,401,115	200,598	10,610,700	42,676,626
Oct ber 26		54,964,488	176,595	10,609,359	41,698,881

	ava	TUM .	DAI	4414	TUR	AB.	
(Capital	Jan.	1,	1866,	\$41,	900.	(.000,

	(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)						
	Legal			Circulation-			
Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Tenders.	Deposits.	National.	State.	
January 8	. \$31.960,249	\$1,466,946	\$15,543,169	\$40,856,022	\$94 ,636,559	\$228,780	
January 18	97,800,289	1,276,987	15,560,965	41,496,820	24,757,965	227,958	
January 20		926,942	15,832,769	41,904,161	24,70 0,001	217,372	
January 27		811,196	16,849,637	48,991,170	14,564,106	226,258	
February 8	. 96, 89 5,260	777,627	16,738,229	42,891,128	24,628,103	221,860	
February 10		652,989	16,497,648	42,752,067	24,850,926	221,700	
February 17		605,740	16.561 4:1	41.502,550	24,850,055	220,452	
February 24		616,958	16,809,501	40,887,614	24,686,212	216,490	
March 2		633, 33 2	16,304,846	40,954,936	21,876,089	2 5,214	
March 9	101,559,861	867,174	15,556,696	89,770,418	24,987,700	210,163	
March 16		918 ,485	14,5,2,842	89,276,514	25,062,418	197,720	
March 23	. 100,109,595	798,606	13,712,560	87,022,546	25,094,253	197,299	
March 80		685,034	18,786,081	86,184,640	24,983,417	197,079	
April 6		731,540	18,004,994	86,008,157	25,175,194	168,028	
April 18		873,487	12,522,085	86,422,929	24,213,014	167,018	
April 20		805,486	11,905,608	86,417,890	24,231,958	166,963	
April 27		577, 68	12,248.545	86,259,946	25,231,978	164,331	
May 4		815,469	12,656,190	87,685,406	25,203,234	160,385	
May 11		1,188,668	11,962,868	87,858,776	25,225,178	145,248	
May 18		1,186,881	12,199,422	87.844,743	25,234 465	160,241	
May 25	97,041,720	1,018,809	12,848,141	88,898,141	25,210,660	150,151	
June 1		766,553	14,188,806	40,811,569	25,204,939	159,560	
June 8		681,149	14,868,900	41,470,876	25,194,114	159,313	
June 15		561,990	14,373,575	41,788,706	25,190,565	159.150	
June 22		476,438	14,564,614	42,553,871	25,197,817	158,908	
June 19	99,477,074	486,699	15,195,550	49,506,816	25,182,920	158,812	
July 6	100,110,830	1,617,688	15,117,307	48,458,654	25,214,100	144,689	
July 13	101.498,516	1,198.529	15,743,211	43,116,765	25,216,181	141,588	
July 20	103,400,400	1,521,893	15,469,406	43,876,800	25,218,727	185,799	
July 27	102,405,771	785,641	15,837,748	43,580,594	25,254,906	142,450	
August 8		756,254	15,796,059	43,389,523	25,016,492	•••••	
August 10	100,000,000	684,968	15,758,958	44,962,268	25,197,164	•••••	
August 17	109,930,003	664,695	15,554,590	48,702,501	25,182,658	••••	
August 24	100,079,091	779,112	16,810,823	42,360,049	25,214,5°6	•••••	
Augus' 81	100,000,020	767,819 833,063	15,843,796	41,214,607	25,190,091	•••••	
Sepiember 7	100,000,110		14,975,941	40,891,745	25,196,084	•••••	
September 14	109 479 094	748,714 642,798	18,774,830 18,466,258	40,640,8 20 89,71 2 ,168	25,183,876 25,184,048	•• ••	
September 21	101 001 744	642,829	14,0:2,447			•••••	
Octob r 5	101,021,199	618,428	18,928,694	89,127,659 89,215,488	25,150,081 98 149 817	•••••	
October 12	100.090 700	505,805	18,691,864	88,801,454	25,143,517	•••••	
October 19	109,008,122	501,008	18,009,829	88,686,844	25,267,095	•••••	
October 26		481, 755	11,915,788	87,872,6 97	25,168,348	•••••	
		701,100	77,910,100	01,014,001	w/1001040	•••••	

BOOK NOTICES.

Mr. Van Nostrand will begin, in January, the publication of a new monthly mazazine, whose title sufficiently indicates its purpose. It will be called the Eclectic Engineering Magazine, and will be conducted by Mr. A. L. Holley, a well-known American engineer. It will not consist entirely of original articles; the pros ectus explains that the object of the conductor and publisher is " to present within limits of space and cost that all can afford, the cream of not less than fifty engineering, mechanical, chemical and metallurgical publications. The French and German magazines will be largely translated, and papers and discussions refore societies will be condensed." This will certainly be a very useful and interesting addition to our Magazine literature.

THE

MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE

AND

COMMERCIAL REVIEW.

DECEMBER, 1868.

THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ON CERTIFIED CHECKS.

The annual reports of the heads of the financial bureaus are unusually important and voluminous, and yet somewhat infelicitious in some of their recommendations. The report of Comptroller Hulburd, though in the main an able document, presenting a clear elucidation of important current questions affecting banking, is yet open to objection on some of its conclusions. We have had repeatedly to take exception to the views of the Comptroller relative to the certification of checks, but never so decidedly as in connection with this present document.

As we view the matter, the report appears to have totally misconceived the nature and purpose of certifications as practiced by the banks of this city. The certification of a check is an affirmation by the bank on which it is drawn that the drawer is "good" for the sum specified on the order, and is regarded as binding the bank for the payment of the check. The drawer may have assets to cover the check, or he may not; and, in the latter case, the bank certifies on the understanding thathis account will be made good before the close of business on the same day; these anticipatory

certifications are, of course, granted only to firms of known means and credit; and the practice appears to be an almost inevitable adjunct of the present method of transacting business, especially in Wall street. A broker buys, say \$100,000 of bonds, for which he has to pay principally with money borrowed from another party, giving the bonds as collateral for the loan; he cannot procure the money until he has deposited the bonds with the lender, and yet he cannot procure the bonds until he can give the seller a satisfactory check. The seller of the bonds refuses the unendorsed check of the buyer because the amount is large, and he does not sufficiently know the position of the drawer. To avoid this difficulty the buyer of the bonds asks his bank to certify his check for \$100,000 as "good," promising to deposit before the close of the day the check of the party with whom he has arranged to borrow on security of the bonds. The bank knows his affairs, has confidence in his probity, and guarantees his check; the effect being to grant him a credit for the time necessary to get the bonds, deposit them with the money lender, and place the sheck of the latter in the hands of the bank. The banks in making this a common practice with brokers of good standing, have an important compensation in saving the handling of an immense amount of money. The fact of the check being certified causes the receiver to deposit it with his bank instead of presenting it for payment; and thus the trouble and time of counting so much currency is saved to both the bank on which it is drawn and that in which it is deposited, while the risk of carrying money from bank to bank is avoided. Next morning, the check is settled, through the Clearing House, without the use of

dollar of currency, the currency lying dormant in the banks instead of repeatedly changing hands. Certification is thus seen to be a very important economy of time and trouble to the banks and their customers. Without some such arrangement, indeed, it would be almost impossible to carry on the enormous daily transactions of Wall streets Banks, bankers and brokers would have to double their establishments for the purpose of turning over and over and from hand to hand the currency which, under the present joint operations of certification and Clearing-House settlements, lie, undisturbed in the bank vaults, representing the transactions but not used in them, beyond the settlement of balances between banks.

The Comptroller characterises the expedient of certification as an "inflation" to the extent of about \$112,000,000. That the checks serve the functions of circulation for the day is unquestionable; but it is an error to regard them as an addition to the active circulation; for they cause, as before stated the currency in the banks to remain inactive, instead of being turned over say twice daily. Without the use of checks there would be the same amount of business transacted as with them, except

so far as operations might be curtailed by the clumsy, embarrassing and more costly method of effecting exchanges. Mr. Hulburd is literally accurate in representing the certification of checks as an extension of "credit" to the customers of the banks; but his language leads to a very mistaken conclusion, when he says that the banks thus furnish "\$112.000,000 of credit for speculation," and that "a fictitious capital of \$120,000,000 is created by means of certified checks." In the case of certification where the assets do not, at the time, stand to the drawers credit, there is of course an extension of credit; the credit, however, is but momentary; it is not independently of funds to be provided by the party to whom it is granted, but in anticipation of a deposit to be made immediately after, when the credit ceases to be such. The transaction effected through the certified check is really represented by the drawer's own means, and could have been effected equally without the certification, only by a less convenient method, as before indicated. The Comptroller's objections, if they had any force at all, would apply against the use of checks certified or uncertified. For if certification were abolished, checks would inevitably be used to about the same extent as now; the difference being that the business would be transacted only through firms of the highest credit, whose checks would pass without certification. If the certified checks are an inflation, why should not the uncertified be regarded as such? And why, according to this reasoning, should not all checking be abolished as "fictitious credit" conducive to demoralizing speculation !

The Comptroller attempts to prove more than even he himself allows in affirming that the New York banks "furnish \$70,000,000 of capital and \$112,000,000 of credit for speculation." According to this, the speculative loans, represented almost entirely by demand loans, ought to stand at \$182,000; yet, in another part of his report, he represents the demand loans as averaging only \$68,500,000; conclusively disproving the assumption that the banks afford \$112,000,000 of "credit" or "fictitious capital" through certification.

It is much to be regretted that the Comptroller, upon these hastily conceived opinions, should have undertaken the grave responsibility of recommending that "National Banks be prohibited by law * * from certifying checks to be good which are not drawn against actually existing cash deposits standing to the credit of the drawer when the checks are made and presented." Such a course would be an unwarrantable and mischievous interference with the method of conducting business established between the banks and the public. It would accomplish no conservative purpose; would remedy no evil; would cause serious temporary embarrassment and perpetual inconvenience; and the effects would not fall alone upon the speculative interests of Wall street, but

also upon a large extent of wholesale operations in commerce, where certification is found to be as necessary to the convenience of transfer as in the transactions on the Stock Exchange.

THE LAKE SIMCOR CANAL.

The attempt has been made, we observe, to revive the project of a ship canal from Lake Simcoe to Lake Ontario. So far as the conformation of the land through which it would pass is concerned, this undertaking seems to be feasible enough while the benefits which would accrue would be of the greatest commercial importance. Lake Simcoe is situated in the northwestern part of the Canadian Peninsula; its length is thirty miles, and it empties through the Severn River into the Georgian Bay. It thus has an uninterrupted communication with all the upper lakes, enabling it to be readily converted into a valuable thoroughfare for commerce. This would be effected easily enough, it would seem, by the construction of a ship canal of adequate dimensions, from the southern extremity of the lake to the city of Toronto on Lake Ontario, a distance of about forty miles.

This would reduce the length of water communication between the western ports and the Atlantic about four hundred miles, by obviating the necessity of passing down the southern part of Lake Huron and through the River St. Clair, Lake St. Clair, Detroit River and Lake Erie. Not only is there a great saving of distance, but time is also greatly economised by enabling vessels coming down from Mackinaw to continue on their voyage without delay from the head winds which prevail on Lake Huron blowing with such force as to impede rapid progress. Captains complain greatly of the delay and annoyance which they experience from these winds, which are, perhaps, the greatest obstacle to profitable navigation. Another advantage, by no means inconsiderable, of this route of lake transit, lies in the fact of the greater coolness of the water. Vessels laden with wheat and corn are therefore far less liable to injury and loss of their cargoes from heating than is the case by the other modes of transportation. Business men would not be slow to appreciate this fact.

There will be, however, we conceive, great difficulty in obtaining the necessary funds for the accomplishment of this undertaking. The prospect of securing any considerable government aid, it must be remarked, is very feeble. The public debt of Canada is of too formidable dimensions to warrant any such expectation. There can be only lands to grant, and the practical value of such a donation is too inconsiderable to be taken into the account. If the peninsula had been a part of the United States, this

matter would have been agitated many years ago, and perhaps, with such assistance, an entire success achieved, as has been the case in so many of the States. But this country was sought by settlers and emigrants from the Old World, whereas British North America derived but small additions to population in this manner. Hence the prospective value of the surrounding land could not be a very desirable inducement for any considerable internal improvements, nor would the plan of laying direct taxes for such a project find supporters in a province sparsely populated, with little wealth.

The Simcoe Canal, therefore, must depend upon private enterprise. This is a formidable difficulty. Capitalists seldom invest largely in enterprises where the emoluments are likely to be for a long time inconsiderable as well as precarious. It is very doubtful whether the Erie Canal itself would have been constructed at this day, if individual enterprise had been required to make the entire outlay.

But times have greatly changed. The railroad era has introduced new ideas among men of fortune. Undertakings which would once have been regarded as Utopian are now taken into serious consideration. There has been for years past a great augmentation of wealth, the accumulation of which enables outlays for ventures that, in Canada, and, indeed, in our own country, not many years ago, would have been deemed chimerical

It is yet to be demonstrated whether the New Dominion of Canada has the requisite enterprise and ability to engage in an internal improvement so extensive as this proposed Lake Simcoe Canal. That any considerable subsidy can be obtained from the Home government is not, as we have already stated, to be anticipated, and we seriously question whether there is private capital or inducements sufficient for the purpose at present.

A company has been in existence for many years having for its express object the construction of a canal to connect the waters of Lake Huron with those of Lake Ontario. Two years ago it had pluck enough to give a public entertainment, at which leading forwarders and other distinguished citizens of the United States were present. The evident purpose was to divert attention from the proposed Niagara ship canal, for so long a time a pet project of citizens of Oswego and Ogdensburg. Terrapins and turkeys were duly sacrificed and copious libations made, which indeed served to bring out able speeches on the subject of better water communication, but was followed by a long spell of somnolency, which has not been since disturbed.

Whether a like end awaits the attempted revival of the Simcoe project remains to be seen. It is hardly the kind of undertaking after all to attract capital from the United States. The "solid men of Boston" and Portland,

to be sure, could make it of service to those cities, as it would materially reduce their expenses of transportation, and they have but to make freights a little cheaper to increase very largely their business. So also the forwarders of Oswego would be enabled to load vessels and receive cargoes from the upper lakes, which might enable them successfully to rival Buffalo. But the proposed canal, if ever constructed, will be under the control of citizens of a foreign government which is not always sure of being friendly; and in the event of hostilities, it would be employed for the passage of vessels of war and the transportation of war material to be used in military operations against every American town situated on the great lakes. At the present time there are too many unadjusted matters in controversy between Great Britain and the United States to permit our men of capital to be very lavish of means for the construction of a foreign route of transit capable of being operated for so mischievous a purpose. The Mississippi with its branches, affording all the facilities of an inland sea, the Erie Canal with full power of transporting double the freight that now rides upon it, and the four great trunk railroads-all which are in our own territory and subject to our legislation-will in preference be depended upon for many years to come. There are too many openings for the investment of capital in this country for our men of fortune to occupy themselves about, without the necessity of crossing the line to find an opportunity in a foreign realm.

The projectors of the Simcoe Canal will, therefore, we fear, be compelled to wait some time before obtaining sufficient capital for this enterprise. We apprehend and prize the value of the facilities which they offer. The Niagara Ship Canal and analogous enterprises have not half the advantages. We regret that we have not the proper opportunity to avail ourselves of them. It would be a commercial improvement which we cannot overestimate. But we must accept the situation, and leave it for "British gold" instead of American greenbacks to do whatever is required for better navigation and transportation in the Dominion of Canada.

PLUCTUATIONS IN THE GOLD PREMIUM.

Within the last three months we have seen the gold premium fluctuate 18 points; and within the last few weeks the fluctuatious have been frequent within a range of 10 points. These changes too plainly show that, although we have now attained a comparatively settled condition of affairs political and commercial, yet we are subject to wide variations in monetary values.

It is the mistortune of a suspension of specie payments that it always

creates a powerful speculative interest, which seeks to prolong the suspension for the sake of profiting by means of these fluctuations. The magnitude of the speculative movements in gold in Wall street is an illustration of the extent to which this interest has expanded during the past few years in the United States. The ordinary commercial demand for gold, for the payment of duties, the purchase of exchange and the liquidation of contracts payable in gold, probably does not exceed \$20,000,000 per week; and yet this amount does not represent onetwentieth part of the weekly transactions of the Gold Room. One day's exchanges at the Gold Exchange Bank this week aggregated close upon \$180,000,000, and the total business of the Bank for the first fourteen days of this month reaches the surprising total of \$1,580,000,000. On an average, the whole stock of gold on the market is turned over about four times every day. When it is considered that upon the major portion of this enormous amount of transactions a commission is paid of 1.16 or 1 of one per cent, and that besides this dealers make large profits out of the lending of coin, it is apparent that the trading in gold yields an enormous annual revenue to Wall street, and that the consolidation of this branch of business becomes an important bar to the resumtion of specie payments. For in such an extensive business interest, dependent upon the transactions in gold, we have an evident motive for a continuance of the present condition of the currency and the strongest possible inducement to efforts for producing fluctuations in the premium; while, with an immense amount of capital engaged in the transactions of the Gold Room, the power is always at hand for controlling the market upon the most shadowy pretexts. It thus becomes a part of the business of the gold dealer to produce the widest possible oscillations in the premium. Whatever may occur in the spheres of politics, finance or commerce which can be supposed to have any bearing upon the value of gold has its importance magnified to the utmost, upon the well-understood principle that an exaggerated response in the premium will be followed by a reaction to the opposite extreme, enabling the speculator to make a double profit, first by huying and next by selling, or vice versa. Within the last few days we have witnessed a significant illustration of the expedients to which the profits upon gold manipulations will induce speculators to resort. In two instances, the funds of a large corporation, to the extent of several millions, have been employed in the purchase of gold to be held off the market, with the result of compelling borrowers to pay from 1 to 2 per cent per day for its use, and of producing a fluctuation of 2@3 points in the premium.

With such a large and influential interest dependent upon the creation

of the most frequent and the widest possible fluctuations in the premium, it is clear that steadiness in the price is virtually impossible. Could we have an even range of the premium, the evils of suspension would be much less aggravated; for the mercantile interest would then have steady data upon which to predicate its operations. wide and constant oscillations thus rendered inevitable, the trade of the country is perpetually baffled and discouraged by artificial and unnecessary risks, and commerce is demoralized by being made unduly spec! ulative. It is only necessary to analyse the course of trade, for the last few weeks, for illustration of the deranging effects of these fluctuations. The importers, instead of remitting in payment for their imports in September and October, when they had realised upon their goods, have anticipated a decline in gold this month as the result of the elections and of the free exportation of breadstuffs and cotton, and have postponed their remittances until such decline should occur. holders of gold now take advantage of this postponement of remittances, and use every sort of expedient for keeping up the premium. In some instances, the importers have borrowed gold to make their remittances, intending to return it at the time of the anticipated decline: and, to catch merchants in this position, gold has been made artificially scarce, and exorbitant rates on loans exacted. This postponement of foreign payments helped to induce, for a time, a large amount of mercantile deposits in the hands of banks and bankers, and to keep down the rate of interest to 3@5 per cent, with the result of encouraging an advance in stocks to figures from which they have had to decline heavily, under a subsequent pressure for money. The breadstuffs trade has also suffered serious inconvenience from similar causes. A decline of 10 points in the price of gold has required a corresponding fall in the price of grain, to equalize our markets with those of Europe. Farmers, however, are slow to perceive the connection between the gold premium and the market value of their produce, and have therefore resisted the required decline. The grain merchants of the West have been naturally desirous of satisfying themselves that the fall in gold would be permanent before conceding, and they have therefore held on to their large stocks with much tenacity. The result of this hesitation has been an accumulation of grain at the lake ports beyond what the banks were willing to carry, and a severe decline in prices, with injury to dealers; while the foreign exchanges have been deprived of relief the expected from a liberal supply of produce bills. During the same time, the cotton trade has been in a measure retarded, from the same cause. These are but illustrations of the manner in which the fluctuations in the gold premium impede and derange all commercial

operations. These embarrassments, of course, very largely augment the risks of business enterprises, and so far tend to prevent that free employment of capital which is essential to the industrial and commercial recuperation of the country. The value of raw materials, of manufacturers, of produce and of imported merchandise are thus all rendered uncertain; and as the possible fluctuations are large enough to cover a good portion of the usual profit on commercial transactions, it results that many cautious capitalists prefer employing their means in real estate or securities to engaging in active enterprises calculated to increase the wealth of the country.

It is impossible to conceive of any stronger evidence of the mischiefs of the suspension of specie payments than is afforded by these considerations. It is out of the question to expect a permanent confidence in business while the currency is kept thus fluctuating in value; and every year of the protraction of suspension is therefore represented by a failure to accumulate a large amount of wealth which would otherwise have been realised. In the meantime we are disqualifying ourselves for competing with other countries in various forms of enterprise, and are necessitating the purchase of a large proportion of our varied supplies in foreign markets, with securities which constitute a foreign lien upon our resources.

PROPOSED DIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

In the midst of the excitement of the recent Presidential election several of the journals belonging to Western New York published leading articles recommending the division of the State into two separate commonwealths. The metropolitan newspapers have discussed the proposition with the gravity due to a measure so important, and some readers may have been induced to believe that the division was seriously contemplated. It is very possible that a resolution or bill will be introduced into the Legislature at its next session at Albany, proposing to give the consent required by the Federal Constitution, for the formation of a new State; but it is hardly probable that the matter, in any event, will go further. The counties to be included in the proposed "State of Manhattan" are New York, Kings, Queens, Suffolk, Richmond, Westchester and Putnam.

The Federal Constitution, Article IV., provides that "no new State shall be formed or created within the jurisdiction of any other State nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned

as well as of the Congress." No action has ever been taken under this provision, except in the case of West Virginia. The erection of that State was accomplished under the pressure of a war necessity, and we are inclined to the opinion that some political convulsion will be required to obtain any sufficient pretext for dividing the State of New York.

There has never been any general agitation of the subject, or discussion, to enable the people and the Legislature to mature their judgment in regard to its expediency. In 1857, the Mayor of this city, having been defeated in his opposition to the Metropolitan Police Law, started the idea of a division of the State and procured the calling of a public meeting for the purpose of agitating the subject. But the movement perished, still-born. A second attempt, in 1861, had no better success. The alleged grievance then was the legislation for this city and the counties nearest to it, by the State Legislature; certainly a questionable policy, but clearly within the province of that body as much as local legislation for any other county.

Now we have another agitation of the same question, but we predict for it and for future efforts in the same direction a similar result. The different sections of the State have too many and great interests in common to permit this division. It is not the city alone that is interested in the vast wealth that has been accumulated here, and its future profitable employment and increase; for this port has become, by reason of its position and commercial facilities, the most prominent outlet for the productions of the interior not only of this State but of the West; and the rendering of those facilities more perfect and complete must be the object and intent alike of both sections. It may be urged that a division would not change this. We admit that it would not in the main, and yet petty jealousies and disagreements would likely arise giving a check to the present freedom of intercourse, and necessarily resulting in a direct injury to the whole country.

But as the question is raised it is not uninteresting to remember that the seven counties of the Southeast could afford the division as well as the remaining fifty-three. Whatever risk they would incur in the way of unfriendly action of the Northern State would be counterbalanced by the advantages possessed for retaliation in holding the ocean outlet for all interior productions, and also in having two representatives in the Senate of the United States always sure to watch over the interests of this metropolis.

In regard to public indebtedness and taxation, the smaller State would be the gainer. With a division, would be an adjustment of the existing obligations. The canal debts amounted, at the close of the fiscal year in 1867, to \$15,736,960; and the General Fund Debt, which is also

chargeable against the revenues of the canals, amounted to \$5,642,600. As the Northern State would contain all the canals within its limits, it would naturally become their proprietor, and must accordingly take with them this total debt of \$21,380,000. The Bounty State Debt is in terms about forty-eight millions, of which, making the apportionment according to valuation, the Southern State would have twenty-eight millions to assume. This would be all the State debt that would legitimately devolve upon us, and would make no addition whatever to our present liabilities.

The most sensible relief, however, would be in the matter of taxation for the support of Free Schools. By the law of 1867, an annual tax of 1½ mills is to be levied for all time upon the taxable property of the State, received into the Treasury and apportioned among the school districts for the free tuition of the children. Our representatives also voted for that measure, so that under the present arrangement we have no right to complain. The aggregate of this tax for the present fiscal year will be \$2,080,134 65; of which four-sevenths will be collected here, and only about one-third received back in the subsequent distribution, as will be seen in the following table:

	School Tax	School
Counties.	Paid.	Money Received.
New York	\$ 891,7 5 (7	\$848,707 75
Kings	172.896 62	140 975 64
Richmond		12,804 10
Queens	27,755 79	27,4:8 41
Potram	7,264 56	8,068 10
Suffolk	12,556 45	22,408 89
Westchester	60,288 00	50,131 00
	\$1,162,246 86	\$610,058 &9

It is here seen that the seven counties which it is proposed to cut off from the State of New York pay four sevenths of all the State taxes, and actually are contributing \$552,187 97 annually to support free schools in Clinton, Franklin, St. Lawrence, Jefferson, Oswego, Onondaga, Monroe, Erie, Chatauqua and other counties of the State, besides three millions and more additional to support their schools at home. This saving of more than half a million is quite an item, even in this metropolis, and cur country cousins up the Hudson and away out toward the Lakes find it a snug little amount with which to lighten the burden of education in their towns and school districts.

It will take very long for the inhabitants of Northern and Western New York to ascertain what advantage they could derive and especially what equivalent to the reduction of income that would ensue after severing the counties that pay the major part of the taxes. The fable of Minutius of the Belly and the members is by no means inapplicable. It is possible

to divert much commerce from the port of New York, in the event of a division of the State, by discriminating legislation in favor of other centres of trade. Perhaps the Erie Railway might be made a thoroughfare for the benefit of Boston and Philadelphia; and the Niagara ship canal could direct commerce to Montreal and Portland. But on the other hand the crippling of this great centre of trade would be to paralyze in a measure the trade of the whole country.

The configuration of the soil and the courses of the streams all indicate that Nature intended the entire State to belong to one commonwealth; and the sagacity of her four millions of inhabitants will maintain that unity unbroken. To the motto "Excelsior," if need be, will be added the watchword of the French Republic of 1793: "The commonwealth, one and indivisible."

THE BRIDGE OVER THE HUDSON.

It was finally determined the last week by the "Hudson Highland Suspension Bridge Company" to locate their proposed bridge over the Hudson River at the narrow point above Peekskill Bay known as Antony's Nose. On the western bank is the site of Fort Montgomery, and that of Fort Clinton near by on the eastern side. This was the site originally contemplated, and it promises superior engineering and commercial facilities.

This company was incorporated, as our readers will remember, by the Legislature at its last session, and contains among its members such men as General E. W. Serrell, Judge Robert Cochran, DeWitt C. Littlejohn, Elliott F. Shepherd, and others engaged in forwarding and transportation business, and closely identified with the commercial interest of the country. The stock is fixed at \$2,500,000, and the usual powers of bridge companies are conferred by the act. The point selected for the site of the bridge is very feasible. It is less than twelve miles distant from Turner's Station on the Erie Railroad. There is a gap in the mountains on that route, so that the directors of the Erie Company could easily run a track eastwardly, passing the freight of the Dean Iron Mines and the Highland Mills at an easy grade, to the bridge, and thus go down on the eastern side of the Hudson River into this city. The New York, Newburgh and Oswego Midland Railroad Company could, if they desired, avail themselves of this way of getting over the Hudson River. So also the New York and Albany Railroad Company, if their road should ever be constructed, will be enabled to carry their track over the bridge at Fort

Montgomery, and enter New York on the northern extremity. The act of incorporation expressly provides for giving such facilities to any "Railroad corporation whose road shall have a terminus at said bridge, or shall connect with the same or either of its avenues of approach, or shall run its trains in connection with any railroad having such terminus or connection with said avenues of approach."

These are all possible connections by means of this bridge, ndicating the various ways in which it may be made available, and yet we have reason for believing that the act of incorporation was never obtained for the purpose of making connections with New York. So long as the carriage of passengers and freight through this city is surrounded with the difficulties, detention and expense now attending it, there can be little inducement for making the upper part of this island a railroad terminus. A tunnel from one end to the other of the island would work a great change in this respect. But till that improvement is made it is a positive disadvantage for a road to cross the Hudson. The Erie Railway, for example finds it far easier and cheaper to lay down its freight at Jersey City, where tug-boats can take it up and carry it to every side of New York, and to receive consignments from every part of this city in the same manner. The difficulties, delays, and enormous expense of moving freight through the city, are too exorbitant a tax not to be avoided wherever it is possible. The persons endeavoring to build a road on the western side of the Hudson naturally take a similar view of the subject. The freight question has been already brought to so fine a point, that any increase in the expense of transportation which this change would require. would be likely to result in a transferment of a large part of our traffic with the West from this city to other points. This project of bridging the Hudson at Fort Montgomery, cannot therefore be regarded as an enterprise in which the city of New York has any considerable interest, and we must look elsewhere for a true explanation of the decision to which we have referred.

Nor is it a problem of very difficult solution. During the summer of last year several citizens of Putnam and Westchester counties, and residents of Connecticut formed an association, and employed engineers to survey a route from Turner's Station eastwardly to the Hudson River at or near the base of the Highlands, and onward to the Connecticut river. So favorable was the report of the survey that the Erie and New England Railroad Company was at once incorporated to construct a railroad with two divisions; the western division extending from Turner's Station to the Hudson, a distance of about eleven miles; and an eastern division extending from the Hudson to the State line in the town of North Salem. There has been a route surveyed by citizens of Connecticut from that

place to Derby, on a direct line with another railroad now being constructed from Derby to New Haven. This will afford a continuous route from the Erie Railway at Turner's, in Orange County, in about a straight line to New Haven, enabling a continuance as far as Boston.

This is sufficient to demonstrate that the "Hudson Highland Suspension Bridge" to be constructed at Antony's Nose, despite the Knickerbocker traditions, is emphatically a "Yankee notion," calculated, if not prima ily designed, for the benefit of the Eastern States. Indeed, the principal "corporators" of the Bridge Company are directors also of the Eric and New England Railroad, and expect to complete their track, and have it in working order long before the bridge can be finished. They have anticipated this difficulty, however, by obtaining also a franchise for a ferry across the Hudson at Peekskill Landing, which can be used till the bridge is put in good condition.

The professed purpose of the men engaged in this enterprise is to procure coal by a more direct route. It is estimated that four millions of tons of coal are consumed every year in New England, and that part of this State lying east of the Hudson; and that it can be transported by this road a dollar a ton cheaper than by any other. The distance round to Hartford will be sixty miles, and about the same to New Haven, and no breaking of bulk will be required. Every person familiar with transportation can readily understand the force of this.

The principal interest then which the city of New York has in this bridge enterprise is that derived from the general benefit of improved commercial facilities. What increase of prosperity may come to Hartford, New Haven and Boston will, of course, indirectly help this city.

It, however, brings out in strong light the importance to this city of a system of tunnels, which shall enable us to carry from one end of the island to the other, without delay or transhipment, the largely increasing volume of freight whichis every year flowing towards New York for distribution; and when that is accomplished, then, if the Midland Bailway Company should determine to cross the Hudson at the bridge, as the name of Mr. Littlejohn, and other in the charter, would seem to indicate, or if the Eric Ratiway Company should carry a track to this city over the bridge, the distance being the same as the present route, of course the interest of this city would become at once more direct.

THE HOME CONSUMPTION OF COTTON.

It is a matter of considerable practical moment to the cotton trade to ascertain with accuracy the consumption of cotton within the United States. Before the war, the data were easily obtained, and estimate reached sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes. But, within the last four years, the routes of transportation have so materially changed that former methods of estimating the consumption are no longer reliable. Very large amounts of cotton now pass up the Mississippi and over the railroads to the East, instead of, as formerly, reaching that destination through ocean transportation. This important change has not been sufficiently taken into account in late crop statistics, and the result has been that until this year a large amount of cotton has not been counted, and that the estimates of consumption at the North and the South have been very inaccurately proportioned, too little being allowed to the North and too much to the South. In fact, no wholly complete system of reporting the cotton transported inland has been established; so that the movement in that direction has had to be, to a certain extent, made up from quite uncertain data. In our last annual cotton statement, however, we gave a result more nearly accurate than has ever before been obtained; and as other statements were deficient in this particular branch of the movement, our results varied from the figures of some who have been recognized as authorities on cotton statistics. Taking into account the railroad movement from the Southwest to the Eastern States, our estimates of Northern consumption exceeded others; while our estimate of the consumption in the Southern States was so much below contemporaneous computations that doubts were suggested in some quarters as to its accuracy. From the fact of our inquiries having covered every possible source of information, we felt the utmost confidence in the substantial accuracy of our returns, and have since had the satisfaction of finding that the trade has very generally recognized that our method of making up the crop statement is more complete than those generally adopted.

It is especially gratifying to find that returns recently completed by the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers and Planters, though compiled from sources very different from ours, afford a marked confirmation of the accuracy of our figures for the consumption in the North and South respectively. The inquiries of the Association cover all the known mills in the country, and may be considered exhaustive. Returns have been received from 643 mills, running 6,380,000 spindles; while the spindles not reported upon are estimated at about 600,000. We are indebted to

Mr. B. F. Nourse, the Statistician of the Association, for the following summary statement, made up to November 28th:

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COTTON MANUFACTURERS AND PLANTERS. SUMMARY OF RETURNS FROM MILLS RECEIVED PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 28, 1868.

States. Northern States.	No. Mills.	No. Spin dles.	Av. No. Yarn.	No. Pounds Cotton Spun Yearly.	Av'e No. Pounds Per Spindles.
Maine	. 22	448,800	22.56	\$8,888,008	64.98
New Hampshire	. 87	784,460	25,88	48,089,439	65.48
Vermont	. 19	24,188	80.86	1.041.125	48 18
Massachusetts	. 140	2.827.822	27.20	184.568.652	57.80
Rhode Island		1.062.694	85.86	50,742,878	47.76
Connecticut	. 76	527,816	29.39	29,495,790	55.75
New York	. 48	410,070	81.28	20,545,044	60.10
New Jersey	. 15	158,840	86 x8	6.8:6.000	51.44
Pennsylvania	. 64	367,856	17.66	88,858,004	90.67
Delaware	. 8	48,108	19,84	8,038,980	70.48
Maryland	. 10	89,858	12.87	6,929,788	176.07
Ohio		21.884	18.06	8,170,C00	188.89
Indiana	1	11,800	14	1,500,000	188.89
Missouri	. 4	18,436	10	2,475,000	184.21
Total North	. 561	6,161,962	28.08	870,602,088	60.14
Southern States.					
Virginia	. 10	26,060	15.89	4,010,000	111.20
North Carolina		21,118	10.54	8,009,000	142.53
Nonth Carolina	. 6	81,588	18.98	4,174,100	189.14
Georgia	. 90	69,789	19.86	10,864,350	155.70
Alabama		95,196	16.91	2,820,596	111.94
Mississippl	. Š	6,994	8.39	1,145,000	165.87
Texas	4	8,528	9.58	1.872.104	10 89
Arkansas		994	8.48	258,430	979.65
Tennessee		11.720	9.88	1,597,200	136 28
Ken ucky		6,264	10	1,075,000	171.63
Total Fouth	. 81	218,089	12 93	80,825,750	189.
Northern States	. 561	6,161,962	98.08	810,609,088	60.14
Bouthern States		218,099	12,98	80,835,750	189.
Total U. S	. 648	6,390,061	27 51	400,927,573	62.84

It appears that the 643 mills here reported upon consume 400,927,783 pounds of cotton per annum, or 890,000 bales. Allowing 85,000 bales for the consumption of the mills not heard from, and say 25,000 bales for consumption otherwise than in the mills, we have upon this basis of estimate a total consumption in the country of about 1,000,000 bales. Returns of this character, however, are subject to a certain degree of over statement, owing to a very natural trade motive in the manufacturer to give an appearance of importance to his works. It is not easy to say what allowance should be made on this account; but a moderate deduction would bring down the figures to a very close approximation to our annual statement, which shows the consumption of the United States to have been 885,000 bales. We think it must be in all fairness conceded that this result, based upon the most direct sources of information, affords a satisfactory vindication of our last crop return and of the method of computation on which it was based; and further, that it indicates the fallacy of adhering to the old method of making up the crop statements.

This statement further shows that the error of those estimates which placed the Southern consumption at near 200,000 bales. Our figures of 60,000 bales for the South, or $6\frac{3}{4}$ per cent of the whole home consumption, were received with much incredulity, even by those in the trade who have been regarded as authorities; we find, however, that returns from the mills of both sections give the proportion consumed in the South a_8 only $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the whole home consumption.

Upon the foregoing estimates it may be fairly concluded that, for last year, the consumption at home averaged 17,500 bales per week. Some Eastern authorities hold that the current rate is 20,000 bales per week-Taking a course between these figures, and estimating the probable consumption for the current year at 950,000 bales, it would result, assuning the crop to be 2,700,000 bales, that we shall have for export about 1,750,000 bales, or abuot 90,000 bales more than the exports of last year. For the years 1858-9 and 1859-60, the home consumption averaged 950,000 baies; so that the cotton trade has now recovered to an extent which places it upon an equality with the most active of former years. The increase in the population of the country of course requires a larger supply of cotton goods than was needed in 1860; but, on the other hand, a much larger proportion of our cotton manufactures is now kept at home, the exports being quite nominal; and this consideration is the more material from the fact that the fabrics we formerly shipped were chiefly of a heavy character.

The above statement affords an interesting indication of the extent and character of cotton manufactures in the several States and sections. The largest consumption is in Massachusetts, the amount spun in that State being one-third of the total for the United States. Next in extent comes Rhode Island, next New Hampshire, and then Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Maine. The New England States, according to this return, consume about 295,000,000 pounds, or 73 per cent of the total quantity used in the country. New York ranks seventh in this class of manufactures. Among the Southern States, Georgia takes the lead, followed in order by South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina and Alabama. The largest mills are in Maine and New Hampshire, where the average of spind les is 20,000 to each mill, and in Massachusetts, where the average is 16,500 per mill. The finest average class of yarns is made in New Jersey, where the average number is 36.22, and next in order Rhode Island, New York, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine. In the South, the goods produced are almost exclusively of a coarse, heavy character, the yarns varying from number 8.39 in Mississippi to 16.91 in Alabama. The West has scarcely any standing in this branch of manufacture, three States only being represented, and the consumption in these being but 7,000,000, or less than one-fourth that of the South.

THE CURRENCY AND THE PUBLIC DEBT.

The financial condition of the government must, from its prime importance, claim the early and earnest attention of the new administration. It is pertinent, therefore, for us to take a cursory view of the situation, with special reference to measures which seem to us practical and indispensible to any substantial progress towards the resumption of eoin payments, whether that result be more or less remote.

First—That portion of the public debt which consists of gold interest bonds, having reached a condition in which government is relieved from any present provision for it, except the punctual payment of interest, may and ought to be left undisturbed until it can be either paid in coin at maturity, or until government is in condition to avail itself of its reserved right of paying a portion, after five years from date, either from proceeds of new loans, attained at lower rates of interest, or by exchange, with the consent of holders, for other bonds, upon a coin basis, on more favorable terms. In our judgment it will be expedient for Congress to authorize a five per cent loan of definite period (in the act authorizing which it should be unequivocally expressed that the principal and interest are payable in coin), to be issued in exchange for the outstanding six per cent bonds, at the option of the holders. To cover the contingency that government may at times desire to use its surplus means in paying a portion of its debt, it may be made to mature at different, yet specific periods. It is, in our judgment, certain, that all efforts to reduce the rate of interest below five per cent will prove ineffectual; and to encumber the contract with an objectionable option of pre-payment would defeat the end in view. It is far better for government to take its chances of the market in purchasing a limited amount of its debt from time to time, than thus to depreciate the whole loan. With this simple provision for the funded debt, we should leave it undisturbed by any Congressional discussion whatever.

Second—Our next step would be to pass the law, obviously just in itself, making all contracts, specifically payable in coin, legally binding upon parties making them. To this no sound objection can be made. It has already received the decided approbation of the Senate. Such a law would remove a serious impediment to foreign commerce, and it is believed would open the way for the re-introduction and gradual increase of metallic currency. The two currencies working side by side with equal liberty and legal protection, must produce the best results. It would remove the temptation to fraud and relieve the community from embarrassments which now exist with respect to all transactions in gold credit. Even if it fail to secure all the good which is confidently expect ed, it can at least produce little harm, and its manifest justice ought to secure its immediate adoption.

Third.—The subject that next demands consideration is the paper our. rency, the money of the country. Here we reach the really serious and embarrasing question. To lay violent hands upon it, will be to impede all operations of trade, arrest industry, and derange the affairs of Government itself. The paper currency consists of two kinds. First.—The direct issues of the Government. Second.—That which is issued by the Nation. al Banks, and of which the Government is practically the endorser. It is obviously the part of wisdom, first to obtain relief from this incidental liability for the bank notes, by placing them in condition to protect themselves, before a single step can be taken to provide for the direct issues of the Government itself. This is in conformity with sound mercantile policy. and the necessity of the situation. In fact, to touch the legal tender notes, which form the basis of all bank obligations, would only bring the notes down upon the Treasury for payment. The indispensible course seems therefore to be, to require of the banks a regular and practically operative redemption of their notes at a central point (New York). To secure this important end, it will be necessary so to modify the law, that all bank notes received into the Treasury in payment of taxes, shall be assorted, sealed up under Government seal, and sent to their respective places of redemption in New York City, for payment in legal tender notes. This course will enforce upon the banks the habit of protecting their issues which they have either never acquired, or have long since totally abandoned. The notes paid out now never return to the banks issuing them. They possess the same value in public estimation as the paper into which they are legally redeemable, and the banks have become accustomed to regard them as not among their immediate liabilities. Most of these notes have never been seen by the banks since their fire emission, and the feeling of direct responsibility respecting that has become pratically extinct. It is both the necessity and due, of the Government to awaken this sense of obligation, and to create the habit of accountability on the part of the banks as principal debtors, b.. fore any immunity can be secured by the Treasury from its legal obligation to pay in case of default by the banks. In fact the consideration by which the National banks were allowed the privilage of issuing circulating notes was, that having special capital and resources, they possessed the means and afforded the guaranty of prompt payment, and that they were intended ultimately to supersede the legal tender issues, which were simply a temporary expedient and a war measure. It is obvious that such a system of practical redemption in legal tender notes will prepare the banks for self-support, and relieve the Government from an impending liability now hardly less than that which belongs to its own notes.

This requirement rigidly enforced would produce as much contraction

of the currency as the country could bear for a considerable time. It would be unwise to proceed further until the operation of this restriction had produced a system of acknowledged regularity, and this could only be ascertained by actual experience.

Fourth.—Having done this effectually, and having thus given the banks the character and stability contemplated by Congress to make them permanent institutions, it remains only to provide finally for the redemption and funding of the legal tender notes-or their redemption in coin-and the consequent resumption of specie payment throughout the country. An important expedient in accomplishing this result has already been found in the exchange of the legal tender notes for others bearing a low yet accumulating interest, which would make it an object to withdraw some of them gradually from circulation. It is confidently believed that by this time the operation of the law giving legal protection to coin contracts, would so increase the metallic currency, and the beneficial result of the redemption system would render the banks so strong and reliable, that the legal tenders could be gradually retired, first by conversion into interest bearing notes, if need be, and these again into gold bearing five per cent bonds; and that the process of financial restoration would be effected with greater facility than now seems possible. At all events the process we suggest is a natural one, and the steps in it those which afford the best protection to all the great interests involved. G. S. C.

THE TREASURY REPORT.

There are three topics in the Treasury report which, during the last week, have been anxiously canvassed—the funding of the deht, the question of taxation, and the resumption of coin payments. The Secretary of the Treasury may certainly be complimented in having prepared, as his last report, a document which in lucid statement, practical wisdom and judicious suggestion, will compare favorably with any financial state paper ever issued in this country or elsewhere. In reading this paper we seem to pass over the entire period of Mr. McCulloch's Secretaryship, which forms indeed an interesting chapter in the financial history of this country. When he entered the Cabinet our finances were in the deplorable state of confusion and derangement incident to the conclusion of the war. Eight hundred millions of money had to be raised in a shorter space of time than so large a sum was ever ob. tained by any government in the world. The short date Seven-Thirties, by means of which the loan was negotiated, have now been funded into long bonds, as have also the whole of the short obligations which are supposed likely to embarrass the Treasury. The funding process is just about completed, and the report before us offers, as one of its chief features, an account of the closing up of the transaction.

A second point of interest in the period of Mr. McCulloch's service of office, is the growth of our internal revenue system. Clumsy and costly, oppressive and inquisitorial, it destroyed much more of the nation's wealth than it brought into the Treasury, and as it became too burdensome to be borne, it has by successive acts been so modified and improved that it compares favorably as a system with the revenue methods of other countries. Of course we are speaking from a legislative point of view, and when the administering of the revenue laws is made so pure and strict, and faithful, as to break up the whisky ring, and to stop the tobacco frauds, the improvement in our fiscal methods may be pushed still further, so as to relieve the industrial energies of the people from the direct pressure of taxation, and to let the fiscal screw press where the body politic is the least sensitive.

By far the most important part of the report before us is that discussing the currency. After showing how our irredeemable paper currency increased the cost of the war, and have added to the peace and expenditure of the Government; how it causes instability in prices, perturbation in trade, and hinderance to industrial progress; how it shakes the public credit by raising dangerous questions as to the payment of the public debt; how it gives to the rich and robs the poor, he concludes that "if our country is in a measure prosperous with such an incubus upon it, it is because it is so magnificent in extent, so diversified in climate, sorich in soil, so abundant in minerals, with a people so full of energy, that even a debased currency can only retard but not put a stop to its progress."

What is the remedy for this evil which is thus vividly set before us? On this point the reply of Mr. McCulloch is two fold. First, he very justly says the remedy is to be found in "a reduction of the paper circulation of the country till it appreciated to the specie standard." This sound view of the subject Mr. McCulloch says he still adheres to, and he adds that the remedy was emphatically condemned by Congress, and it is now too late to return to it. At a future time we shall have something to say about this gloomy view of contraction as being condemned by Congress and impossible of readoption. Congress intended, as we have often showed, to forbid the abuses of contraction rather than to stop contraction itself or to condemn the country forever to the miseries of a redundant, depreciated, irredeemable circulation As there is no other remedy for redundancy but contraction, so there is no other permanent remedy than this for the depreciation and unstability which redundancy brings.

The case does, however, admit of palliation. Secondly, therefore Mr. McCulloch proposes that the coin contract law should be enacted, and that another law shall be passed providing, first, that after January 1, 1870, the greenbacks shall cease to be a legal tender for private debts subsequently incurred, and secondly, that after the further lapse of one year greenbacks shall cease to be legal tender for any purpose except Government dues for which they are now receivable. Thirdly, he proposes to contract the outstanding volume of the greenbacks by making them convertible at the pleasure of the holders into bonds, bearing such a rate of interest as Congress may appoint.

This proposition of the Secretary is so judicious, and would meet so many of the conditions of the case, that we wonder it has not received more attention from the daily press. When the pending trials in the Supreme Court have settled the mooted questions about the constitutionality of the legal tender law, we shall recur to this important aspect of the currency question.

SOUTHWESTERN, GA., BAILBOAD.

The Southwestern Railroad of Georgia, as at present existing, consists of the following lines:

Main Line—Macon to Albany. (Fort Valley to Butler Branches. { Smithylle to Eutala (Cuthbert to Fort Gaines	107.5 21.0 59.5 19.5	miles.
Total length owned and operated	907.5	miles.

The road is laid with iron varying from 34 to 51 lbs. to the yard, and has cost about \$17,500 per mile. It was constructed almost wholly on the cash principle, and is perhaps the most economically managed line in the United States. The company have never failed in the payment of dividends, and even in the years subsequent to the war, when the work of reconstruction was heaviest, have always had a surplus available for the stockholders.

The stock of engines and cars is ample for an increasing business, and is well kept up by constant additions. The following shows the number of each on the 1st August, 1865, and at the close of each of the last three fiscal years:

	Aug. 1,		July 8	1
	1565.	1866.	1867.	1868.
Locomotives	20	20	23	26
(Passenger		90	20	20
Matt ha	•	8	8	8
Cars Freight	175	223	949	890
Total	208	250	277	318

The following is a statement of the mileage of trains, and passenger and freight traffic for the last three years:

		1865-66.	1866-67.	1867-68.
	Passenger and mail	122,660	151,689	178,621
Miles run by trains	Freight, &c	141.864	151.658	159,681
	Total	264,594	806,886	888,302
1	Through	10.867	19,008	9,653
Passengers carried	Way	104,930	97,474	86,021
	Total	115,787	109,477	94.874
	Bales of cotton	87,250	187,696	289,848
•	Barrels of flour	9,851	16,411	4,405
West-S.A. court. 3			10,005	89,411
Freight carried	Sacks of flour	971,849	689,588	149,648
	Bushe. of wheat	8,866	4.615	5.066
	Cwts of bacon		50,416	85,564

The number of bales of cotton in 1859-60 was 206,807. The total freight carried over the road in 1867-68 amounted to 101,238 tons.

The gross earnings from operations in the year 1859-60 and those for the three years ending July 31, 1868, compare as shown in the following statement:

acatement.				
	18 59-6 0.	1865-66.	1 866-67.	1867-68.
	(200.0 m.)	(197.5 m.)	(198.0 m.)	(\$07.5 m.)
Freight—eastward		\$838,945 62 178,843 86	\$891,187 11 269,839 25	\$439,553 81 257,165 18
Passengers—through	86,649 83	47,822 05	47,684 97	43,295 80
	142,557 47	260,783 45	255,189 05	178,394 98
United States mails	21,082 55 6,527 20	41,501 62	10,804 26 2,865 56	2,180 60
Total gross carnings	\$676,895 87	\$856,845 60	\$1,006,958 90	\$990,544 29
Operating and other current ex	rpenses:			
Operating expenses	291,888 58	\$518,044 18	\$585,454 55 }	\$468,047 12
Internal revenue tax	1 980 00	26,984 85 1,250 00	28,768 68 5 1,950 00	1,250 00
Annuity to city of Macon	1,400 00	1,300 00	1,200 00	1,200 00
Ordinary expenses	\$298,183 58	\$541,928 98	\$560,468 98 87,595 71	\$469,297 12 108,510 70
Expenses on all accounts	298,138 56	541,998 98	597,998 94	577,807 82
Earnings less expenses	\$888,762 29	\$815,616 69	\$408,959 95	\$842,786 47
The above figures, divided by t	he averag	ge number	of miles op	erated in
the years severally, give the follow	wing resu	lta :		
Gross earnings per mile		84 48 \$4,56		
Ordinary expendes, per mile	1,1	165 67 2,89		
Extraordinary			194 41	
Total	1,9	1 65 67 2,88 918 81 1 .6 8	6 55	
Karrings over ord. expenses, p.m			3 29 2,118 90	
Total expenses to earnings	48.	81 p.c. 68.16		
The Fort Gaines branch was on		-	d onened in	1850_60

The Fort Gaines branch was only partially built and opened in 1859-60, and was not in use in 1865-66, having been taken up during the war. It was re-built in 1866-67. These acts account for the difference of mileage operated in the several years.

The total receipts and disbursements on all accounts for the years above noted were as follows:

	185 9- 66	*1865-66.	1866-67.	1 867-68.
Gross earnings		\$856,645 60	\$1,006,958 90	
Expenses (incl. taxes, &c.)	298.183 58	641,228 98	597,998 94	577,807 82
Net ernings	\$888,762 29	\$315,616 69	\$408,959 26	8342,786 47
Add premium & discount New bonds issued	8,841 58	58,000 00	••••	••••
Total resources	\$887,608 82	\$878,616 69	\$408,959 96	\$849,786 47

Disposed of on the following accounts:

Interest on bonds	\$27,632	50			\$34,160	00	\$ 81,570 00
Ma on annuity (2 years)			2,40		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		
bividen Fabruary	(4)93,424	00 (4)127,986	00	(4) 160,170	00	(1)128,156 00
" Augus(4	1)116,876	0 0	••••		(4)128,156	00	(4)128,436 00
" extra (Aug.) (5)146,095	00	••				• • • •
Bonds paid to date			60,500	00			
Construction, &c			77,462	20	70,000	00	39.644 10
Revenue tax, appropriation					6,407	89	6.759 79
Revenue tax, appropriation	2,576	32	81,705	08	10,065	46	8,170 58
Total diabursements	\$887,608	83	\$878,C16	63	\$408,959	26	\$843,735 47

By reference to the statement of earnings, it will be seen that the east-ward freight increased in 1867-68 \$118,371 30, while the westward freight decreased \$112,664 12, and the passage, mail, and miscellaneous decreased \$92,115 99. The increase in eastward traffic is due principally to the larger production of cotton in the sections tributary to the road. The down or westward traffic decreased chiefly in the fact that nearly half a million bushels of corn less than in previous years was needed for subsistence, evidencing the fact that the planters raised their own corn instead of relying on the Northwest for supplies. The falling off in passage and down freight is attributable to this, as well as to the low price of cotton last fall and winter, and the consequent scarcity of money in the country to pay for goods and travel.

The financial condition of the company, as shown by the general account of August 1, of the years above noted, was s follows:

	1860.		1866.		1867.		1868.	
Capital stock	\$2,911,900	00	\$3,203,400	00	\$8,203,900	00	\$8,910 000 (00
Bonds (20 years)	250,000	00	82 (10	00	836,000	DÜ	824,007 (00
., (:0 ,)		00	58,000	00	56,000	00	55,009 (00
" (20 "), endors	102,000	93	51,000	00	£1.000	UO	61,000 (00
Fare tickets	••••		21,020			ti5	4,337	50
Transpo tation			836,360	96	990,700	D6	942,760	09
Die otuer roads	••••		5,165	63	28,810	27	8,456 1	90
Unclaimed dividends	••••		111,550			0Ó	8,989	00
Other :tems	••••		66	00)		147	90
Prem um and discount			1.039	57	8,237	67	8.881	98
Bill payab e			12,582	04	632	77		
Profit and loss	859.555	88	179 919	79	271,163	48	13 ,294	10
Total			\$4,808,552	99	\$5,055,416	 45	\$4,734,047	51

Against which are charged the following accounts:

Construction, &c	\$3,776,936	28 \$8,751,978 44	\$3,802,×26 84	\$3,719,818 26
Transportation		541.928 95	600,468 23	5:7.807 82
Interest on bo ds	27,932	50 78.518 84	84.160 OJ	
Macon ann ity		2,500 00		
Augnet dividends	262.971	00 101.108 00		
Stocks and honds		39,173 66		
Susp use accounts	•••••	99.761 4		
Bills re eivable	221,282			
Transfe agent		4,162 18		
Confe erate money	•••••	102.447 68		
Cash on hand & in bank	87,198			
Out on mand of the built :				100,000 01
(Total		@4 909 589 DO		#4 794 047 R1

All the bonds of this company bear 7 per cent interest, and all, with the exception of \$45,000, are convertible into capital stock at par. The bonds endorsed by the Central Railroad Company have been paid off one-half since 1864-65.

The twenty-year bonds are due, in various sums, in 1877, '78, '79, and 1880.

An act of the Georgia Legislature, approved March 4, 1866, authorized the consolidation of the Muscogee into the South Western Railroad Company. This change is now in progress, the latter assuming the liabilities of the Muscogee Company, and exchanging their stock for stock of the South Western, at 87½ per cent of its face value. The Muscogee Railroad extends from Butler to Columbus, and has a length of 50 miles. It cost about \$1,000,000.

A detailed history of the South Western Company will be found in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine of January, 1867.

LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE BAILBOAD.

The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, commencing at Louisville, Ky, on the Ohio River, extends in a southern direction to Nashville, Tenn., a distance of 165 miles. About 30 miles south from Louisville the Lebanon Branch diverges easterly to Lebanon 37.3 miles, and thence is continued by the Lebanon Branch or Knoxville extension to Brodhead, a further distance of 549 miles, the intention of the company being to further extend the line to the Tennessee border in the direction of Knoxville. The Bardstown Branch, (formerly the Bards town and Louisville Railroad,) which leaves the main stem about 10 miles north of the Lebanon junction, extends to Bardstown 17.3 miles. The Memphis brauch leaves the main stem about 164 miles from Louisville, and runs southwest to the State line of Tennessee, making connection with the Memphis, Clarkesville and Louisville Railroad, which with the Memphis and Ohio Railroad (both now opersted by the Louisville and Nashville Company,) forms a continuous line from Louisvil e to Memphis.* There is also now being constructed a branch from the Knoxville extension at Sanford (75 miles from Lebanon Junction) to Richmond, a distance of 33 miles, of which at the close of the year 1867-68, there was open 72 miles.† Thus it appears that, while the main stem pierces Tennessee in the centre, and connects with other due south lines, its western arm reaches the Missis ippi at Memphis, and its eastern arm, destined to meet the roads now being constructed in Tennessee, North and South Carolina, and already in operation in Georgia, will ultimately reach the Southern Atlantic ports by lines of moderate length. When these lines are completed, Louisville will be in the great centre of the trade of the whole South and attain many commercial advantages not yet enjoyed by any of the cities of the Ohio Valley.

[•] The Memphis and Ohio Railroad (180% miles) was leared in September, 1867, for a term of ten y ars, and has since then been operated by the Louisville and Nashville Company. The Memphis, Clarkesville and Louisville Railroad (82% miles) is in the hands of a rate receiver, and is operated by the Louisville and Na-hville Company as agent of said receiver. The total distance from Louisvil to to Memphis is 387 miles.

[†] The Richmond branch was expected to be completed and in operation November 15, 1963.

The following statement shows the length of railroad and sidings on the main stem and branches of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad at the close of each of the last four fiscal years (June 30):

	1864-65		1865-66	1866-67	1867_68		
	Rail-	8id-	Rail- Sid-	Rail- Bid-	Rail- bid-		
	road.	ing.	road, ings.	road, ing.	road, ings.		
Main stem	185.00	17.16	185.00 18.88	185.00 19.00	185.00 19 81		
Bardst'a br'ch	17.80		17.80 0.69	17.80 0.69	17.80 0.89		
Leb'non br'ch	87.80	1.49	87.80 1 4 40	87.80) = 00	87.80)		
Leb. br. exten		****	47.70 4.47	47.70 7.89	54.90 8.88		
Mem. branch	46.00	2.67	46.00 2.96	46.00 8.59	45.00 8.55		
Richmond br		••••			7.75 0.67		
Total road & sidings	285.6 0	21.83	838.80 96. 95	888.89 81.97	848,25 88.72		
Average utiles operated.	20% an		808 10	888 RO	236.20		

The motive and carrying power employed on the main stem and branch lines July 1, 1864, and at the close of the fiscal years, as above, is stated in the following tabulation:

		Inly 1.	_	lose of	fiscs' ve	ers-
Locomotive engines	**************************	1864.	1864-5. 60	Nose of 1965–6. 65	1866-7. 66	. 167-8.
DOCUMENTO SEGUES.	Pastenger	81	49	43	45	45
Passenger train cars.	Baggage	. 8	79	10	15	15
	(Expices	. 8	8	8	8	
	f House		295	807	864	868
Preight train care	Rack	. 91	204	98	98	110
Freight train cars	}	. 22	21	48	48	43
			107	119	119	136
	(Stone and grave)	K7	70	83	83	83
Service cars	(Wrecking		1	1	1	1
	Boarding	. 7	19	11	11	11
						~~
Total of all cars		. 576	AAD	791	786	£18

The business of the road, including the performance of engines and cars, passenger and tonnage traffic, and the results yearly for the same years is epitomized in the following general statement:

Miles run by locomotives hauling	trains:	:						
		1864	-65.	18	965-4	6. 1	36 6- 6	
Passenger trains)			(4	18.97	1 4	12.79	5 488,804
Freight trains	}	744,	340		28.87		18.23	
Distributing trains	,	96,	700		7.09		8,45	
Train, of all kinds		B41.			9.91		9.45	
			~~	~	,,,,,	•	,	, 0.20,
Passengers and 'reight (tons) ca								
Number of passengers		455.	067	8	88.67	8 34	30.72	L 865,F46
Pas engers carried one mile	83.	042		46.0	18.71		8.58	
Tons of freight							2.98	
Tons carried one mile	•••••			26,96	0,84		118,1	
Gross earnings, expenses and pr	ofits from	n o	pera	tions	:			
	1864-68		٠ ،	865-66	t	1866-	RT	1867-66.
Passenger earnings	\$2,708,77					2877.26		2856,818 89
Freight "	1,811,34			26,890		1,152,47		1,215,702 96
Freight	121.82			21,199		81.84		90 586 57
Mail service	87,500			47,659		40.02		41,035 00
Miscellaneous sources	140.09			87.121				25,476 Uz
MINCHIAMOUR BOUICES	140,00	f TA		01,133	10	5,56	* 00	MOINTO CO
Earned by the main stem and bro								
Main stem	2R.986.15	4 12	22.5	60.276	04	\$1,790.19	7 94	\$1,895,763 88
Lebanon branch and extension	87.48	9 48	T	21,29	88	189.10	8 68	185,895 64
Memphis branch	88.07		i	04,90	26	154.00		193,685 26
Bardstown branch	12,78			19.598		20.96		28.051 52
Richmond branch	20,10	0 00		20,000				213 69
Miscellaneous	140.09	2° 10		87.19	110			
WIRCCHMICARD								
Total gross earnings	\$4,814,54	0 05	\$8,1	48,696	47	\$2,158,87	14 57	\$2,228,909 44
Operat'g, includ'g taxes	2,142,02					1.848.40	ō 90	1,809,514 83
B) B		_~_						
Net earnings (profits)	29 179 KI	5 42	\$1.	99 054	77	\$810.46	8 67	\$919,094 61
Interest account	291,75	Ř ŘÁ	V-1	77.076	22	182,91		227,208 21
				,010		-04,01		
Balance	\$1,950,75	8 58	\$1,4	14,978	44	\$627,60	5 90	\$691,691 40

A stock dividend of 10 per cent was paid in April, 1864, on account of twentytwo months' earnings up to June 30, 1863. Since then 8 per cent per annum in cash has been divided.

The following deductions show the average earnings and expenses per mile of road operated, the earning and expenses per train mile, and the relation of expenses to earnings for the same four years :

	1864-65.	186566.	1866 67.	1867-68.
Gross earnings per mile of road	\$15,106 93	\$10,870 54	26,477 27	26,696 83
Operating expenses "	7,500 08	5,117 57	4,045 62	8,893 89
Nett earnings "	7,606 85	5,252 57	2,481 65	2,782 96
Gross earnings per train mile	8 5 12:68			\$3 41:8 ³
Operating expenses "	2 54:58	1 61:59	1 45:07	1 4::80
Nett carnings "	2 58:15	1 65:84	0 87:19	0 99:58
Expenses to earnings, per cent	49.64	49.85	62 46	58.76

The financial condition of the company at the close of each of the same years, (being the whole period since the consolidation of the main stem and branch accounts,) is shown in the following abstract of the yearly balance sheets:

	1865.		1866.		1867.		1868.
Capital stock (general)	25,527,870	68	\$5,490,106	48	\$5,492,688 5	6	\$7,869,186 87
Richmond br.—stock act							869,410 80
Funded debt		ÒÒ	8,105,000	00	2,965,000 (Ò	2,883,500 00
Bills payable			******		*******		885,689 55
Notes and accounts	7,298						5,861 88
Back taxe,					40 801 6		•••
Back interest		27	17.691	19	15,292		18,016 88
Second mortgage (funded interest) bonds	,		,			_	
_ due		00	2,800	00	1,400 0	Ю	******
June bilis and pay-rolls	#48,490						148,881 67
Back dividends	169,916						67,895 88
Dividends payable Aug. 1	221,114						
Profit and loss	2.527 215						
	2,001 000		0,000,00			_	
(Tinha)	19 K70 71K	00	10 7784 948	40	18 941 005 4	ıΩ	12 009 988 1K

Per contra: the charges which follow:

		2		8
Construction account	9,665,568 97	10,069,768 94	10.168,830 48	10,196,421 28
Lebanon br. extension		887,106 20	582,855 89	1.187,961 69
Lebanon branch extension mort bonds		569,000 00	524,000 00	519,000 00
Lebanon branch ext. u. Louisville bonds.	********	881,470 00	804,283 75	287,669 98
Richmond branch	*********			887,461 65
Tennessee State bonds	574,772 76		*******	
Sundry bonds and no.es	828,78) 84		184,464 89	311,970 93
Transportation accounts	559,571 17	925,686 74	272,496 60	181,598 00
Memphis, Clarkesville & Louisville Rail-	,	,		
road Co		121,562 50	147,694 64	50,847 79
Memphis Division R.R	*** ****		,	90.150 91
Memphis & Ohio R.R. Co	********			873,078 05
Real estate; timber and quarry lands	83,294 13		80,962 55	22,082 65
Shop and fuel stock	857,941 87		888,654 77	408,808 88
U. S. 7-30 reasury notes	590,648 19			
Cash on hand, June 30			287,847 96	
,,		***************************************		

The Lebannon branch extension accounts, and also the Richmond branch accounts, are kept separately while under construction, and are as follows:

Cost of road to June 80	1866.	1867	۲.	1868.	Richm'd br. 1868 7 \$412,194 44
Derived from the following sources	:				
L. & N. RR Co.; cash advanced			355 89 300 00	600,000 0	
Louisville loan bonds	60,000		010 00 158 23	68,221 0	8 24,669 79
Sandry accounts		8,	750 SS	1,812 1	3

Total \$1,550 202 88 \$1,808,659 16 \$2,457,991 87 \$412,134 44

Sundry accounts.....

Of the mortgage bonds issued on the Lebanon branch extension account, \$76,000, and of the Louisville loan bonds \$295,711 25 have been sold, the balance of the \$600,000 of each issue is held by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, and appears in the general account as part of their resources.

The funded debt of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company is described as issued and as outstanding year y in the following tabular statement:

	Total am't		Outstandi	ng June 20	
	of issues	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
Main stem: 1st mort. 7 p. c. bonds, dated July 1, 1858, and due Jan 1866-77 Lebanon branch: income 7 p. c. bonds, due	\$3,000,000	\$ 1,7 6 5,000	\$1,656,000	\$1,594,00 0	\$ 1,515, 000
(various) 19t2-1865	175,000	21,000	1,000	••••	******
Memphie branch: 1st mort. 7 p. c. bonds, due May 1, 1870-75.		286,000	261,000	967,000	267,000
Bardstown & L'swille RR: 1st mort. 7 p. c. bonds, due Jan. 1, 1870	. 80,000		80,000	80,000	27,500
bonds, due Nov. 16, 1880-85	600,000		600,000	600,000	600,000
Tennessee 6 p. c. loan bonds, viz.:					
Main stem in Tennessee, due January 1, 1893-93	\$60,500	580,500			•••••
Louisville City 6 p c loan bonds,	v z. :				
Main stem: due April and Oct. 15, 1866-87. Lebanon branch: due June 2 and Nov. 2.	1,000,000	1,000,000	912,000	849,000	849,000
1895	225,000	235,000	225,000	225,000	235,000
1898		•••••	600,000	600,000	60,000
Total funded debt	\$5,490,500	\$8,857,500	\$4,305,030	\$4,165,000	\$4,083,500

In October, 1861, a sinking fund of \$400,000 per annum was directed to beset apart out of the net earnings of the road to pay—first, the interest of the debt, next, the amount necessary for the completion of the road, and then the debt itself. The reduction of the debt yearly has been effected under the operations of this fund. The Tennessee State loan was paid off by the surrender of bonds of that State owned by the company.

The comp my are now issuing a series of consolidated first morigage 7 per cent thirty year bonds, with interest, payable in April and October, and to become due April, 1898. The amount provided for is \$8,000,000, of which \$2,50°,700 are to be set apart for the redemption of existing issues. In relation to these the President, in his report for 1868, says:

Under the amendment to our charter, accepted by the stockholders on the 31st of March, 1868, the board of directors have made preparation for the issuance and sale of the bonds contemplated by the amendment, and have caused to be executed a mortgage upon the property of the company to secure the payment of the bonds and interest, and are now offering for sale a limited amount of the bonds in New York and Louisville.

It was the purpose of the retiring board to seil the binds only as the proceeds were needed, for the preservation of the property, and the objects contemplated by the amendment and with this purpose steadily adhered to by our successors the wisdom of the amendment will very shortly be made practically obvious. The property cost the company more than \$18,000,000, and is now worth certainly over \$15,000,000, with a mortgage debt upon it less than two millions and a half; and by the prior use of the proceeds of the bonds issued under the amenument in the acquisition of additional property, the debt of the company will not certainly increase more rapidly than will the property increase in amodut and value, and it is believed that much better than this may be done for the company.

We have made arrangements for the registration of our bonds, and in such manner as will protect the holders against loss by fire, theft, or other casualty, and all persons who may desire a safe security for themselves or others de; en ent upon them, may accomplish this purpose by a purchase and proper registration of our bonds. Our company is a home institution of growing prosperity and undoubted solvency and permanency, and will continue to increase in value as the country continues to develop and prosper.

RAILROAD BARNINGS FOR OCTOBER.

The gross earnings of the under specified railroads for the month of October, in 1867 and 1868, and for the first ten months of each year are exhibited in the subjoined statement;

		ober		Ionthe
Railroads.	1867.	18 6 8.	1867.	1918.
Atlantic and Great Western	. \$477.528	\$156,886	\$4,216,988	\$3,920,735
Chicago and Alton		480.212	8,208,589	3,746,999
Chicago and Northwestern		1,574,905	9,582,194	11,292,298
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific		559,900	8,888,108	3,805,291
Illinois Central	823,901	901,681	5,819,882	6,040,793
Marietta and Cincinnati		125,065	1,002,948	
Mishigan Cantral	506,295	611.8 20	8,657,775	1.053,868
Michigan Central				3,768,147
Michigan South. & North. Ind	. 539,435	589,(61	8,819 645	4,189,140
Milwaukee and St. Paul		1,487,484	4,(59,788	5,518,789
Ohio and Mississippi	879,367	283,849	2,151,100	2,455,542
Pittsburg, F.t W. & Chicago	. 784,801	812,114	5,977,802	6,595,464
St. Loui-, Alton & Terre Haute		2:0.478	1,812,836	1,620,800
Toledo, Wabash and Western		480,766	8,124,118	3,803,032
Western Union		97,599	640,807	
AL OB MOTH OFFICE ************************************	. 119,001	51,000	310,001	664,851
Total	8,088,764	\$8,044,195	\$58,687,060	\$57,928,209

UNITED STATES ASSAY OFFICE FOR NOVEMBER.

Statement of business at the United States Assay Office at New York, for the month ending November 20, 1868:

Foreign coin	10,000 00 545,000 00	\$575,000 00
DEPOSITS OF SILVER, INCLUDING PUBOHASES.		•
Foreign coin. Foreign bu'llon United *Lates buillion (contained in gold). Colorado Lake *- uperior. Nevada	15,000 00 6,000 00 5,000 0	4117 000 00
Total deposits, payable in bars	\$500,000 00 192,000 c0	\$117,000 09
Gold bars stamped Transmitted to U. S. Mint, Philadelphia, for coinage		\$692,000 no 692,395 87 98,659 49

AGRICULTURAL RETURNS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

The official reports of the agricultural condition of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland have just been completed and published. From these papers it appears that in the whole kingdom of Great Britain there were 3,933,924 acres under wheat in 1868, against 3,629.784 in 1867. Under barley there was less than in the former year—2,337,037 acres this year against 2,431,801 1867. Under oats there was an increase—4,452,060 acres in 1868, and 4,409,899 acres in 1867. The total acreage of land under wheat, barley, and outs was 10,723,021 in 1868, against 10,471,284 in 1867. The number of acres devoted to the cultivation of potatoes in 1863 was 1,549,196, against 1,496,762 in 1867. In the entire kingdom there are 9,035,506 cattle, 35,508,424 sheep and 3,166,300 pigs. The number of cattle and sheep ave greatly increased since last year; the number of pigs has decreased 22 per cent. The population of the United Kingdom in 1867 was 30,157,473, and in 1863, 30,369,845 — the population of Ireland in 1868 is set down at 5,532,343, and of Great Britain 24,637,502.

NATIONAL BANK RESERVES.

We are indebted to the Comptroller of the Currency for the following tables, showing the state of the lawful money reserve of the National Banks on the first Monday of October, 1868. The corresponding statement for the first Monday of July will be found in the Magazinz for September, 1868 (vol. 59) page 205. Table of the state of the lawful money reserve (required by sections 81 and 82 of the national currency act) of the National Banking Association of the United States, as shown by the quarterly reports of their condition on the morning of the first Monday in October, 1868, before the commencement of business.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.

					07 70807 70			
	Liabilities to				Comp. Inter.	Amt, in redemp.		Percent, of
Manny	_	Amount			notes & 8 p.	cities avail, for	Amount	avail» ble
of ban		required	1 1 1		c. temp. loan	redemption of	of svail.	reserve 10
report		as reserve.	tenders.	Roecie.	cert ficaton.	cireulation.	referve	labilite.
Maine		\$1.972.535	81.000.180	\$28.539	880,330	\$1.792.128	\$2.986.184	7-10
New Hampshire	6,650,149	897.62	990.09	4.43	192,960	1,118,479	1.703,947	35 6-10
Vermont	2.4:4.888	1.262,151	691.488	15.057	142,330	9 27.925	1.776.890	21 1-10
Measachnaetts 161	55.073 216	8.460.981	4.213.071	188,489	781.960	7.638.479	12 771 973	22 20 10
Teh de Island	10.940.5%	2.584.070	1.419.626	20,083	989.910	8.9-9.978	4.018.490	00.00
Connecticut 81	80, 285, 988	- 54.30	9,189,190	716.16	531.830	8,688,103	6.498.549	21 4:10
New York 340	78,858,159	11,752 668	6.693 860	264.298	9.015.920	9.644.501	17.617.509	29 5-10
New Jersey	24.164.877	8,694, 759	1.89 575	68.840	491.090	8, 459, 199	6.915.148	24 5-10
Pennsylvania	46.019.920	6,603,968	4.609.730	90.00	1.814.310	4.501.592	10,485,927	8-10 8-10
Delaware	2.778.110	418,717	805.7:8	£ 73	106.680	339.123	656.980	86-30
Maryland	4. 852, 889	649.926	127	49.517	79.850	872 517	1.046.605	24 2-10
District of Columbia.	189.720	80.08	4.808	958	9	14.068	680.68	20 8-10
Virginia	K. 9K5. 479	808.808	676,908	83,106	98.920	418.521	1.145.450	19 3-10
Wast Fireinia	4.676.934	201.02	440.900	48.477	85.810	SER 911	200 800	19 9-10
North Caro ina	1.488.959	214.940	916.064	87.8 87.8	9	180	224 090	25 % S
South Carolina	1.859.131	908.830	279.848	88,488	3.460	117,916	427,156	81 6-10
Georgia	8.6.4.679	548,701	791.748	86.901	187.460	686.976	1.882,114	85 1-10
Alabama	5-8.7%	88 80	157.534	88		44.0	807	84 7-10
Mi-elestrol	40,500	6,073	17,450	. :	:	3	18,100	4 7 10
Texas	1,202,315	189,433	186,194	217,908	::	960,04	609, 121	8 8 8-10
Arkaneae	7.1,668	112,750	86,611	2,487	::	88,800	136,947	16 8-10
Kentucky 11	9,812,531	008.183	871.181	488	080.98 98	248,185	661,818	200
Tennassee	4,559,989	688.976	597.856	20.871	68,690	294,126	25.25	8 : 6 :10
Oblo	80.831.148	4.519.671	8,440,905	88,639	641.760	8,805,084	6,411,881	ST 1-10

8828288882828 64168888888 84168 84168 841	38 9-10	88288888888888888888888888888888888888
A (148,008 3, (108,731 1, 140,847 1, 140,847 1, 140,847 1, 140,847 1, 140,831 1, 14	\$96,958,443	### 1948 1948
1,996,878 905,510 905,520 805,510 801,400 811,700 71,928 7	\$47,060,541	9,004,776 1,005,113 1,005,113 1,006,213 1,016,700 88,706 81,036 11,036,113 1,036,113 1,136 191,034 191,034 191,034 191,034
188, 980 178, 880 178, 880 178, 880 17, 880 17, 880 17, 880 18, 880 18	~	\$6,245,010 944,490 900,570 1,2856,410 605,770 605,870
10,000 10,000 11,000 11,000 11,000 11,100 11,100 10,000 10	₩.	106.085 108.085 108.085 109.981 1377.073 1377.073 13.000 8.000 8.000 13.000 8.000 13.000 8
24-18,047 1,883,983 680,981 1,877,685 88,589,988 88,581 1,165 1,16	\$39,084,670	\$7,701,970 1,008,1164 1,008,1164 1,238,708 1,241,071 1,241,071 1,241,071 1,241,071 1,401,108 1,401,108 1,401,108 1,401,108 1,401,108 1,401,108 1,401,108 1,401,108
9,899,469 1,989,691 1,409,845 1,409,108 1,409,108 1,419 1,419 1,61	862,216,475	\$18.088.828 \$18.088.428 \$1.006.391 \$1.006.391 \$1.006.888 \$1.006.888 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388 \$1.006.388
19, 486, 611 10, 448, 810 7, 194, 900 4, 194, 900 8, 897, 718 8, 894, 800 808, 894 808, 894 11, 197, 800 138, 894 138, 894 138, 894 138, 894 138, 894 138, 894 138, 894 138, 894	\$414,776,498	977, 169, 413 13,073,716 13,585, 995 15,485, 995 16,485, 995 1,577, 816 1,577, 816 1,677, 816 1,681, 144 19,188, 468 11,688, 468 11,688, 468 11,642, 270 1,042, 270 200, 104, 901
Indiana To Indiana To Indiana To Indiana To Indiana To To To To To To To T	1,413	Boston Albany Philadelphis Baltinore
Indiana Illinois Michigan Wichigan Wiconain Towa Minnesota Missousi Kanras Kanras N. braska N. braska Oregon Oregon Utaho	Total	Boston Albary Albary Filiadelphis Filiadelphis Filiadelphis Filiadelphis Filiadelphis Baltimore Washington How Orlens Coloreland Chicago Det oft Miwankee Hi Louis Leavenworth Total Kew York

Liabilities of binks in cities to be protected by a reserve of twenty-five per cent of the amount
 Amount in New York city available for the redemption of circulation.

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Abstract statement, as appears from the books and Treasurer's returns in the Treasury Department, on the 1st of November, and 1st of December 1868:

	<i></i>	BEARING COIN	*** * ******* * *		
		November 1.	December 1.	Increase.	Decrease-
& per cont	. bonds	\$221,588,400 00	221.588,400 00	\$	8
6 " "	1881	288,677,800 00	288,677,800 00		
6 "	(5-90's)	1,602,812,250 00	1,602,570,400 00	258,150 00	******
	•				
Total		2,107,577,950 00	2,107,536,100 00	2 58,150 00	
	DERT BI	ARING CURREN	T THTEREST.		
			\$44,887,000 00	ee 149 000 00	•
6 per ct. (RR) bonds	\$42,194,000 00 58,825,000 00	58,140,000 00		185,000 09
No. cent.	certificates	14,000,000 60	14,0(0,000 00	••••	100,000 0)
Mavy Lett	. F d 8 p.c	A 210001000 00	22,010,000 00		
Total		114,519,000 00	116,477,000 00	1.958.G00 00	\$
1000					4
	MATURED DEI	T NOT PRESENT	ED FOR PAYME	KT.	
7-30 n.due	Aug. 15, '67, J'e & J'y 15, '69	\$2,956,950 00	\$9,478,450 00	8	\$478,500 00
2	an int notes material line		• • •	•	• •
10. July	15, Aug. 15 Oct. 15, Dec. 1 ,				
18 0 7. M	15, Aug. 15 Oct. 15, Dec. 1, ay15, Aug. 1, Sep. 1 & 15, 1 & 16, 1868.				
and Oct	1 & 16, 1868	5,128,310 00			903,890 00
Rids of T	e xas ind'ty	200,0.0.0	256,000 00		0.000.00
Treasury	notes (old) pr. 15, 1842, Jan. 28, 1847 &	151,611 64	149,361 64	••••••	2,250 00
P.de of V	pr. 10, 1042, Jan. 20, 1041 @	487,500 00	485,500 00		59,000 00
Mar. 31	. 1843	446,492 00	445 449 00	••••	02,000 00
	y loan ·····	814,860 GO	44*,492 00 248,160 00	*** *****	71,700 00
Comporar	indebt'ess	18,000 00	18,000 00	*********	
Cerum. Or	Indobe cap	20,000 00	20,000 00		
Total.		9,753,728 6	8,945,988 64	\$	1,507,840 00
				•••••••	,-,,
	DEB	P BEARING NO I			
United St	ates notes	\$856,021,073 00	\$856,031,078 00	8	\$
Fractiona	l currency	88,418,985 45	88,875,968 17	461,989 75 8,589,000 00	******
Gold certi	.ofdeposit	19,716,840 00	28,255, 840 00	00 000,985,8 (•••••
		400 181 000 40	410 120 101 15	4 000 000 74	_
Total	••••	409,151,898 43	418,152,181 17	4,000,202 75	\$
		RECAPITULAT	OM.		
		•		•	8
Doesdon of	in interest	9 107 577 980 00	2,107,836,100 00	258,150 00	•
		114 8 0 000 0	116,477,000 00	1,958,000 00	
Matured d	r'yinterest	. 114,5:9,000 00 9,758,728 6-	8,245 888 64		1.507.840 00
Matured d	le bl	. 9,758,728 6	l 8,945 888 64		1,507,840 00
Matured d	o interest	. 9,758,728 6	8,945 888 64 41J,152,181 17	4,000,282 75	1,507,840 00
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate	o interest	9,758,728 6 409,151,898 4 2,641,002,572 0	8,245 888 64 413,152,181 17 2,645,711,164 81	4,000,282 75	
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate	o interest	9,758,728 6 409,151,898 4 2,641,002,572 0	8,245 888 64 413,152,181 17 2,645,711,164 81	4,000,282 75	
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate Coin & cu	o interest	9,758,728 6 409,151,898 4 2,641,002,572 0 113,878,019 24	8,245 888 64 41J,152,181 17 2,645,711,164 81 1 106,679,820 67	4,7(8,593 75	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate Coin & cu	o interest	9,758,728 6 409,151,898 4 2,641,002,572 0 113,878,019 24	8,245 888 64 41J,152,181 17 2,645,711,164 81 1 106,679,820 67	4,7(8,593 75	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate Coin & cui	r, in Treas	9,758,728 6- 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 06- 113,878,019 24- 2,527,129.558 8:	8,245,888,64 413,152,181,17 2,645,711,164,81 1,106,679,820,67 3,589,081,844,14	4,000,282 75	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate Coin & cui Debt less The fo	r. in Treas	9,753,723 6 409,151,898 4 2,641,002,572 0 113,878,019 2 2,527,129,552 8 7s the amount	8,245,888,64 413,152,181,17 2,645,711,164,81 1,106,679,820,67 3,589,081,844,14	4,000,282 75	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate Coin & cui Debt less The fo	r, in Treas	9,753,723 6 409,151,898 4 2,641,002,572 0 113,878,019 2 2,527,129,552 8 7s the amount	8,245,888,64 413,152,181,17 2,645,711,164,81 1,106,679,820,67 3,589,081,844,14	4,000,282 75	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate Coin & cui Debt less The fo	r. in Treas	9,753,723 6 409,151,898 4 2,641,002,572 0 1:3,878,019 2 2,527,129,552 8 78 the amount	8,245,888 64 413,152,181 17 3,645,711,164 81 106,679,320 67 3 2,589,031,844 10 of coin and	4,000,282 75	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing no Aggregate Coin & cur Debt less The fo the dates	r. in Treas	. 9,758,723 6 . 409,151,896 4; . 2,641,003.572 0 . 113,878,019 24 . 2,527,129.573 8 ys the amount :	8.245.888 64 413,152,181 17 2,645,711,164 81 106,679,820 67 3 2,539,031,644 10 of coin and	4,000,283 75 4,748,593 75 11,903,391 83 currency se	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing n Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates	r. in Treas	. 9,758,723 6 . 409,151,896 4; . 2,641,003.572 0 . 113,878,019 24 . 2,527,129.573 8 ys the amount :	8.245.888 64 413,152,181 17 2,645,711,164 81 106,679,820 67 3 2,539,031,644 10 of coin and	4,000,283 75 4,748,593 75 11,903,391 83 currency se	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing n Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates	r. in Treas	. 9,758,723 6 . 409,151,896 4; . 2,641,003.572 0 . 113,878,019 24 . 2,527,129.573 8 ys the amount :	8.245.888 64 413,152,181 17 2,645,711,164 81 106,679,820 67 3 2,539,031,644 10 of coin and	4,000,283 75 4,748,593 75 11,903,391 83 currency se	7,198,698 57
Matured d Bearing n Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates Coin Currency.	r. in Treas. coin and cur. colin wing statement show in the foregoing table coin Al	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 0: 113,673,019 2: 2,527,129,552 8 ys the amount : 1D OURRENCY IS \$103,467,983 77 10,463,083 47	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 106,679,820 67 106,679,820 67 106,679,820 67 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 10	4,000,282 75 4,148,592 75 111,902,291 83 currency sej 7,788,912 66	7,198,669 57 parately at
Matured di Bearing in Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates Coin Currency.	r. in Treas. coin and cur. coin and cur. dilowing statement shows in the foregoing table coin Al	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 0: 113,673,019 2: 2,527,129,552 8 ys the amount: 10 OURRENCY IS \$103,467,983 77 10,463,083 47	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 18,263,946 18 17 18,263,946 18 18,263,946 18 18,263,946 18 106,679,820 67	4,000,283 75 4,74,8,593 75 11,902,391 33 currency sej 5,7,788,912 66	7,198,698 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,198,698 57
Matured di Bearing in Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates Coin Currency.	r. in Treas. coin and cur. coin and cur. dilowing statement shows in the foregoing table coin Al	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 0: 113,673,019 2: 2,527,129,552 8 ys the amount: 10 OURRENCY IS \$103,467,983 77 10,463,083 47	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 18,263,946 18 17 18,263,946 18 18,263,946 18 18,263,946 18 106,679,820 67	4,000,283 75 4,74,8,593 75 11,902,391 33 currency sej 5,7,788,912 66	7,198,698 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,198,698 57
Matured di Bearing in Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates Coin Currency Total coin The s	r. in Treas. coin and cur.	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 00 113,673,019 34 2,527,129,552 8 78 the amount 1 10 OURRENCY IN \$103,467,985 77 10,463,083 47 113,578,019 24 on the debt,	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 18,263,946 18 17 18,263,946 18 106,679,820 67 as existing O	4,000,282 75 4,74,8,592 75 11,902,291 32 currency sep 7,788,912 65 ctober 1, ac	7,198,668 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,198,698 57 d Novem-
Matured di Bearing in Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates Coin Currency Total coin The s	r. in Treas. coin and cur. coin and cur. dilowing statement shows in the foregoing table coin Al	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 00 113,673,019 34 2,527,129,552 8 78 the amount 1 10 OURRENCY IN \$103,467,985 77 10,463,083 47 113,578,019 24 on the debt,	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 18,263,946 18 17 18,263,946 18 106,679,820 67 as existing O	4,000,282 75 4,74,8,592 75 11,902,291 32 currency sep 7,788,912 65 ctober 1, ac	7,198,668 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,198,698 57 d Novem-
Matured di Bearing in Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates Coin Currency. Total coin The a ber 1, 1	coin and cur. coin and curre'y coin and curre'	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 00 113,673,019 34 2,527,129,552 8 78 the amount 1 10 OURRENCY IN \$103,467,985 77 10,463,083 47 113,578,019 24 on the debt,	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 18,263,946 18 17 18,263,946 18 106,679,820 67 as existing O	4,000,282 75 4,74,8,592 75 11,902,291 32 currency sep 7,788,912 65 ctober 1, ac	7,198,668 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,198,698 57 d Novem-
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Matured di Bearing of Aggregate Coin & cu: Debt less. The fo the dates Coin Currency. Total coin The a ber 1, 1 as follow	coin and cur. coin a	9,758,722 6 409,151,996 4: 2,641,002,572 04 113,673,019 24 2,527,129,553 8 78 the amount : 10 CURRENCY IS \$108,467,985 77 10,465,083 47 113,573,019 24 On the debt, rest on the 6	3,245,883 64 413,152,181 17 52,645,711.164 81 106,679,820 67 82,639,031,844 14 0f coin and TREASURY. \$98,423,374 54 18,253,946 12 106,579,320 67 as existing Ocompound into	4,000,282 75 4,748,592 75 11,903,391 33 currency sel 17,788,912 65 ctober 1, are erest notes) sr. Increase.	7,193,693 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,193,693 57 d Novem-, compares Decrease.
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Matured di Bearing in Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less The fo the dates Coin Currency Total coir The a ber 1, 1 as follow	coin and cur. coin a	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 00 113,673,019 24 2,527,129,552 8 48 the amount 113,673,019 24 20 the debt, 2,647,129,638 00 2,7,129,638 00 2,131,735 00 1124,228,735 00 2,131,640 00 2,131,640 00	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 16 21,107,111,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 18 2,639,031,644 17 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,10,274,240 00 17,030,648 00 90,154,274 00 82,560,270 00 \$2,560,270 00	4,000,282 75 4,748,692 75 4 11,903,291 33 currency sel 5 7,788,912 66 ctober 1, and erest notes) st. Increase. 18,489 00 118,680 00	7,192,698 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,193,698 57 d Novem-, compares Decrease.
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Matured di Bearing in Aggregate Coin & cu Debt less. The fo the dates Currency. Total coir The s ber 1, 1 as follow Coin—5 p	coin and cur. coin a	9,758,722 6 409,151,896 4: 2,641,002,572 0: 113,673,019 24 2,527,129,552 8 78 the amount: 10 OURRENCY IS \$103,407,985 77 10,405,083 47 113,578,019 24 on the debt, rest on the centre of	\$ 2,645,711,164 81 17 16 21,107,111,164 81 17 106,679,820 67 18 2,639,031,644 17 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,253,946 18 18,10,274,240 00 17,030,648 00 90,154,274 00 82,560,270 00 \$2,560,270 00	4,000,282 75 4,748,692 75 4 11,903,291 33 currency sel 5 7,788,912 66 ctober 1, and erest notes) st. Increase. 18,489 00 118,680 00	7,193,693 57 parately at 14,982,611 23 7,193,693 57 d Novem-, compares Decrease.

DEPARTMENT REPORTS.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ERPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, December 1, 1868.

In compliance with the requirements of law, the Secretary of the Treasury has the honor to make to Congress the following report:

In his former communications the Secretary has expressed so fully his views upon the great subjects of the currency, the revenues and the public debt, that it may be thought quite ennecessary for him again to press them upon the attention of Congress. These subjects, however, have lost none of their importance; on the contrary, the public mind during the past year has been turned to their consideration with more absorbing interest than at any former period. The Secretary will, therefore, he trusts, be pardoned for restating some of the views heretofore presented by him.

If there is any question in finance or political economy which can be pronounced settled by argument and trial, it is that inconvertible and depreciated paper money is inturious to public and private interests, a positive political and financial evil, for which there can be but one justification or excuse, to wit: a temporary necessity arising from unexpected and pressing emergency; and it follows, consequently, that such a circulation should only be tolerated until, without a financial shock, it can be withdrawn or made convertible into specie. If an irredeemable bank note circulation is no evidence of bankrupt or badly managed banking institutions, which should be deprived of their franchiese, or compelled to husband and make available their resources in order that they may be prepared at the earliest day practicable to take up their dishonored colligations, why should not an irredeemable Government currency be regarded as an evidence of bad management of the national finances, fin not national bankruptcy? And why should not such wise and equal revenue laws be enseted, and such economy in the use of the public moneys be enforced, as will enable the Government either judictiously to fund, or promptly to recidem its broken promises? Th

the public conscience, nor that they are chargeable, in no small degree, with the demoralization which so generally prevails.

The economical objections to these notes as lawful money—stated at length in previous
reports of the Scoretary—may be thus briefly restated. They increase immensely the cost of
the war, and they have added largely to the expenses of the Government since the restoration of peace; they have caused instability in prices, unsteadiness in trade, and put a check
upon judicious enterprises; they have driven specie from circulation and made it merchardise; they have sent to foreign countries they product of our mines, at the same time that
our European debt has been steadily increasing, and has now reached such magnitude as to
be a heavy drain upon the national resources, and a serious obstacle in the way of a return
to specie payments; they have shaken the public credit by raising dangerous questions in
regard to the payment of the public debt; in connection with high taxes (to the necessity
for which they have largely contributed) they are preventing ship building, and thereby the
restoration of the commerce which was destroyed by the war; they are an excuse for (if
indeed they do not necessitate) protective tariffs, and yet fail, by their finctuating value, to
protect the American manufacturer against his foreign competitor; they are filling the
coffers of the riob, but, by reason of the high prices which they create and sustain, they are
almost intelerable to persons of limited incomes. The language of one of the greatest men
of modern times, so often, but not too often, quoted, is none too strong in its descriptions
of the injustice and the evils of an inconvertible currency:

"Of all the contrivances for cheating the laboring classes of mankind, none has been more effectual than that which deludes them with paper money. Ordinary tyranny, oppression, excessive taxation—these bear lightly on the happiness of the mass of the community compared with a fraudulent currency and the robberles committed by depreciated paper. Our own history has recorded for our instruction enough, and more than enough, of the demoralising tendency, the injustice, and the intolerable oppression, on the virtuous and well disposed, of a degraded paper currency authorised or in any way countenanced by Government."

ment."

The experience of all nations that have tried the experiment of inconvertible paper money has proved the truth of the eloquent words of Mr. Webster. If our country is in a measure prosperous with such an incubus upon it, it is because it is so magnificent in extent, so diversified in climate, so rich in soil, so abundant in minerals, with a people so full of energy, that even a debased currency can only retard, but not put a stop to its progress.

The Secretary still adheres to the opinion so frequently expressed by him, that a reduction of the paper circulation of the country until it appreciated to the specie standard was the true solution of our financial problem. But as this policy was emphatically condemned by Congress, and it is now too late to return to it, he recommends the following measures as the next best calculated to effect the desired result.

Agreements for the nayment of coin seem to be the only ones, not contrary to good worsle.

of the paper circulation of the country until it appreciated to the specie standard was the true colution of our financial problem. But as this policy was emphatically condemned by Congress, and it is now too late to return to it, he recommends the following measures as the next best calculated to effect the desired result.

Agreements for the payment of coin seem to be the only ones, not contrary to good morals, the performance of which cannot be enforced in the courts. "Coin contracts" executed before the passage of the legal-tender acts, as well as those executed since, are satisfied in all the performance of the legal-tender acts, as well as those executed since, are satisfied in all the performance of the legal-tender acts, as well as those executed since, are satisfied in all the performance of the performance of

may be authorised by Cengress on the debt into which the present outstanding bonds may be funded. The period for which they would continue to be a legal tender would be sufficient to enable the people and the banks to prepare for the contemplated change and the privilege of their conversion would save them from depreciation. What has been said by the Secretary in his previous reports on the peraicious effects upon business and the public morals of inconvertible legal tender notes, and what is said in this recommendation. It may not be improper, however, to suggest another reason for divesting these notes of their legal tender character by legislative action. Although the decisions of the courts have been generally favorable to the constitutionality of the acts by which they were authorized, grave doubts are entertained by many of the ablest lawyers of the country as to the correctness of these decisions; and it is to be berne in mind that they have not yet been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The illustrious lawyer and statesman, whose language upon the subject of irredeemable paper money has been quoted, in the Senate of the United States, on the twenty-first day of December, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, expressed the following opinion:

"Most unquestionably there is no legal tender in this country, under the authority of this Government or any other, but gold and silver, either the coinage of our own mints or foreign coins, at rates regulated by Congress. This is a constitutional principle, perfectly plain, and of the very highest importance. The States are expressly prohibited from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts, and although no such express prohibition is applied to Congress, yet, as Congress has no power granted to it in this respect but to coin money and to regulated the value of foreign coins, it clearly has no power to substitute paper or anything else for coin as a tender in payment of debts and in discharge of contracts. Congress has se

For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1866. \$179,046,651 58
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1867. 176,417,810 88
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868. 104,464,509 56

chiefly in foreign bottoms. The carrying trade between the United States and Europe is almost literally in the handsof Europeans. Were it not for the remnant of ships still employed in the China trade, and the stand we are making by the establishment of a line of steamers on the Pacific, the coastwise trade, which is retained by the exclusion of foreign competition, would seem to be about all that can, under existing legislation, be relied upon for the employment of American shipping.

competition, would seem to be about all that can, under existing legislation, be relied upon for the employment of American shipping.

There are many intelligent persons who entertain the opinion that the country has been benefitted by the transfer of our bonds to Europe, on the ground that capital has been received in exchange for them, which has been profitably employed in the development of our national resources; and that it matters little whether the interest upon the debt is received by our own people or by the people of other countries. This opinion is the result of misapprehension of facts, and is unsound in principle. It is not to a large extent true that capital, which isbeing used in developing the national resources, has been received in exchange for the bonds which are held in Europe. While many articles, such as reilroad from, machinery, and raw materials, used in manufacturing—the value of which to the country is acknowledged—have been so received, a large proportion of the receipts have been of a differ nt description. Our bonds have been largely paid for in articles for which no nation can afford to run in debt—for articles which have neither stimulated industry nor increased the productive power of the country, which have in fact added nothing to the national wealth. A reference to the custom-house entries will substantiate the correctness of these statements. Two-thirds of the importations of the United States consist of articles which, in economical times, would be pronounced luxuries. The war and a redundant currency have brought about unexampled extravaganse, which can only be satisfied by the most costly products of foreign countries. No exception could be taken to such importations, if they were paid for in our own productions. This unfortunately, is not the fact. They are annually swelling our foreign debt, without increasing our ability to pay it. How disastrous such a course of trade, if long continued, must be, it requires no spirit of prophecy to predict. to predict.

to predict.

Nor is it an unimportant matter that the interest upon a large portion of our securities is received by citizens of other countries instead of our own. If the interest upon a public debt is paid out where the taxes to provide for it are collected, the debt, although a burden upon the mas; of tax-payers who are not holders of securities, may be so managed as not to be a severe burden upon the nation. The money which goes into the Treasury by means of taxes will flow out again into the same community in the payment of interest; and were it not for the expenses attending it, the process would not, in a purely economical view, be an exhausting one. If the bonds of the United States were equally distributed among the people of the different States, there would be less complaint of the debt than is now heard. Anti-tax parties will attain strength only in those States in which few bonds are held. If the people of the West are more sensible of the burdens of Federal taxation than are those of the Eastern States, it is because they are not holders to the same extent of national securities. This inequality cannot, of course, be prevented by legal or artificial processes. The securities will be most largely held where capital is the most abundant; and they will be more equally distributed among the respective States—if not among the people—as the new States approach the older ones in wealth.

proach the older ones in wealth.

will be most targety neith where capital is the most abundant; and they will be more equally distributed among the respective States—if not among the people—as the new States a; proach the older ones in wealth.

These manifest truths indicate how important it is that the debt of the United States shoul! be a home debt, so that the money which is collected for taxes may be paid to our own pxple in the way of interest. In fact, a large national debt, to be tolerable, must of necers ty be a home debt. A nation that owes heavily must have its own reople for creditors. If it does not, the debt will be a dead weight upon its industry, and will be quite likely to re it eventually into bankruptcy. The United States are not only able to pay the interest on their debt, but to set a good example to other nations by steadily and rapidly reducing that debt. What is now required, as has been already intimated, are measures which will tend not only to prevent further exportation of our bonds, and in the regular course of trade to bring back to the country those that have been exported, but which will also tend to restore those important interests that are now langualsing, as the result of the war and adverse legislation. The first and most important of these measures are those which shall bring about, without unnecessary delay, the restoration of the specie standard. The final difficulties under which the country i laboring may be traced directly to the issue and continuance in circulation of irredeemable promises as lawful money. The country will not be really and reliably prosperous until there is a return to specie payments. The question of a solvent, convertible currency underlies all other financial and economical queetions. It is, in fact, a fundamental question; and until it is settled, and settled in accordance with the toachings of experience, all attempts a tother financial and economical reforms will either fail absolutely or be but partially successful. A sound currency is the life-blood of a consurer call nition.

lar will, if not the popular prejudice, must be listened to in the preparation of revenue laws. Justice must in some instances, yield to expediency; and some legitmate sources of revenue may be unavailable because a resort to them might be collous to a majority of tax-payers. The people of the United States are enterprising and self-reliant. Most of them are the 'architects of their own fortunes;" few the inheritors of wealth. Engaged in various enterprises, with constantly varying results, and in sharp competition with each other, they submit reluctantly to inquisitions of tax-gatherers, which might not be obnoxious to people less independent, and living under less liberal institutions. Then, too, the United States are a new country, of large extent and diversified interests; with great natural resources, in the early process of development. Not only may systems of revenue which are suited to England, or Germany, or France, be unsuited to this country, but carrell and judicious observation and study are indispensable to the preparation of tax bills suited to the peculiar Interests of its different sections. It was with a view of supplying Congress with such information as was needed to secure the passage of equal and wise excise and tariff laws, which would yield the largest revenue with the least oppression and inconvenience to the people, that a revenue commission was created in 1865. The creation of this commission was the first practical movement towards a careful examination of the business and resources of the country, with a view to the adoption of a judicious revenue system. The reports of this commission were interesting and valuable, and they exhibited so clearly the necessity for further and more complete investigations, that by the act of July 13, 1866, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to appoint an officer in his department, to be styled the special commissioner of revenue, whose duty it should be "to inquire into all the sources of national revenue, and the best method of collecting t

The following is a statement of receipts from internal revenues for the last three fiscal vears:

For the year ending June 30, 1866	.\$309,226,813 42
For the year ending June 30, 1867	
For the year ending June 30 1868	. 191,087,589,41

It thus appears that the internal revenue receipts for the year ending June 30, 1867, fell below the receipts for the year ending June 30, 1866, \$13,199,275 99, and that the receipts for the year ending June 30, 1868, fell abort of the receipts for 1867, \$74,939,948 02. The receipts for the first four months of the present fiscal year were \$48,736,348 33. If the receipts for these menths are an index of those for the remaining eight, the receipts for the present fiscal year will be \$146,209,044.

This large reduction of internal revenue receipts is attributable both to inefficient col lections and to a reduction of taxes. It is quite obvious that the receipts from customs cannot be maintained without an increase of exports or of our foreign debt. If the receipts from customs should be diminished, even with a large reduction of the expenses of the Government, our internal revenues must necessarily be increased. The first thing to be done is to introduce economy into all branches of the public service, not by reduced appropriations to be made good by "deficiency bills," but by putting a stop to all unnecessary demands upon the Treesury. There is no department of the Government which is conducted with proper economy. The habits formed during the war are still strong, and will only yield to the requirement of inexorable law. The average expenses of the next ten years for the civil service ought not to exceed forty millions of dellars per annum. Those of the War Department, after the bounties are paid, should be brought down to thirty-five millions of dollars, and those of the Navy to twonty millions. The outlays for pensions and Indians cannot for some years be considerably reduced, but they can doubtless be brought within thirty millions. The interest on the public debt when the whole debt shall be funded, at an average rate of interest of five per cent., will amount to one hundred and twenty-five millions, which will be reduced with the annual reduction of the principal. This large reduction of internal revenue receipts is attributable both to inefficient col

When the internal revenue and tariff laws shall be revised so as to be made to harmonize when the internal revenue and tarm laws and be revised so as to be made to narmonize with each other, it is supposed that three hundred millions can annually be realized from these sources, without burdensome taxation. How much shall be raised from each can be determined when the whole subject of revenue shall be thoroughly investigated by Congress, with the light shed upon it by Commissioner Wells in his exubastive report of the present year. The Secretary does not doubt, however, that the best interests of the country will be subserved by a reduction of the tariff and an increase of excise duties.

According to this estimate, the account would stand as follows:

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Receipts from customs and internal revenues	300,000,000
Expenditures for the civil service	35,000,000 20,000,000 30,000,000

Leaving, as an excess of receipts, \$50,000,000 to be applied to the payment of the principal of the debt. If the growth of the country should make an increase of expenditures necessary, this increase will, by the same cause, he provided for by increased receipts under the same rate of taxation; and, as it is to be hoped that the regular increase of the revenues without an increase of expenses, there will be a constantly increasing amount, in addition to that arising from a decrease of interest, to be annually applied to the payment of the debt. If large additional expenditures should be unavoidable, they should at once be provided for by additional taxes. What is required, then, at the present time, is a positive limitation of the annual outlays to three hundred millions of dollars, including fifty millions to be applied to the payment of the principal of the debt, and such modifications of the revenue laws will secure this amount, without unwise restrictions upon commerce, and with the least possible oppression and inconvenience to the tax-payers. In the foregoing estimates of resources, miscellaneous receipts and receipts from sales of gold and of property purchased by the War and Navy Departments during the war, and no longer needed. On a return to specie payments, there will be no premiums on cein, very little Government property will hereafter be sold, and under the homestead law, and with liberal donations of the public domain, which are likely to be made as heretofore, no considerable amount can be expected from lands. Whatever may be received from these mades. made.

made. The Act of March 31, 1868, exempting from taxes nearly all the manufactures of the country other than distilled spirits, fermented liquors, and tobacco, was sudden and unexpected. It not only deprived the Treasury of an immense revenue, but the reduction was so great as to leave an impression on the public mind that it would be only temporary, and that a tax in some degree equivalent to that which was removed would of necessity soon be resorted to. It is, perhaps, for this reason that this measure has failed to give relief to the public by a diminuition of prices, and has benefited manufacturers rather than consumers. The frequent and important changes which have been made in the internal revenue laws, the case with which exemptions from taxation have been obtained, and the suddenness with which taxes have been greatly augmented or reduced, have constituted one of the greatest evils of the system. Sudden changes in the revenue laws are not only destructive of all business calculations, but they excite—not unreasonably—a feeling of discontent and a sense of injustice among the people, most unfavorable to an efficient collection of taxes. While it is admitted that, in a new and growing country like ours, modifications of the taxes will be irrequently necessary, some definite policy should at once be inangurated in regard to our internal revenues, the general principles of which should be regarded as finally established.

Assuming that the receipts from customs will be reduced by a reduction of duties, or by

Assuming that the receipts from customs will be reduced by a reduction of duties, or by the effects of a return to specie payments upon importations under the present tariff, and that, consequently, there must be an increase of internal taxes, there are three sources of revenue which are likely to be considered.

First. An increase of taxes upon distilled spirits.

The idea of deriving the bulk of the revenue from this article is a very popular one; and even our unfortunare experience has only partially convinced the public of its impossibility. The late exorbitant tax on distilled spirits, intended, perhaps, not merely as a revenue measure, but as an encouragement to temperance, proved to be the most demoralizing tax ever imposed by Congress, corrupting both the manufacturers and the revenue officers, and familiaring the people with stopendous violations of the law. The restoration of it, or any considerable increase of the present tax, would lead to a repetition of the frauds which have brought the internal revenue system into such utter diagrace.

Second A restoration of the tax or manufacturers shollshed in March leat.

Second. A restoration of the tax on manufacturers sholished in Merch last.

The objections to the restoration of this tax are, that it would indicate vacillation on the part of Congress, and that this tax, principally on account of numerous exemptions, was partial and unjust. It is also apparent that, if restored, it would fail to be permanent by reason of the persistent and united hostility of a class of citizens influential and powerful, and whose influence and power are rapidly increasing.

Third. An increased and uniform tax on sales; and this the Secretary respectfully

recommends. Under the present law, wholesale and retail dealers in goods, wares, and merchandise of foreign or domestic production, wholesale and retail dealers in liquors, and dealers in tobacco, are subject to a similar but nuequal tax upon sales. This inequality should be removed, and a tax levied upon all sale sufficient, with the revenues from other sources, to meet the wants of the Government. The reasons in favor of a tax upon sales are, that it foodld be levied generally throughout the country, and would not be liable to the imputation of class legislation; that it would be so equally distributed as not to bear so oppressively as other taxes upon individuals or sections; and that no depression of one branch of industry, which did not injuriously affect the business of the entire country, could greatly lessen its productiveness.

As has been already stated, the receipts from custems for the fiscal year, ending June 30, 1865, were, \$170,046,651 58; for the year ending June 30, 1867, \$176,417,910 88; and for the last fiscal year, \$164,464,599 56. These figures show that the tariff has produced large revenues, although it is in no just sense a revenue tariff. In this respect it has exceeded the expectations of its friends, if, indeed, it has not disappointed them. It has not checked importations and complaint is made that it has not given the anticipated protection to home manufactures—not because it was not skillfully framed to this end, but because an inflated currency—the effect of which upon importations was not fully comprahended—has, in a measure, defeated its object. It has advanced the prices of dutiable articles, and, by adding to the cost of living, has been oppressive to consumers without being of decided benefit to these industries in whose interest it is regarded as having been prepared. In his last report, the Secretary recommended the extension of specific duties, but did not recommend a complete revision of the tariff, on the ground that this work could not be intelligently done as long as business was subject to constant derangement by an irredeemable currency. The same difficulty still exists, but as decided action upon the subject to the currency ought not to be longer post-poned, the present may not been unfavorable time for a thorough not to be longer post-poned, the present may not been unfavorable time for a thorough not to be longer post-poned, the present may not been unfavorable time for a thorough not of incongruities and obscurity, and to harmonize it with excise taxes and with our agricultural and commercial interests, but also to adapt it to the very decided change which must take place in the business of the country upon the restoration of the specie standard. Large revenues are now derived from customs, because a redundant ourrency produces extravagance, which stimulates importations. If the currency were co

There will be in the future, as there have been in the past, widely different opinions upon this long vexed and very important subject; but the indications are decided that the more enlightened sentiment of the country demands that the tariff shall hereafter be a tariff for revenue and not for protection, and that the levenues to be derived from it shall be no larger than, in connection with those received from other sources, will be required for the comount-cal administration of the Government, the maintenance of the public faith, and the gradual extinguishment of the public dott. While the country is not at present, and may not be for many years to come, prepared for the abrogation of all restrictions upon foreign commerce, it is unquestionably prepared for a revenue tariff. The public debt is an incumbrance upon the property of the nation, and the taxes, the necessity for which it creates, by whatever mode and from whatever sources collected, are at the supers pormit them to be permanently increased, for the benefit of any interest or section. Fortunately, or unfortunately, as the question may be regarded from different standpoints, the necessities of the Government will be such for many years that large revenues must be derived from outstoms, so that a strictly revenue tariff must incidently benefit our home manufactures. According to the estimate made by the Secretary, an annual revenue of three hundred millions will be required to meet the necessary demands upon the Treasury, and for a satisfactory roduction of the public debt. How much of this amount shall be derived from customs it will be for Convress to determine. In examining this difficult question, the magnitude of our foreign debt. and the necessity not only of preventing its increase, but of rapidly reducing it, must be kept staken up with bonds bearing a lower rate of interest, payable in some European city, in order that they may be less likely to be returned to the United States at unpropitious times. Whether this is accomplished or not, it is

I he public debt on the 1st day of November, 1867, amounted to \$2,491,504,450, and consisted of the following items: Debt bearing ourrency interest.

Matured debt not presented for payment.

Debt bearing no interest. 426,768.640 09 18,237,538 83 402,385,677 39 Cash in the Treasury..... 133,998,398 62 On the first day of November, 1868, it amounted to \$9,597,129,552.82, and consisted of the following items: 439,151,896 49 Debt bearing no interest..... By a comparison of these statements it appears that the debt, between the first day of November, 1867, and the first day of November, 1868, increased \$25,625,102 63. Of this increase, \$24,152,000 is chargeable to the Pacific railroads, and \$7,200,000 to the purchase of Russian America. Within the same period there was paid for bounties \$44,000,515, and at least \$4,000,000 for interest on compound and seven three-tenth notes, which had accrued prior to the first of November, 1867. If these extraordinary advances and payments had not been made, the receipts would have exceeded the expenditures \$43,767,412 18. Considering the heavy reduction of internal taxes made at the last session of Congress, and the large expenditures which have attended the military operations against the Indians on the frontier, and the maintenance of large forces at expensive points in the Southern States, this statement of the amount of the debt cannot be regarded an unastisfactory one. The bounties will, it is expected, be entirely paid within the next three months, and very little interest, except that which accrues upon the funded debt, is hereafter to be provided for. Should there be henceforth no extraordinary expenditures, and no further donations of public moneys in the form of bounties or of additional subsidies to railroad companies—with proper economy in the administration of the General Government, and with indictions amendments of the revenue laws, and proper enforcement thereof, the public debt, without oppressive taxation, can be rapidly diminished, and easily extinguished within the period heretofore named by the Secretary.

rapidly diminished, and easily extinguished within the period heretofore named by the Secretary.

The ability of the United States to maintain their integrity against insurrection, as well as against a foreign enemy, can no longer be doubted. The question of their ability, under democratic institutions, to sustain a large national debt is still to be decided. That this question abould be affirmatively settled, it is, in the opinion of the Secretary, of the highest importance that the tax-paying voters should be encouraged by the fact that the debt is in the progress of rapid extinguishment, and is not to be a perpetual incumbrance upon them and their posterity. If it be understood that this debt is to be a perpetual incumbrance upon the property and industry of the nation, it is certainly to be feared that the cellection of taxes necessary to pay the interest upon it may require the exercise of power by the Central Government, inconsistent with republicanism, and dangerous to the liberties of the people. The debt must be paid. Direct repudiation is an impossibility; indirect repudiation, by further issues of legal-tenderlootes, would be madness. To insure its payment without a changelin the essential character of the Government every year should witness a reduction of its amount and a diminution of its burdens. The Secretary is confident that he expressed the sentiments of the intelligent tax-payers of the country when he said in his report of 1865:

"The debt is large, but if kept at home, as it is desirable it should be, with a judicious system of taxation, it need not be oppressive. It is, however, a debt. While it is capital to the helders of the securities, it is still a national debt, and an encumbrance upon the national estate. Neither its advantages nor its burdens are or can be shared or borne equally by the people. Its influences are anti-republican. It adds to the people, because it involves the collection and disbursement of vast sums of money, and renders rigid national economy almost impracticable

creation.

"The Secretary respectfully suggests that on this subject the expression of Congress should be decided and emphatic. It is of the greatest importance in the management of a matter of so surpassing interest that the right start should be made. Nothing but revenue will sustain the national credit, and nothing less than a fixed policy for the reduction of the public

sustant the national oredit, and nothing less than a fixed policy for the reduction of the public debt will be likely to prevent its increase."

And in his report of 1897, when he remarked:

"Old debts are hard debts to pay; the longer they are continued, the more edious they become. If the present generation should throw the burden of this debt on the next, it will be quite likely to be handed down from one generation to another, a perpetual, if not a constantly increasing burden upon the people. Our country is full of enterprise and resources. The debt will be lightened every year with great rapidity by the increase of wealth and population. With a proper reduction in the expenses of the Government, with a revenue system adapted to the industry of the country, and not oppressing it, the debt may be paid before the expiration of the present century. The wisdom of a policy which shall bring about such a result is vindicated in advance by the history of nations whose people are burdened with inherited debts, and with no prospect of relief for themselves or their posterity."

In his last report, the Secretary referred to the condition of the Treasury at the close of the war, and at some subsequent periods, alluding especially to the emergency in the spring of

In his last report, the Secretary referred to the condition of the Treasury at the close of the war, and at some subsequent periods, alluding especially to the emergency in the spring of 1865, arising from the very large requisitions which were waiting for payment, and the still larger requisitions that were to be provided for to enable the War Department to pay arreax-ages due to the army, and other expenses which had already been incurred in the suppression of the rebellion. In briefly reviewing the administration of the Treasury, from April, 1865, he did not think it necessary to state how much of the large revenue receipts had been expended in the payment of debts incurred during the war; and he would not undertake to do it now, did not misapprehension exist in the public mind in regard to the expenditures of the Government since the conclusion of hostilities, prejudicial to both the law-making and the law-executing branches of the Government.

the law-executing branches of the Government.

The war was virtually closed in April, 1805. On the first day of that month the public debt amounted, according to the books and accounts of the department, to \$2,386,955,077.34. On the first day of September following it amounted to \$2,757,689,571.43, having increased in four

months \$300,734,484.09. From that period it continued to decline until November 1, 1867, when it had fallen to \$2,491,504,450. On the first day of November last, it had risen to \$2,597,129,552,82. By this statement it appears that between the first day of April, 1863, and the first day of September of the same year, the debt increased \$300,734,464.09, and that between the first day of September, 1865, and the first day of November, 1868, it decreased \$30,560,018.61; and that on the last day mentioned it was \$160,174,475.46 larger than it was on the first day of April, 1865. Since then the Treasurer's receipts from all sources of revenue have been as follows:

For April, May, and June, 1865.	\$ 83,519,164 13
For the year ending June 30, 1866.	558,032,620 06
FOR the year ending dune 30. 1987	49-1,634,010 27
For the year ending June 30, 1868.	4 5,638,083 32
June 30 to November 1, 1868	124,652.184 42

Total of receipts. \$1,662,476,062 20
To which should be added the increase of the debt between the first day of
April, 1865, and the first day of November,
160,174,475 48

81,829,659,537 68

It has been impossible to obtain an exact statement of the amount of such debts paid by

Amount paid for Alaska..... 7,231,000 00

Deducting this sum from the amount of the revenues, \$1,662,476,062.29, and \$160,174,475.48, the increase of the public debt—the remainder, \$1,142,685,411.78, or an average of \$318,928,021.89 per annum, is the amount actually expended in the payment of current expenses and interest.

It is thus shown that within a period of three years and seven months, the revenues or the receipts fr om all sources of revenue reached the enormous sum of \$1,662,496,662 20, and that \$6.5,431,125 90 were paid on debts which were actually due at the close of the war, and for bounties which, like the pay of the army, were a part of the express of the war. Adding the amount thus paid to the debt, as exhibited by the books of the Treasury on the first day of April, 1665, it appears that the debt of the United States at that time was \$2,997,389,303 24, and that the actual reduction has been \$470,256,650 42; and but for the advances to the Pacific roads, and the amount paid for Alaska, would have been \$519,650. 650 42.

Nothing can better exhibit the greatness of the resources of this young nation than this statement, or show more clearly its ability to make "short work" of the extinguishment of the public debt. It will be borne in mind that these immense revenues have been collected, while one-third part of the country was in a state of great destitution, resulting from its terrible struggle to separate itself from the Union, with its political condition unsettled, and its industry in a great degree paralyzed; and while also, the other two-thirds were slowly recovering from theightain upon their productive labor and resources—a necessary accompaniment of a gigantic and protracted war.

The Secretary has noticed with deep regret indications of a growing sentiment in Congress—notwithstanding the favorable exhibits which have been made from time to time of the debt-paying power of the country—in favor of a postponement of the payment of any part of the principal of the debt until the national resources shall be a increased as to make the payment of it more easy. If this sentiment shall so prevail as to give direction to the action of the Government he would feel that a very great error had been committed, which

could hardlystall to be a severe misfortune to the country. The people of the United States will never be so willing to be taxed for the purpose of reducing the debt as at the present time. Now, the necessity for its creation is better understood and appreciated than it can be at a future day. Now it is regarded by a large majority of tax-payers as a part of the great price paid for the maintenance of the Government, and, therefore, a sacred debt. The longer the reduction of it is postponed, the greater will be the difficulties in the way of accomplishing it, and the more intolerable will seem to be the burden of taxation. The Sectetary, therefore, renews the recommendations made in his first report, that a certain definite sum be annually applied to the payment of the interest and the principal of the debt. The amount auggested was two hundred millions of dollars. As the debt is considerably smaller than its maximum was estimated at, the amount to be so applied annually might now safely be fixed at one hundred and seventy-five millions of dollars, according to the estimate already made in this report.

The subject of the currency in which the five-twenty bonds may be paid—ag'tated for some

to the estimate already made in this report.

The subject of the currency in which the five-twenty bonds may be paid—ag'tated for some time past—was freely discussed during the recent political canvass, and made a question upon which parties, to some extent, were divided. The premature and unfortunate agtistion and discussion of this question have been damaging to the credit of the Government both at home and abroad, by exciting apprehensions that the good faith of the mation might not be maintained, and have thus prevented our bonds from advancing a price as the year three would have advanced, after it was perceived that the maximum of the debt has been reached, and have readered funding at a low rate of interest too unpromising to be undertaken. In his report in 1815, the Sacratary need the following language:

might not be maintained, and have thus prevented our bonds from advancing a price, as thy been reached, and have advanced, after it was perceived that the maximum of the debt has been reached, and have readered funding at a low rate of interest too unpromising to be nudertaken. In his report in 1805, the Secretary used the following language:

"Before concluding his remarks upon the national debt, the Secretary would suggest that the credit of the five-twenty bonds issued under the acts of Ferbrary 25, 1862, and Jane 30, 1864, would be improved in Europe, and, consequently, their market value advanced at home, if Congress should declare that the principal as well as the interest of these bonds is to be paid in coin. The policy of the Government is regard to its funded debt is well understood in the United States, but the absence of a provision in the term of the bonds issued under them should be paid in coin, while such a provision is contained in the set under which the ten-forties were issued, has created some apprehension in Europe that the five-twenty bonds might be called in at the expiration of five years, and paid in United States notes. Although it is not desirable that our securities should be held out of the United States, it is destrable that they should be of good credit in foreign markets, on account of the influence which these markets exert upon our own. It is, therefore, important that all misapprehensions on these points should be removed by an expiritie declaration of Congress that these bonds are to be paid in coin."

Without intending to criticise the inaction of Congress in regard to a matter of segret importance, the Secretary does not hesitate to say that, if his recommendations had been adopted, the public debt would have been in rapid progress. The Secretary does not think it necessary to discuss the question in this report. His opinions upon it are well known to Congress and the people. They were definitely presented in his report for lever, and they romain unchanged. He begs leave mer

at such city or cities in Europe as he may deem best.

The fact that, according to the recommendation, \$50,000,000 of the bonds to be issued are to become due each year for ten consecutive years (at the expiration of which time all of the bonds would be under the control of the Government) would ensure an annual reduction of \$50,000,000 of the public debt, and impart a credit to the other bonds which would ensure the negotiation of them on favorable tryns.

negotiation of them on favorable terms.

Of the expediency of an issue of bonds corresponding, to some extent, in amount with those held in Europe—the interest and principal of which shall be paid in the countries where they are to be negotiated—there can be but little doubt. On this point, the Scartary need the following language in his report of 1866:

"The question now to be considered is not how shall our bonds be prevented from going abroad—for a large amount has already gone, and others will follow as long as our credit is good, and we continue to buy more than we can pay for in any other way—but how shall they be prevented from being thrown upon the home market, to thwart our efforts in restoring the specie standard! The Secretary sees no practicable method of doing this stan early day, but by substituting for them bonds, which being payable, principal and interest in Europe, will be less likely to be returned when their return is the least to be desired.

The holders of our securities in Europe are now subject to great inconvenience, and not a little expense in collecting their coupous; and it is supposed that five per cent., or, perhaps, four-and-s-half per cent. bonds, payable in London or Frankfort, could be substituted $f\pi$ our six per cents, without any other expense to the United States than the trifling examission s to the agents through whom the exchanges might be made. The saving of interest to be thus effected would be no inconsiderable item; and the advantages of having our bonds in Europe placed in the hands of actual investors is too important to be disregarded. garded.

The Secretary has nothing further to say on this point than that careful reflection has only strengthened his convictions of the correctness of the views expressed in the foregr-

In recommending the issue of bonds bearing a lower rate of interest, to be exchanged for the outstanding six per cents, the Secretary must not be understood as having changed his opinion in regard to the expediency or the wisdom of the recommendation in his last re-

nis opinion in regard to the expediency or the wisdom of the recommendation in his last re-port:

"That the act of March 3, 1865, be so amended as to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to issue six per cent. gold-bearing bonds, to be known as the consolidated debt of the Unit-ed States, having twenty years to run, and redeemable, if it may be thought advisable, at an earlier day, to be exchanged at par for any and all other obligations of the Government, one-sixth part of the interest on which, in lieu of all other taxes, at each semi-annual pay-ment, shall be reserved by the Government, and paid over to the States according to population."

He refers to what he then said in advocacy of that recommendation, as an expression of his well-considered opinions at the present time, and he is only prevented from repeating the recommendation by the fact that it met with little approval at he that session, and has not grown into favor since. He sincerly hopes that the future history of the debt will vindicate the wisdom of those who are unable to approve the proposition.

The following is a statement of the public debt of the lat of July, 368:

DEBT BEARING COIN INTEREST.				
5 per cent bonds	\$221.588.400	00)	
6 per cent bonds of 1867 and 1868.	6,893,441	80)	
6 per cent bonds, 1881.				
6 per cent 5-20 bonds.				
Year marker for the	12,000,000	~		
Navy pension fund	. 13,000,000	UU	42.083.003.641	90
		_	\$2,003,003,031	-
DEBT BEARING CURRENCY INTEREST.	•			
6 per cent bonds	\$29,069,000			
3 year compound interest notes	21,604,890			
3-year 7-30 notes	25,534,900	90)	
3 per cent certificates.	50,000,000	00	1	
			196,228,790	00
MATURED DEET NOT PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT.				
3-year 7-30 notes, due August 15, 1967, and June 15, and				
July 15, 1868.	\$19,189,750	00		
Company Interest nates weekend Tune 10 Tule 17 Au	613 ¹ 103 ¹ 100	•	1	
Compound interest notes, matured June 10, July 15, Au-				
gues 15, October 15, and December 15, 1867, and May 15,				
1968	6,556,920			
Bonds, Texas indemnity	256,000			
Ronds, Texas indemnity. Treasury notes acts July 17, 1861, and prior thereto	155,111	64		
Bonds, April 15, 1842.	6,000	00	l .	
Bonds, April 15, 1842. Treasury notes, March 3, 1863. Temporary loan. Certificates of indebtedness.	555,499	00	1	
Temporary loan	797.029			
Cartificates of indebtedness	18,000			
COLUMNOS OF INSCRIPTIONS	10,000	•	20,527,309	RA
DEBT SEARTS NO INTEREST.			20,001,002	-
DSBC SEVELLEND INTEGERS.				
	Anna 444	~~		
United States notes	\$356,141,793	00	1	
United States notes	32,626,951	75		
United States notes	32,626,951	75	ı	
United States notes	32,626,951	75		75
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit.	32,626,951 17,678,640	75 00	406,447,314	_
United States notes Fractional Currency Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt.	32,626,951 17,678,640	75 00	406,447,314	_
United States notes Fractional Currency Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt.	32,626,951 17,678,640	75 00	406,447,314	_
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt	32,626,951 17,676,640 \$100,500,561	75 00	406,447,314 \$2,636,957,049	_
United States notes Fractional Currency Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt.	32,626,951 17,676,640 \$100,500,561	75 00	. 406,447,314 \$2,636,807,049	19
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt	32,626,951 17,676,640 \$100,500,561	75 00	406,447,314 \$2,636,957,049	19
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt. Amount in Treasury, coin. Amount in Treasury, currency.	39,626,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 30,505,970	75 00 28 97	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,538	19 25
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt	39,626,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 30,505,970	75 00 28 97	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,538	19 25
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt. Amount in Treasury, coin. Amount in Treasury, currency. Amount of debt, less cash in Treasury.	\$100,500,561 37,505,970	75 00 28 97	406,447,314 \$2,636,937,049 131,066,538 \$2,505,200,516	19 25 94
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt. Amount in Treasury, coin. Amount in Treasury, currency.	\$100,500,561 37,505,970	75 00 28 97	406,447,314 \$2,636,937,049 131,066,538 \$2,505,200,516	19 25 94
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit	\$2,626,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 33,505,970 for the fiscal	75 00 28 97	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit	\$1,696,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 30,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509	75 00 28 97 ye 66	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes Fractional Currency Gold certificates of deposit Total debt. Amount in Treasury, coin. Amount in Treasury, currency Amount of debt, less cash in Treasury. The following is a statement of receipts and expenditures: 30, 1868: Receipts from customs. Receipts from lands.	32,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 30,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509 1,318,715	75 00 28 97 ye 66 41	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt. Amount in Treasury, coin. Amount in Treasury, currency. Amount of debt, less cash in Treasury. The following is a statement of receipts and expenditures: 30, 1868: Receipts from customs. Receipts from lands. Receipts from lands.	\$1,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 33,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509 1,318,715 1,788,145	75 00 28 97 ye 66 41 85	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes Fractional Currency Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt. Amount in Treasury, coin. Amount of debt, less cash in Treasury. The following is a statement of receipts and expenditures: 30, 1888: Receipts from customs. Receipts from lands. Receipts from direct tax. Receipts from direct tax. Receipts from direct tax.	32,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 30,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509 1,318,715	75 00 28 97 ye 66 41 85	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit	\$1,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 33,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509 1,318,715 1,788,145	75 00 28 97 ye 66 41 85	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit	32,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 37,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,599 1,318,715 1,788,145 191,067,569	75 00 28 97 56 41 85 41	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit	\$1,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 33,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509 1,318,715 1,788,145	75 00 28 97 56 41 85 41	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit. Total debt	32,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 33,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509 1,318,715 1,788,145 191,067,569 46,949,033	75 00 28 97 56 41 85 41	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94
United States notes. Fractional Currency. Gold certificates of deposit	32,636,951 17,678,640 \$100,500,561 33,505,970 for the fiscal 164,464,509 1,318,715 1,788,145 191,067,569 46,949,033	75 00 28 97 56 41 85 41	406,447,314 \$2,636,207,049 131,066,532 \$2,505,200,516 ar ending Ju	19 25 94

Expenditures for the civil service (of which amount there was paid for premium on purchase of Treasury notes prior to maturity, \$7,001,151 004). Expenditures for pensions and Indians. Expenditures by War Department. Expenditures by Navy Department. Expenditures for interest on the public debt.	\$60,011,018 71 \$7,883,069 10 123,246,648 68 25,775,502 72 140,424,045 71	
Total expenditures, exclusive of principal of public debt The following is a statement of receipts and expenditures f		
ber 30, 1868: The receipts from customs.	\$49,676,594 67	
The receipts from lands	714,895 03	
The receipts from lands The receipts from direct tax.	15,536 02	
The receipts from internal revenue.	38,735,863 08	•
The receipts from miscellaneous sources (of which amount	00,100,000	
there was received from premium on bonds sold to re- deem Treasury notes the sum of \$587,725 12)		ý.
deem Treasury notes the sum of \$587,725 12)	6,949,979 97	
- <u> </u>	 	
Total receipts, exclusive of loans	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	\$95,392,868 77
Expenditures for the civil service (of which amount there		
was paid, as premium on purchase of Treasury notes prior	*** *** *** ***	
to maturity, \$300,000)	\$3 1,227,106 33	
Expenditures for—	10.000.040.00	
Pensions and Indians	19,358,647 70	
War Department	27,219,117 02	
Navy DepartmentInterest on public debt	5,604,765 33	
rutelest on briouc dept	38,742,814 37	
Total expenditures, exclusive of principal of public debt.		\$105 159 470 75
The Secretary estimates that, under existing laws, the receitive quarters ending June 30, 1869, will be as follows: From Customs. Lauds. Internal revenue Miscellaneous sources.	\$125,000,000 00 1,000,000 to 100,600,000 00	litures for the
TITIOCHEROOUS BOULOCE	20,000,000 00	
Receipts		1946 000 000 00
And that the expenditures for the same period, if there		
will be:	DO TO LOCKION	or eno arm'i
For the civil service	\$40,000,000 00	
Pensions and Indians	18,000,000 00	
War Department, including \$6,000,000 bounties	66,000,000 00	
Navy Department	16.000,000 00	
Navy Department	91,000,000 00	
•		
Expenditures	(231,000,000 00
The receipts and expenditures under existing laws for the fire	scal year ending	June 30, 1870,
are estimated as follows:		, ,
From Customs	\$160,000,000 00	
Internal revenue	140,000,000 00	
Lands	2,000,000 00	
Miscellaneous sources	25,000,000 00	
Receipts	{	327,000,000 CO
The expenditures for the same period, if the expenses of the	e army should	be kept up to
about the present average, will be as follows:	•	
For the civil service	\$50,000,000 00	
Pensions and Indians	30,000,000 00	
War Department	75,000,000 00	
Navy Départment	20,000,000 00	
Interest on public debt	128,000,000 00	
Tonou Jihana	 ,	m non non no
Expenditures		
The accompanying report of the Commissioner of Internal	Revenue gives :	the necessary

The accompanying report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gives the necessary information in regard to the bureau, and contains many very judicions recommendations and suggestions, which are worthy the careful consideration of Congress. The internal branch of the revenue service is the one in which the people feel the deepest interest. The customs duties are collected at a few points, and although paid eventually by the consumers, they are felt only by the great mass of the people in the increased cost of the articles consumed. Not so with the internal taxes. These are collected in every part of the Union; and their burdons fall, to a large extent, directly upon the tax-payers. Assessors, collectors, inspectors, detectives—necessary instruments in the collection of the revenues—are found in every part of the country. There is no village or rural district where their faces are not seen, and where collections are not made. The eyes of the whole people are therefore directed to this system, and it is of the greatest importance that its administration should be such as to entitle it to public respect. Unfortunately this is

not the case. Its demoralisation is admitted; and the question arises, where is the remedy? The Secretary is of opinion that it is to be found in suchamendments to the act as will equalize the burdens of taxation, and in an elevation of the standard of qualification for

revenue offices

revenue offices.

Upon the subject of internal taxes the Secretary has already spoken. In regard to the character of the revenue officers, he has only to say that there must be a decided change for the better in this respect, if the system is to be rescued from its demoralized condition. After careful reflection the Secretary has come to the conclusion that this change would follow the passage of the bill reported by Mr. Jenckes, from the Joint Committee on Retrenchment and Reform, on the 14th of May last, entitled "bill to regulate the civil service and promote the efficiency thereof." The Secretary gives to this bill his hearty approval, and refers to the search which was made upon its introduction, by the gentleman who reported it, for an able and lucid exposition of its provisions, and for a truthful and graphic description of the evils of the present system of appointments to effice.

On the 5th day of October last, the day for their regular quarterly reports, the number of national banks was aixteen hundred and forty-four, seventeen of which were in voluntary liquidation.

Their capital was.	\$42 0.634.511	00
Their discounts.	655,875,277	35
Their circulation		
Their deposits	601,830,978	40

Their circulation.

283,63,244 to Their deposits.

283,63,244 to Their deposits.

283,63,244 to Their deposits.

Is no other country was so large a capital ever invested in banking, under asingle system, as is now invested in the national banks, never before were the interests of a people so interwoven with a system of banking as are the interests of the people of the United States with their national banking system. It is not strange, therefore, that the condition and management of the deepest concern. That the national banking system is a perfect one is not asserted by its friends; that it is a very decided improvement, as far as circulation is regarded, upon the systems which it has superseded, must be admitted by its opponents. Before it was established, the several States, whether in conformity with the Constitution or not—jointly with the General Government, during the existence of the charter of the U.S. Bank, and solely after the expiration of that charter—exercised the power of issuing bills of credit, in the form of bank notes, through institutions of their own creation, and thus controlled the paper money, and thereby, in no small degree, the business and computee of the Country. In May, 1863, when the National Currency Bureau was established in Washington, some fitteen hundred banks, organized under State laws, furnished the people of the United States with a bank note currency. In some of the States the banks were compelled to protect, partially at least, the holders of their notes against loss, by deposits of securities with the proper authorities. In other States, the capital of the banks (that capital being wholly under the control of their managers) was the only security for the redemption of their notes. In some States there was no limit to the amount of notes that might be issued, if secured according to the requirements of their statutes, nor any necessary relation of circulation to capital. In others, while notes could be issued only in certain proportions to capital, there was no restricti

by him to the act.

by him to the act.

On the fifth day of October last, the loans or discounts of the banks in the City of New York amounted to \$163,634070 23 only \$90,000,000 of which consisted of commercial paper, the balance, being chiefly made up of what are known as loans on call—that is to say, of loans on collaterals, subject to be called in at the pleasure of the banks. Merchants or manufacturers cannot, of course, borrow on such terms, and it is understood that these loans are confined mainly to persons dealing, or rather speculating, in stocks or coin. This statement shows to what extent the business of the banks in New York has been diverted from legitimate channels, and how deeply involved the banks have become in the uncertain and pangerous speculations of the street.

The deposits of these institutions on the day mentioned amounted to \$226,645.655 80, and of their assets, \$113,339,688 80, consisted of certain cash items which were in fact mainly certified checks, which had been passed to the credit of depositors, and constituted a part of the \$226,645,655 80 of deposits, although the banks always deduct such checks from their deposits in making up their statement for the payment of interest, and

their estimates for reserves. It is understood to be the practice of a number of the banks (perhaps the practice exists to a limited extent in all) to certify the checks of their customers in advance of the deposits out of which they are expected to be paid; in other words, to certify checks to be good, under an agreement between the banks and the drawers, that the money to protect them shall be deposited during the day, or at least before the checks, which go through the clearing-house, can be presented for payment. The Secre tary has learned with great surprise that a number of banks—generally regarded as being under judicious management—certify in a single day the checks of stock and gold brokers to many times the amount of their capitals, with no money actually on deposit for the protection of the checks at the time of their certification. A more dangerous practice, or one more inconsistent with prudent, not to say honest banking, cannot be conceived. It is unauthorized by the act, and should be prohibited by severe penaltics. Astide from the risk incurred by this reckless method of banking, the effect of such practice is to foster speculation by creating infiation. It is in fact part and parcel of that fictitious credit which is so injurious to the regular business of the city and to the business of all parts of the country, which feel and are affected by the pulsations of the countred active. It is this very dangerous practice, combined with the more general practice of making loans "on call," which leads to unsafe extensions of credits, and makes many of the banks in New York helpless when the money market is stringent. Can anything be more discreditable to the banks of the great emporium of the country, or afford more conclusive evidence of their imprudent management, than the fact, that with a capital—including their surplus and their undivided profits—of one hundred millions of object-tender notes, by combinations for speculative nurposes, our create a money stringency by which not only the stock mark evidence or their imprintent management, than the lact, that with a capital industing their surplus and their undivided profits—of one hundred millions of doilins, the withdrawal from circulation of ten or fifteen millions of legal-tender notes, by combinations for speculative purposes, can create a money stringency, by which not only the stock market is broken down, but the entire business of the city and to some extent the business of the country is injuriously affected. If the banks were no more extended than they ought to be, or had proper control over their customers, no such combinations would be likely to be formed, or if formed, they would utterly fail of their object.

These remarks do not, of course, apply to all the banks in New York, for some of them are strictly commercial institutions, and are under the control of men who are distinguished alike for their talents and their conservatism. They are, however, applicable to them as a class, and they undoubtedly apply in some measure to many banks in other cities.

The recommendation of the Comptroller, that all national banks be prohibited by law from certifying checks which are not drawn upon deposits actually existing at the time the checks are certified to be good, is heartly concurred in.

The Secretary has long entertained the opinion that the practice of paying interest on deposits—tonding as it does, to keep the banks constantly extended in their discounts—is injudicions and unsafe He therefore approves of the recommendation of the Comptroller, that national banks be prohibited from paying interest on bank or individual balances.

that national banks be prohibted from paying interest on bank or individual balances.

The Secretary also agrees with the Comptroller in his recommendation that authority be given to him to call upon the banks for reports on days to be fixed by himself. If a receive is necessary, it should be kept constantly on hand, and the business of the country ought not to be disturbed by the preparation of the banks for the quarterly reports.

The views of the Secretary in regard to the necessity of a central redoeming agency for the national banks have been frequently presented, and it is not necessary for him to

repeat them.

There are other suggestions in the Comptroller's report deserving the attention of Congress, which the Secretary lacks the time to consider. There is one subject, however, not discussed by the Comptroller, to which the Secretary invites special attention.

discussed by the Comptroller, to which the Secretary invites special attention.

Although the national banking system should be relieved from the limitation now imposed upon the aggregate amount of notes that may be issued, this cannot eafely be done as long as the suspension of specie payments continues. Nevertheless, measures should at once be adopted to remedy, as far as practicable, the inequality which exists in the distribution of the circulation. As the Government has, by the tax upon the notes of State banks, deprived the States of the power of furnishing facilities to their citizens, it is obviously just that those States, which are thus deprived of these facilities, or which do not share equally with other States in the benefits of the national banking system, should be supplied with both banks and notes. There are two modes by which this may be accomplished. One by reducing the circulation of the banks of large capital only; the other by limiting the amount of notes to be furnished to all the banks—say, to seventy per cent. of their respective capitals. The latter mode is preferable, as by it no discrimination would be made between the banks, and all would be strengthened by a reduction of their libilities, and by a release of a part of their means now deposited with the Treasurer, which would be of material service to them in the preparation they must make for a return to specie payments. If a redeeming agency should be established, the reduction of the circulation of the existing banks could be effected as rapidly as new banks can be organized in the Western and Southern States, where they are needed.

The new Territory of Alaska has been the object of much attention during the past year.

The new Territory of Alaska has been the object of much attention during the past year, but its distance, and the uncertainty and infrequency of communication with it, and our imperfect knowledge of its condition, have somewhat embarrassed the department in organising therein a satisfactory revenue system.

Under the authority of the act of the last session, the administration, by special agency (which in the absence of the regular machinery was of necessity resorted to) has been superseded by the appointment of a collector to reside at Sitka, who left for his post in September last, and has probably, ere this, entered upon the discharge of his duties.

A gentleman from this department accompanied him, to assist in establishing the collector service on a proper foundation, and in perfecting assaugements for the prevention of amuggling.

Recognising also the vast importance of reliable information on matters not immediately connected with these objects, but having nevertheless a most important bearing upon them, mere or less direct, another agent, long familiar with that country, was, at the same time, dispatched with directions to apply himself to the ascertainment of its natural resources, the inducements and probable channels of trade, and the needs of commerce in the way of lights and other aids to navigation. He was also particularly entrusted with a supervision of the fur interests and the enforcement of the law prohibiting the killing of the most valuable fur-bearing animals.

The evistance of coal at numerous points has been known for years and some of the

supervision of the fur interests and the enforcement of the law prohibiting the killing of the most valuable fur-bearing animals.

The existence of coal at numerous points has been known for years, and some of the beds were worked by the Russians with indifferent success; none, however, has been hitherto procured on the North American Pacific coast equal to that from the Nanaimo mines, on Vancouver's Island; and this, though raised from a considerable depth, is not of superior quality. The officers of the cutters were therefore instructed to explore the coast as far as practicable, for the purpose of ascertaining the supply and the quality of coal in the Territory. A number of localities producing coal were visited, including the abandoned Russian mines, but at none did the outcroppings exhibit any flattering promise, except on the coast of Cook's inlet. There, near Fort Kenay, about seven hundred miles from Sitka, were found upon the cliffs numerous parallel veins extending many miles along the shore. Some of the coal taken from them proved to be superior to that from the Nanaimo mines. The indications are that the supply is abundant and the quality fair.

The protection of the fur-bearing animals is a matter of importance hardly to be overrated. In consequence of information received last spring, the captain of the Wayanda was directed to visit, as early in the season as practicable, the islands in Behring's Sea, where the fur seal chiefly abounds. On his arrival at St. Paul's and St. George's Islands, he found there several large parties engaged in hunting the animals indiscriminately, and in traffic with the natives complained that the reckless and unskilful movements of the new hunters had already driven the animals from some of their usual hannts. The captain of the cutter instituted such measures as he felt authorized to institute for the maintenance of the peace, and the protection of the animals from some of their usual hannts. The captain of the cutter instituted such measures as he felt authorized to

and the protection of the animals from indiscriminate slaughter.

The preservation of these animals, by the observance of strict regulations in hunting them, is not only a matter of the highest importance in an economical view, but a matter of life or death to the natives. Hitherto, scals have been hunted under the supervision of the Russian Company, and exclusively by the natives, who are trained from children to that occupation, and derive from it their clothing and subsistence. They have been governed by exact and stringent rules as to the time of hunting, and the number and kind of scals to be taken. It is recommended that these rules be continued by legal enactment, and that the existing law prohibiting absolutely the killing of the fur scal and sca otter be repealed, as starvation of the people would result from its strict enforcement. The natives (with the exception of the Indians in the southern part of the territory, who are fierce and warlike) are a gentle, harmless race, easy to govern, but of great enterprise and daring in the pursuit of game—many of them passing annually in their akin cances from the mainland and Aleutian Islands to the Islands of St. Paul and St. George, a distance of about one hundred and fifty miles, through a strong sea, and returning with the proceeds of their hunt. hant.

hunt.

The seals are extremely timid and cautious. They approach their accustomed grounds each year with the greatest circumspection, sending advance parties to reconnoitre, and at once forsaking places where they are alarmed by unusual or unwelcome viators. They have been in this way driven from point to point, and have taken refuge in these remote islands, whence, if they are now driven, they must resort to the Asiatic coast. There can be no doubt that, without proper regulations for hunting these valuable animals, and the more valuable but less numerous sea otters, a very profitable trade will soon be entirely destroyed.

The United States cannot, of course, administer such a trade as a Government monopoly, and the only alternative seems to be to grant the exclusive privilege of taking these auimals to a responsible company for a series of years, limiting the number of skins to be taken annually by stringent provisions. A royalty or tax might be imposed upon each skin taken, and a revenue be thus secured sufficient to pay a large part of the expenses of

the Territory.

Our relations with the Hudson Bay Company and the regulation of the transit of merchandise between their interior trading posts and the sea-coast, by way of Stikine river, will doubtiess require early attention, but at present the Secretary is not sufficiently advised to offer any recommendations upon the subject.

The recent political changes in Spain, and the indications of a more liberal commercial polity on her part before the revolution took place, adds force to the remarks and recommendation of the Secretary in his last report, in regard to our commercial relations with that country. He again strongly recommends the repeal of the sets of July 13, 1832, and June 30, 1834, so that Spanish vessels may be subject to our general laws, which are ample to afford protection against unfriendly Spanish legislation, and are free from the innumerable difficulties of administration which exist under these special enactments.

The Secretary asks attention to the necessity of more exact and stringent laws respecting the carriage of passengers, and also of such legislation as shall settle, so far as they can be settled in this manner, some of the vexed questions arising under steamboat laws.

It is necessary merely to repeat what has been at other times stated in regard to the insufficiency of the tax fund to meet the necessary expenses of the marine hospitals, not withstanding the economy which, during the past year, has reduced the expenditures more than \$18,000. It is impossible to ignore the fact that these hospitals are, and must be, unless the rate of tax is greatly increased, a constant drain upon the Treasury.

The revenue cutter service now comprises twenty-five steamers and seventeen sailing vessels. Of the six steamers on the lakes, all but one are at present, agreeably to the views of Congress, out of commission, the Sherman alone being in sctive service.

Rive of the steamers on the sea-coast are small tugs, from forty to sixty tons burden, the utility and efficiency of which at the leading ports—as substitutes for ordinary rowboats on the one hand, and for the light cutters on the other, both in the harbor duties of inspection and police, and in the prevention and detection of smugging—have been so thoroughly tested by experience that it is thought they abould be employed still more extensively than they now are. Upon the lakes in particular they would be of the greatest value, and they should be substituted for the large steamers now there, which should, with one exception, be sold, as they are depreciating in value and are a usless expense. The exception is the S. P. Chase, which is of such dimensions that she might be brought to the seacosat, where she could be used to advantage. This would probably be preferable to a sale of her where she lies. The schooner Black, being old and not fit for further service, has been sold. The Morria, also, is about to be disposed of for the same reason. The steamer Nemaha, stationed at Norfolk, has been destroyed by accidental fire.

On the Pacific coset are the Wayauds, in Alaska, and the Lincoln, at San Francisco, both

On the Pacific coast are the Wayauda, in Alaska, and the Lincoln, at San Francisco, both in excellent condition; the schooner Reliance, recently ordered to Sitka, is also in good order. The schooner Lane, at Puget Sound, is old and unfit for the requirements of that atation.

station.

The addition of several thousand miles of sea-coast, by the purchase of Alaska, renders the entire force in the Pacific inadequate for even the ordinary duties pertaining to the service, without regard to the additional demands upon it for the protection of the fur-bearing animals. The recommendation heretofore made that two first-class steamers be built or purchased for the Western coast is therefore renewed. A steam-outter is also needed for Charleston, and one for the coast of Texas.

In his report for the year 1864, the Secretary called the attention of Congress especially to the condition of the shipping interest of the United States. In his report of last year, he again referred to it in the following language:

again referred to it in the following language:

"The shipping interest of the United States, to a great degree prostrated by the war, has not revived during the past year. Our shippards are, with rare exceptions, inactive. Our surplus products are being chiefly transported to foreign countries in foreign vessels. The Secretary is still forced to admit, in the language of his last report, 'that with unequaled facilities for obtaining the materials, and with acknowledged skill in shipbuilding, with thousands of miles of sea-coast, indented with the finest harbors in the world, with surplus products that require in their transportation a large and increasing tonnage, we can neither profitably build ships, nor successfully compete with English ships in the transportation of our own productions."

of our own productions

"No change for the better has taken place since that report was made. On the contrary, the indications are that the great shipbuilding interest of the Eastern and Middle States has been steadily declining, and that, consequently, the United States is gradually ceasing to be a great maritime power. A return to specie payments will do much, but will not be sufficient, to avert this declension and give activity to our shippards. The materials which enter into the construction of vessels should be relieved from taxation by means rials which enter into the construction of vessels should be relieved from faxation by means of d-awbacks; or if this may be regarded as impracticable, subsidies might be allowed as an offset to taxation. If subsidies are objectionable, then it is recommended that all restrictions upon the registration of foreign-built vessels be removed, so that the people of the United States, who cannot profitably build vessels, may be permitted to purchase them in the cheapest market. It is certainly unwise to retain upon the statute books a law restrictive upon commerce when it no longer accomplishes the object for which it was enacted."
What was said by the Secretary in 1866 and 1857 upon this subject is true at the present time, and he therefore feels it his duty to repeat his recommendations. The shipping interest was not only prostrated by the war, but its continued depression is stributable to the financial legislation, and the high taxes consequent upon the war. The honor and the welfare of the country demand its restoration.

Accompanying this report there is a very accurate and instructive chart, prenared by Mr. S. Nimmo, Jr., a clerk in this department, which presents, in a condensed form, the progress of shipbuilding in the United States from 1817 to 1868.

Since the abrogation of the treaty of June 4, 1854, between the United States and Canada, Since the arrogation are to the transfer of the commercial relations of the two countries has been presented. Canada has yet to consolidate a political confederation with the other English colonies and possessions on this continent, and until the hostility of Nova Scotia to that measure is removed, and the concurrence of Northwest British America is at coured, the authorities at Ottawa are in no situation to make an adequate proposition to the United States, in exchange for the great concession of an exceptional tariff, on our northern frontier, in favor of the leading Canadian staples. On the other hand, nutl the United States shall have fully matured a satisfactory system of duties, external as well as internal, the shall have fully matured a astisfactory system of duties, extornal as well as internal, the Secretary would be indisposed to favor any special arrangement which would remove any material branch of the revenue system from legislative control. Meanwhile, a Canadian policy for the enlargement of the Welland and St. Lawrence Canals to dimensions adequate to pass vessels of one thousand tons burden from the Upper Lakes to the Atlantic, will doubtless be regarded as indispensable to any substantial renewal, by treaty or legislation, of the former arrangement. The discussions and experience of the last twelve months are regarded by the Secretary as warranting an authoritative comparison of views between the representatives of Great Britain and Canada and the Government of the United States; and in that avent this denartment will chearfully courthing to all appropriate means to approximate the converted means the converted me sentratives of creat final and canada and the Government of the United States; and in that event this department will cheerfully contribute, by all appropriate means, to comprehensive measures which shall assimilate the revenue systems of the respective countries, make their markets mutually available, and, for all commercial or social purposes, render

the frontier as nearly an imaginary line as possible. There certainly seems ne just reason why all the communities on the American continent might not imitate the example of the Zoll Verien of the German States.

The progress of the coast survey has been satisfactory, and commensurate with the appropriations, as will be seen from the annual report of the superintendent of that work. During the past year surveys have been in progress in the following localities, named in geographical order, vis: On the coast of Maine, in Penobecot bay and on the islands lying within its entrance; on the shores of St. George's and Medonick rivers; in Muscougus bay; on the estuaries of Quelog bay, and in the vicinity of Portland; completing all the in-shore work between the Penobecot and Cape Elizabeth. In Massachusetts, between the Barnstable and Monomay, completing the survey of Cape Cod. In Rhode Island, on the western part of Narragansett bay. In New York, at Bondout and in the bay of New York. In New Jersey, on the coast near the head of Barnegat bay. In Maryland and Virginia, on the Potomac river and the southern part of Chesapeake bay. In North Carolina, in Pamilloo sound and on its western shore, including Neuse and Bay rivers, and of the coast north of Hatteras. In South Carolina, on the estuaries of Port Royal sound. In Georgia, on St. Catherine's, Doboy, and St. Andrew's sounds; in the Florida straits and in the bay between the keys and main shore of Florids. On the coast between Pensacola and Mobile entrances. At the passes of the Mississippi, and in Galveston, Matagorda and Corpus Christi bays, on the coast of Texas. In California surveying parties have been at work on the coast between Buenaventura and Santa Barbara, at Point Sal, and on the peninsula of San Francisco. In Oregon, on Yaquinna bay, Columbia and Uehaleur rivers. In Washington Territory, on Fuca straits and in Puget sound.

In the Coast Survey Office, forty-eight charts have been entirely or partially engraved during the very of which principal and the particular of the coast between they have not which principal and the particular of the coast parts and an entirely or partially engraved during the wave of which principal and the particular of the coast parts and The progress of the coast survey has been satisfactory, and commensurate with the appro-

straits and in Puget sound.

In the Coast Survey Office, forty-eight charts have been entirely or partially engraved during the year, of which nineteen have been published. Regular observations of the tides at seven principal stations have been kept up, and tide tables for all parts of the United States, for the ensuing year, have been published. A new edition of the Directory or Coast Pilot for the western coast has been prepared, and a preliminary guide for the navigation of the north-western coast has been compiled.

This brief glance at the operation of the Coast Survey during the past year shows the great scope of that work, which has justly earned a large measure of public favor. Its importance to the commerce and navigation of the country are now well understood, nor can its incidental contributions to science fail to be appreciated by the representatives of the people. The work should be pressed steadily forward, with means sufficient for the most effective working of the existing organization, so that it may embrace, at no distant period, the whole of our extended coast line within its operations, including the principal harbors in our newly acquired Territory of Alaska. or our extended coast line within its operations, including the principal harbors in our newly soquired Territory of Alasks.

The report of the Lighthouse Board is, as usual, an interesting one. No bureau of the Treasury Department is conducted with more ability, or with a more strict regard to the public interests than this.

In view of the extension of the lighthouse system consequent upon the increase of the commerce of the country and the acquisition of sea-coast territory, it is respectfully submitted that some authoritative definition of the limit to which aids to navigation shall be extended by the General Government should be established.

mitted that some authoritative demnition of the limit to which aids to navigation shall be extended by the General Government should be established.

It may well be doubted whether the General Government should be called upon to do more than to thoroughly provide the sea and lake coasts with lights of high order, both stationary and floating, and so to place lights of inferior order as to enable vessels to reach secure anchorages at any season of the year.

The act of Congress approved August 31, 1858, establishing the Lighthouse Board, directs that the coasts of the United States shall be divided into twelve districts. It is recommended that authority be given to increase the number of districts to fourteen.

The business of the bureau would be facilitated if Congress should confer the franking privilege upon the Lighthouse Board, in the same manner and upon the same terms as it is now exercised by the several bureaus of the Treasury Department.

The attention of Congress is called to the annual report of the Director of the Mint, which contains the usual statistics of the coinage of the country, and various suggestions and recommendations, which are worthy of consideration.

The total value of the bullion deposited at the mint and branches during the fiscal year was \$77,166,318 70, of which \$25,472,894 £8 was in gold, and \$1,693,423 £8 in aliver. Deducting the redeposit, the amount of actual deposit was \$45,51,325 £4.

The coinage for the year was: In gold coin, \$18,114,425; gold bars, \$6,026,810 06; silver coin, \$1,136,750; aliver bars, \$456,236 40; nickel, copper, and bronze coinage, (one, two, three and five-cent pieces,) \$1,713,385; total coinage, \$29,964,560; total bars stamped, \$6,483,046 54.

The gold deposits of domestic production were: At Philadelphia, \$1,300,338 53; at San Francisco, \$14,630,117 84; at New York, \$5,409,996 55; at Denver, \$357,935 11. The silver deposits were: At Philadelphia, \$67,700 78; at San Francisco, \$651,239 05; at New York, \$262,313 06; at Denver, \$5,082 67.

The gold and silver deposits of foreign production were \$1,686,602 35. The amount of gold coined at Philadelphia was \$3,864,425; at San Francisco, \$14,979,558 52; of silver at Philadelphia, \$314,750; at San Francisco, \$522,000; of nickel, copper, and bronze at Philadelphia, \$1,713,335. Total number of pieces struck, \$49,735,340.

The branch mint at Denver has never coined money, and its expenses are entirely out of proportion to its business. The law under which it was organised should be repealed, and the institution reorganized as an assay office.

During the past year the branch mint building at Carson City, Nevada, has been completed, and the necessary machinery and fixtures have been forwarded. It will be ready for work early next season.

The mint at Philadelphia and the branch mint at San Francisco have the confidence of the people and of the Government, and when the new mint building in San Francisco is erected, these mints will be of ample capacity to supply coinage for the whole country. The business of coinage requires large and expensive establishments, under charge of men of science and undoubted integrity; and such can be successfully maintained only at commercial centres, where builton of different degrees of fineness is continually offered for manipulation. The establishment of additional branch mints is, therefore, unnecessary, and would be injudicious. and would be injudicious

and would be injudicious.

The entire deposits at the branch mint in San Francisco were formerly in unparted bullion; now nearly two-thirds of the amount is deposited in bars, refined by private establishments. The law requires that the parting charge shall equal the actual cost of the process: but the experience of the past four years shows that not less than thirty thousand dollars annually may be saved to the Government by discontinuing the business of refining upon the Pacific coast, and it is, therefore, recommended that the Secretary be authorized to exchange the unparted bulllon deposited at the mint for refined bars, whenever in his opinion it may be for the public interest to do so.

It is also recommended that authority be given for the redemption of the one and two-cent pieces by the Treasurer, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the department.

department.

It is also recommended that authority be given for the redemption of the one and twocent pieces by the Treasurer, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
department.

On the first day of April last Mr. R. W. Raymond was appointed Commissioner of Mining
Statistics, in place of Mr. J. Ross Browne, new Commissioner to China.

Mr. Raymond was instructed to continue the work so ably commenced by his predecessor,
and his report will show with what diligence and ability he is performing the duties assigned to him. The Secretary invites the attention of Congress to this report, and asks for the
recommendations which it contains due consideration.

The following extract, from the Secretary's report of 1867, presents, in language which
he cannot make more explicit, his present views:

"The Secretary respectfully recommends the reorganization of the accounting offices
of the Treasury Department, so as to place this branch of the public service under one
responsible head, according to what seems to have been designed in the original organisation of the department, and followed until the increase of business led to the creation of
the office of Second Comptroller, and subsequently to that of Commissioner of Customs.
There are now three officers controlling the settlement of accounts, each independent of the
others, and, as a consequence, the rules and decisions are not uniform where the same or
like questions arise. In the judgment of the Secretary, the concentration of the accounting offices under one head would secure greater efficiency, as well as greater uniformtry of practice, than can be expected under a divided supervision. It is believed, also, that
it would be advantageous to relieve the Commissioner of Customs of the duty of examining
ciently large to demand his whole time. It is therefore recommended that the office of Comptroller be crusted, having general supervision of the accounting officers, and appellate
jurisdiction from their decisions: to which should be transferred the dut

Congress.

The report of the Supervising Architect gives full and detailed accounts of the progress that has been made in the construction of public buildings.

The reports of the heads of all the respective bureaus will be found to be of unusual interest—containing, as they do, accurate information in regard to the affairs of the Government in this interesting period of its history.

Mr. S. M. Clark having resigned the office of Superintendent of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Mr. G. B. McCartee has been piaced temporarily in charge of it. As the past management and present condition of this bureau are now under investigation by the Joint Committee on Retrenchment and Reform, the Secretary feels at liberty on, to say, at this time, that, from the examinations which he has caused to be made by officers and clerks of this department, be feels justified in remarking that the reports which have been at various time put in circulation in regard to over issues of notes or securities, and of dishonesty in the administration of the bureau, are unfounded.

A systematic effort is being made to reduce the expenses of the administration of the customs

are unfounded.

A systematic effort is being made to reduce the expenses of the administration of the customs service, and with considerable success. The process is necessarily slow and beset with difficulties; but material reduction has been already made, and still greater is in progress.

During the war the business of the Treasury Department was so largely and repidly increased, and so many inexperienced men necessarily employed, that perfect order and system could not be enforced. Many accounts were unsettled, and some branchess of business had fallen into confusion. Much attention has been given by the Scoretary "to straightening up" the affairs of the Department. He is now gratified in being able to say, that order and system have been nirroduced where they were found to be needed; that the bureaus are in good working order, and

that the "machinery" of the department is in as satisfactory condition as perhaps it can be, under existing laws. The result of the examinations which he has caused to be made has excited his admiration of the wisdom displayed by Mr. Hamilton in the system of accounting which he introduced, and most favorably impressed him with the value of the services of the men who, poorly paid, and little known beyond the walls of the Treasury Building, have for years conducted, with unfaltering fidelity, the details of a business larger and more complicated than was ever devolved upon a single department by any Government in the world.

In concluding this communication, it may not be inappropriate for the Secretary, in a few brief words, to review some points in the general policy of the administration of the Treasury for the meat four vears.

past four years.

The following statement—published in the last Treasury report—exhibits the Treasury on the last of April, 1865:	condition of the
Treasury on the 1st of April, 1865:	
Funded debt	. \$1,100,361,241 80
Matured debt	349,430,00
Temporary loan certificates	
Josephinery and Cortangues.	98,408,325 29
Certificates of indebtedness	171,790,000 00
Interest bearing notes	526,812,860 00
Suspended or unpaid requisitions	114,256,548 93
United States notes, legal tenders	433,160,569 00
Fractional currency	24,254,094 07
Clastania dationty	- 32 ³ 50.5 (105 61

\$2,433,437,003 18 56,481,924 84 Cash in the Treasury.....

unded debt	28 1.109.568.191 80
Waterwall dabt	1.503.020 00
Tamporary loan	107 148 713 16
Certificates of indebtedness	85,093,000 00
Five-per cent, legal tender notes	
FIVE-per cent. legal tender inter-	
Compound interest legal tender notes	830,000,000 00
Seven-thirty notes	433,160,569 00
United States notes, legal tenders	26.344.743 51
Practional currency	20,344,743 51
Suspended requisitions uncalled for	2,111,000 00
•	
m.41	#19 945 907 APR KR

88,218,056 13 Deduct cash in Treasury.....

......\$2,757,689,571 43

From this statement it will be perceived that \$1,275,834,123.25 of the public debt consisted of various forms of temporary securities, \$433,169,569 of the United States notes—the excess of which over \$400,000,000 having been put into circulation in payment of temporary loans—and \$26,344,743 of fractional currency. Portions of this temporary debt were maturing daily, and all of it, inclind; \$18,415,000 of the funded debt, was to be provided for within a period of three years. The seven-thirty notes were, by law and the terms of the loan, convertible at maturity, at the will of the holder, into five-twenty bonds, or payable, like the rest of these temporary obligations, in lawful money.

It was, of course, necessary to make provision for the daily maturing debt, and also for taking up from time to time such portions of it as could be advantageously courerted into bonds or paid in currency before maturity, for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of accumulating large sums of money, and of relieving the Treasury from the danger it would be exposed to if a very considerable portion of the debt were permitted to mature, with no other means for paying it than that afforded by sales of bonds in a market too uncertain to be confidently relied upon in an emergency. In addition to the temporary lean, payment of which could be demanded on so short a notice as to make it virtually a debt payable on demand, the certificates of indebtedness, which were maturing at the rate of from fifteen to twenty millions per month; the five per cent. notes which matured in January following, and the compound interest notes, which were payable at various times within a period of three years, there were \$33,000,000 of seven-thirty notes which would become due as follows, vis.:

\$300,000,000

August 15, 1867 June 15, 1868 July 15, 1868

communations.

Of the unavailing effort that was made by the Secretary to contract the currency, with the view of appreciating it to the specie standard, he forbears to speak. His action in respect to contraction, although authorized, and for a time sustained, was subsequently disapproved (as he thinks, an wisely) by Congress. This is a question, however, that can be better determined hereafter than nov

anwisely) by Congress. This is a question, however, that can be better determined hereafter than now.

Complaint has been made that in the administration of the Treasury Department since the war there has been too much of interference with the stock and money market. This complaint, when honestly made, has been the result of a want of reflection, or of imperfect knowledge of the financial condition of the Government. The transactions of the Treasury have, from necessity, been connected with the stock and money market of New York. If the debt after the close of the war had been a funded debt, with nothing to be done in relation to it but to pay the accruing interest, or if business had been conducted on a specie basis, and conceavely been free from the constant changes to which it has been and must be subject—as long as there is any considerable difference between the legal and commercial standard of value—the Treasury could have been managed with entire independence of the stock exchange or the gold room. Such, however, was not the fact. More than one-half of the national debt, according to the foregoing exhibits, consisted of temporary obligations, which were to be paid in lawful money, or converted into bonds, and there was in dirental an large amount of irredeemable promises constantly changing in their convertible value. The Secretary, therefore, could not be indifferent to the condition of the market, nor avoid connection with it, for it was, in fact, with the market he had to deal. He would have been happy had it been otherwise. If bonds were to be sold to provide the means for paying the debts that were payable in lawful money, it was a matter of great imporance to the Treasury that the price of bonds should not be depressed by artificial processes. If he seven thirty notes were to be converted into two-twenty bonds, it was equally important that they should sustain such relations to each other, in regard to prices, that conversions would be effected. If bonds were at a discount, the notes would be prese

the state of the market has been a matter of deep selicitude to the Secretary. If he had been indifferent to it, or failed carefully to study the influences that controlled it, or had hesitated to exercise the power with which Congress had clothed him for successfully funding the temporary debt by conversions or sales, he would have been faile to his trust. The task of converting a thomsand millions of temporary obligations into a funded debt, on a market constantly subject to natural and artificial fluctuations, without depressing the prices of bonds, and without disturbing the business of the country, however it may be regarded now, when the work has been accomplished, was, while it was being performed, an exceedingly delicate one. It is but simple justice to say, that its successful accomplishment is in a great measure attributable to the judicious action of the Assistant Treasurer at New York, Mr. Van Dyck.

now, when the work has been accomplianed, was, while it was being performed, an exceedingly delicate one. It is but simple justice to esy, that its successful accompliahment is in a great measure attributable to the judicious action of the Assistant Treasurer at New York, Mr. Van Dyck.

Similar complaint has also been made of the manner in which gold and bonds have been disposed of, by what has been styled "secret sales;" and yet precisely the same course has been pursued in these sales that careful and prudent men pursue, who sell on their own account. The sales have been made when currency was needed, and prices were satisfactory. It was not considered wise or prudent to advise the dealers precisely when and to what amount sales were to be made (no sane man operating on his own account would have done this), but all sales of gold have been made in the open market, and of bonds by agents or the Assistant Treasurer in New York, in the ordinary was, with a view of obtaining the very best prices, and with the least possible disturbance of business. In the large transactions of the Treasury, agents have been indipensable, but none have been employed when the work could be done equally well by the officers of the department. Whether done by agents or officers, the Secretary has no reason to suppose that it has not been done aktilfully and honestly, as well as economically. He is now weeks ago by powerful combinations in New York, should send to the Treasury large amounts of the three per cent. certificates for redemption, no further sales of bonds are likely to be naceasary. Until, however, the receipts from internal revenues are increased, the necessities of the Government will require that the sales of gold shall be continued. These sales are now being made by advertisements for sealed bids, instead of the agencies heretofore employed. The result, so far, has not been entirely satisfactory, but a proper respect for what, according to the tone of the press, appeared to be the public sentiment, seemed to require it

HUGH McCULLOCH, Secretary of the Treasury,

Hon. Schuyler Colpax, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.

OFFICE OF THE CONFIGURED OF THE CURRENCY,
STR: In compliance with the provisions of section 61 of the national curroncy act, I have the
honor to present, through you, to the Congress of the United States, the following report:
Sluce the last annual report 12 national banks have been organized, of which five are new
associations. One was organized to take the place of an existing State bank, and six were
organized to take the place of finational banks previously organized, but now in liquidation and
winding up, making the total number organized upto October, 1685.

Table exhibiting the number of banks, with the amount of capital, bonds deposited, and circulation, in each State and Territory, September 80, 1868.

States and Territories.	Organised.	Closed or closing.		Capital paid in.	Bonds on deposit.	Circulation issued.	In actual circula- tion.
Maine	61		61	\$9,085,000 10	58,407,250	\$7,569,166	\$ 7,510,066
New Hampshire	40	••	40	4,785,000 00	4,839,000	4,328,195	4,281,695
Vermont	40	••	40	6,560,012 50	6,517,000	5,803,960	5,737,560
Massachusetts	209	3	207	80,032,000 00	64,718,400	58,561,030	57,084,640
Rhode Island	63	••	63	20,364,800 00	14,185,600	12,676,630	12,491,480
Connecticut	83	3	81	24,684,220 00	19,769,000		17,443,793
New York	314	15	299	116,544,941 00	79,442,500		68,853,726
New Jersey	55	1	54	11,583,350 00	10,678,650		9,397,685
Pennsylvania	205	ž	197	50,247,390 00	44,303,350		38,772,103
Maryland	33	••	33	12,790,902 50	10,065,750		8,904,800
Delaware	11	•••	11	1,428,185 00	1,348,200		1,198,925
Dist. of Columbia	6	3	4	1,550,000 00	1,398,000	1,278,000	1,137,700
Virginia	20	2 2	18	2,500,000 00	2,429,800	2,157,930	2,146,670
West Virginia	15		15	3,316,400 00	2,243,250	2,020,350	1,988,550
Ohio	137	4	133	22,404,700 00	20,768,800	18,667,750	18,410,426

Indiana	71	3	60	13,867,000 00	13,533,500	11,169,655	11,018,735
Illinois	23		63	13,670,600 60	11,047,950	9,777,600	9.648.150
Michigan	73	'i	43	5,210,010 00	4.357.700	3,873,956	3,836,455
Wisconsin	ñ	•	34	2,000,000 00	2,708,050	9 503 050	2.541.410
		•		2,500,500 00		2000,000	3,252,228
Iowa	48		44	4,057,000 00	3,713,750	3,365,063	
Minnesota	16	1	15	1,710,900 60	1,713,300	1,501,900	1,476,800
Kansas	5	••	5	400,000 00	383,000	354,600	341,000
Missouri	20	3	18	7,810,309 00	4,734,050	1,305,550	4,129,310
Kentucky	15		15	2,835,800 00	2,665,900	2,367,370	2,338,630
Tennessee	13	"i	13	2,025,300 00	1,492,700	1,270,220	1,204,755
Louisiaua	-	î	-5	1,800,000 00	1,398,000	1,345,000	1,131,415
	:		-	158,000 00	75,000	66,000	64,035
Mississippi		2	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •				170,000
Nebraska	•	••	•	350,000 00	235,000	170,800	170,000
Colorado	3	••	3	350,000 00	297,000	254,500	254,000
Georgia	9	1	8	1,600,000 00	1,383,500	1,235,400	1,234,000
North Carolina	6		6	653,300 00	399,500	317,600	316,000
South Carolina	3		3	665,000 00	204,000	153,000	135,008
Alabama	ž	ï	ĭ	500,000 00	370,500	353,025	304,900
Nevada	- 7	-	7	155,000 00	155,000	131,700	131,788
	•	••	•				
Oregon	Ť	••	Ţ	100,000 00	100,000	88,500	88,500
Texas	4	••	4	525,000 00	473,100	417,635	467,535
Arkansas	3	••	3	200,000 00	200,000	179,500	179,500
Utah	1	••	1	150,000 00	150,000	135,500	135,000
Montana	ī		1	100,000 00	40,000	36,000	36,000
Idaho	ĩ		ĩ	100,000 00	75,000	63,500	63,500
		••		200,000 00	10,000	30,000	
Total	1,685	56	1,639	436,189,111 00	342,619,950	309,915,168	299,806,585

Total..... 1,685 From the number of banks organized, heretofure stated to be 1,685, should be deducted \$6 leaving the number in active operation 1,638.

The banks to be excluded are the following:

NEVER COMPLETED THEIR ORGANIZATION SO AS TO COMMERCE BUSINESS.

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The First National Bank of Lansing, Michigan, No. 331.
The First National Bank of Penn Yan, New York, No. 169.
The Second National Bank of Canton, Ohio, No. 463.
The Second National Bank of Ottumwa, Iowa, No. 186.
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SUPERSEDRO BY SUBSEQUENT ORGANIZATION WITH THE SAME TITLES. The First National Bank of Norwich, Connecticut, original No. 65, present No. 458, The First National Bank of Utics, New York, original No. 120; present No. 1,305,

IN VOLUMEARY LIQUIDATION.

```
The First National Bank of Columbia, Missouri.
The First National Bank of Carondelet, Missouri.
The National Union Bankjof Rochester, New York.
The National Union Bankjof Rochester, New York.
The National Bank of the Metropolis, Washington, D. C.
The First National Bank of Leonardsville, New York.
The Farmers' National Bank of Richmond, Virginia.
The Farmers' National Bank of Richmond, Virginia.
The Farmers' National Bank of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
The City National Bank of Crawford County, Meadville, Pennsylvania.
The First National Bank of Kinkart, Indiana.
The First National Bank of New Ulm, Minnesota.
The Pirst National Bank of Misconsis, Indiana.
The Berkshire National Bank of Indianapolis, Indiana.
The Rittanning National Bank of Indianapolis, Indiana.
The National Bank of Providence, Fennsylvania.
The Pirst National Bank of Providence, Fennsylvania.
The National State Bank of Providence, Fennsylvania.
The Pirst National Bank of Gincinnal, Ohio.

Sinco Cotober 1, 1867:
The First National Bank of Kingston, New York.
The First National Bank of Skancatelea, New York.
The First National Bank of Downingtown, Pennsylvania.
The Appleton National Bank of Skancatelea, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The First National Bank of Owen Branawick, New York.
The Richonal Mechanics and Perm
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Of the banks in liquidation, the following are winding up for the purpose of consolidating with other banks:

The Fourth National Bank of Indianapolis, Indiana, with the Citisens' National Bank of Indian apolis.

The Pittston National Bank, Pittston, Pennsylvania, with the First National Bank of Pittston. The Berkshire National Bank of Adams, Massachusetts, with the First National Bank of Berkchire.

The Kittanning National Bank, Kittanning, Pennsylvania, with the First National Bank of Kittan-

ning.
The First National Bank of Providence, Pennsylvania, with the Second National Bank of Scran-

ton, Ponnsylvania.

The National Bank of Dubuque, Iowa, with the First National Bank of Dubuque.

The Ohio National Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio, with the Merchant's National Bank, of Cincinnati.

The First National Bank of Titusville, Pennsylvania, with the Second National Bank of Tituswille.

The National Exchange Bank of Richmond, Virginia, with the First National Bank of Richmond.

The Second National Bank at Watertown, New York, with the first National Bank of Watertown

The following banks in liquidation are succeeded by new organizations, which are to take their circulation as that as it is redeemed; this being the only process by which a change of location can be effected.

The First National Bank of Downington, Pennsylvania, succeeded by the First National Bank of

The First National Bank of New Brunswick New Jersey, succeeded by the Princeton National
The First National Bank of New Brunswick New Jersey, succeeded by the Princeton National Bank, Princeton, New Jersey.

The Second National Bank of Des Moines, Iowa, succeeded by the Pacific National Bank of Council

The First National Bank of Phumer, Pennsylvania, succeeded by the First National Bank of Sharon, Pennsylvania.

tatement showing the national banks in liquidation for the purpose of closing up and going out of existence, their capital bands deposited to scoure circulation, circulation delivered, circulation redesined, and circu-ation outstanding, October 1, 1881.

Name of Bank.	Capital.			Legal Tenders deposited	Circulation delivered.	Pirculation returned and destroyed.	Circulat'n outstand- ing.
First Nat. Bk. Columbia, Mo	\$100,000	1		\$90,000	\$50,000	\$6,910	\$83,090
First Nat. Bk. Carondelet, Mo	30,000	1	• • • • • • • • •	25,500	25,500	16,640	8,860
Nat. Un. Bk. Rochester, N. Y	400,000)	\$230,000		193,500		192,500
Nat. Bk. Metropolis, Wash'n D. C	200,000		202,000	******	180,000		180,000
First Nat. Bk. Leonardsville, N. Y.	50,000		50,500		45,000		45,000
Farmers' Nat. Bk. Richmond, Va.,	100,000		100,000	******	85,000		85,000
Farmers' Nat. Bk. Wankesha, Wis.	100,000	•		90,000	90,000		89,860
City Nat. Bk. Savannah, Ga	100,000		********		(5)	******	*****
Nat. Bk. Crawf'd Co., Meadville, Pa	300,000			44.444	(∗)		******
First Nat. Bk. Bikhart, Ind	100.000		100,000	******	88,150	1,000	87, 150
First Nat. Bk. New Ulm, Minn	60,000		60,000		54,000	2,000	54,000
First Nat. Bk. Kingston, N. Y			200,000		180,000		180,000
			50,000	••••••	45,000		45,000
First Nat. Bk. Bluffton, Ind				• • • • • • •			
First Nat. Bk. Skanesteles, N. Y	150,000		153,000	• • • • • •	135,000		135,000
First Nat. Bk. Jackson, Miss	100,000		45,000	• • • • • •	40,500	• • • • • •	40,500
Appleton Nat. Bk., Appleton, Wis.	50,000		50,000	• • • • • •	45,000	• • • • • •	45,000
Nat. Bk. Whitestown, N. Y	120,000		50,000	•••••	44,500	•••••	44,500
First Nat.Bk.Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio.	50,000		50,000		45,000	******	45,000
First Nat. Cedarburg, Wis	100,000		80,000	******	90,000	18,000	72,000
Commercial Nat. Bk. Cin., Ohio	560,000)	407,000		345,950		345,960
First Nat. Bk. South Worcester, N.Y.	175,000)	177,700		157,400		157,400
Not. Mech. & Farmers' Bk. Alb., N. Y.	350,000)	350,000		314,950	3,520	311,430
		No			,	-,	-,

Statement showing the national banks in liquidation for the purpose of consolidating with other banks, their capital, bonds, and circulation.

Name of Bank.	Capital.	U. S. bonds on deposit.	Circulation delivered.	Circulation returned and destroyed.	Circulat'n outstand- ing.
The Pittston N. B'k, Pittston, Pa	\$200,000		(*)		
The Berkshire N. B'k of Adams, Mass	100,000		(*)		
The Fourth N. B'k of Indianapolis, Ind.	100,000	\$94,000	\$85,700	\$1,100	\$84,600
The First N. B'k of Providence, Pa	100,000	101,550	90,000	1,000	89,000
The Kittanning N. B'k, Kittanning, Pa.	200,000		(*)		*******
The Ohio N. B'k of Cincinnati, Ohio	500,000	530,000	450,000	2,500	447,500
The N. S. B'k of Dubuque, Iowa	150,000	146,000	127,500	3,400	124,100
The N. Rx. B'k of Richmond, Va	200,000	206,300	180,000	******	180,000
The First N. B'k of Titusville, Pa	100,000	100,000	86,750	1,505	85,245
				•	00,000
The Second N. B'k, Watertown, N. Y	100,000	100,000	90,000	•••••	90,000
	No circ				

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NATIONAL BANKS IV LIQUIDATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHANG-ING THEIR LOCATION, THEIR CAPITAL, BONDS, AND CIRCULATION. 732 magg _

			(11.	Circu-
			culation	lation
Name of Bank.	U. S.	Circula-	return'd	out
v				
	DODGS OF	tion . e-	and des-	stand-
Canite	deposit.	livered	traved.	ing.
The First National Bank of Down ngtown, Pa \$:00,0				
THE PIRE MELICIES DEUR OF DOWN DELOWD, PR \$.000	ww. Ston'our			
The First National Bank of New Brunswick, N. J. 100.0)00 100 .0 00	90,000	500	89.500
The Second National Bank of Des Molues, Iowa, 10.6	000 80,100	42,500		42,500
The First National Bank of Plumer, Pa 100.0	000 10J.000	87,500		87.530

NATIONAL BANKS WEIGH HAVE FAILED TO REDEWN THEIR CIRCULATING NOTES, AND FOR WE CE RECEIVEDS HAVE BARN APPOINTED.

The First National Bank of Att ca, New York, Leonidas Doty, receiver.
The Venango National Bank of Franklin, Pennsylvania, Harvey Henderson, receiver.
The Mcr. hants' National Bank of Washington, D. C., James C. Kennedy, receiver.
The First National Bank of Medina, New York, Edwin P. Healey, receiver.
The Tennessee National Pank of Mcmphis, Tennessee, William A. H. II, receiver.
The First National Bank of Newton, Newtolville, Massachuretts, D. Wayland Jones, re-

The First National Bank of Newton, Newtolville, Massa huests, D. Wayland Jones, receiver The First National Bank of Selma, Alabama, Corneling Cadle, jr., receiver. The First National Bank of New Orleans, Louisiana, Charles Ca-e, receiver. The National Inadilla Bank, Uoadi ia. New York, Lewis Kingaley, receiver. The Farmers and Ci izers' National Bank of Stooklyn, New York, Crederick A. Platt, receiver The Croton National Bank of the city of New York, C. P. Baliey, receiver. The National Bank of Vicasburg, Missestppi, Redwin F. Bown, receiver. The First National Bank of Keoauk, Lowa, H. W. Sample, receiver. The First National Bank of Setbel, Connecticut, E. S. Tweedy, receiver. The affairs of the First National Bank of Att ca have been finally closed, and a dividend 1 std to the creditors of forty-cight per cent.

The affairs of the First National Bank of Newton has a been finally closed. The government claims were paid in full, and a dividend of forty per cent paid to the general creditors. A partual dividend has been declared to the creditors of the Parmers and Citizens' National Bank of Brooklyn, New York, of fifty five percent, and to the creditors of the Croton National Bank of the city of New York of fifty per cent upon all claims approved or adjudeated.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NATIONAL BANKS IN THE HANDS OF RECEIVERS, THEIR CAPITAL, AMOUNT OF UNITED STATES BONDS DEPOSITED TO SECURE CIRCULATION, ABOUNT OF CIR-OULATION DELIVERED, THE AMOUNT OF ORGULATION REDEXISED A THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING ON THE 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 1868.

	Legal Tenders					Circu
			on deposit			lation
		U. 8.		Circula-		out
		bonds or	n from sale	tion de-	tion re-	stand-
	Canital.	de osit	of bonds.	livered.	deemed.	ing.
The First Nat onal Bank of Attica. N.Y. The Venango National Bank of Frank-	\$50,000	8	\$44,000 00	\$44,000	\$32,750	\$11,950
lin, Pa. The Merchants' National Bk of Washing-	800,000	40,010	61,871 (0	85,000	64.030	20,970
ton.D.C	200,000	80,000	127,741 00	180,000	125,800	54,900
The First National Ba'k of Newt'n, M se	150,000	146,000		130,000	6.500	128.500
The First National Bank of Medina, V.Y. The Tempessee Nat'nal B'k of Memphis.	50,000	20,000	27,320,25	40,000	26,210	18,790
Tenn	100,000	59,000	58,979 00	90,040	59,465	80,585
The First Nalional Bank of Selma, Ala.		60,000	41,947 90		48,145	36,875
The First National Ba's of New Orleans.	100,000	•	•	-		•
The National Unndilla Bank, Unadilla,	500,000	1(0,000	104,743 00	180,000	118,585	66,415
The Farmers and Cit zens Nat. Bank of	120,00)	61,200	53,188 50	100,000	64,880	85,120
B'klyn, N. Y The Croton Nat. B'k of the city of N.	8:0,000	183,500	106,504 10	253,900	187,92)	115,980
THE CROUDE Mat. DR OF CHE CITY OF IN.	000 000	4 49 000	M3 404 00	180,000	105,111	W4 000
York, NY	200,000	142,000	73,181 90			74,899
The First National B'k of Beihel, Conn	60,000	8 ,000	• • • • • • •	26,800	2,020	24, 80
The First National B'k of Keckuk, tows The First National B'k of Vicksburg.	100,000	100,000	•••••	90,000	28,78)	61,2:10
Miss	50,C00	٥,000 د		25,500	1,963	28,585
The following statement exhibits the outstanding, October 5, 18:8:		and am	ount of not	es isaued	L, redeer	ned and
outstanding, October 5, 16:8:	~~~					
	Ones	•		****		
				Notes.		
Issued				8,896,670	88	,896,576
Redeemed			• • • • • • • • • •	254,75	4 -	251,754
						
Outstanding			•••••••	8,641,89	9 8	,641,893
	I wos			0.000 10		010 000
Iraued		· · · · · · · · · ·	• • • • • • • • • •	2,978,16		,956,820
Redeemed				78,17	6	146,353
Outstanding				2,904 98	4 5	.809,968
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	Fives					
Issued	A 1068	•		00 400 80		
Issued	• • • • • • • •	•••••	• • • • • • • • • • • •	28,106,72		,533,640
Redeemed			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	482,18	9 2	410,660
Ontstanding				92.694.596	118	122,980
						,
T 3	Tens.	•		- 042 04		
Israed				7,915,91		,159,140
Receemed				142,85	, 1	428,590
Outstanding				6 M10 FF		20E OF
On returning	• • • • • • • • •	••••		1,118,000) T(,7 35, 05

Teventice.	0.010.000	44 900 440	
Issued	9,919,899 86,853	44,886,440 787,1: 0	
Outstanding	2,182,967	48,659,840	
Issued	855,181 17,956	\$17,759,050 8:2,900	
Outstanding One Hundreds,	837,925	16,896,260	
Issued	267,35 0 15,58 3	\$26,785.000 1,558,300	
Outstanding	251,767	25,.76,700	
Issued	18,486 1,759	\$6,748,000 679,000	
Ontstanding	11,727	5,868,500	
Issued	4,746 1,846	\$4,746,000 1,846,000	
Outstanding	2,900	2,900,000	
Total of all denominations outstanding on the first Monday of Octob Add for fragments of notes outstanding, lost or destroyed, portions		\$200, 806,110	
have been redeemed		456	

(We here omit tables showing the lawful money reserves of the banks each quarter of the year, they having already appeared in the Chronicle. See page 712 of this Volume.)

STATEMENT OF CAPITAL LOAMS AND DISCOUNTS MADE BY MATICUAL BANK ING ASSOCIATIONS. 1867.

	1108	٠,	1001.				
							Ay, time
States and	Capital.			of Aggre			t of each_
Territories.	Capital.		listinct lo				in loan and
			aroosib 🕏	its. j'ns &	disc.	& di coun	
Maine	\$9,085,000	CO	87,838	\$50,708.	,849 8		
New Hampshire	4,785,000	(0	18,839	11,080,	942 2		
Vermont	6,510,012	50	80,653	19,085	570 ~	0 6980	
Massachuse ts	79,989,000	00	189,800	892,562	189 1		
Rhode Is and	20.864.800	00	27.058	67.036.	811 1	0 2,477 0	
Connecticut	24.544.220	00	83,900	105,467	506 8	1 1,268 0	
New York	116,494,941	00	545,822	1,669,141.	369 8	0 8,189 0	0 59
New Jersey	11,888,850			84,098			0 75
Pennsylvania	50,277,795		274, 182	352,188			0 71
Delaware	1,428,185		18,439	10.268.			19
Maryland	12,590,902		45,396	59,094	941 2	2 1,809 0	0 54
Dist. of Columbia	1.850,000		7.814	1.689	809 0	9 600 (1	0 64
Virginia	2.500. 00		23,667	18,757.	303 8	8 793 0	D 66
We t Virginia	2,216,400			7,810.			Ď 77
North Carolina	583,800			8,967.			0 54
Georgia	1,700,(0)		8,174	18,156.			Ď †9
Alabama	500,060		798	1.638.			
Texas	576,450			1.615.			
*rksnsas	200,000			1.795.			
Kentucky	2.885,000		7,114	11,497			
'i ennersee	2,100,000		7.810	14,116.			
Ohie	22,404,700		75,454	147, 287.			70
Inciana	19. 67.000		43,880	48,674.			74
Ill'nois	11,620,000		65,896	105,645,			
Michigan	5.007,010		85,518	88,606.			
Wiscousin	2,935,000		80,279	22,491.			63
Minnesota	1,460,000		18,810	9 906			0 66
Iowa	8.959.000		29,008	21.785.			0 74
Miseouri	7,559,300		14,669	89,660.			72
Kansas	400,000		1.650	1.471.			0 55
Nebraska	250,000		8,251	2,787,			70
Oregon	100,000		252		659 8		73
Colorado Territ'/	850,000		1,755	1.715.			
Utah Territory	150,000		220		275 8		0 90
Montana Territ'y	100,000				646 0		
Idaho Territory	100,000		78		827 1		
Louisiana	1.800,000		8,991	11,899			
	2,000,000						
Total	422,804,686	00	1,755,988	8,851,004.	865 06	3 1,909 0	71

NOTE.—The banks in Mississippi, (2.) South Carolina, (2.) and Nevada, (1.) in all five banks, not having reperted, are not included in above.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE AMOUNT AND RATE OF TAXATION (UNITED STATES AND STATE), OF THE NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS FOR THE TRAF ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1867.

OF IEE MAILURED DEPENDE	-	, ,,,		NATA DE		1001.
		Rate per	Amount of		Total am't	Rate
		cent of	taxes paid		of tax's p'd	p.c. of
	IAmount of	United	to & ass'd	Rate per		ÛS.Æ
States and	taxes paid	States		ct. of Stat		S. tax n
Ter itories.	U. Sta'es.		author's.	taxation		
Maine	\$180,119 00	.03	\$141,945 64	.015	\$821,844 64	.085
N. Hampehire	88,778 90	.019	98,178 88	.019	181,951 78	.038
Vermont	127,918 57	.019	144,168 50	.022	266,877 (7	.011
Massachus's	1,616,834 50		1.562,128 10	.03	8,178,959 60	.0402
R. Island	834.844 25	.015	195,835 83	.01	590,199 57	.025
Connecticut	484,440 85	.017	887,146 26	.016	821,586 61	.083
Now York	8,022,662 16		4.058.706 11	.0348	7.088.861 27	.06.40
New York	253.859 81	.022		.0%	476,465 59	.042
New Jersey			298,106 98			.0892
Pannsylvania	1,242 037 40	.0947	278,268 04	.0058	1,540,805 44	
Maryland	260.961 25	.0906	166,054 11	.0181	496,8 5 86	.0857
Delaware	32,620 68	.09:26	1,260 61	.0008	88,881 29	.0986
Dis. of Col'b'a	15,829 45	.0188	8,285 94	.0098	18,615 39	.0161
Virginia	48,844 81	.0193	18,925 66	.0055	62,270 47	سهين.
W. Virginia	46,966 84	.021	51,457 88	.093	98,428 72	.044
Objo	514.631 46	.0229	520,951 20	.03:8	1,085,632 66	.0461
Indiana	278,797 60	.0216	200,373 29	.0155	479,169 89	.0371
Illinois	821,406 94	.0276	281,917 00	.03	553,823 24	.0476
Michigan	111,789 96	.022	68,061 41	.0184	179,850 97	.0354
Wisconsin	76,588 95	.0261	62,011 51	.021	188,194 76	.0471
Iowa	106,849 84	.0366	89,981 27	.0221	194,630 61	.0487
Minnesota	89,182 48	.02	29,533 90	.018	6:,654 68	.683
Kaneas	10,229 23	(/25	7.801 08	.02	1H.090 81	.043
Missouri	183,141 77	614	189,247 69	.03	812,889 46	.034
Kentucky	59,816 01	.021	17,446 77	.(108	77,283 78	.027
Tennessee	52,459 82	.037	27,974 80	.014	80,484 62	.041
Louisiana	85,894 28	.0276	20,041 58	.0154	55,935 86	.043
Nebraska	10,784 67	.0429	7.014 89		17,749 06	.0709
Çolorado	9,701 71		1,615 (4	.0046	11.816 72	.0323
Georgia			6.050 46		46,895 21	.019
North Carol'a	9,048 71		5,144 81	.0083	14,198 02	
Alabama	8,742 52			.0095	12,592 01	.027
Oregon	1.693 86		-,	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	1.628 86	
Texas	6.865 86		2.149 84		9,014 70	
Arkansas	5.745 88		1,850 94		7,096 87	
Utah	1,887 4					
Montana	837 81				1,897 81	
Idaho	478 65		1,405 86		1,884 01	
	710 00	.0.41	2,700 00		-10-2 VI	
Total	9,595,607 81	234	8,818,196 92	2.082	18,888,784 28	4.883

STATEMENT SHOWING THE AMOUNTS AND KINDS OF UNITED STATES BONDS HELD BY THE TREA-URER OF THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE THE REDEMPTION OF THE CIRCULATING NOTES OF NATIONAL BANKS ON THE SOTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1868.

D seri	ptien	of sect	rities.		Amounts.
Registeredi	bondi	-Act o	f June	4, 1858	\$805,000
	**	4.		2, 1800	59,000
46	66	44		8, 1851	8,487,00
Coupon		64	<u></u>	8, 1861	1.000
ooupon.	44	**	March	i, 1861	16.0 (
Registered	44	Antes	Alaiva Inly 1	and August 5, 1861	58,611,000
Coupon	66	ACIBO	n o n'i y	5, 1861	9.00r
	a			1 1000	6,506,8%
regittereu	DONU	-act o	H F 00. 3	5, 1869	
Conbon pon	108 A	FCER OF 1	reo. z.,	1863	4,9000
Ke:14tered	Donge	I—Act o	of March	8, 1868	34,149 080
**	4.	4-	**	8, 1864, 5 per cent	88,596,150
Coupou	**	44	• 6	8, 1864, 5 "	10,000
Registered	66	**	June	10, 1864	88,045,100
- B	66	Acts	of July	1, 1862, and July 2, 1864	9,968,00
**	44	Acto	March	8, 1864, 6 per cent	8,508,50
•4	66		*	8, 1865, first series	27,218,10
	66	44	*	8, 1865, second series	10,714,10
44	•4	44	44	0 100K third anima	2,287,55
4.		44	"	8, 1865, third reries	185,000

REPORTS

The national currency act requires every association to make a report, exhibiting in detail its resources and liabilities on the first Monday of January, April, July and October, of each year. In addition to this, every association is required on the

first Tuesday of each month to make a statement, exhibiting the average amount of loans and discounts, specie and other lawful money sposits, and circulation; and banks not located in the cities named in section \$1 of the act are required also to return the amount due them available for the redemption of their circulation.

The quarterly reports coming, as they do, upon a certain epecified day, known in advance, and for which the amplest preparation may be made, can hardly be e pected to present the ac ual working condition of the banks. They are, I course, careful to exhibit the full amount of reserve required, and otherwise a full compliance with all the important provisions of the law. But itis in the large cities, especially in New York, that this plan proves most objectionable. Gold and stock sp culators. knowing that at certain time the banks will make it a p int to have a full supply of lawful money in their vaults, get up combinations for the purp se of producing a scarcity of legal-tender notes, and a stringent money market, so as to depress the market for g vernment, State, railroad, and other securities. National banks, held firmly to the requirements of the law, are seriously embarrassed by such trickery, Their necessities compel them to have the lawful money at any hazard. Besides the damage resulting from an unnecessary and forced depression of public securities, regular commercial transactions are impeded, suspended, or forced to be arried on at ruinous rates, owing to the artificial stringency thus produced. It is becoming more manifest, as one quarter succeeds another, that the evil is becoming m re and more intolerable. Honest industry, regular trade, and legitimate business of every kind, which depend upon the banks for their usual facilities, are subjected to great inconvenience, har takip, and loss, through the abuses thus practiced.

This state of things calls for a prompt and efficient remedy. This may be found in an amendment to section 34 of the act, authorizing the Comptroller of the Currency to call upon the banks for five detailed statements or reports during each year, fixing upon, some day that is past for the date of the report. In this way the condition of the banks may be ascertained at irregular intervals, without previous preparation on their part; and the precise period when the reports will be called for being unknown to the public, outside operators will be prevented from conspiring against the banks

and the honest trade of the country.

This subject is commended to the early attent on of Congress.

BANKS IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.

Section 42 of the currency act provides that any association may go into liquida-tion and be closed by a vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of its stock; that due notice of such action shall be published, ac.; and at any time after the expiration of one year from the publication of such notice, the said association may pay over to the Treasurer of the United States the amount of its outstanding notes in lawful money of the United States, and take up the bonds which it has on Jep at with the Treasurer as security for such circulating notes-leaving it optional with the bank or its representatives to take up the bonds, or not.

Under this provision a bank may go into liquidation, pay off its depositors and other creditors, do no business, have no existence as a bank of discount and deposit, and yet reap all the benefits of a circulation guarantied by the government. In some cases the ownership has been concentrated in the hands of two or three individuals, who continue to do business as private bapkers, avoid taxation, evade the requirements of the currency act, and still retain the most profitable feature of a national

To correct abuse of this kind, it is suggested that national banking ass ciations which go into voluntary liquidation be required to provide for their ontstanding circulation in I wful money, and take up their bonds within three or six months; in default of which, the Comptroller shall have power to sell their bonds at public auction in New York City, and, after paying to the Treasurer the amount of the outstanding circulation of the bank in lawful money, to pay over any excess realized from the sale of the bonds to the association or its legal representatives,

Banks that are winding up for the purpose of consolidating with other banks, or for the purpose of reorganizing at some other and more desirable points, should be ex-

cepted from the foregoing requirements.

A CENTRAL REDREMING AGENCY.

The opinion was expressed in the last annual report from this office that it was

important that a system of redemptions for national bank notes should be established as ear y as practicable, by meane of which they should be made convertible into the lawful money of the country, whether it be paper or gold, at the principal centre of trade. Without repeating the argument then made, the conviction is again expressed that only by rigil, unfailing re emptions at a central point can the bank currency

of the country be kept at a uniform par value.

A prevalent objection to this doctrine is, that it would re der the country banks tributary to New York. While there is strong reason to believe this objection would prove to be unfounded, yet it may be entirely removed by authorizing the national tanks of the country to take the whole matter into their own hands. If Congress should provide by law for the organization of a national bank in New York City, without circulation, in which every national bank should be required to become a stockholder in proportion to its surplus fund, a bank with a capital of from ten to fifteen or twenty millions could be established, which w uld become the redeeming agency of the whole country, an ithe clearing-house of all national bank notes in circulation. It would be owned, controlled, and managed by the tanks themselves for their benefit, and in their interest. It should have one department dev ted exclusively to redempti us and exchanges of currency, and another department devotes to a general bluking busin se. The latter department could be made to pay all the ex enses of the redemptions and exchanges, an I yield a revenue to the stockholdesr in adulti n, which would be so much interest on their surplus funds thus invested. Such an inetitution would prove of incalculable benefit to the banking, commercial an i industrial interests of the country. It would place the bank circulation of the country at once upon the soundest footing, and demonstrate practic lly the fact that the bunks stand ready to make their issues not only redeemable, but actually convertible at all times in the great markets of the Union.

Moreover, such an agen y, by becoming a pla e of d posit for that portion of the reserves kept in New York, would remedy the evils adverted to in my last report, growing out of the payment of interest on the balances of the country banks, and their consequent use by the New York City banks. The reserves, instead of being loined on call to speculators and brokers, as is largely done at present, would be held exactly where they would be needed, and would be applied to just the purpose for which they were intended. They would be actual reserves, and at all times available as such; thus adding to the safety and the credit of the currency of the country, and carrying

into practical operation the spirit and intent of the law on this subject.

This suggestion is earnestly commended to the consideration of Congress, as tending to reconcile the interests of all sections on the question of redemptions.

THE PERIODICAL STRINGENCY IN NEW YORK CITY.

A careful study of the back statements of New York taken separately, and the application of the facts so obtained to the a gregate statement or abstract of the whole, affords valuable and instructive information.

The abstract shows the total of loans to be \$163,634,000.

An examination of the statements in detail seews the character of the loan to be substantially as follows:

Commercial or business paper	\$90,000,000
Demand loans	68,500,101
Accommodation loans	8,500,000
Su-pended loans	1,5 0,000

Total 168,500.000

Nine sixteenths, or rather more than half the loan, is legitimate bus ness paper; the balance is upon call, or for accommodation. The amount loaned on call for commercial purp ses is not stated; but reliable information leads to the belief that it is very small. The customs and necessities of trade are of such a character as to preclude loans of this kind. The merchant, with it capital invested in trade, must know when his liabilities are to mature, in order that he may be prepared to meet them. It would be unserfe for him to use money in his business which he is liable to be called on to pay at any memory. Consequently, merchants and others in business where the profits are regular and legitimate, yielding a fair return to kill and industry, cannot afford to borrow money or call. Dealers in money, stocks and gold constitute almost the only class of business men whose transactions are of such a nature as to make call loans desirable or profitable; and it is scarcely possible to avoid the inference

that nearly one-half of the available resources of the national banks in the city of New York are used in the operations of the stock and gold exchange; that they are loaned upon the security of stocks which are bought and sold largely on speculation, and which are manipulated by cliques and and combinations, according as the bulls or

bears are, for the moment, in the ascendancy.

In addition to this direct loan of \$70,000,000, they furnish facilities by means of certified checks to the same class of operators to an amount ranging from \$110,000,000 to \$120,000,000 daily, (on the 5th of October the amount was \$1.2,800,000), and these checks are made to swell the amount of individual deposits. They are credited to depositors as money, and are circulated and treated as money by the banks and by their customers; yet, when ascertaining the amount of deposits upon which they must hold a reserve, or upon which they must pay taxes, the banks invariably deduct all such checks on hand. For instance, on the lat Monday of October they reported:

\$112 000,000 of credit for speculation.

The use of certified checks is a direct inflation to that exten; which stimulates the stock market, and keeps the price of a large class of mi-cellaneous securi ies much above their actual value, so that the market is feverish and fluctuating, and a slight stringency reduces the price. Taking advantage of an active demand for money to move the crops, west and south, shrewd operators form their combinations to depress the market by "locking up" money—withdrawing all they can control or borrow from the common fund: money becomes scarce, the rate of interest advances, and stocks decline. The legitimate demand for money continues; and, fearful of trenching on their reserve, the banks are straitened for means. They dare not call in their demand loans for that would compel their customers to sell securities on a falling market, which would make matters wosse. Habitually lending their means to the utmost limit of prudence, and their credit much beyond that limit, to brokers and speculators, they are powerless to afford relief. Their customers, by the forceof circumstances, become their masters. The banks cannot hold back or withdraw from the dilemma in which their mode of doing business has placed them. They must carry the load to save their margins. A panic, which should greatly reduce the price of securities, would occasion serious if not fatal results to the banks most extensively engaged in such operations, and would preduce a feeling of insecurity which would be very dan gerous to the entire banking interest of the courtry.

The fact that a banking interest with capital and surplus of \$100.0 0,000 can be, and has been repeated y placed at the mercy of a few shrewd, though bold and unscrupulous men, is evidence of some inherent defect in its management, and the foregoing statement may serve in a nie degree to show where the error lies:

1st. In demand or call loans to brokers and speculators, on collateral security, by which nearly one-half the active resources of the banks are used directly to foster and premote speculative operations.

2d. Certified checks or loans of credit to the same class of men, whereby stocks are inflated and immense operations are carried on daily upon ctitious capital.

3d. The payment of interest on bank balances; which, being payable on demand, must be loaned a call in order to avoid loss.

The necessity for making call leans is, in part, owing to the fact that a large fund, belonging to country banks, is held by the New York City banks, subject to the payment of interest. This fund is liable to be demanded at any time. But, bearing interest, it cannot be suffered to lie unemployed, and so must be loaned on call. It may be merely a coincidence; but on the first M nday of October, the bank deposits held by the New York City banks were \$68,529,417, and the call loans reported were \$68,500,00%. These loans, as before stated, are made to brokers, stock and gold operators, on collateral security, and constitute a large portion of the capital used in speculation. Thus, by a vicious practice, the reserve fund of the country is handed over to the tender mercies of Wall street and its purlieus.

Not content with the \$70,000,000 so absorbed, a fictitious capital of \$120,000,000 is created by means of certified checks, which, by an ingenious arrangement, after

being traded on the street, are finally traded back to the banks that issue them, without materially increasing or diminishing the cash deposits. Many of the largest and best manage national banks in New York deprecate the practice herein set forth, and look with anxie'y and alarm toward the final issue; but they are all in volved in the danger. The failure of one or more institutions, through reckless management would endanger the whole. If all bankers were wise and prudent, no law would be required to restrain them; but they are in the position of trustees—trustees for their stockholders, trustees for their depositors, and trustees for the public. If they habitually engage in practices dangerous to stockholders, dep since and the public the law may be invoked to provide a remedy. It is not becoming that institutions organized under an act of Congress for the public good, should o far pervert their corporate powers and privileges as to work detriment to the public interests. If they regard legislative interference as arbitrary and tyrannical, they may have the opti n of conforming to the requirements of law, or of withdrawing from a system to which they add no strength.

A return to specie payments would be the best remedy for speculation; as every departure from specie value is the signal and incentive for its rise and reign. As a present corrective, however, it is recommended that national banks be prohibited by law from paying interest on bank balances, and also from certifying checks to be g od which are not drawn against actually existing cosh deposits standing to the credit of

the drawer when the checks are made and presented.

N twithstanding the fact, however, that the troubles to which the banking interest is liable are caused primarily by the disregard of sound principles on the part of the banks themselves, it is never beless true that they do recur from time to time. and that they are usually the cause of wide-spread disaster-disaster reaching far beyond the immediate circle in which the trouble originated, and extending into

eve y branch of trade, and in o every sect on of the country.

When money is abundant, the temptation is very great to find employment for it as much as possible; and though the danger of too great extension is palpable, and has been demonstrated by experience, yet the majority of bankers are prone to g.) on, carrying full eail, until they find themselves in the breakers, repeating the same mistakes and suffering the same retributions which they themselves, or their pred-ceesors, have before ma 'e and suffered. The fact smust be taken as they are found to exist. Panics come; and while it would be wise to learn lessons of wiedom from experience, so as to avoid their recurrence, the fact that we are, and will probably continue to be, liable to panics as long as men make mi-takes, or act in reckless disregard of established principles, should be duly considered. Recognizing this fact, it may not be without profit to accertain the nature of the trouble that prevails in a time of financial pressure.

If banks habitually lend Il their available mean when times are easy, or when there is no extraneous demand for money, it is evident that when an extra demand arises, it can be met only by withdrawing or calling in loans previously made. For instance, during the Summer months there is but little demand for money throughout the country generally, be on the ordinary wants of regular trade, and a large surplus is accumulated in the large cities, principally in New York. The banks in New York, with their coffers full to overflowing, seek employment for their money, and loan freely as far as they can find be rowers, and at low rates. Their funds are thus absorbed, and to a considerable extent form the basis upon which a large amount of business is transacted. Abundance of money at low rates stimulates and builds up a certain kind of business, which comes to depend upon the banks for its activity and support. Meantime the grain crops of the A est, and the cotton crops of the South, are gathered, and are made rea ty or shipment to market. Both are prime necesities to the country at large. They must go forward, and money is required to buy them and to move them. The der and is paramount and must be answered; but it can be met only by withdrawing money that has bee; absorbed and become the very life blood of a business built up and supported by its use.

The banks contract their loans, and murmurs are heard of stringency. require all the money in the country to pay for them; but 'Wall street demands its share, insisting, and not without reason, that the banks encouraged its speculative operations by tendering means in abundance, and now to withdraw the accustomed

support will be ruinous to its interests. The banks, interested so argely in the operations of their customers, cannot afford to call in their loans, or to cut off supplies; their own safety is at stake, and they mut carry their customers through, or suffer with them the consequences of a dangerous convulsion, possibly of a fatal collapse.

This is substantially the history of a panic under the present order of things. I ossibly it might be prevented by a proper conservatism exercised in season; b t prudence is not the most distinguishing trait of the times. The important question, therefore, is how to relieve the public? There is not money enough in the country to meet all the demands at once. A suspicion that a financial institution is unable to respond to all demands, is alm at fatal to its stability; and when confidence is unsettled, judgment loses its sway, and unreasoning pasic follows.

THE REMEDY.

If the Treasury of the United States could hold in reserve a certain amount of legal tender notes in excess of the amount of money in regular circulation, to be advanced to banking institutions at a specified rate of interest upon the deposit of United States bonds as collateral a curity, a source of relief would be established which would effectually prevent a monetary pressure from being carried to any ruin us extent.

This proposition is not anomalous or without precedent. In time of severe pressure, the Bank of England has been authorized by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to issue it notes in excess of the limitations prescribed in its charter. I his was done in violation, or without authority, of law, upon the pledge by the Government of an act of indennity. In our government no power to make such pledges exi is; and therefore, any extraordinary provision of the character suggested must be authorized

by law.

The measure is one of relief and protection to the interests of the public at large, and therefore justifiable. If the consequences of overtrading, speculation, and otherwise reckless conduct could be confined to the parties or institutions so overtrading or speculating, they might well be left to their own resources; but immense interests are involved which are in no way responsible for the trouble. A financial panic generally extends to commercial circles, and in several instances has damaged the toade and industry of the country to such an extent that its effects have been felt for years. Any measure that would mitigate or prevent such calamities would be a measure of national importance and a proper subject for Congressional legislation.

SPECIE PAYMENTS.

The subject of specie payments naturally comes up whenever the currency question is discurred, and much ingenuity has been exercised in devising plans for an early resumption.

The principle obstacle to specie payments may be found in the stat ment of the public debt of the United States for the 1st of October, 1868, under the head of Debt bearing no int-rest," as follows:

of Government notes circulating as money, and designed to take the place of gold and silver by being made "a legal tender for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports" and interest on the bonded debt. As long as the people prefer an inferior currency—inferior because irredeemable and inconvertible except at a heavy discount—they will have it to the entire exclusion of the precious metals. Whenever the people conclude that it is more economical to conduct the business of the country on a specie basis, they can ordain specie payments by making provision through their representatives in Congress for the payment or withdrawal of the present depreciated paper currency issued and kept in circulation by the Government. And whenever the people wish to restore the credit of the nation, they can do it through their representatives in Congress, by removing the only embarrassment that stands in the way—by directing that provision shall be made for the payment of a floating ndebtedness amounting to \$888,000,000, consisting of promises to pay that are never

paid—and ro establish the fact that the United States is a solvent debtor, able and willing to pay every debt as it becomes due. Specie payments and the restoration of public credit are within the reach, and depend upon the will, of the people of the United States.

FREE BANKING.

Whenever Congress shall inaugurate measures looking to the appreciation of United States n tes to a gold standard, the effect of such measures will probably be to diminish the volume of such notes in circulation. To what extent the reduction would have to be carried in order to place them permanently on a specie basis, would at present be mere matter of speculation. Doubtless a large amount might be carried, with profit to the Government and with benefit to the public.

As soon as the effect of such measures becomes apparent, by the gradual approach of legal tender notes to a par with gold, the restrictions impose d upon the issue of circulating notes by national banks may be safely removed, provided the establishment of a central redeeming agency in the city of New York, at which all national bank notes are redeemable at par, shall be required by law. Any inconvenience resulting from a reduction of legal tenders may thus be remedied, and the remedy will be in the rands of the only competent judge of the necessities of the case—the business public of the United States.

Respectfully submitted,

H. R. HULBURD, Comptroller of the Currency.

Hon. Hegh McCulloon, Secretary of the Treasury.

THE MINES OF AUSTRALIA.

The Melbource Australian says: Some interesting statistics just issued from the Mining Department show a decrease in the number of miners employed in 1867, as compared with 1866, and an increase in their average earnings. Indeed it is satisfactory to observe that these have been steadily on the rise for the last Fix years; while we must not lose sight of the fact that the yield of gold does not represent the who e of the mine s' earnings; inasmuch as these are supplemented by the tens of thousands of p unds expended in unsuccessful ventures by capitalists in Melbourne and elsewhere. The mean number of miners employed in 1867 was 65,857, of whom about three-fourths were engaged in alluval operations. Their average earnings per man were £67 10s. 7\dagged, and those of the quartz miners £158 11s. 8dad. per head per annum. The machinery two millions sterling; the estimated value of all claims, £7,461,212; the length of water races, 2,300 miles; and the quantity of gold exported during the past year was 1,433,687 ounces, of which 560,527 ounces were obtained from quartz veins, and 873,160 ounces from alluvial workings. We subjoin an estimate of the value of the metals and minerals raised in the colony from the first discovery of the gold field to the 31st December, 1867:

Gold, 88,910,982% ounces Bilver, 12,591 oz , at 5s. 6d, per os	£185,643,811
Tin	10 .04c
Copper	80.496
Coal, 1,958 tons, at £1 10 per ton	205
Kaolin, 1,767 tons, at £4 per ton	7.028
Slates	FOR
Meg. esite, 6½ tons, at £3 per ton Diamonds, about 80 carats, at an average of, say, £1 per carat. Sapphires, numbers cannot be estimated, say.	80 150
nahhumasi mamasin asamas na asamasagi gal	100

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

Derangement of Monetary affairs—Statement of the New York Banks—Rates of Loans and Discounts—The Stock Market—Bonds sold at the New York Stock Exchange Board—Prices of Government Securities at New York—Course of Consols and American Securities at London—Railway and Miscellaneous Securities at New York—General Movement of Coin and Bullion at New York—Course of Gold at New York—Course of Foreign Exchange at New York.

November has been remarkable chiefly for derangements in monetary affairs, produced by the operations of speculative combinations in Erie stock. Extraordinary issues of shares have been made by the managers of that Company, and the proceeds hoarded for about three weeks. It is estimated that not less than \$15,000,000 of legal tenders were in this way taken out of the banks. This sudden movement, coming immediately after the withdrawal of large amounts of money to the West, had the eff ct of reducing the legal tenders in the Clearing-House banks, in the week endi g November 7th. to \$47,100,000. This, of course, necessitated a violent contraction of loans, and compelled borrowers on stock collaterals to pay, for a time, rates of interest ranging from 7 per cent in gold to 1 per cent per day. About the middle of the month, the Brie party became large buyers of their stock; and in that way the funds for some time held out of circulation wer again returned into the banks, with the result of a marked ease in money and a fall in the rate of interest to 5027 per cent. The wide fluctuations in banking movements will be apparent from the following compar son of items on November 7th and 21st:

•	NOV. 7,	NOV. EL.
Loans and discounts	\$256,600,000	\$251,000,000
Specie	16,400,000	17,800,000
Circulation	84,800,000	84,100,000
Deposits	175,500,000	184,100,000
Legal tenders	47,100,000	68,500, 00

The extreme scarcity of money materially interfered with discounting oper ations, and caused much inconvenience to merchant; but, within the last two weeks, the accumulation of paper has been worked off and rates have declined 2@3 per cent, the rate for prime merchants paper, at the close, being 7@9 per cent. The success with which the tying up of money has thus been carried on has produced a strong impression of the evils arising from the lack of elasticity in our currency, which will probably find expression in an appeal to Congress for the adoption of measures promotive of a more effective redemption of bank circulation. The Sub-Treasury found it necessary at to reduce one period of the month, its currency balance to abo t \$8,500,000 in redeeming 3 per cent Certificates sent in by the banks to procure legal tenders; and, as a means of staying the panicky feeling, the Secretary of the Treasury announced that, during the continuance of the pressure, rather than sell bonds or gold to supply himself with currency, he would, if necessary, reissue legal tender notes which had been redeemed but not cancelled. Fortunately, the necessity for this extreme resort did not occur; and, since the return of ease, the Treasury has again sold gold to the amount of about \$1,000,000.

The following comparison shows the totals of the statements of the New York banks at the close of each week in October and at the close of October 1867:

	Nov. 7.	Nov. 14.	Nov. 21.	Nov. 28.	Nov. 30, '67.
Loans and discounts	\$25 6,612,191	\$249,119,539	\$251, 091,068	\$254,886,057	£247,815,509
Specie	16.446,741	16,155 008	17,833,153	15,786,277	16,572,890
Circulation		84,249,564	84,195,063	81,284,568	84,080,792
Deposits	175.556,708	175 .150,589	184,110,340	187,418,885	175,686,288
Legal Tenders	47,167,207	51,466,693	58,599,914	62,440,206	51.038.182

Tre following are the rates of Loans and Discounts for the month of October:

RATES OF LOANS AND DISCOUNTS.

•	Nov. 6.	Nov. 18.	Nov. 20.	Nov 27.
Oall loans			5 @ 7	5 @ 7
Loans on Bonds and Mortgage	ž.	날	-@7	-ĕ 7
A 1, endorsed bills, 2 mos	Ē	ular	8 (2010	7 તે 8
Good endorsed bills, 3 & 4 mos	90	9	9 @≀2	8 @ 10
" single names	_5	Ĺ	10 @12	9 @11
Lower grades	-1	_	12 @15	12 @:5

The stock market during the first half of the month was excited and panicky, in sympathy with the condition of the money market and the ecceptric movements in Erie shares. A very sharp "corner" in Erie was devel ped, under which the price advanced to 54. During this process it is supposed the Erie combination succeeded in placing a large amount of stock upon the street. The subsequent litigation caused the stock to be wholly neglected, and the price declined to 35½, closing at 40. The pressure in money caused the failure of a large operator in the Milwaukee and St. Paul's stocks, with the result of a break in the common shares from 97½ to 61. New York Central declined from 129½ to 115, and Hudson River from 138 to 120. All other stocks also declined very heavily; but upon the return of the "tied up" currency into circulation there was a rapid upward movement in prices, and at the close of the nonth the morth, have been as follows:

Railroad "			1868. 2,345 1,539,212	Increase. 534,696	Dec 87 6
Mining " Improv'nt"	***************************************	13,600 17,120	11.6.9 28,750 11,200	7,863 15,1,0	5,990
Telegraph " Steamship" Expr'ss&c"	****	79,514 117,719 121,672	26,151 48,926 45,274	••••	t 3,363 68,798 76,293
Total—N	ovember nce January 1	1,359,168 19,510,315	1,718,627 18,619,672	854,459	890,648

United States bonds have fluctuated very widely, in sympathy with the derangements in the money market, and with the efforts of combinations to depress prices. Farly in the month Five-Twenties of 1862 fell to 1664, but sub-equently recovered to 1134; this extreme rise, however, was due part ally to speculation, and the price stood at the close at 1114. Sixty-Seven fell to 1084, but recovered to 1114, and closed at 1114. Excepting Si ty Twos, the range of fluctuations has been 24@3 per cent. The month c os d with a healthy demand from investors, and with a generally st ong feeling am ng dealers, based upon the understanding that measures will be early introduced into Congress with a view to closing up all outstanding gold-bearing loans, and declaring the principal of all United States bonds payable in coin. We see, however, little prob-

ability of this latter measure passing the lower House. The amount of transactions at the board for the month has been \$29,600,000 against \$15,800,000 for the same period of 1867. The transactions in bonds registe ed at the Stock Exchange compare as follows:

BONDS SOLD AT THE	N. Y. STOCK	EXCHANGE	BOARD.	
Classes.	1867.	1848.	Inc.	Dec.
U. S. bonds	\$10,896,500	823,065,900	\$12,669,400	\$
U. S. notes				1,208,150
St'e & city b'ds	8,484,500	5,416,000		•••••
Company b'ds	827,500	1,181,700	854,900	••••
		•	•	
Total—November				• • • • • • •
" since Jan. 1	193.891.380	995,184,690	81 793 810	

The daily closing prices of the principal Government recurities at the New York Stock Exchange Board in the month of November, as represented by the latest sale officially reported, are shown in the following statement:

PRICES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AT NEW YORK.											
Day of	-6's, 18	81.~~		-6's. (5-	20 vrs.) Coup	on —	5'	5.10-4·		
	Coup.		1862.				1867. 18				
3	115%		10934	108	107%	••••	110%	110%	106		
3	114		109 K	107%	107%	1104	110%	110%	106		
4	115		103%	106%	106%	1091	109%	1101	105%		
5	113%		106%	106	105%	11836	108%	10)	104		
ß	11236	113	107%	108%	1061	108%	108	108%			
7	112%	11234	107%	1063	1063	1093	108%	109%	104%		
9	114 X	112%	107	1073	107%	1103	110	110%	1043		
10	1183	119%	108 %	106%	107	109%	109 %	110%	105%		
11	118%	112%	108	106%	107	109 💥	109%	110%	105		
12		118	108%	106%	106%	109%	109%	110€	105		
18			1083	1061	106%	109%	1093	109¥			
14	118%	11234	10834	1063	106%	1.9%	109%	110	104%		
16	114	118	109%	107%	107%	110%	110%	110%	1051		
17	1141		109%	1063	107%	1093	110	1111	105		
18	11436	1181	110	107%	1073	110	110%	1101	105		
19	11434	118%	109%	1073		109%	110%	110%	105		
90	114	111%	110%	1073	107%	110%	110%	110%	105 ¥		
21	114%	1141	1111	107%	108	110%	110%		105%		
23	115	115	1191	107%	108%	110%	110%	111	105%		
24	115%	115	113%	108	108%	110%	111%		106%		
25	115%		113%	108	1083	110%	110%		1083		
26				(Thank	sgivin)				
¥7	115%	1143	119%	107%	103	110%	110%		106%		
28,	115		1113	1073	107%	110%	110%	110%	166		
3)		114%	111%		107%	110%	110%				
First	115%	119	109%	108	107%	110%	110%	110%	106		
Lowest	11234	112	106%	106	105%	108%	108%	108%	104		
Highest	115%	115	118,4	103¥	108%	110%	111%	110%	106%		
Range	8	. 8	6%	214	2%	276	23%	376	234		
Last	115	114%	111%	107%	107%	110%	110%	110%	106		

The prices of bonds at London and Frankfort have remained remarkably steady through the wide fluctuations in the home market, as will appear from the following daily quotations:

COURSI	OF C	ON 801	S ANI	D AME	RICAN SECURITIES AT LOS	TDON.			
Date.	for	Am. U. S. 5-20s	Ill.C.	Erie	Date.	for	Am. U.S. 5-20s	Ill.C.	Erie
Monday 2 Ta'sday 3 Wednesday 4 Thursday 5 Friday 6 Saturday 7 Monday 9 Thesday 10 Thesday	94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94%	74% 74% 74 78% 78% 74%	9714 9714 9714 97	27% 28 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 26%	Saturday 21 Monday 23 Tuesday 24 Wednesday 25 Thursday 26 Friday 27 Saturday 28 Monday 30	94½ 94½ 94½ 94½ 94½	74% 74% 75 74% 74% 74%	96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96	29% 28% 29 26% 27 27 27 27
Wedney 11 Thurs 12 Friday 13 Saturday 15 Monday 16	94% 94% 94% 94% 94%	7434 7134 7434 7334	9634 96 96 9534	25% 28% 26 30%	Range	9434	136	97¼ 1½	23% 32% 9
Tuesday	94 943	74%	96 98	30 30 30 30 303	Low ST.	4%	75	103	28% 50% 26% 27%

The closing prices of Five-Twenties at Frankfort in each week ending with Thursday, were as follows:

Nov. 5. N.v. 2. Nov. 19. Nov. 76. Month. 79%@79% 70% 79 19% 78%@79%

The following table will-how the opening, highest, lowest and closing prices of all the railway and miscellaneous securities quoted at the New York Stock Exchange during the months of October and November, 1868:

•		Orto	ber			- Nove	miner —	
	Open			Clos.	Open.	High.	Low	Clos
Railroad Stocke-	Opuu.	m.gu.	22 · W.	0100.	Open.	n 18 cm	₩.	CIOS.
	. 49%	45	40	40	41	41	40	40
do do pref	. 707		-		60	63	60	63
Boston, Hartford & Erie	23	2 1	23	2734	27%	27%	27%	27%
Chicago & Alton	150	155%	150	151%	151	:81	184	147
Onicago es Anon	159	156	152	156	150	150	135	147
do do pref Chicago, Burl. & Quincy do & Gt. Eastern	170	171	168		170	170	169	170
CHICARO, Dull. of Sulfactions	. 40¥	40%	40	170	7 10	110		
do do de Manuella	- 202	97 💥		4034	****	1000	73	• • • •
do & Northwest'n	. 88% . 88	001	88%	95	90%	90%		86 87*/
do do pref		98%	88	92%	91	9134	77X	87%
do & Rock Island	. 103%	1093	101	1:6%	104%	109	101	1083
Cleve., Col., Cin. & Ind do & Pittsburg	. 79	80	75	77	78	78	75	7636
do & Pittsourg	. 84X	91%	84%	88%	87	89%	81%	68%
do & Toledo	. 101 X	106%	1011	108	109	108	95	100%
Del., Lack & Western	. 121%	189	1217	139	180	180	126	129)
Dabuque & Bioux city	. 95	101	95	10)	••••	••••	••••	• ••
do do biei	. 95	95	96	95	40			40
Erie	. 47	19%	88%	41%		54	85)/s	
do pref	. 70	71	66	65	65	65		60
Hannibal & St. Joseph	. 89	00:	87	89	90	90	90	90
do do pref		89%			.99	11236	.86	9216
Hudson River	. 189	189	184%	187 %	187%	139	120	181
do do scrip	• ::::.	:.::.	:::	::::	90	.90	90	90
Illinois Central	. 147%	147%	148	145	144	144	141	148%
Ind. & Cin innati	. 50 . 96	50	50	50	•::•	•::•	****	::••
Joliet & hicago		96	96	96	95	95	86	15
Long Island	- 45	45	46	45	*****	****	•::-	-::
Lake Shore	. 99	102%	981	100€	99%	100	96	100
Lake Shore Mar. & Cincin., 1st pref. do 2d pref. Michigan Central 60 S. & N. Ind.	. 25%	25%	88%	283€	25	25	25	25
do 2d pret	9	10	9	10	::::	::::	:.:•	.::::
Michigan Central	. 119	119	1183	119	116	118	111	11736
GO B. & N. Inc	. 88 %	91	88%	87	85	91	80	81136
All. & Pr. du Ch'il. 181 pl		::::	•::-		105	105	105	105
Milwaukee & St. Paul	. 95⅓	111	93	1023	95	975	61	70 %
do _ do pref	. 98	119	93	1023	96⅓	98%	76	89₩
Morris & Essex	. 65%	66	65%	.66		::::	•••	:
New Jersey	. 134	184	1201	121	184	184	181%	183
do Central	. 123X	182%	119	1901	190%	121	116	116
New York Central	. 126%	180%	128%	128%	1251	1497	1:5	129%
do & N. Haven	. 141%	142	141%	143	148	148	140	140
Norwich & Worcester	• •:::.	*:::.	*:::.	*****	80	90	9)	90
Unio & Mississippi	. 39%	8236	28%	8.%	×0%	81 🗶	28⅓	81%
do do pref		79	78	79	79	79	79	79
Panama Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica	. 845	845	330)	8.0	830	890	880	880
Pittsb., Ft. W. & Chica	. 108%	117%	106%	1141	115%	1131	105%	11!%
Reading	. 98%	100%	98%	94%	973	99%	93	9934
Rome & Watertown	• • • • • •	• • • •	• • • •	• • •	114	1:4	114	114
Stonington		•	****	•::-	85	85	85	85
Toledo, Wab. & Western.	. 59	67	5834	64	6136	63	54	58 %
do do do piet	. 76	78	78%	74	731	731€	70	71
Miscellaneous-			~~					4014
Cumberland Coal	. 83	86	. 88	. 85	85	41	.84	40%
Del. & Hild. Canal Coal	. 128%	1803	128	199%	18)	1837	197	18234
Pennsylvania Coal Spring Mountain Coal Pacific Mail	. XIO	220	210	220	220	220	220	290
pring Mountain Coal	40	40	40	40	:::	44:::	446:2	.::::
Pacine mail	. 110	180%	110	1263	124%	124%	119%	1187
Boston Water Power	1634	18%	15%	19	15)	15%	14%	15)
Canton	. 47	5134	47	481	47	5136	45)	δi
Brunswick City	. 9_	1x3	9_	1236	12	19		1!
Mariposa	0	814	151	8	614	614	191/	6
do pref	. 1334	24.4	181	23%	217	2834	183	213
Quicksilver	211	27%	213	91	22)	25	20	237
Manhattan Gas	. 330	230	280	990	2 15	2:25	235	2:35
West. Union Telegraph	. 841/4	83	84	36%	36	87 %	88,≼	87
Express-								
American	. 49	49	45%	46%	46	49	41	48
Adams		5834	491	5034	4934	50	46	50
Adams United States	49	50	47	47	48	50	44%	50
Merchant's Union	. 28%	28%	21	2134	2134	21%	15%	19%
Wells, Fargo & Co		81%	283	28%	28)	293	25	27
				-				

Gold has fluctuated between 132 and 137. This wide range of quotations has be n due rather to speculative operations attributed to the Eric combination than to any legitimate causes affecting the premium. Early in the mont, large amounts of gold were withdrawn from the market, and the "short" it terest being quite large, borrowers of coin were a mpelled to pay, for one day's use of it, from 1@1 per cent. The market has a very steady undertone, owing to anticipations among foreign houses that, within a few weeks, a considerable amount of coin will have to be exported. The ample supply of cotion bills, together with some exports of bonds, have obviated the necessity of shipping gold in connection with remittances against the coupons of foreign holders of our bonds.

The following formula will show the movement of coin and bullion during the month of November, 1867 and 1868, respectively:

GENERAL MOVEMENT OF COIN AND BULLION AT NEW YORK.

In banks, near first	513,8 5 201,600 16,969,514	1868. \$16,446,741 1,200,760 201,825 16,485,908 82,200	686,905	275 488,606
Total reported supply	\$28,646,188	\$84,866,884	\$10,520,701	\$
Exports of coln and bullion	\$1,569,100 7,804,984	\$1,181,084 7,688,888		\$388,016
Total withdrawn	\$8,874,034	\$8,819,972	\$	\$54,062
Excess of reported supply	\$ 4,972,099 16,411,726	\$25,546,902 15,786,277	\$10,574,808	\$ 625,449
Derived from unreported sources	\$1,489,627	\$9,760,625	\$8,820,998	8

The following exhibits the fluctuations of the New York gold market in the month of November, 1868:

COURSE OF GOLD AT NEW YORK.

Date.	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st.	Closing.	Date,	Openi'g	Lowest	High'st.	Closing.
Monday 2 Tuesday 3 Wednesday 4 Tharsday 5 Friday 6 Saturday 7 Monday 9	138 kg 133 kg 132 kg 132 kg 134 kg 134 kg	18814 188 18216 1832 1834 1844	138% 132% 182% 184% 184%	183 ½ 138 132 ½ 188 ½ 134 ½ 134 ½	Monday	184% (Tha 135% 184%	184% 184% nksg 185 184%	135½ iving 135¾ 1:5¾	184% 185% Day) 135% 135%
Tuesday 10 Wedne-dny 11 Thursday 12 Friday 13 Saturday 3 Monday 16 Tuesday 17 Wednesday 17 Wednesday 17 Friday 19	138% 134% 133% 134% 135% 136% 134% 134%	183% 188% 184% 185% 184% 183% 184%	134% 184% 183% 185 137 186% 185% 135	184% 188% 188% 186% 186% 186% 185% 185%	1862	140% 146% 145% 238%	137% 138% 145% 210 148 129	141% 14-% 14876	14134
Friday	134%	184%	184%	184%	S'ce January 1, 1868	1933	133	150	135 %

The following exhibits the quotations at New York for bankers 60 days

bills on the principal European markets daily in the month of November, 1868:

0	URSE OF FORE	IGN BECHAN	9 3 (60	DAYS)	AT NEW Y	ORK		
_	London. cents for	Paris. centimes	cen	ts for	Bremen. cents for	cer	mburg. ats for	Berlin. cents for
Days.	54 pence.	for dollar.		rin.	rix dater.	M.	banco.	tnaier.
2	109%@	514%@513%	41 (@41%	79%@79%	36	@36%	71%@71%
8	10 3 21093	515 51434	41 (@4136	79%@79%	86	@36%	71%@71%
4	109%@109%	515 @514%	41 (@41%	79%@79%	36	@36%	71%@71%
5	109%@109%	516%@515	41 (@411%	79%@19%	86	@3614	71%@71%
6	109 @109%	518% 0516%	41 6	@41%	79 @79%	353	4@36	71%@72
7	109 @1093	51 13 @516 %	41 6	@41%	79 @7936		@36	71%@72
9	03401304	518 % @516 ¥	41 6	@4134	79 @79%		4@36	71%@72
10	109%@109%	517%@516%	41 (204136	791(@79%	36	@36%	71%@71%
11	109% @109%	517%@516%	41 (79% @79%	86	@36%	71%@71%
19	109 4 @109%	517%@518%	41 (704 36	791(@79%	36	@31136	71%@71%
18	109公司109公	517%@516%	41 (@41%	7916791	36	@36%	71%@71%
14	100%@109%	517%@516%	41 (794@79%	36	@36%	71%@71%
16	109 @109%	517%@516%			78% @78%	36	@	71%@71%
17	10) (0109%	517%@516%	41 (78% @78%	36	@	71%@71%
18	109 @10936	517%@516%	41 (@41%	78% @78%	36	@	71%@71%
19	100%@109%	517% @516%	41 (78% @78%	36	@	71%@71%
20	109%@109%	517%@516%	41 (78% @78%	36	@	71%@71%
21	109%@103%	51736@51636	41 (78% @78%	36	Ø	71 1 @71%
23	109%@109%	517%@516%	41 (@41%	78% @78%	36	@	71%@71%
94	109%@109%	517%@516%		@41%	78% @78%	86	Ø	71%@71%
25	109%@109%			@41%	78 4 @ 78%	36	@	71%@71%
26		(Thanks						
27	109%@109%	517%@516%		@4134	78¥@78%	86	Ø	TIKOTIK
3 8		517%@51636		@4114	78%@78%	86	ā	717071%
80	109%@109%	517%@516¥	41	@41%	78×@78%	86	ā	71%@71%
Nov., 1867 Nov., 1868	109 @109% 109 @109%	518¥@518¥ 517¥@518¥		041% 041%	78¥@79¥ @79		(@86% (@86%	TINGTS TINGTS

JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE.

Returns of the New York, Philadelaphia and Boston Banks.

Below we give the returns of the Banks of the three cities since Jan. 1:

	MEW IUM	A CITE BANK	METURAS.		
Date. Losns.	Specie.	Circul tion.	Deposits.	L. Tend's.	Ag. c'earigs.
January 4 \$349,741,297	\$12,724,614	\$ 84,184,391	\$187,070,786	\$62,111,901	\$483,966,804
January 11	19,422,856	84,094,187	194,885,525	64,758,116	553,894,525
January 18 256,083,988	23,191.867	34,071,006	205,883 148	66,155,941	619,797, 369
January 25 258,892,101	25,106,800	81,0-2,762	210,093,084	67,154,161	528,508,228
February 1 266,415 618	23,955,820	44,062,521	218.330.524	65,197,158	637,449,928
February 8 270,555,856	22,823,872	81,096,834	217,844,518	55,846,959	597,942,595
February 15 271,015,970	24,192,955	84,048,296	216,759,823	68,471,762	550,521,185
February 21 267,768,648	22,518,997	84,100,023	209,095,851	69,868,980	452,421,593
February 29 267,240,678	22,091,642	84,0 6,228	208,651,578	58,553,607	705,100,784
March 7 269,156,686	20,714,238	34,153 957	207,737,080	57,017,044	619,319,598
March 14 266,516,034	19,744,70!	84,218,881	201,188,470	54,738,866	691,277,641
March 21 261,416,900	17,944,808	84,212,571	191,191,526	52,261,088	649,489,341
March 28 257,878,247	17,828,867	84,190,808	186,525,128	59,128,078	557,848,908
April 4 254,287,891	17,077,299	84,227,108	280,956,846	51,709,706	567,788,188
April 11 252,936,725	16,849,150	34,194,272	179,851,880	51,982,609	493,871,451
April 18 254,817,936	16,776,542	84,219,581	181,832,523	50,488,660	623,718,928
April 25 252,814,617	14,943,547	84,227,624	180,807,489	53,866,757	6:2,784,154
May : 257,628,672	16,166,878	84,114,848	191.206,135	57,863,590	588,717,909
May J 265,755,888	21 286,910	84,205,409	199,276,568	57,541,827	507,028,567
May 16 267,724,788	20,939,142	84,193,249	201.31 1.305	57,618,095	480,186,908
May 23 267,881,279	20,479,947	84,188,088	909,507,550	62,288,002	488,785,149
May 30 268,117,490	17,861,088	84,145,606	204,716,964	65,638,964	602,118,948
June 6 273,792,267	14,328,531	84,188,159	209,089,655	68,822,023	640,668,339
June 18 275,142,024	11,193,681	84,166,846	210,670,765	69,202,840	530,828,197
June 20 274,117,608	9,124,830	84,119,120	211,484,887	72,567,582	553,938,817
June 27 276,504, 86	7,758,800	84,048,721	214,302,207	73,853,303	516,726,075
July 8 281,945,981	11,954,730	84,032,466	221,030,806	72,125,939	595,646,698
July 11 281,147,708	19,235,348	81,068,202	244,820,141	68,531,549	591,756,895
July 18 232,912,490	20,399,081	84,004,111	228, 180, 749	71,847,545	505,462,464
July 25 290,345,255	20,804,101	88,968,878	2 26,761,661	72,235,586	497,169,897

rocci rocuman	V2 DAME.	-,	01, 1		1
Date. Loans. August 1 279,311,578 August 8 279,705,787 August 15 277,808,620 August 22 276,315,781 August 23 271,780,726 September 5 271,780,726 September 12 272,055,690 September 12 271,252,096 September 28 271,252,096 September 38 289,553,383 October 17 264,644,435 October 17 264,644,535 October 31 262,365,599 November 31 256,612,191 November 21 251,091,093 November 22 251,091,093 November 28 254,386,087		Circulation. 83,857,306 31,074,874 84,114,087 84,112,139 84,170,419 84,170,419 84,170,419 84,034,693 84,034,693 84,034,693 84,034,693 84,183,103 84,183,988 84,278,210 84,357,637 84,349,549,549,549,549,549,549,549,549,549,5	Deposits, 228, 101,867 231 716,498 228,561,867 216,488 207,564,841 207,564,841 207,564,841 207,564,841 207,564,841 207,565,824,528 207,568,834 207,565,826 208,567,847 175,556,718 175,100,589 184,110,340 187,418,885	L. Tend's. 78,688,761 74,051,518 72,9-5,461 69,787,645 67,787,378 65,9-87,778 65,9-87,778 67,772,770 68,567,576 60,210,447 60,705,198 61,590,9 61,697 61,696,967 65,711,494 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,690,9 61,401,205	Ag. clear'gs, 409, 34, 169 587, 004, 881 482, 533, 952 610, 308, 551 480, 785, 665 470, 096, 175 493, 197, 072 518, 471, 552 520, 105, 094 747, 618, 516 657, 958, 155 655, 516, 454 850, 452, 642 876, 571, 604 887, 866, 571, 604 887, 866, 541
		LPHIA BANK I	ETURNS.		
	281 Tenders. 16, 782, 423 16, 187, 7945 16, 827, 428 16, 837, 995 17, 684, 184 17, 684, 184 17, 684, 184 17, 573, 149 17, 573, 149 17, 577, 577 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 17, 157, 157 18, 281, 166 18, 283 14, 493, 287 14, 381, 166 15, 283, 695 16, 177, 191, 185 16, 184, 185 16, 185, 185 16, 187, 187 17, 187 17, 187 17,	Loans, \$52,00 t, 304 \$52,598,707 \$51,018,196 \$52,598,707 \$51,018,196 \$52,592,599 \$52,604,916 \$52,532,946 \$52,532,946 \$52,459,757 \$53,450,573 \$52,209,234 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$52,556,949 \$53,857,711,754 \$53,812,556,949 \$53,565,474 \$53,812,556 \$53,562,449 \$53,451,556 \$53,562,449 \$53,451,556 \$53,562,449 \$54,6574,758 \$64,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$54,674,758 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,768 \$56,674,740	Specie. \$28,913 \$20,615 \$20,678 \$21,898 \$24,673 \$27,898 \$24,673 \$211,365 \$232,189 \$211,365 \$232,189 \$211,365 \$232,189 \$21,365 \$251,061 \$29,518 \$29,518 \$29,518 \$29,518 \$204,699 \$204,699 \$204,699 \$204,699 \$204,699 \$15,364 \$27,778 \$28,387 \$294,593 \$21,394	Circulation. \$10,689,000 10,681,752 10,689,000 10,641,752 10,645,286 10,683,927 10,683,927 10,683,484 10,633,713 10,641,899 10,643,613 10,641,897 10,640,473 10,640,473 10,653,675 10,661,276 10,653,675 10,661,276 10,653,675 10,661,276 10,653,675 10,657,640 10,675,675	Deposite \$8,000,000 at 1,131,830 at 1,157,089 37,312,540 57,932,957 37,936,653 87,010,590 36,453,444 31,526,561 42,452,550 85,536,956 32,428,350 31,278,119 32,255 671 32,017,546 36,030,063 36,000,957 38,574,457 42,910,499 43,016,663 43,243,562 44,826,629 44,824,368 45,156,630 45,777,78 46,636,777 45,085,676 44,083,150 45,279,109 44,778,566 429 44,824,368 45,155,561 44,083,150 45,279,109 44,778,566 429 44,824,368 45,156,630 45,279,109 44,778 45,985,676 44,083,150 45,279,109 44,730,388 43,955,514 44,935,555,515
October 5. October 12. October 19. Oct ber 26. November 2. November 9. November 16. November 28. November 28. November 28.	15,677,539 15,084,008 14,841,786 14,545,736 13,802,798 13,229,206 12,571,778 12,825,598 13,016,784	55,248,513 55,378,834 55,401,115 54,964,488 54,781,646 53,957,647 53,323,460 52,350,630 52,356,666	195,689 161,282 200,798 176,595 222,901 867,221 835,012 298,754 249,154	10,608,33:10,607,418 10,610,700 10,609,359 10,612,512 10,611,086 10,609,645 10,605,975 10,608,158	43,525,479 42,713,633 42,616,626 41,698,881 41,107,463 39,343,77,937 87,738,444 3:,176,990

BOSTON BANK RETURNS.

(Capital Jan. 1, 1866, \$41,900,000.)

		,,	Circulation-				
Date.	Loans.	Specie.	Tenders.	Deposits.	National.	State.	
Janu:17 8	\$ 31.960, 2 49	\$1,466,946	\$15,548,169	\$40,856,022	\$ 24,636,559	\$228,720	
January 18	97,800,289	1,976,987	15,560,965	41,496,520	24,757,965	227,958	
January 20	97,483,468	926,942	15,832,769	41,904,161	24,700,001	217.872	
January 27	97,438,435	811,196	16,849,687	43,991, 70	14,564,106	226,258	
February 8	96,895,260	777,627	16,788,229	42,891,128	24,628,103	221.00	
February 10	97,978,9 6	652,989	16,497.648	42,752,067	24.850,926	221,700	
February 17	98,218,828	605, 40	16.561 4 1	41.502,550	24,850,055	220,452	

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